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


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
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AGNOSTICISM IN AMERICAN FICTION.

THE new generation of novelists—by which is intended not those who exist merely in the present age, but those who actively belong to it—differ in at least one fundamental respect from the later representatives of the generation preceding them. Thackeray and Dickens concerned themselves not at all about a philosophy of life. With more or less complacency, more or less cynicism, they accepted the religious and social canons which had grown to be the commonplace of the first half of this century. They pictured men and women, not as affected by questions, but as affected by one another. The morality and immorality of their personages were of the old familiar Church-of-England sort; there was no speculation as to whether what had been supposed to be wrong was really right, and *vice versa*. Such speculations, in various forms and degrees of energy, appear in the world periodically; but the public conscience during the last thirty or forty years had been gradually making itself comfortable after the disturbances consequent upon the French Revolution; the theoretical rights of man had been settled for the moment; and interest was directed no longer to the assertion and support of these rights, but to the social condition and character which were their outcome. Good people were those who climbed through reverses and sorrows towards the conventional heaven; bad people were those who, in spite of worldly and temporary successes and triumphs, gravitated towards the conventional hell. Novels designed on this basis in so far filled the bill, as the phrase is: their greater or less excellence depended solely on the veracity with which the aspect, the temperament, and the conduct of the *dramatis personæ* were reported, and upon the

amount of ingenuity wherewith the web of events and circumstances was woven, and the conclusion reached. Nothing more was expected, and, in general, little or nothing more was attempted. Little more, certainly, will be found in the writings of Thackeray or of Balzac, who, it is commonly admitted, approach nearest to perfection of any novelists of their time. There was nothing genuine or commanding in the metaphysical diletteism of Bulwer; the speculations of Georges Sand are confined within a limited circle, and are the least permanently interesting feature of her writings; and the same might in some measure be affirmed of George Eliot, whose gloomy wisdom finally confesses its inability to do more than advise us rather to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of. As to Nathaniel Hawthorne, he cannot properly be instanced in this connection; for he analyzed chiefly those parts of human nature which remain substantially unaltered in the face of whatever changes of opinion, civilization, and religion. The truth that he brings to light is not the sensational fact of a fashion or a period, but a verity of the human heart, which may foretell, but can never be affected by, anything which that heart may conceive. In other words, Hawthorne belonged neither to this nor to any other generation of writers further than that his productions may be used as a test of the inner veracity of all the rest.

But of late years a new order of things has been coming into vogue, and the new novelists have been among the first to reflect it; and of these the Americans have shown themselves among the most susceptible. Science, or the investigation of the phenomena of existence (in opposition to philosophy, the investigation of the phenomena of being), has proved nature to be so orderly and self-sufficient, and inquiry as to the origin of the primordial atom so unproductive and quixotic, as to make it convenient and indeed reasonable to accept nature as a self-existing fact, and to let all the rest—if rest there be—go. From this point of view, God and a future life retire into the background; not as finally disproved,—because denial, like affirmation, must, in order to be final, be logically supported; and spirit is, if not illogical, at any rate outside the domain of logic,—but as being a hopelessly vague and untrustworthy hypothesis. The

Bible is a human book; Christ was a gentleman, related to the Buddha and Plato families; Joseph was an ill-used man; death, so far as we have any reason to believe, is annihilation of personal existence; life is—the predicament of the body previous to death; morality is the enlightened selfishness of the greatest number; civilization is the compromises men make with one another in order to get the most they can out of the world; wisdom is acknowledgment of these propositions; folly is to hanker after what may lie beyond the sphere of sense. The supporter of these doctrines by no means permits himself to be regarded as a rampant and dogmatic atheist; he is simply the modest and humble doubter of what he cannot prove. He even recognizes the persistence of the religious instinct in man, and caters to it by a new religion suited to the times—the Religion of Humanity. Thus he is secure at all points: for if the religion of the Bible turn out to be true, his disappointment will be an agreeable one; and if it turns out false, he will not be disappointed at all. He is an agnostic—a person bound to be complacent whatever happens. He may indulge a gentle regret, a musing sadness, a smiling pensiveness; but he will never refuse a comfortable dinner, and always wear something soft next his skin, nor can he altogether avoid the consciousness of his intellectual superiority.

Agnosticism, which reaches forward into nihilism on one side and extends back into liberal Christianity on the other, marks, at all events, a definite turning-point from what has been to what is to come. The human mind, in the course of its long journey, is passing through a dark place, and is (as it were) whistling to keep up its courage. It is a period of doubt: what it will result in remains to be seen; but analogy leads us to infer that this doubt, like all others, will be succeeded by a comparatively definite belief in something—no matter what. It is a transient state—the interval between one creed and another. The agnostic no longer holds to what is behind him, nor knows what lies before, so he contents himself with feeling the ground beneath his feet. That at least, tho the heavens fall, is likely to remain; meanwhile, let the heavens take care of themselves. It may be the part of valor to champion Divine revelation, but the better part of valor is discretion, and if Divine revela-

tion prove true, discretion will be none the worse off. On the other hand, to champion a myth is to make one's self ridiculous, and of being ridiculous the agnostic has a consuming fear. From the superhuman disinterestedness of the theory of the Religion of Humanity, before which angels might quail, he flinches not, but when it comes to the risk of being laughed at by certain sagacious persons, he confesses that bravery has its limits. He dares do all that may become an agnostic;—who dares do more is none.

But however open to criticism this phase of thought may be, it is a genuine phase, and the proof is the alarm and the shifts that it has brought about in the opposite camp. "Established" religion finds the foundation of her establishment undermined, and, like the lady in Hamlet's play, she doth protest too much. In another place, all manner of odd superstitions and quasi-miracles are cropping up and gaining credence, as if, since the immortality of the soul cannot be proved by logic, it should be smuggled into belief by fraud and violence—that is, by the testimony of the bodily senses themselves. Taking a comprehensive view of the whole field, therefore, it seems to be divided between discreet and supercilious skepticism on one side, and on the other the clamorous jugglery of charlatanism. The case is not really so bad as that: nihilists are not discreet, and even the Bishop of Rome is not necessarily a charlatan. Nevertheless, the outlook may fairly be described as confused and the issue uncertain. And—to come without further preface to the subject of this paper—it is with this material that the modern novelist, so far as he is a modern and not a future novelist, or a novelist *temporis acti*, has to work. Unless a man have the gift to forecast the years, or at least to catch the first ray of the coming light, he can hardly do better than attend to what is under his nose. He may hesitate to identify himself with agnosticism, but he can scarcely avoid discussing it, either in itself or in its effects. He must entertain its problems; and the personages of his story, if they do not directly advocate or oppose agnostic views, must show in their lives either confirmation or disproof of agnostic principles. It is impossible, save at the cost of affectation or of ignorance, to escape from the spirit of the age. It is in the air we breathe,

and, whether we are fully conscious thereof or not, our lives and thoughts must needs be tintured by it.

Now, art is creative; but Mephistopheles, the spirit that denies, is destructive. A negative attitude of mind is not favorable for the production of works of art. The best periods of art have also been periods of spiritual or philosophical convictions. The more a man doubts, the more he disintegrates and the less he constructs. He has in him no central initial certainty round which all other matters of knowledge or investigation may group themselves in symmetrical relation. He may analyze to his heart's content, but must be wary of organizing. If creation is not of God, if nature is not the expression of the contact between an infinite and a finite being, then the universe and everything in it are accidents, which might have been otherwise or might have not been at all; there is no design in them nor purpose, no divine and eternal significance. This being conceded, what meaning would there be in designing works of art? If art has not its prototype in creation, if all that we see and do is chance, uninspired by a controlling and forming intelligence behind or within it, then to construct a work of art would be to make something arbitrary and grotesque, something unreal and fugitive, something out of accord with the general sense (or nonsense) of things, something with no further basis or warrant than is supplied by the maker's idle and irresponsible fancy. But since no man cares to expend the trained energies of his mind upon the manufacture of toys, it will come to pass (upon the accidental hypothesis of creation) that artists will become shy of justifying their own title. They will adopt the scientific method of merely collecting and describing phenomena; but the phenomena will no longer be arranged as parts or developments of a central controlling idea, because such an arrangement would no longer seem to be founded on the truth: the gratification which it gives to the mind would be deemed illusory, the result of tradition and prejudice; or in other words, what is true being found no longer consistent with what we have been accustomed to call beauty, the latter would cease to be an object of desire, tho something widely alien to it might usurp its name. If beauty be devoid of independent right to be, and definable only as an

attribute of truth, then undoubtedly the cynosure to-day may be the scarecrow of to-morrow, and *vice versa*, according to our varying conception of what truth is.

And, as a matter of fact, art already shows the effects of the agnostic influence. Artists have begun to doubt whether their old conceptions of beauty be not fanciful and silly. They betray a tendency to eschew the loftier flights of the imagination, and confine themselves to what they call facts. Critics deprecate idealism as something fit only for children, and extol the courage of seeing and representing things as they are. Sculpture is either a stern student of modern trousers and coat-tails or a vapid imitator of classic prototypes. Painters try all manner of experiments, and shrink from painting beneath the surface of their canvas. Much of recent effort in the different branches of art come to us in the form of "studies," but the complete work still delays to be born. We would not so much mind having our old idols and criterions done away with were something new and better, or as good, substituted for them. But apparently nothing definite has yet been decided on. Doubt still reigns, and, once more, doubt is not creative. One of two things must presently happen. The time will come when we must stop saying that we do not know whether or not God, and all that God implies, exists, and affirm definitely and finally either that he does not exist or that he does. That settled, we shall soon see what will become of art. If there is a God, he will be understood and worshipped, not superstitiously and literally as heretofore, but in a new and enlightened spirit; and an art will arise commensurate with this new and loftier revelation. If there is no God, it is difficult to see how art can have the face to show herself any more. There is no place for her in the Religion of Humanity; to be true and living she can be nothing which it has thus far entered into the heart of man to call beautiful; and she could only serve to remind us of certain vague longings and aspirations now proved to be as false as they were vain. Art is not an orchid: it cannot grow in the air. Unless its root can be traced as deep down as Yggdrasil, it will wither and vanish, and be forgotten as it ought to be; and as for the cowslip by the river's brim, a yellow cowslip it shall be, and nothing more; and the light that never was on sea or land

shall be permanently extinguished, in the interests of common sense and economy and (what is least inviting of all to the unregenerate mind) we shall speedily get rid of the notion that we have lost anything worth preserving.

This, however, is only what may be, and our concern at present is with things as they are. It has been observed that American writers have shown themselves more susceptible of the new influences than most others, partly no doubt from a natural sensitiveness of organization, but in some measure also because there are with us no ruts and fetters of old tradition from which we must emancipate ourselves before adopting anything new. We have no past in the European sense, and so are ready for whatever the present or the future may have to suggest. Nevertheless, the novelist who, in a larger degree than any other, seems to be the literary parent of our own best men of fiction, is himself not an American, nor even an Englishman, but a Russian—Turguénieff. His series of extraordinary novels, translated into English and French, is altogether the most important fact in the literature of fiction of the last twelve years. To read his books you would scarcely imagine that their author could have had any knowledge of the work of his predecessors in the same field. Originality is a term indiscriminately applied, and generally of trifling significance, but so far as any writer may be original, Turguénieff is so. He is no less original in the general scheme and treatment of his stories than in their details. Whatever he produces has the air of being the outcome of his personal experience and observation. He even describes his characters, their aspect, features, and ruling traits, in a novel and memorable manner. He seizes on them from a new point of vantage, and uses scarcely any of the hackneyed and conventional devices for bringing his portraits before our minds; yet no writer, not even Carlyle, has been more vivid, graphic, and illuminating than he. Here are eyes that owe nothing to other eyes, but examine and record for themselves. Having once taken up a character he never loses his grasp on it: on the contrary, he masters it more and more, and only lets go of it when the last recesses of its organism have been explored. In the quality and conduct of his plots he is equally unprecedented. His scenes are

modern, and embody characteristic events and problems in the recent history of Russia. There is in their arrangement no attempt at symmetry, poetic justice, or artistic balance. Temperament and circumstances are made to rule, and against their merciless fiat no appeal is allowed. Evil does evil to the end; weakness never gathers strength; even goodness never varies from its level: it suffers, but is not corrupted; it is the goodness of instinct, not of struggle and aspiration; it happens to belong to this or that person, just as his hair happens to be black or brown. Everything in the surroundings and the action is to the last degree matter-of-fact, commonplace, inevitable; there are no picturesque coincidences, no providential interferences, no desperate victories over fate; the tale, like the world of the materialist, moves onward from a predetermined beginning to a helpless and tragic close. And yet few books have been written of deeper and more permanent fascination than these. Their grim veracity; the creative sympathy and steady dispassionateness of their portrayal of mankind: their constancy of motive, and their sombre earnestness, have been surpassed by none. This earnestness is worth dwelling upon for a moment. It bears no likeness to the dogmatism of the bigot or the fanaticism of the enthusiast. It is the concentration of a broadly-gifted masculine mind, devoting its unstinted energies to depicting certain aspects of society and civilization, which are powerfully representative of the tendencies of the day. "Here is the unvarnished fact—give heed to it!" is the unwritten motto. The author avoids betraying, either explicitly or implicitly, the tendency of his own sympathies; not because he fears to have them known, but because he holds it to be his office simply to portray, and to leave judgment thereupon where, in any case, it must ultimately rest—with the world of his readers. He tells us what is; it is for us to consider whether it also must be and shall be. Turguénieff is an artist by nature, yet his books are not works of art: they are fragments of history, differing from real life only in presenting such persons and events as are commandingly and exhaustively typical, and excluding all others. This faculty of selection is one of the highest artistic faculties, and it appears as much in the minor as in the major features of the narrative. It indicates that Turguénieff might, if he chose, produce a story as

faultlessly symmetrical as was ever framed. Why then does he not so choose? The reason can only be that he deems the truth-seeming of his narrative would thereby be impaired. "He is only telling a story," the reader will say, "and he shapes the events and persons so as to fit the plot." But is this reason reasonable? To those who believe that God has no hand in the ordering of human affairs, it undoubtedly is reasonable. To those who believe the contrary, however, it appears as if the story of no human life or complex of lives could be otherwise than a rounded and perfect work of art—provided only that the spectator takes note, not of the superficial accidents and appearances, but of the underlying Divine purpose and significance. The absence of this recognition in Turguénieff's novels is the explanation of them: holding the creed their author does, he could not have written them otherwise; and, on the other hand, had his creed been different, he very likely would not have written novels at all.

The pioneer in whatever field of thought or activity is apt to be also the most distinguished figure therein. The consciousness of being the first augments the keenness of his impressions, and a mind that can see and report in advance of others a new order of things may claim a finer organization than the ordinary. The vitality of nature animates him who has insight to discern her at first hand, whereas his followers miss the freshness of the morning, because instead of discovering they must be content to illustrate and refine. Those of our writers who betray Turguénieff's influence are possibly his superiors in finish and culture, but their faculty of convincing and presenting is less. Their interest in their own work seems less serious than his; they may entertain us more, but they do not move and magnetize so much. The persons and events of their stories are conscientiously studied, and are nothing if not natural; but they lack distinction. In an epitome of life so concise as the longest novel must needs be, to use any but types is waste of time and space. A typical character is one who combines the traits or beliefs of a certain class to which is he affiliated—who is, practically, all of them and himself besides; and when we know him there is nothing left worth knowing about the others. In Shakespeare's Hamlet and Enobarbus, in Fielding's Squire Western, in Walter

Scott's Edie Ochiltree and Meg Merrilies, in Balzac's *Père Goriot* and Madame Marneff, in Thackeray's *Colonel Newcome* and Becky Sharp, in Turguéneff's *Bazarof* and Dimitri Roudine, we meet persons who exhaust for us the groups to which they severally belong. Bazarof, the nihilist, for instance, reveals to us the motives and influences that have made nihilism, so that we feel nothing essential on that score remains to be learnt.

The ability to recognize and select types is a test of a novelist's talent and experience. It implies energy to rise above the blind walls of one's private circle of acquaintance; the power to perceive what phases of thought and existence are to be represented as well as who represents them; the sagacity to analyze the age or the moment and reproduce its dominant features. The feat is difficult, and when done by no means blows its own trumpet. On the contrary, the reader must open his eyes to be aware of it. He finds the story clear and easy of comprehension, the characters come home to him familiarly and remain distinctly in his memory, he understands something which was till now vague to him, but he is as likely to ascribe this to an exceptional lucidity in his own mental condition as to any special merit in the author. Indeed, it often happens that the author who puts out-of-the-way personages into his stories—characters that represent nothing but themselves, or possibly some eccentricity of invention on their author's part, will gain the latter a reputation for cleverness higher than his fellow's who portrays mankind in its masses as well as in its details. But the finest imagination is not that which evolves strange images, but that which explains seeming contradictions, and reveals the unity within the difference and the harmony beneath the discord.

The number of our recent novelists who have achieved anything that seems of moment is almost remarkably small. Mr. Bret Harte scarcely enters into our present category, his brilliant genius, like that of Dickens, being mainly devoted to illustrating the already familiar proposition that immoral and uncultivated persons may upon occasion display delicacy of feeling and self-abnegating virtue. He formulates a strenuous protest against phariseeism; but Turguéneff begins where Harte leaves

off. Still less need we instance Theodore Winthrop, who might have become one of our most important figures, but who at the time of his death had only attempted (in a style that lacked repose and simplicity) to animate the prosaic facts of modern life with the romance of mediæval and chivalrous times. The last new story-teller, the author of "Mr. Isaacs," seems to have undertaken a somewhat similar enterprise, and the emphatic popularity of his little books reminds us of the success of "Cecil Dreeme" and "John Brent." Side by side with him comes Mr. A. S. Hardy, whose touching and graceful story is French in its scene, in its style, in its dialogue, and in the names given to its characters; but the characters themselves and the sentiment are American. Neither these gentlemen, however, nor such agreeable writers as Mr. Boyesen, Mr. Bishop, Mr. Lathrop, and Mr. Fawcett can be called epoch-making; the iron of the new age has not fully entered into their souls, and they are not explicitly either for it or against it. The discoverer of "Uncle Remus" has, however, lately shown gifts which may, by and by raise him to an eminence among us which would astonish no one except himself; and the biographer of "The Grandissimes" has made Louisiana one of the most charming States in literature. As for the ladies who have honored our literature by their contributions, it will perhaps be well to adopt regarding them a course analogous to that which Napoleon is said to have pursued with the letters sent to him while in Italy. He left them unread until a certain time had elapsed, and then found that most of them no longer needed attention. We are thus brought face to face with the two men with whom every critic of American novelists has to reckon; who represent what is carefullest and newest in American fiction; and it remains to inquire how far their work has been moulded by the skeptical or radical spirit of which Turguénieff is the chief exemplar.

The author of "Daisy Miller" had been writing for several years before the bearings of his course could be confidently calculated. Some of his earlier tales,—as, for example, "The Madonna of the Future,"—while keeping near reality on one side, are on the other eminently fanciful and ideal. He seemed to feel the attraction of fairyland, but to lack resolution to swallow it whole; so instead of idealizing both persons and plot,

as Hawthorne had ventured to do, he tried to persuade real persons to work out an ideal destiny. But the tact, delicacy, and reticence with which these attempts were made did not blind him to the essential incongruity; either realism or idealism had to go, and step by step he dismissed the latter, until at length Turguénieff's current caught him. By this time, however, his culture had become too wide and his independent views too confirmed to admit of his yielding unconditionally to the great Russian. Especially his critical familiarity with French literature operated to broaden, if at the same time to render less trenchant, his method and expression. His characters are drawn with fastidious care, and closely follow the tones and fashions of real life. Each utterance is so exactly like what it ought to be, that the reader feels the same sort of pleased surprise as is afforded by a phonograph which repeats, with all the accidental pauses and inflections, the speech spoken into it. Yet the words come through a medium; they are not quite spontaneous; these figures have not the sad, human inevitableness of Turguénieff's people. The reason seems to be (leaving the difference between the genius of the two writers out of account) that the American, unlike the Russian, recognizes no tragic importance in the situation. To the latter, the vision of life is so ominous that his voice waxes sonorous and terrible, his eyes, made keen by foreboding, see the leading elements of the conflict, and them only; he is no idle singer of an empty day, but he speaks because speech springs out of him. To his mind the foundations of human welfare are in jeopardy, and it is full time to decide what means may avert the danger. But the American does not think any cataclysm is impending, or if any there be, nobody can help it. The subjects that best repay attention are the minor ones of civilization, culture, behavior; how to avoid certain vulgarities and follies, how to inculcate certain principles: and to illustrate these points heroic types are not needed. In other words, the situation being unheroic, so must the actors be, for, apart from the inspirations of circumstances, Napoleon no more than John Smith is recognizable as a hero.

Now, in adopting this view, a writer places himself under several manifest disadvantages. If you are to be an agnostic, it

is better (for novel-writing purposes) not to be a complacent or resigned one. Otherwise your characters will find it difficult to show what is in them. A man reveals and classifies himself in proportion to the severity of the condition or action required of him; hence the American novelist's people are in considerable straits to make themselves adequately known to us. They cannot lay bare their inmost soul over a cup of tea or a picture by Corôt; so, in order to explain themselves, they must not only submit to dissection at the author's hands, but must also devote no little time and ingenuity to dissecting themselves and one another. But dissection is one thing, and the living word rank from the heart and absolutely reeking of the human creature that uttered it—the word that Turguénieff's people are constantly uttering—is another. Moreover, in the dearth of commanding traits and stirring events, there is a continual temptation to magnify those which are petty and insignificant. Instead of a telescope to sweep the heavens, we are furnished with a microscope to detect infusoria. We want a description of a mountain; and instead of receiving an outline, naked and severe perhaps, but true and impressive, we are introduced to a tiny field on its immeasurable side, and we go botanizing and insect-hunting there. This is realism; but it is the realism of texture, not of form and relation. It encourages our glance to be near-sighted instead of comprehensive. Above all, there is a misgiving that we do not touch the writer's true quality, and that these scenes of his, so elaborately and conscientiously prepared, have cost him much thought and pains, but not one throb of the heart or throe of the spirit. The experiences that he depicts have not, one fancies, marked wrinkles on his forehead or turned his hair gray. There are two kinds of reserve—the reserve which feels that its message is too mighty for it, and the reserve which feels that it is too mighty for its message. Our new school of writers is reserved, but its reserve does not strike one as being of the former kind.

And yet Mr. James and Mr. Howells have done more than all the rest of us to make our literature respectable during the last ten years. If texture be the object, they have brought texture to a fineness never surpassed anywhere. They have discovered charm and grace in much that was only blank before.

They have detected and described points of human nature hitherto unnoticed, which, if not intrinsically important, will one day be made auxiliary to the production of pictures of broader as well as minuter veracity than have heretofore been produced. All that seems wanting thus far is a direction, an aim, a belief. Agnosticism has brought about a pause for a while, and no doubt a pause is preferable to some kinds of activity. It may enable us, when the time comes to set forward again, to do so with better equipment and more intelligent purpose. It will not do to be always at a prophetic heat of enthusiasm, sympathy, denunciation: the coolly critical mood is also useful to prune extravagance and promote a sense of responsibility. The novels of Mr. James and of Mr. Howells have taught us that men and women are creatures of infinitely complicated structure, and that even the least of these complications, if it is portrayed at all, is worth portraying truthfully. But we cannot forget, on the other hand, that honest emotion and hearty action are necessary to the wholesomeness of society, because in their absence society is afflicted with a lamentable sameness and triviality; the old primitive impulses remain, but the food on which they are compelled to feed is insipid and unsustaining; our eyes are turned inward instead of outward, and each one of us becomes himself the Rome towards which all his roads lead. Such books as these authors have written are not the Great American Novel, because they take life and humanity not in their loftier, but in their lesser manifestations. They are the side scenes and the background of a story that has yet to be written. That story will have the interest not only of the collision of private passions and efforts, but of the great ideas and principles which characterize and animate a nation. It will discriminate between what is accidental and what is permanent, between what is realistic and what is real, between what is sentimental and what is sentiment. It will show us not only what we are, but what we are to be; not only what to avoid, but what to do. It will rest neither in the tragic gloom of Turguénieff, nor in the critical composure of James, nor in the gentle deprecation of Howells, but will demonstrate that the weakness of man is the motive and condition of his strength. It will not shrink from romance, nor

from ideality, nor from artistic completeness, because it will know at what depths and heights of life these elements are truly operative. It will be American, not because its scene is laid or its characters born in the United States, but because its burden will be reaction against old tyrannies and exposure of new hypocrisies; a refutation of respectable falsehoods, and a proclamation of unsophisticated truths. Indeed, let us take heed and diligently improve our native talent, lest a day come when the Great American Novel make its appearance, but written in a foreign language, and by some author who—however purely American at heart—never set foot on the shores of the Republic.

The aim of this paper has not been to express an opinion as to the merits of our writers, but to inquire whether, in the light of the recent results of social and scientific changes, their work is likely to be complete and final in itself, or merely preparatory and experimental. That it is good of its kind no one doubts, but whether its category be that of the bricklayer or the architect remains to be proved.

JULIAN HAWTHORNE.

ON THE EDUCATION OF STATESMEN.

THE thoughts that find expression in the following pages were suggested by the experiment which some of our more prominent institutions of learning have undertaken, of providing extended courses of instruction in the Political Sciences. In two of these institutions separate faculties have been established and Schools of Political Science formally announced; in another a four years' course upon History and Political Science, corresponding in all respects, so far as grade is concerned, to other academic courses, has been prepared; while at other centres of learning such liberty of choice in the selection of studies is allowed and such rich and extended courses prepared that the same end is practically achieved.

These steps indicate the tendency of thought among those who are giving direction to the educational policy of this country. They show that boards of control admit as desirable and regard as feasible technical and extended instruction in the Political Sciences. It must therefore be of some interest, and we trust not inappropriate, to inquire respecting the basis of such a decision, and to this simple inquiry will the thought of the present article be confined. The reader then need expect no discussion in technical pedagogics; questions of organization, of courses of study, of the true harmony between this and other lines of education, and the like, are purposely set one side. Assuming rather that these questions have been wisely answered, the fundamental query still remains: Have our educators any rational basis for this present movement? Are schools for higher education in the Political Sciences, the factors of public life being what they are, destined to failure or success? Is this scheme practicable in a Republican government and

among peoples of decided democratic tendencies? Another question also lies bound up with these. Granting the possibility of success, what is the mental attitude which instructors must bring to their work, and what the spirit that must be infused into the students who come under their instruction, in order to achieve this success? The form itself of these questions, which all will admit as pertinent, implies the presence of serious difficulties. As, however, in any struggle the best armor is a knowledge of the strong points of one's opponent, so in this case there is no more pertinent preparation for aggressive work than a thorough acquaintance with the embarrassments to be encountered.

But before proceeding to a consideration of these difficulties, it may be well to ask what is meant by success. For some undertakings there are gradations in the success that may be achieved, but in this case until a certain foothold is gained there is no room for a comparative estimate. The situation must be mastered or defeat acknowledged. Success here cannot be measured by the effect of the courses pursued upon the mental growth of the students, for if mental development be all that is required, there is no reason in departing from the old and tried curriculum, the facilities for which are already provided and which is comparatively less expensive. The education here considered is technical as well as disciplinary, and, like all technical studies, is to be judged by its results outside the student. A school of engineering that does not provide better bridges and buildings is a failure; so a School of Political Science that does not make itself felt in the life of the State cannot be said to have achieved success. In the degree of influence they exert in public life, there may be gradations, but until that influence is exerted in some degree these courses of instruction will not have proved their right to be. The question for study now lies clearly before us.

The difficulty which first occurs to one at all familiar with matters of education lies in the fact that these studies lead neither to a remunerative profession nor to any recognized social standing. Being technical as well as disciplinary, and being of such a character that some maturity of mind is required for their pursuance, thus claiming in part those years usually

given to a preparation for professional life, it is quite doubtful if large numbers of young men can be induced to take them up in a thorough manner. An analysis of this difficulty, however, leads to a question of university organization, and as such lies outside our present purpose. Moreover, it has received the careful attention of those under whose control this new departure in education has been set on foot; as a result, several plans have been adopted, in principle perhaps the same yet in form quite distinct, by which it is hoped that this obstacle may be overcome. It will be therefore but a manifestation of due deference to class this difficulty as an embarrassment rather than an obstacle.

A second and much more serious difficulty is found in the unattractiveness of public life in the United States to men of high culture and broad attainments. It therefore fails to draw from private pursuits those who are the most capable of uniting in their own person high scholarship and true statesmanship. While this remains true, there is no guarantee that young men, even tho they have prepared themselves by careful study for public trusts, will care to enter public life. How, then, can one hope that an education in the Political Sciences will come to influence State policies?

This introduces a question exceedingly interesting, independently of the relation it bears to the discussion in hand. Why is it that in a Republic, among self-governing people, the best talent, the most carefully trained intellects, and the most highly developed judgments are, as a rule, to be found outside the State service?

In following out the thoughts suggested by this question, no direct reference will be made to the condition of the civil service, which necessitates the adoption of corrupt means for the maintenance of one's position as the representative of a large constituency; nor indeed to party bribery at elections, where the suffrage of large numbers of voters is openly regarded as merchandise. These are indeed evils, and must rasp the sensibilities of men of honesty, culture, and refinement. Yet evils of this sort are, in some form or other, necessary attendants upon the practical workings of all governments. Nor again does the difficulty here considered include what is termed the harshness

of public life. Stern measures, strong personal feelings, severe criticisms, and promiscuous contact with men, ever have and probably ever will make part of a public career; but these facts can never deter a strong man from entering public life. At least these are universal conditions of political activity, and must be accepted as elements in the problem to be solved.

Omitting, then, these palpable considerations, attention is drawn to another and deeper explanation of this fact. This explanation applies primarily to the condition of affairs in the United States. It may not be easily perceived when stated. Indeed, it may fail entirely of recognition, except by those who, out of the experience of their own growth, are enabled to feel the charm of personal independence and to understand, by possessing it, that culture which arises from the higher education.

A comparative study of the possible sphere of activity open to statesmen will disclose certain limitations imposed upon public leaders in this country which are not elsewhere known. These limitations are imposed by the working of parties under the constitutions of our National and State governments, as well as by the political customs into which this people have fallen. When one studies the Constitution of the United States, the first lesson learned is, that the safety of popular liberty depends upon the separation of the governmental functions. If he inquire how liberty is thus conserved, he is quickly answered, that, since it is made impossible for all the functions of government to be deposited in the hands of a single person, personal government is no longer to be feared.

While we remember that union among these States was born of a struggle against illegal usurpation of individual power, we can, as historical students, explain the importance which the statesmen of an hundred years ago attached to this safeguard against personal rule; yet this should not blind us to the evils of irresponsible administration, which is itself a result of the separation of the functions of government. It is true that at the present time there is no danger of the establishment of personal government, except it come through the Napoleonization of politics; but can one unreservedly congratulate his country upon the class of men and grade of ideas that, under impersonal irresponsible administration, come to the front? Under the

rule of irresponsibility, there is no guarantee that real power lies with those honored with the highest offices. Indeed, it not unfrequently occurs that personal or intellectual strength is a positive detriment to a candidate. Under such conditions, the men to whom politics are fascinating are either those who rejoice in the sense of power without its responsibilities, or—what is yet more to be deprecated—those who rejoice in the appearance of power with neither its reality nor its responsibility, still who for sake of the show are willing to serve as puppets to men of the former class. They who under such conditions may be induced to enter political life are, for the most part, inferior to those who come to the front under the *régime* of personal responsibility.

During what may be termed the formative period in the life of this Republic, the importance of the themes discussed served to bring some of the talent of the country to bear upon public administration, yet even then there was more often the appearance than the reality of great statesmanship. If one compare the spirit which rules in English public life with that which for the most part has controlled in this country, and then consider the difference in constitutional forms, it is believed that he will recognize the application of these remarks.

Another thought in this connection is that under irresponsible party government it becomes necessary for one who would achieve public recognition to merge his individuality into a great organization, practically secret in its deliberation and workings. The power of this organization is such that no man can, as a man of practical sense, hope for an election upon the merits of any question in opposition to its wishes. That focalizing of happy accidents, which secures to a candidate an independent election is very rare. Yet this power of party rests upon the fact that a party can promise anything and be held to the fulfilment of nothing. Its head is nowhere. The party catechism defines a perfect candidate as one who can keep his mouth shut or, if he open it, will say nothing. There is no such thing in this country as responsible leadership of party, and its absence, together with all its absence implies, goes far in explaining why the best talent of this country is not procurable for the public service. In England and France a different state

of affairs exists. In England especially does one observe public life to be attractive to the most highly trained intellects. The leadership of both the government and the opposition is a position of apparent power, of actual power, and of power joined to personal responsibility. It affrights an inferior man; it lures a powerful man. To fill either place gives full scope to the entirety of a statesman's talents, and satisfies the inherent sense of dignity which every public administrator ought to feel. The same is true of all members of the government, especially in France, where a minister may fall independently of the Cabinet of which he is a member. The same spirit permeates the ranks of the parties, and it is quite natural that, under such conditions, public life should be attractive to men of the highest order of talent and culture.

A still further explanation of the fact that the public service of the United States fails to draw the best talent, and in consequence that young men of good parts who have followed thorough courses in political science may find themselves without congenial occupation, is disclosed when we observe that the prevalent conception of the State in this country lacks entirely the element of dignity. The popular estimate of public service is low, and be this estimate correct or not, it is yet effective in rendering a political career unattractive to the highest grade of intellect. Nor indeed is it to the point to say that the character of the public servants necessitates a low appreciation of their service, for this, so far as it be true, is itself a part of the state of things to be explained. This condition of affairs may be referred to no single cause, but an influential causal antecedent may be found in the doctrine of State functions that came to the front with Jacksonian democracy. This doctrine restricted the State to negative duties: it is commonly known by the name *laissez faire*. It was adopted by the American people as the rule of their government, but such is its nature that no people can put into practice the doctrine of letting things run themselves without growing into an undignified form of State life. Wherever State powers are reduced to the narrowest possible limits, popular sentiment will as a natural consequence grade private initiative and private control above State functions, and as long as this estimate continues, one cannot hope that the best talent will

be placed at the service of the public. The best men of the country will always address themselves to those occupations where actual power resides, for true men are not caught by show.

If my meaning has been made plain it will appear that a higher political education can with difficulty flourish among a people that has adopted *laissez-faire* as the maxim of control in its public policy, for all thought among such a people is practically to effect a negation of activity. In this fact is found the philosophic explanation of the absence of any great administrative genius among statesmen since the day of Albert Gallatin. The present, however, affords some evidence that this restrictive policy is losing its power over men's minds, and as its influence recedes may we hope that education and talent and genius can be induced to enter the service of the State. Certain it is that with the comprehensive conception of government there must come greater actuality of power to the public servant and greater dignity to the State itself. In our optimism, therefore, we may at least go so far as to recognize that there is some reason in accepting the present as especially opportune for undertaking systematic political education. The tendency of both sentiment and events is such as will require greater knowledge of the technicalities of public life, a wider study of the methods of control, and a more extended development of administrative talent. This is the growing demand. It makes no difference whether this be a conscious demand on the part of the public or not; it is real, and upon it may this educational experiment find standing ground. But in addition to this, the nature of public questions is changing, and a different sort of preparation from that which heretofore has been regarded as sufficient is now required. The questions that have claimed especial attention during the century of national life past have been for the most part in connection with constitutional interpretation. It was appropriate that such discussions should be passed over to lawyers, as lying especially in their province. This being the case, it was natural also that a study of the law should be regarded as an adequate preparation for public life. Now, however, we are for the most part done with constitutional interpretation. The pressing questions of to-day deal with the direction and form of national growth in the future, and not with the form of national

organization expressed in any given instrument. For this the reading of law is not sufficient. It will give neither the knowledge nor the bent of mind necessary for taking the lead in coming discussions. The preparation now required will be found in an exhaustive comparative study of history. This alone can give that grasp over the forces in human society and that insight into the law of social development which must characterize the statesmen of the next generation. The fact that these schools of political science have recognized this truth and have made history the basis of their instruction, shows more than anything else that they are in harmony with the forces of the day.

What, then, can be said? Is public life in this country so unattractive as to quench all enthusiasm for a study of general politics? Are the petty restrictions upon a public career so annoying and the sphere of possible power so narrow that the best talent will always be devoted to other pursuits? This obstacle to the quick success of political education exists, but is not insurmountable. In the observed decay of the restrictive theory of government there is ground for hope, and in the necessity for some adequate solution to dangerous public and social problems there is material for deep scholarly enthusiasm. A consideration of these difficulties, however, points a sure lesson to those who would give instruction in the political sciences. Success for their work requires that they exalt the idea of the State. They must point out that the State is in the highest sense the expression of the life of the people, and that he who succeeds in impressing his personality upon it moulds the environment in which character is developed, for thus they show that men may worthily devote intellect and power to the public service. It also lies in their province to define the questions pressing for solution, and awaken in the minds of those with whom they come in contact the enthusiasm of great ideas born of great necessities. Such an enthusiasm is subject to no laws but those of its own making, and may overcome all adverse conditions. Perhaps, after all, the surest evidence that education in the political sciences can attain its purpose is the fact of the almost simultaneous appearance at so many centres of learning of the facilities for procuring it.

Thus far in our discussion of the expediency of political education, those facts alone have been considered which tend to deter men from a thorough preparation for public life or from entering it when prepared. There is, however, another side to this question. Not only must trained men be willing to enter public life, but the voters must be willing to have them do so.

It is an easy thing to point out the truism that a self-governing people should be educated in those branches of knowledge pertaining to government. Yet it is quite another matter to derive from this as a major premise a complete defence for Schools of Political Science. The difficulty lies in the second premise of the syllogism, which is nothing less than the totality of existing facts, including the ignorance, the prejudices, and the class interests of those upon whom the government ultimately rests. It must not be forgotten that this is a democratic country, and that popular sentiment in one's favor, no matter how created, is the only support for a public career. The one great question for political educators is: What form of instruction may be undertaken which will lead students to grasp high ideals of State life and yet not destroy their power over the community whose support they will be called upon to seek? This question must be answered before the scholarly element can be infused into public life. In what has been written upon political education, I do not remember a single endeavor to bridge over this gap. Yet this feat of engineering must be accomplished or the position of those who undertake such education will be like men who train warriors on one side of an impassable chasm while the field of battle lies upon the other.

It will be noticed that the position here assumed, as indeed throughout the discussion, is extreme. No amnesty of thought is concluded with those who concede that a study of History, Jurisprudence, and Economy may appropriately form part of a general education, while denying that they who have followed such courses are any better prepared to direct public policies than they who have not; on the contrary, it is held that these studies are desirable from the standpoint of a technical as well as of a general education. It is assumed that certain courses of study must have a tendency to develop the mental attitude and intellectual grasp of a statesman, and that until this training

may be utilized in public administration the schools providing it will not have attained their highest possible success.

Reduced, then, to a single phrase, the difficulty here presented is that of prejudice against scholarship in public life. An analysis of this sentiment will, it is believed, show it to be in part real and well founded, in part, however, imaginary; it will also disclose criticisms upon those who the most strenuously urge their own claims to scholarship as well as upon those who entertain the prejudices.

There are three separate classes that come naturally to mind in this connection.

In the first class are to be found those who now control public affairs, but whose control rests upon something besides public confidence inspired by personal worth. The second class is composed of those business men the success of whose undertakings depends upon special legislation in their favor. This includes by no means all engaged in industrial pursuits, yet the desire for trade-legislation among those interested is so strong, that it permeates more or less the entire profit-making community. The vast numbers which go to make up the third class are called, merely for convenience, the masses—a class which every one believes to exist, but which no one is able to define. As used here, the word is intended merely to describe those whose ordinary income arises neither from property nor from that kind of education which brings with it social position.

Of the three classes here considered, the one from whose prejudice the least instruction may be drawn in giving shape and tone to the desired political education, yet perhaps the one whose opposition is the most apparent and natural, is that of the patronage politician. So far as the men now controlling public affairs are themselves imbued with the scholarly spirit, the attempt to reënforce this element of control must meet with approval and encouragement. Such men have nothing to lose by an increased intensity in public life of the spirit which they already represent. The fact, however, with large numbers of public men is that the power which they wield and their ability to keep themselves in office rests upon the distribution of patronage and not upon any rational sentiment of the people in their favor. While this continues, it will be impossible to realize high

ideals of government, and any effort in that direction will meet with discouragement from men so situated. For, even tho a man of honest merit be by some accident elected to represent a constituency where large patronage exists, he will quickly discover that he must give up his meritoriousness or retire to private life. A poor civil service and a high grade of statesmanship cannot exist at the same time; nor can any organized effort to prepare young men for public trusts meet with encouragement from public men whose power will disappear with the birth of a pure civil service. Did any one ever inquire why the State of New York, embracing among her citizens men of the highest talent and men capable of taking rank with the greatest publicists, has now for years failed to present the nation with statesmanlike counsels? The insignificant State of Vermont, on the other hand, becomes a significant and powerful factor in the deliberations of the nation, and leaves her proud mark in legislative records. Has New York degenerated while Vermont has developed? This but states again the query, it does not answer the question. The explanation lies rather in the fact that one who represents a small State where there is little patronage has time and energy, which one who represents a large State has not, to develop and exercise in the service of the nation statesmanlike qualities. While such a condition of things lasts, while many men holding municipal, State, and National offices are exercising an authority which does not primarily rest upon a public sentiment growing out of confidence in themselves, but rather upon a distribution of patronage, it must follow that any endeavor which looks toward a change in the basis of that authority, which if successful would deprive them of their power, will arouse their suspicion, their prejudice, and their opposition. There is no rational basis of interest for such men in any effort whatever that looks toward the placing of public life upon a higher level of thought and action. Yet this ought not to be a source of discouragement. It presents an obstacle truly, but one the recognition of which brings with it a stronger purpose. Moreover, those engaged in this educational effort may look with confidence for support from all who are interested in civil-service reform, and even among public men these are by no means few in number. Of

the sympathy of educators in this reform movement there can be no question, for until a pure civil service shall have been established, they must work in vain for the full accomplishment of what they endeavored. Here again does this higher political education show itself to be in harmony with what is newest and to stand in line with the forces now coming to the front. In this there is encouragement.

The second class of prejudices against the spirit of control in public life, which the higher political education would tend to introduce, is observed when one studies the customary methods of thought among business men. A consideration of the ground upon which their prejudice rests brings to light a condition of affairs much more serious in themselves than those just passed in review, and calling for a far more delicate treatment than was regarded necessary in the case of what may be termed patronage-opposition. Its serious aspect arises from the fact that this prejudice grows directly out of personal self-interest, which in business life has come to be regarded as providing an ultimate rule of ethics; while the delicacy with which it must be handled is due to an unwarranted egoism on the part of both men of books and men of business, which renders difficult mutual appreciation and understanding.

Men of affairs appear not unfrequently to urge their claim upon nineteenth-century civilization as tho they held a first mortgage upon it. This, they say, is a business civilization rather than one of thought. We, the business men, apply the motive-power to the wheels of industry. To our activity and energy is due all subjection of natural forces, and all organization of human labor, which marks this age as one of material comforts and great possibilities. The society now formed is preëminently a business society, and on that account its management should be handed over to business men. The criterion of success and basis of judgment applicable to private affairs, they continue, should be adopted in affairs of legislation. All public questions are directly or indirectly business questions, and men out of business have no standing ground for interference.

On the other hand, men who do not look at matters of public concern from this class standpoint fail to perceive the

justice of being assigned thus to a subordinate position. They recognize the fact that the predominant thought of this century is bent on business, that the test quite generally accepted for success or failure is size of capital fund, number of laborers controlled, price of real estate, rate of profit, and the like. They fully appreciate the wonderful power of the present age, and gladly admit that to gain supremacy over natural forces indicates a higher grade of civilization than to strive, as did the Romans for example, for extended sway over peoples. But at the same time they cannot see in all this a sufficient end of living. They refuse, therefore, to be satisfied with the rate of profit arising from any given act as sufficient proof of its goodness or badness. They wish to go behind the price of real estate for a rule of judgment. They hold that there is such a thing as a self-conditioned social organism in which character is formed, and that the rational development of this organism should be the purpose of rational beings. They find in the application of nineteenth-century methods to the realization of the highest ideals of a perfect society the only proper test for public acts.

It is not intended to say that all men engaged in business are actuated by that which for a better name is here termed the business spirit, nor that all men engaged in education would find themselves in harmony with the second method of viewing public questions; but it is claimed that there do exist these two mental attitudes at variance with each other, and that those who undertake political education must, in order to have any standing ground whatever, assume the broad basis of judgment.

A closer examination of this prejudice shows that there lies in the business mind a sense of necessary incongruity between theory and practice, sufficient testimony to the fact being found in the usual manner in which the words are employed. So far as the abstract question is concerned, a student cannot recognize that there exists any natural antagonism between what is theoretical and what is practical. He must maintain that, in thought at least, there is harmony between them or abandon his claim to scholarship. A theory is merely an explanation of observed facts. It may be incorrect, it may be incomplete, in which case its attempted application will lead to failure, but to

assume to act independently of premises which theory alone can afford is irrational. All intelligent legislation, for example, must proceed upon the basis of what for the time being is believed to be the explanation of relations existing between the forces employed. The only logical position for any one who distrusts a proposed legislative enactment is to attack the theoretical or explanatory considerations upon which it rests, and not, while their truth is admitted, deny that the law will work in practice.

With such statements as these it is quite probable there will be no disagreement; that, however, does not cause the difficulty to disappear, but only indicates the heart of the matter to remain untouched, and shows that what goes under the name of antagonism between theory and practice is not at all what in reality is meant. It is between broad rules of judgment and practical maxims of particular forms of business that the essence of the difficulty lies. A man of affairs urges that none but members of his class ought to undertake legislation touching industries, because they alone know the technicalities of business. Students of society, on the other hand, hold that technical legislation of this kind is the worst of all legislation, because it must be class legislation. Class legislation is admissible only where there is a single interest at stake, and that, in a complex society, is never the case. These words practical and theoretical are meaningless in popular discussion. They are like orthodoxy and heterodoxy: a person must stand behind them to give them meaning. Every man regards that as practical, judging from the common use of the word, which makes a profit in his own business, while that is impractical—theoretical—which curtails his particular profit. The desirability of a public policy formed upon the basis of general interest, rather than one resulting from the survival of the strongest interest, is the convincing argument in favor of political education, for in this manner only can that sentiment be created by which the great possibilities of this century may be realized for all. It need not be apprehended, however, from the natural antagonism between broad policy and particular interests, that those who essay political education will fail entirely of the sympathy of the business portion of the community. This will only be necessarily the case

where the business carried on is out of harmony with the highest interests of the social body. For all undertakings growing out of normal conditions, the individual and the general interest will coincide. It rests with scholars themselves to gain the confidence of those managing such industries, and this they can do by showing such an appreciation of business activity that their judgments may be regarded as sound and their purposes attainable. Upon no other basis do they deserve confidence.

It is seldom the case that a deep-seated prejudice discloses criticism upon one of the parties concerned only, and certainly the question here in controversy presents no exception. The temptation to which students are especially liable is to forget that actual conditions temper principles, and it is because they forget this fact that they have brought upon themselves the name of Theorists. Of the various studies embraced in a political education, that of Political Economy is perhaps open to the severest censure in this regard. This science has been especially guilty of not holding strictly to verities in its processes of reasoning, and on this account it has lost much of its old-time authority. The course of legislation of late years has offered it many indignities by refusing to recognize its "principles" as authoritative. This may be interpreted as the natural result of having adopted false methods in economic study; or one may see in this "rebellion of common-sense" an indignity offered to the superior knowledge of Economists. The writer is inclined to regard this withdrawal of confidence as a deserved chastisement. The entire attitude of English Political Economy at the present time, whatever may be said for it historically, is out of harmony with usually accepted methods of study. It does not start with analysis, but with assumption, and comes to be for all practical purposes an argument against State intervention. The daily contact of business men with the results of unrestrained competition leads them to deny the rule that economic forces should be subject to no control, and to suspect the system of thought upon which it rests. This is the essence of that which is justifiable in business prejudice against the claims of economists, and discloses an error to be avoided in all branches of political education.

In the entire range of thought outside the applied sciences,

there appears to be but one study the development in which shows the normal relation between theory and practice. This study is Law. The probable explanation of the natural growth here observed is, that Law is born of contested rights. It is largely made through court decisions, and they who make it must themselves apply their own rules. For this reason the imagination, that insidious enemy of all sound thinking (as well as its necessary servant), is kept to its proper functions. Nothing is admitted into a legal system until it has been tested. Nothing is regarded as worthy continued consideration, indeed, unless there come with it adequate means for its realization. Observe, for example, the sharp line drawn by Jurisprudence between moral claims and legal rights. The two may be the same in essence but are separated in Law. A moral claim becomes a legal right when means for its enforcement are provided; and until such machinery may in the existing condition of society be introduced, it lies in the spirit of Law to refuse it recognition. Thus in confining its thought to what is practical, Law binds itself to a growing society, it becomes a developing study, it realizes always the highest which existing conditions render possible, and it excludes confusion by refusing to take cognizance of any but actual cases.

The spirit and method here disclosed ought to be adopted by all who study public questions. The atmosphere surrounding social and industrial problems would then be entirely changed. The suspicion of business men would disappear, because the ground of it would have passed away. Certain it is that from an analysis of this prejudice important lessons may be drawn for those interested in political education.

It remains yet to consider the attitude of the masses toward scholarly statesmanship in a Republic, or—what amounts to the same thing as the theme is here discussed—the possibility of inducing the majority of voters to avail themselves indirectly of the benefits of political educators. The general belief is that the masses are prejudiced against scholarship. It is quite probable that, upon a hasty judgment, this popular sentiment would be regarded as the most serious of all the difficulties to be overcome, but considered by itself as an isolated fact, a careful examination of it fails to support such a conclusion.

There are two subordinate inquiries which must be undertaken in carrying out such an examination: the one asks if the masses of the people are susceptible to the influence of great ideas and high moral principles, and are able to comprehend broad views of public questions; while the second submits the query whether or not the higher education tends to develop aristocratic sentiments. If the first of these questions be answered in the negative or the second in the affirmative, one must despair of influencing public life through a higher political education where popular government prevails.

The first query here submitted, as to the character of influences to which the great numbers of men are open, could be completely answered only by an exhaustive study of the progress of the world's thought. Manifestly such a study is here impossible. If, therefore, the reader will undertake for himself to pass in review the great movements of history, it is believed he must arrive at the conclusion that the masses of men have not been behind their leaders in sensitiveness to great truths or in willingness to undertake their realization. They have too frequently risen in their enthusiasm and action to the level of their foremost statesmen to be open to the charge of confirmed dulness. The record of the ages is a continual interpretation of the words, "Thou did'st hide these things from the wise and understanding, and did'st reveal them unto babes." The things revealed were not theories or syllogisms, but moral perceptions and guiding principles. The question here asked is old, and has appeared under many forms. It is the fundamental one as regards the rationality of self-government, and the extent to which constitutionalism is practised shows at least the present judgment of the world upon it. One might mass quotations confirming it from all grades of literature. "The ruder sort of men," said the late Mr. Bagehot, who perhaps was the keenest observer of character that England has produced in this century, "will sacrifice all they hope, all they have,—*themselves*,—for what is called an idea—for some attraction which seems to transcend reality, which aspires to elevate men by an interest higher, deeper, wider, than that of ordinary men's lives." Said a gentleman who knew thoroughly American politics, "You may talk principles on the stump, but don't try it in the Assembly."

The susceptibility of great bodies of people to ideas that take them outside themselves cannot be reasonably questioned. This, however, proves only the possibility of scholarly control in a popular government, not that it may be easily realized. The masses of men, it is true, may be moved by the same influences that move men of the widest observation and the broadest intellect, yet it does not on that account follow that the many will grant the trained men their confidence. For in addition to the fact that unscholarly dreams may serve the function of great ideas and lead to acts in themselves truly heroic, it must be admitted that the majority of men are influenced as much by the bearing of those who appeal to them as by the matter presented. Popular prejudice against scholarship, so far as it exists, finds its origin just here.

The notion is quite prevalent that education fosters aristocratic sentiments, but aristocracy of any kind is felt to be the enemy of democracy, and in consequence the principle of self-preservation impels the masses of people to look with suspicion upon an uncompromising man of culture.

To the question, Does education foster the aristocratic element in human nature? there is no answer. It may or it may not; all depends upon the spirit in which the instruction is given and received. So far as American colleges are concerned, one must, however, admit that they fail to bring the young men with whom they have to do into harmony with true democracy, which practically effects the same political results as a positive development of an aristocracy of learning. It has become quite fashionable to smile at the Declaration of Independence, because it contains some phrasing that has not stood the test of careful analysis. But such a smile indicates intellectual weakness rather than strength, since it shows that one cares more for words than for the spirit of an age or the truth of an idea so great that it moved a generation. The criticism is a supercilious philological, not a profound historical criticism. Since this shallow sentiment is found most frequently among those who are "superiorly educated," it appears but fair to conclude that the intellectual training at our colleges fails to develop within the student a true understanding of the forces of his own century. Certain it is, so far as success in political life is concerned, that if a scholar's

education has inoculated him with a sense of his personal superiority, he is but poorly equipped to influence men in a country where universal suffrage is the fact. He who does not feel within himself that spirit of humanity which is the essence of democratic sentiment, must be a very clever actor to retain a people's good-will; and the fact that so few have succeeded in this kind of theatricals is to the credit of the electors and a proof of their good sense.

If considerations such as these have any bearing upon the question under discussion, they point to the nature of those influences affecting character that should permeate all instruction in the Political Sciences. It is of even less importance that a student gain technical knowledge than that he should come to understand the permanent forces of his own time and grow into harmony with them. Thus it is the highest task of an instructor to interpret these social forces. All history of the past, all analysis of the present, should be brought to the service of this one purpose. An education under such influences would preserve to the student that healthy optimism always to be found with the main body of the people, and there is no prejudice except in favor of a man who has brought himself into this attitude, or rather who has maintained this attitude notwithstanding his education. The masses of the people are capable of feeling the inspiration of great ideas, and are willing to support men made great by representing them. They make but the one uncompromising demand that these ideas shall be carried out for them by men, the attitude of whose address and the sentiment of whose hearts are not a continuous contradiction to the grandest thought that has ever moved them, which is, that supreme law under nature lies with the people. If the people are to choose their leaders from the educated, that education must have no tendency to develop an aristocracy in feeling, for an aristocracy is the one thing which a democracy (unless so far corrupted as to find pleasure in equality of servitude) will not stand.

The general conclusion to which our study seems to have led is, that the purpose of those who have undertaken this new departure in University education, tho surrounded by many difficulties, may yet be realized. More, however, depends upon

the mental and spiritual attitude of those who undertake the instruction than upon any external conditions whatever. It is the presence or the absence of a rational enthusiasm that will give success or failure to this education. Does a pessimist ask what there is in our day to give birth to scholarly enthusiasm? If a three years' course of study be regarded as not too extended to answer this question for young men, a confirmed pessimist will certainly excuse any failure to answer him in a word. One thing, however, may be said. The permanent lesson of history, to him who finds in its records continuity of purpose, is that different times are entrusted with different problems for solution. The question that to-day presses for recognition is the social question; not in any narrow sense, but bringing with it the widest of moral considerations. Whenever a problem of this nature claims attention, the State must come to the foreground. Herein lies the peculiar appropriateness at the present time of a careful study of questions of public policy and administration, for it is of the utmost importance that the strengthened State should be controlled by men who understand why it is strengthened. He who can grasp this idea holds the mental attitude of a scholar, no matter what his training may have been. Some men are born with this peculiar insight into the present, and possess naturally a judicial temperament; but common minds that have not the genius of statesmanship can only come to this high ground for thought and action by a laborious study of the order of development, and by a purely objective analysis of existing forces and factors. It is then out of a union of pressing necessities on the one hand and great possibilities on the other that there may be born a scholar's enthusiasm. Whether or not schools of Political Science will attain the high success for which they hope, one cannot say; but of this one may be certain: it is essential to the well-being of the immediate future, as well as to the conservation of what is best in democracy, that the purposes which prompted them shall in some manner be worked out.

HENRY C. ADAMS.

THE RAILWAY PROBLEM.

ON the 4th of July, 1828, Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, then the only surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence, turned the first sod in the construction of the Baltimore and Ohio, the earliest of the railways of the United States. If it had been permitted to him to foresee the magnificent results of half a century of national progress, Mr. Carroll could well have said that fate had been kind to him in the imperishable association of his name with that great act which asserted the liberty of these States, and with that other great act which inaugurated the system of internal improvements, to which in great part this country owes its unparalleled progress.

The growth of the railway system and the development of the prosperity of the country have been to each other reciprocally cause and effect. As the railways penetrated the wilderness, agriculture, trade, and commerce followed in their train, and the profits realized therefrom found remunerative investment in new railways, which in their turn widened the boundaries of civilization. The railways have overcome the disintegrating influences of distance and of conflicting sectional interests. They have invited immigration by their development of that great Northwest in which the immigrants have found their homes. They have made the toil of the farmer productive by bringing the markets of the world to his door. They have rendered available the mineral wealth of the country by moving the ore to the mint and the furnace. They have stimulated manufactures by the rapid transportation of the raw material to the factory, and the manufactured product from it. They have built up great cities, in carrying the trade by which those cities live, and the prosperity of the cities has been reflected in the prosperity of tracts of tributary territory. They have made foreign commerce profitable by creating markets for imports and by providing return cargoes in agricultural, mining, and

manufacturing-exports. They have added directly to the wealth of the whole country, and of every citizen. While doing this work, they have steadily reduced their transportation rates, until on the rates of 1880, as compared with those of 1866, they have saved to the producer and consumer a sum equivalent to one cent per ton per mile, which, on the freight moved in 1880, amounted to more than three hundred and twenty-three millions of dollars.

A monopoly which can accomplish such results ought certainly be considered a beneficent monopoly. But that aggregation of capital¹ which has constructed and which now operates the railways of the United States is not in any proper sense of the word a monopoly. Not only is that capital managed by independent corporations,² in many cases rivals in business, and in all cases limited in their charges by the inexorable laws of trade; not only are the shares of those corporations for sale in the open market and susceptible of purchase, in large or small quantities, by any one who may desire to participate in their profits or to obtain a voice in their management; not only are the capital and indebtedness of those corporations owned by hundreds of thousands of individual owners—but also under the free railway legislation which now prevails in almost all, if not in all, of the States in the Union, new and competing lines of railway may be constructed by any persons who may form a corporate organization, and who can contribute or borrow the necessary capital. It is obviously a contradiction in terms to characterize such a system as a monopoly, for it lacks that element of absolute and exclusive proprietorship which is the decisive criterion of a monopoly.

The railway business of a continent cannot be conducted without some friction. In the light of the magnitude of the traffic as evidenced by the statistics which are given in the census report for 1880, it is wonderful that complaints are so few and far between.³ The highest eulogium upon the intelligence and

¹ Capital stock paid in, \$2,613,606,264. Funded and floating debt, \$2,812,116,296.

² In 1880 there were 1165 corporations, of which 169 had not yet begun operations.

³ In 1880 the railways transported 244,178,377 local and 25,404,963 through passengers (of whom 143 were killed and 541 injured), and 153,163,276 tons of local and 137,513,999 tons of through freight.

fair dealing which in general characterize the management of the railways of this country is to be found in the small quantity of well-founded popular dissatisfaction with that management. The complaints with which the public ear is most frequently vexed are neither well-founded, intelligent, nor the expression of any real popular grievance, but they are due in some degree to unreasoning ignorance, and in a greater degree to the efforts of demagogues.

The technical skill with which the railways of this country are managed is generally conceded, and criticism is in the main based, not upon the failure to transport freight and passengers with the greatest possible safety and expedition, but upon alleged overcharges, or upon unjust discrimination in charges.

In railway transportation, as in every other business, honesty is the best policy. Intelligent railway managers condemn overcharges and unjust discriminations, for they know that they are as impolitic and as unprofitable to the corporations as they are unlawful. If no higher motives can be supposed to control their action, enlightened selfishness would compel them to deal fairly with all their customers, and to charge such rates as will attract and not repel traffic, thereby developing the business of their roads to their maximum, and earning the largest possible dividends for their shareholders. But until corporations can be managed as well as operated by machinery, their action must be directed by human, and therefore fallible, instrumentalities; and from this it will sometimes result that, in the course of railway operations, individual rights will be wilfully or negligently trespassed upon. What can the State do, what ought the State to do, to prevent such wrongs?

The first condition of the successful solution of the problem is that there should be a clear understanding of its facts.

As the confederation of States has grown into a nation, so the railways, which came into being as separate corporations, created by the authority of independent States and bounded in their action by State lines, have been merged in great railway systems which transport the commerce of the country without trans-shipment or breaking bulk from the Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Railways have,

therefore, to do with two chief classes of freight, through and local.¹

As to the through freight, there is competition not only between the different railway systems, but also with the various lines of water transportation, and with the railways of Canada, which import their engines and machinery free of duty, which pay lower wages for their labor, and which are geographically so situated that they can compete on terms favorable to them in the transportation of freight between the Eastern and Western States. As to the local freight also, there is competition, by rail or by water or by both, at many points.

Local freight costs the railways more than through freight. By reason of the fluctuation in its demand upon the terminal facilities, rolling stock, and labor, it involves a large outlay in capital and in cost of administration, with uncertainty as to the amount of return in any given period. It necessitates the frequent transportation of light loads, and a consequent loss of income from unused facilities and unemployed labor. Its necessary sidings, switches, and frogs increase the perils of operation. On the other hand, through freight can be transported in full loaded cars, and with the minimum of labor, by reason of certainty as to the duration of the trip and the demands upon that labor.

All freight is not of equal bulk or value, nor is it necessarily received, carried, or delivered in precisely the same manner. It may be received and delivered at the station and loaded and unloaded by the railway employés; it may be received and delivered at the railway sidings, but loaded and unloaded by the consignor or consignee; it may be received from, and delivered to, sidings on private premises and loaded and unloaded there by the consignor or consignee; or it may be received in one of these ways and delivered in another. So also the stipulated speed of transportation may vary. A railway also has to deal both with retail and wholesale customers, that is, with those who at their option make occasional use of its transportation facilities, and with others who make a prearranged regular and constant use of these facilities.

¹ Of the freight receipts of the railways in 1880, 56.16 per cent was derived from local freight, 42.51 from through freight, and 1.32 per cent from all other freight.

It is to the interest of both the public and the railways that rates should be sufficiently large to yield an adequate return for the capital invested, to maintain the plant in a condition of efficiency, and to permit the railway to avail itself of such improvements as may be, from time to time, made in machinery and appliances. The railway plant includes not merely the road-bed and main tracks, but also the terminal facilities, the way stations, the sidings necessary therefor, the rolling stock, and the skilled labor upon which devolves the maintenance and operation of the road. The traffic must be steady in order that there may be no loss from unused machinery and unemployed labor. Return freights must be provided in order to avoid as far as possible the transportation of empty cars. The cost of moving freight varies upon different lines, and upon different parts of the same line, in accordance with the grades, the more or less expensive character of the tunnels, bridges, viaducts, and other engineering appliances that have been provided to overcome natural obstacles, and the cost to the railway of its machinery, fuel, and labor.

The railway manager has, therefore, in fixing a rate to determine the cost of moving a given quantity of freight of the particular kind over the designated distance in the desired manner; and to that end he must consider several elements, to each of which due weight must be given: First, the extent to which the company's way or terminal facilities and labor will be used in handling the freight; second, the necessary demand of that freight upon motive-power and rolling stock, and the possibility of obtaining a full return freight; third, the length of the haul and the favorable or unfavorable character of the grades; fourth, the degree of expedition required, and the consequent accommodation to, or disturbance of, the general traffic arrangements of the road; fifth, the constant or fluctuating character of the demands of the particular freight upon the road's facilities; and, sixth, the relative bulk and value of the freight and the degree of the carrier's responsibility for its safe transportation. Railways have not been chartered, nor has capital been invested in their construction, upon the theory that they are to do business at, or for less than, cost. The railway manager must therefore, in order that dividends may be earned, add, after determining

the cost of moving and handling the particular freight, such a sum for profit as will, in addition to the company's profits from other sources, furnish an adequate return for the capital invested.

But railways cannot always, nor indeed often, arbitrarily determine their rates. Those rates, as applied to articles of commerce or of domestic trade, are necessarily controlled by the market values of those articles at the point of consumption, for those rates must be so proportioned to those values that the articles can be sold at a profit. In general, also, the price of transportation, like that of all other services and all commodities, is dependent upon the existence of a demand, and the relation between that demand and its supply. Railway rates are, therefore, limited in the first place by that enlightened selfishness which induces the carrier to create and foster the demand, and in the second place by that adequacy or excess of supply in relation to demand, which is, in one word, competition. Even where no actual competition exists, rates are affected by its possible creation, for where there is a volume of business which demands transportation and which is charged an unfairly high rate, the surplus capital of the country will promptly seek profitable investment in the construction of a railway to supply that existing demand. Yet an excess of competition in transportation brings in its train serious evils from which the country has more than once suffered. A war of railway rates causes to the shareholders in the companies a diminution of dividends, and sometimes a loss of the principal of their investments, and to the community a fluctuation in values of merchandise, which tends to obliterate the distinction between speculation and legitimate business, and which is always followed by individual losses. Such a war may result also in the bankruptcy of weaker companies, in their absorption by their stronger rivals, and in the consequent loss to the public of the benefits derivable from healthy competition. To guard against the evils of such wars the railways have resorted to pooling agreements whereby at competitive points the traffic or its receipts is divided in stipulated proportions between the competing roads, yet such agreements, like treaties between sovereign States, are broken when either party to them fancies that its interests will be subserved by

their abrogation. The facts that the power of fixing rates over connecting lines through to the point of destination is necessarily vested in the company which receives the goods from the shipper, and that that power in the exigencies of competition is inevitably delegated to irresponsible subordinates to whom their road's need of business is all-important, render nugatory in the hour of trial all pooling agreements, however carefully negotiated and solemnly ratified.

The problem is, therefore, complicated by the competition of water transportation and of railways whose lines are not within the United States, by the opposing interests of rival States and cities, by the necessity of fostering competition and yet restraining it within due bounds, by the independent and possibly conflicting jurisdiction of the United States and of the several States, and by the impotency of governmental action, either legislative or executive, to arbitrarily determine prices, or to interpose barriers to the course of trade.

No new legislation is needed to define the relative rights and duties of railways and their customers.

There is no uncertainty as to the existing law with regard to railway rates. A railway company is bound by its charter. It may lawfully charge such rates as that charter authorizes, and when the charter is silent, or when it vests in the company the power of fixing rates, the company, like all other common carriers, is bound to carry all freight that may be offered to the extent of its facilities at reasonable rates and without unjust discrimination, and it is legally compellable to refund any overcharge in excess of that which shall be adjudged to be reasonable.

If transportation rates could be treated, without reference to the public interest, as subjects of private bargain between the railway and its customers, it would be lawful for the railway on the one hand to demand whatever sum, however exorbitant, that the necessities of its customer would compel him to pay, and for the customer, on the other hand, to have his goods carried as nearly free as possible. But that duty to the public which requires the railway to carry all freight at a reasonable rate defines as reasonable that rate which not only adequately remunerates the railway for the transportation of the particular freight, but also enables it to carry that freight without preju-

dice to its performance of its duty of transporting other classes of freight. In other words, neither the customer nor the railway can be permitted to ignore the fact that the railway is not a private but a common carrier, and that, therefore, its charges must be fixed with reference to its performance of duties to others as well as to the particular customer.

The prohibition of unjust discrimination means simply that a common carrier must charge like rates for like services. It does not mean that the carrier must disregard the well-settled distinction between retail and wholesale business, and must charge the same rate per ton to the man who when and as he pleases ships one ton of coal and to the man who in compliance with contract ships one million tons; nor does it forbid the carrier to make such a discrimination by refunding a rebate after the freight shall have been paid upon the wholesale quantity at retail rates, for the object of the system of rebates is only to protect the carrier against a possible breach of the freighter's contract to deliver the stipulated quantity. Nor does it mean that the carrier shall not in its rates distinguish between those who use its transportation and terminal facilities and labor, and those who use only one or more of those services. Nor does it mean that the carrier may not charge more for transportation over a mile of mountain grades, or a mile of bridge, or through a mile of tunnel, than over a mile of open road in a flat country. Nor does it mean that the carrier may not charge more for expedition of transportation. Nor does it mean that the rates must vary in the ratio of the distances, that is, that the carrier must charge as the rate upon a given quantity of freight for forty miles double the sum which it would charge for twenty miles. Such a rule would disregard the facts that the terminal charges which are generally the same in each of the supposed cases, are a substantial element in the determination of the rate, and that the variance in grade and in necessary expenditure in construction may be such as to render the cost of transportation for forty miles but little greater than that for twenty of those forty miles. Such a rule would also ignore those interests of the public which must not be lost sight of in the consideration of the demands of private customers of the railways. It may be to the interest of the owner of a coal mine fifty miles from market

that rates should be so arranged that another mine owner fifty miles farther away must be shut out of the market, but it is not to the interest of the public that competition should be prevented, and that the cry of anti-monopoly should thus be made effective in the legal establishment and preservation of the worst sort of monopolies. If such a rule had prevailed in the past, the condition of the country to-day would not present the favorable contrast that it now does to the condition of fifty years ago. It is that inequality of rates of transportation in proportion to distance which has built up the trade of the great cities by extending the territory from which the markets of those cities draw their supplies, and it is that same inequality which has developed the manifold manufacturing industries of this country.

Yet even those who admit that the legal relation of the railways and their customers is sufficiently defined by existing law contend that the law is not in practice powerful enough nor prompt enough to do justice as between the railways and the citizens. If this grave aspersion upon the administration of justice were well founded, it might be answered that the appropriate remedy is to be found not in special legislation with regard to railway litigation, but in the accomplishment of such a substantial law reform as will give us only pure and able judges and honest and intelligent jurors. But in fact the aspersion is not well founded. No dispassionate observer of the proceedings in our courts, no careful student of our law reports, will find that as between corporations and individuals there exists any tendency in favor of the former and against the latter to mitigate the severity of the written law. On the contrary, substantial justice is, in general, done in our courts; but when incompetent judges and ignorant jurors err, their mistakes always operate for communism and equally against corporations and those individuals whose wealth, whether inherited or earned, has raised them above the common mass.

It has been contended that the remedy for railway abuses is to be found in governmental acquisition of railway property. No mode of acquisition can, of course, be contemplated other than a purchase as the result either of a voluntary agreement of sale, or of a compulsory taking under the power of eminent

domain, which necessarily involves compensation to the owners of the property so taken, for acquisition by any other mode is confiscation. Assuming, for the sake of the argument, the constitutional power of the government to buy and operate the railways, the main objections to any such purchase are these: first, the outlay for the purchase and maintenance of existing railways and for the construction of such other railways as will be needed in the near future will exceed the cost of the suppression of the Rebellion¹ and in comparison with the amount of the subsequent annual appropriations for railways, the appropriations for pension bills, and River and Harbor bills, will be trifling and insignificant; second, it is certain that the government does not and cannot do its work as economically as corporations and individuals, and so far therefore from governmental acquisition of the railways resulting in the lowering of rates there would be in all probability a raising of rates: third, the favorable influence of competition in the reduction of rates will at once be lost; fourth, State railways in this country would be centres of corruption: the unsavory history of the Erie Canals in New York, and the Pennsylvania State Line of Public Improvements, furnish useful lessons on this subject; fifth, with our unreformed civil service, a political party once intrenched in the railways, would never be driven from power;² sixth, it is not to the interest of those who do business with railways that their claims for damages should only be audited and paid through the Court of Claims and Congressional appropriations;³ seventh, the State ownership of railways means the withdrawal from the States and from the municipalities of a subject of taxation which now pays a not insignificant share of their expenditures;⁴ eighth, the conflicting interests of rival cities and States would intensify political animosities and bring the government into discredit.

It is therefore preferable that the ownership of railway prop-

¹ The reported cost of the 87,891.35 miles constructed up to 1880 is \$4,883,740,596, including equipment and supplies on hand.

² In 1880 the railway employes of all grades numbered 418,957, and their annual pay-roll was \$195,350,013.

³ In 1880 the total damages paid amounted to \$3,456,265.

⁴ In 1880 the railways paid taxes to the amount of \$13,283,819.

erty should remain in the future, as it is now, in individuals acting in corporate organizations.

It is also contended that the State may by legislation regulate the tariff of railway rates, and summarily redress railway abuses. In a republic governmental action is necessarily circumscribed by constitutional limitations. Much misapprehension with regard to the power of the State over the railways has resulted from reasoning by analogy, for the logical value of that method of reasoning is dependent upon an exact similarity in all points between the subjects of comparison. It is a truism that railways are public highways, and yet it is clear that they are not highways in the sense that navigable rivers, canals, and roads, whether common or improved, are highways. Railways differ from those other highways in an important respect which deprives the analogy of all value, and that is, that the railway is not only an artificial highway, but also that it can only be used as a highway in connection with artificial means of transportation which the railway must itself supply and operate. The earlier railways in England and in this country were chartered upon the theory that the company would provide the road and the customers find their several modes of transportation; but it was soon discovered that the magnitude, complexity, and dangers of the business were too great to admit of its conduct in that manner.¹

It is, of course, the duty of the State to provide highways for the use of its citizens. That duty may be performed, either by the construction of such highways by public officers expending the public funds, or by persons, natural or corporate, expending their own funds and receiving compensation therefor either in the direct payment of money by the State, or in the grant of a franchise. Under the power of eminent domain the State may lawfully take, for the purpose of such construction, the private property of any citizen, upon making due compensation therefor, and the property so taken will be vested in the State's grantee, the corporation, subject only to such limitations upon its use and enjoyment as may be imposed by the terms of the charter. That charter constitutes a contract between the State and the

¹ In 1880 the equipment included 17,412 locomotives, 12,330 passenger, 4475 mail, express, and baggage, and 455,450 freight and other cars.

corporation, as binding upon the one as the other. If that charter contain no reservation to the State of a power to impair or destroy the franchise granted, that franchise is indefeasible. Neither principles of right nor rules of law are violated, when the State contracts with a corporation to construct and maintain an improved highway, and stipulates that for the construction and maintenance of that highway the corporation shall be reimbursed by the collection of a transportation charge from those whose persons or whose goods are carried over it.

If the State, by subsequent legislation, so limits the charge as to diminish the compensation stipulated to be paid to the corporation for its performance of the State's duty of constructing and maintaining the highway, the State thereby confiscates the property of those citizens who are the shareholders in the corporation. It is no answer to this to say, that, altho investments in the bonds and shares of railways are private property, yet the franchise is a public use, and as such necessarily subject to governmental regulation. The reply is as conclusive as it is obvious. The State cannot, either in morals or in law, so regulate the use of the highway as to diminish the price it had agreed to pay for the construction and maintenance of that highway; any more than the State can deprive the builder of a jail of a portion of the contract price stipulated to be paid for its construction, or can repudiate its bonded debt.

Corporate property is subject to the taxing power of the State, but it is protected against any undue exercise of that power by those constitutional limitations which are only expressive of the eternal principles of justice, when they require taxes to be uniform. Corporate property is also, in common with all other private property, subject to police regulation, which means simply that the State may by just and equal regulation prevent any one from so using and enjoying his own property as to impair the enjoyment by others of their property. In these and in all other respects corporate property is protected from confiscation to the same extent, and by the same means, that the property of every individual is protected. The homestead and the farm of the farmer, the warehouse and goods of the merchant, the mill and machinery of the manufacturer, and the home of every man, have no protection other than or

greater than that which the constitution and the laws of this free country throw around investments in the bonds and shares of corporations. If that principle of communism which underlies the anti-monopoly agitation is to become a potential force in this country, it will not rest satisfied with the confiscation of railway property, but it will with equal vigor and success attack all private property. It is clear that any one State cannot regulate traffic beyond its own boundaries, nor within those boundaries so as to prohibit or embarrass inter-State commerce. So also the Federal Government cannot regulate the internal trade of any State, yet having regard to the national character of the railway system and to conflicting sectional interests, it is obviously to the interest of the whole country that any regulation of traffic should be administered under Federal, rather than State authority. But governmental action is circumscribed by other than constitutional limitations. Legislation cannot control the operation of the laws of nature or the laws of trade. No legislation can enable railways to transport goods as cheaply across rivers, or over or under mountains, as through level plains, or compel railways to charge rates upon local traffic so low as to force their relinquishment of through traffic. Any such legislation will be as ineffective as the Acts of Parliament which fixed the price of bread, or the Act of Congress which defined the price of gold. The history of tariff legislation, with its inconsistencies, its arbitrary changes, and its subserviency to sectional rather than national interests, is not such as to induce the most thoroughgoing protectionist to advocate the direct regulation of railway rates by Act of Congress. Indeed, if Congress were to take upon itself that duty, it must sit *en permanence*, and it would have no leisure for other legislation.

No Act of Congress could lay down rates which shall be equitably just for all articles, under all conditions of transportation, and for all time. If the rates were not remunerative they would lead to the bankruptcy of the railways, upon which would follow commercial ruin and distress. If the rates are adequate now, they will be too high in the future.¹ If a commission were to be constituted to fix rates for the whole country

¹ The history of the Pennsylvania Railroad illustrates this. Under an act of 1861 it is authorized to charge certain rates, which were then regarded as unduly restrictive, but which are largely in excess of the rates it now charges.

that commission would wield an arbitrary and despotic power, in comparison with which the Government of Russia is liberal constitutionalism. Such a commission would make and unmake fortunes, build up or destroy great cities, and move the seat of empire at its pleasure.

Wise legislation should regard not only the present condition of the country, but also its probable future development. The area of the United States is 3,034,399 square miles, of which 2,970,000 square miles are land, one half of which is arable, and less than one twelfth of the whole land has been as yet put under cultivation. Europe, which has but one half the area of the United States, has a population of one hundred and forty-five to the square mile. The United States has a population of sixteen and one half to the square mile. In view of the probable increase of population by immigration and by natural growth, the consequent extension of the area of cultivated land, the development of villages into cities and of territories into States, and the establishment of new seats of manufactures and new centres of trade, is it not reasonable to suppose that in order to supply the increased demand for transportation, many new lines of railway must be constructed in the near future? It is not the nature of capital to seek unprofitable investments, and it is only wise to so legislate with regard to railways that capital shall be invited and not discouraged.

Having regard to the complexity of the problem, to the magnitude of the pecuniary amounts involved, to the diverse interests of rival States and cities, to possible conflicts between State and Federal jurisdictions, to the inadequacy of legislation to cope with the laws of trade, and to the conditions of the present and the needs of the future, is it not more in keeping with the republican theory of government, and more statesman-like, to trust for the prevention of railway abuses to the application of ordinary legal remedies, to the influence of healthy competition under the laws of trade, and to the enlightened selfishness of railway managers, rather than to attempt to devise extraordinary means of prevention, which, if efficacious, may produce abuses more serious and wide-reaching in their effects than those which they are intended to remedy?

CHRISTOPHER STUART PATTERSON.

A STUDY OF THE MIND'S CHAMBERS OF IMAGERY.

EVERY man, woman, and child has such a chamber where he or she has laid up a store of images or photographs of the objects which have been perceived. It may be interesting to take a look into it and inspect its contents, which will be found to be very curious. Every man has his own chamber of imagery with its separate furniture, grave or gay. It is the place of figures and fancies.

I.

I call the power which reproduces in old or in new forms our past experiences the *Phantasy*, a phrase employed by Aristotle to denote one of the faculties of the mind, and which was used in the English tongue down to the beginning of the last century, when it was abbreviated into *Fancy*, with a more confined meaning. The product may be called the *Phantasm*—always to be distinguished from the *phantom*, in which the object is imaginary. *Phantasy* is a good phrase to designate the remembrance or imaging of a single object, say a lily, as distinguished from a general idea, such as the class lily. The faculty may also be called the *Imaging* or *Pictorial* power, only there is no image or picture except when the reproduction is of an object perceived by the sense of sight—the other senses, however, being also capable of reviving what has passed before us. It is the mind's eye of Shakespeare: "In my mind's eye, Horatio."

All these phrases are figurative, always implying and pointing to a reality. We talk of an image, a likeness, a representation, an idea. In what sense? So far as the sense of sight is concerned, there is an image on the retina of the eye. But this is so situated that it is not seen naturally; in fact, it has been discovered by science. The object is perceived upright, but it is inverted in the eye. Then, so far as the other senses are con-

cerned, there is no image properly speaking. There is merely an affection of the organ—of the ear, the touch, the palate, the nostrils. Speaking rigidly, there is no image of a taste or a sound. Even so far as vision is concerned, the image on the retina cannot be said to be perceived by the mind. It is merely an affection of the organism of such a kind that it becomes the fitting means by which the exact form and color of the object is known; just—and not otherwise—as an ear makes known the sounds emitted. In respect of an image, there can be no such thing in the brain in regard to any of the senses. In all the senses there is an affection not only of the physical part of the senses proper, but of the brain; but this does not take the shape of a form of any kind. If there is no figure in the brain, still less can there be in the mind. A figure is an extended material thing. The figure of a tree is no more in the mind than the tree is. In all the senses the perception is simply a knowledge of an object under a certain aspect, say as having a form or odor. In this sense only is an idea the representation of an object. There is really no likeness between gold as out of the mind and the idea of gold in the mind. There is a correspondence between the two, but no identity.

In fact, this imaging power is merely one of the factors in the memory. In memory there is a recognition of an object or event as having been before us in time past. But in the mere imaging there is no such recognition and no reference to time. We may have a phantasm of a flower without any belief as to where or when we saw it, or indeed as to whether we ever saw it. But in all proper memory there is an image or phantasm, dull or vivid, representing the object or event recognized.

It has to be added, that the mind has the power of forming imaginary figures. These are compositions constructed by the mind out of realities experienced. We have now, not memory, but imagination. Our imaginations, as every one knows, are often more lively than our recollections. The mind delights to form such pictures, and it is the office of the poet and novelist to raise them up by the presentations they furnish.

First. We can thus reproduce the material got by any of the senses. We remember tastes of salt, of sugar, of jelly, of apples, of oranges, and hundreds of other things that are sour

or sweet, or do otherwise powerfully affect our palate pleasantly or unpleasantly. These recollections are not especially inspiring or poetical, but are cherished by gourmands, who feel as it were the taste in their mouth of the food they relish. We can recall the sensation produced by odors, say from roses, lilies, and violets, or from assafoetida, swamps, and malarial pools. Some of these are of an ethereal nature, and have a place allowed them in poetry. We can call up a thousand kinds of sounds, as the voices of our friends, the sighings of the breeze or stream, the barking of the dog, the mewing of the cat, the bellowing of the bull, the lowing of cattle, the chirp or the song of birds—say of the thrush or nightingale, the screech of the eagle, the rasping of the file, the mower whetting his scythe, the roar of the storm, the lashing of the wave on the shore, the rolling of the thunder, the crash of the avalanche. People endowed with a musical ear can recall tunes and are prompted to repeat them, and some are constantly hearing musical airs.

“ Music, when soft voices die,
Vibrate in the memory;
Odors, when sweet violets sicken,
Live within the sense they quicken.”

There are touches which we easily remember—of softness or smoothness, say of satin or of a smooth skin, or of the prickliness of a briar or thorn. The child retains forever the memory of a mother's kiss. But we get our most vivid and varied memories from the sense of sight. We delight to remember colors, say of a flower or a piece of dress, of the morning and evening sky. We image certain forms, as of the persons and faces of our friends, of noble trees, of well-proportioned buildings, of mountains. All that is picturesque, that is picture-like, that is with a well-defined shape, as steeples, cliffs, precipices, leave a photograph of themselves on our souls. The artist uses many of these in his paintings, in his portraits, and in his landscapes. The poet turns them to all sorts of uses in pleasing, in exciting and elevating the mind.

This imaging power helps greatly to enliven our existence. We call up an incident of our childhood. We remember the day on which we were first sent to school, and how we set out

from our parents' roof with strangely mingled feelings of confidence and timidity. As we bring back the scene, mark how everything appears with a pictorial power. We have a vivid picture, it may be, of the road we travelled; we see, as it were, the school-house within and without; we hear, as it were, the master addressing us, and the remarks which the children passed upon us. Or, more pleasant still, we remember a holiday trip in the company of pleasant companions or kind relatives to a place interesting in itself or by its associations; or the visit we paid to the house of a kind friend who had a thousand contrivances to please and entertain us. How vivid at this moment the picture before us of the incidents of the journey, of the little misfortunes that befell us, of the amusements provided for us, of the persons, the countenances, the smiles, the voice and words of those who joined us in our mirth or ministered to our gratification. We not only recollect the events: we, as it were, perceive them before us; the imaging is an essential element of our remembrance. Wordsworth is painting from the life when he speaks of

" Those recollected hours that have the charm
Of visionary things; those lovely forms
And sweet sensations that throw back our life,
And almost make remotest infancy
A visible scene on which the sun is shining."

Or possibly there may be scenes which have imprinted themselves more deeply upon our minds—which have, as it were, burned their image into our souls. Let us throw back our mind upon the time when death first intruded into our dwelling. We remember ourselves standing by the dying bed of a father, and then we recall how a few days after we saw the corpse put into the coffin and then borne away to the grave. How terribly distinct and startling do these scenes stand before us at this instant! We see that pallid countenance looking forth from the couch upon us; we hear that voice becoming feebler and still feebler; and then we feel as if we were looking at that fixed form which the countenance took when the spirit had fled; we follow the long funeral as it winds away to the place of the dead, and we hear the earth falling on the coffin as the dust is committed to its kindred dust.

Secondly. It should be specially noticed that not only are we able to represent these sensible scenes, we are further *able to picture the thoughts and feelings which passed through our minds as we mingled in them.* Not only do we remember the road along which we travelled and the building which we entered : we can bring up the feelings with which we set out from our parents' house, and those with which we passed into the school. Not only do we recollect the amusements which so interested us, but the feelings of interest with which we engaged in them. Not only do we picture the chamber in which a father breathed his last : we can call up the mingled emotions of anxiety or hope and fear with which we watched by his dying bed, and the grief which overwhelmed us as we realized the loss we had suffered. We bring up the feelings which chased each other as we sat by his corpse, or when we returned to our home and felt all to be so blank and melancholy.

We can thus live our mental experiences over again : the efforts we make to acquire a branch of knowledge, a new language, or a new science, and how we found the process to be irksome or stimulating ; what we felt in our failures or our successes, in our fights and in our triumphs, in our friendships and in our enmities, in our temptations yielded to and our temptations resisted. As we survey the past, we can remember the gratitude we felt on kindness shown us, the sorrow that overwhelmed us on the death of a friend, the bitterness of the disappointment when our best hopes were frustrated, when one we trusted betrayed us, the pang that shot through us when we found that we had committed an unworthy deed. We are obliged to use metaphorical language in describing these recollections. We speak of our being able to image or picture to ourselves the outward incidents and the inward feelings, and we thus set forth an important truth.

True, we cannot give these mental states a sensible figure. The reason is obvious. They had no visible or tangible form when we first experienced them, and the memory, in reproducing them, will represent them as they first presented themselves. This circumstance, I may add in passing, furnishes an argument of some little force in favor of the immateriality of the soul. In our primary knowledge and in our subsequent recollection of

bodies we have a sensible image. But in our consciousness of our mental states and in our recalling them we do not, and indeed cannot, so represent them. We give a bodily shape to the school at which we learned our tasks, to the persons and countenances of our early associates, but we cannot give a form or local habitation to our remembered cogitations and sentiments, which live in a higher sphere.

It is conceivable that the memory might have been as correct as it is as to matters of fact without having any pictorial power. In fact, the majority of our memories must be of this character. It is well it should be so, for otherwise excitement would waste our life, and keep us from the performance of many commonplace but important duties. But that is a most benignant endowment whereby we can image absent objects and past events, lay them up in "chambers of imagery," and make them pass as in a panorama before us. We can thus have a series of paintings of all the scenes in which we have mingled, a set of portraits of the friends with whom we had sweet intercourse, and we can view them as Cowper did his mother's portrait :

"Faithful remembrancer of one so dear;
And while that face renews my filial grief
Fancy shall weave a charm for my relief,
Shall steep me in Elysian reverie.
A momentary dream that thou art she,
By contemplation's help not sought in vain,
I seem to have lived my childhood o'er again—
To have renewed the joys that once were mine,
Without the sin of violating thine.
And while the wings of fancy still are free,
And I can view this mimic show of thee,
Time has, but half succeeded in his theft—
Thyself removed, thy power to soothe me left."

This imaging power, as it tends to enliven the mind, so it also tends to give vividness to its productions in words and writings. He is an interesting companion who, having laid up a store of pictures, is ever bringing them out in his conversation. Travelers and biographers instruct us best when they are able to give us a word-painting of the scene and of the man or woman. History is vastly more attractive when it gives the event with its concomitants—say the battle with the field on which it was

fought. Our pictorial writers are generally the most popular. In the mediæval ages they illuminated the manuscripts to attract and delight the eye. In our day, books in almost every department of literature are illustrated. This power has a still more important function. Nothing tends more to degrade the mind and sink it in the mire than low and sensual images rolled as a sweet morsel under the tongue. On the other hand, images of duty, of self-sacrifice, of courage, of honor, of beauty, of love, elevate and ennoble the soul.

Some of the phantasms are much more vivid than others. They differ also in the case of different individuals, and of the same individual at different times or in different states of his body. It is a curious question what can be the cause of this difference. Without professing to exhaust the subject we may specify some circumstances which undoubtedly have an influence on the vividness of the picture.

1. There is the original vividness of the sensation depending primarily on the sensitiveness of the organ, but under this also upon the nature of the object perceived. The senses evidently differ in this respect. The most lively is the sense of sight. The forms and colors originally made known by it may come up almost with the distinctness of the realities. The mental representation (we can scarcely call it picture) of sounds is often very intense, especially in the case of those who have a musical ear, but also when the impression on the ear is strong or vehement—made, for instance, by the bursting of a cannon. Tastes and odors may also be recalled with less impressiveness, as also touches and feelings in our nerves. There are times when our sensations of shapes, colors, and sounds are very intense, and in these cases they are apt to be reproduced with greater vividness. There are scenes of gorgeous coloring, there are picturesque figures, such as horrid precipices; there are sounds such as those of a falling rock, of thunder, or of an avalanche, which we can never forget. Some persons are evidently more susceptible of intense impressions than others, and in these cases the images are apt to be more vivid, and these may be embodied in paintings, in statues, or in word-painting in prose or poetry.

2. The formation of the image is dependent on the state of

the brain. It is believed that even in our sense-perceptions there is brain action. It seems to be established that the third convolution of the left side of the cerebrum is the organ of the symbolic power, or of language. Some eminent men, such as Hitzig, and Fritsch, and Ferrier, maintain that each sense has a separate location in the brain ; others deny this. Without entering into this discussion, it is allowed that brain action is necessary to sense action. The whole eye might be perfect and yet there is no vision if there be a lesion in certain parts of the brain. Not only so, but brain action is required in order to the reproduction of our sense-perceptions. Now it is highly probable that the same part of the brain acting in the perception is necessary in order to its reproduction. When there is a lesion of a certain part of the brain it may not be possible to form an image of the object. In all cases the vividness of the image may depend on the health and susceptibility of the brain matter.

It is well known that persons may lose certain of their recollections while they retain others. The defect seems to arise from a lesion of the brain. We have the record of persons losing the power of picturing forms, while their memory was good in all other respects. We have more frequent instances of people losing their power of using languages or particular languages. This is the disease of aphasia, arising from a derangement in the organ of language. There are cases of persons losing a portion of their knowledge for a time and then recovering it ; perhaps losing it suddenly, and recovering it as suddenly. In all such cases it looks as if, in acquiring the original knowledge, there is a certain state of the brain produced, say by a certain disposition of the molecules, probably in the gray matter in the periphery of the brain. Where there is an effacement or derangement of this matter in the brain the knowledge cannot be recalled. Sometimes the disorganization is only for a time, and when it is cured the mental power is ready to act.

3. There is the mental force particularly of the attention directed to the scenes as they first passed before us. We were interested in them, we turned them round and round, we viewed them under various aspects, and having been so encouraged and fondled, they are apt to visit us again and again, and put on their

best expression. The painter has to study the features of landscapes and the countenances and attitudes of men and women to give us correct figures on his canvas. Under this view, the capacity of bringing up images is more within our power than we might at first imagine.

JAMES MCCOSH.


II.

Dr. McCosh, in the first part of this article, has described the general laws and characteristics of our mental imagery. There follows in the second part an account of some of the results obtained from a special inquiry into this subject, by means of printed questions circulated among a large number of college students.

This inquiry began in 1881 with the distribution at Princeton and Vassar Colleges of Mr. Francis Galton's *Questions upon the Visualising and Allied Faculties*. The replies—about sixty in number—were forwarded to Mr. Galton, who made some use of them in his recently published "Inquiries into the Human Faculty." This work embraces the very original psychological studies of a number of years, and will have a wide influence in popularizing this branch of research; among a great variety of subjects it brings out with force the well-known theories of the author in regard to the obscure influences of heredity and environment, or nature and nurture, upon our ordinary mental operations. Dr. McCosh and myself took up the subject in its more purely psychological bearings, and in pursuing the investigation we have adopted Mr. Galton's method. His Questions, full as they were, naturally did not exhaust such an extensive subject, and a careful reading of the first set of replies suggested several lines of inquiry which might be more fully followed out. The plan took shape in our issuing a second series of questions, which covered some of the problems already discussed by Mr. Galton, and in addition entered some branches of the subject which before had remained untouched. Copies were distributed at Princeton, and a number also were sent to the Harvard Medical School, through the kindness of Professor Stanley Hall.

As it relies wholly upon self-analysis, this method of research is open to the twofold objection that many persons have distorted

ideas of the working of their own minds, and replies may be governed by preconceived notions derived from various sources. It must be confessed we looked somewhat suspiciously upon the first batch of answers, for there seemed to be too much of the personal equation about them, tho signs of the real trustworthiness of the method soon came to the surface; sets of replies from widely scattered sources corroborated each other and fell into natural groups. One such instance may be cited: it was found in a *number-form*¹ which a Vassar student handed in. Never having seen those of other persons, her representation was independent of any previous knowledge of the subject, yet it bore a strong likeness to several which Mr. Galton had obtained in England. Again, a young physician who had never given the subject any attention before, described to us one evening an oval image, in which the twelve months of the year invariably arranged themselves before his mind's eye; the accompanying drawing gives a rough idea of it.



This image coincides with Mr. Galton's description of several which he collected in England. These are two illustrations among hundreds which might be quoted if this method were in need of vindication. Individual eccentricities are often discredited until the circle of inquiry is widened and one apparently anomalous case is matched and authenticated by a similar one from another source. Individual errors of self-inspection are lost in the general results. It must be kept in mind, however, that those who do not possess a vivid imagery are far less

¹ The term *number-form* has been applied by Mr. Galton to vague images which arise in some minds in connection with the arrangement of numerals.

likely to reply than those who do, so that if the replies are collected at random the averages are apt to be too high.

We give below an abstract from the series of thirteen questions which we distributed; among these, numbers 5, 6, and 12 were taken with some slight change from Mr. Galton's series; the remainder were original. Beneath the questions is printed a portion of one of the sets of replies which we received.

The object of these Questions is to ascertain the degree in which the power of forming images in the mind's eye exists in different individuals, and at various ages in the same individual; also how it is influenced by intellectual pursuits and tastes and by the states of mind and body both at the time the images are formed and when they are reproduced.

QUESTIONS.

4. Estimate the relative vividness of your remembrances of (a) Form, (b) Color, (c) Odors, (d) Touches, (e) Sounds.

5. *Persons*.—Can you recall with equal ease the faces of near relatives, friends, or people you have seen but once? Can you cause the image of a well-known person to sit, stand, or go through unusual motions such as in Calisthenics? Where a face is with difficulty recalled what mental method do you adopt to facilitate the process?

6. *Comparison with reality*.—Have you ever mistaken a mental image for reality when in health and wide awake? How frequently do mental images arise in your mind without an effort of the will?

9. *Emotions*.—Can you recall emotions or states of mind and feeling as clearly as images of external objects? Which do you recall most vividly—(a) natural scenes, (b) persons, (c) states of mind during prominent events in your history?

10. *Physical state*.—(a) Are the most vivid mental images that you can now bring up associated with any definite physical state at the time you formed them, such as active exercise on horseback or in running, or such as comparative repose in reading or study? (b) Do you seem to be able to call up mental images easier at one time of the day than another, or in an active rather than a quiet state of body? (c) If you have ever experienced any impairment of vision how has this affected your visualising power at the time or subsequently?

11. *State of mind*.—What was the state of mind in which the most vivid mental images you can now recall, were formed? In what states of mind can you recall mental images most readily?

12. *Childhood and age*.—Have your powers of visualising varied much in your recollection? At what age were the earliest mental images formed which you can still recall. State if you can what is the character of those images—do they seem as bright as those formed in later years? What

events of your home life in childhood do you recall most readily or vividly?

13. Have you come suddenly upon an entirely new scene, and while certain of its novelty felt inwardly that you had seen it before—with a conviction that you were revisiting a dimly familiar locality? Mention if you can an instance or two in which this has occurred. Has any satisfactory explanation of this experience ever suggested itself to you?

REPLIES.

4. Form is vivid. I can see the shape of almost every article of furniture. Color is not very distinct. Odors are only distinct when physical state calls them up, as odor of food when hungry. Touches are merely clear, while sounds are often very vivid. Certain sounds make me shiver to think of them, so vivid are they.

5. I have no image of my nearest friends, but can call up the face of some person I have met lately. But I cannot do this more than two or three times when the face is lost to my vision. I can place figures of persons in certain positions; for instance, I can see my father, excepting his face, in his pulpit. The way I call up what faces I can is by thinking and imaging their surroundings or dress.

6. I never mistook a mental vision for reality. Mental images, since I have been in college, have been almost wholly by will, but formerly they came more readily.

9. I do, and even more vividly. I feel over my sorrows, etc., often most keenly. I recall natural scenery more vividly than faces, but mental states most vividly—often in feeling over mental states, involuntarily acting, tho I cannot say that I ever mistake them for reality.

10. Mental images, so far as I have been able to observe, come most in a passive state of body, and are not associated with any particular exercise.

11. When I am engaged in any kind of mental labor my visions do not come. When I am in a comparatively pensive state with no particular mental object in view, I am most apt to have images.

12. My visualising power I feel is not so good as it was a few years ago. I do not remember when I did not have mental images. I recall very vividly my sister falling into the water and how she looked when she was rescued, tho I was not over four or five years old at the time.

13. I always form a mental image of a place to which I am going for the first time. Sometimes the actual scene conforms with my image, but by a little effort of memory I am usually able to trace the connection.

These answers are somewhat above the average, but upon the whole the replies were intelligently written, and afforded a large quantity of fresh material.

Figuratively speaking, the machinery of our visual memory works unevenly, well oiled here and rusty there; talent for imag-

ing one class of objects may be offset by a marked unskilfulness in imaging another. As Mr. Galton has observed, no one could have foreseen the extent of individual variation which this investigation has disclosed. We wish here to lay the emphasis not upon our imagery of classes of objects, for that largely hinges upon individual taste and education, but upon the caprice of our imagery among objects of the same class. Take faces, concerning which our information is amplest: prominent as they are in our chambers of imagery, no one seems to have an even gift of recalling them, as shown in a number of answers to *Question 5*, selected at random.

(1) I can recall the features of some exceedingly well-known persons, as of my own family; (2) It is hard for me to image faces with great distinctness of detail; (3) I can recall comparative strangers with more ease than near relatives; (4) I can recall the features of many persons, of almost any one, better than of my friends and relatives; (5) I can recall the features of all whom I have ever known intimately, except my mother; (6) I frequently recall faces with vividness, *but not at will*; (7) I can recall the features of males better than of females; (8) I can only recall the features of those who have been lately seen; (9) There are a few persons very well known to me whose features I absolutely cannot recall, and it is very annoying; (10) I can recall readily persons, friends and relations; (11) I can recall all quite distinctly, but those with whom I am associating every day, with more distinctness than others, as my classmates at college better than my friends at home.

Various as these cases are, a more deliberate view of them suggests a number of underlying principles which give a distinctive character to the imagery of each person and are not beyond our finding out; beneath these principles are still deeper causes quite beyond present search. Let us look at some of these cases more carefully. Number 8 is a person whose imaging power in general is quite high; he resembles number 11 in his images of persons; they are bright soon after they are formed, but when some weeks have elapsed they lose distinctness. Another writer says: "To every rule I can lay down I can find exceptions, but I think this is absolutely true: for a few days after seeing a face I can recall it more or less clearly; gradually I lose the power, and after a week at the longest I am unable to bring it back." Numbers 3, 4, and 10 may also be grouped; the more frequently

they see a face, the more difficult it is for them to visualise it. Numbers 1 and 10 give testimony which is directly opposed to this. Number 5 is a somewhat exceptional case, but it is confirmed by others, one of whom writes: "I can see all relatives with whom I have been very intimate, distinctly. Yet there are two or three persons with whom I am nearly as intimate as with my parents, and I cannot visualise them at all distinctly." Others who form clear images of natural scenery say they cannot see faces at all. Number 6 speaks of his difficulty in recalling faces at the moment when he wishes to do so; others say the same. Their images defy the most determined effort to bring them forth at one moment and flash out spontaneously the next.

In one's images of persons it is obvious that the obstacles lie both in the original impression and in the recalling power. Of some faces which perhaps lack individuality we can make no clear mental record at all; or perhaps the record is clear for some days or weeks and then is either obliterated or it refuses our summons; or, again, we form a clear mental record of a face the first time we see it, and after seeing it a number of times the individual records confuse each other. Then our recalling power may be wholly at fault, images may elude us altho we are confident we possess them. It follows that in many cases we cannot decide where the responsibility lies, whether the recording or recalling power is out of gear; if an image occasionally refuses the summons of the will what a short step it is to its never appearing before the mind's eye voluntarily, and just as we are inferring that we do not possess it, some extraordinary stimulus brings it forth. Phantasies which arise in the mind uncalled for are not only of little service to us, but are inconsistent with close thinking; we therefore, as students, avoid them; when we cease to exercise our will-power upon our visualising faculty, we take the first step towards losing what may become an invaluable ally of study. Images under control are as useful as mere day-dreams are worthless. Replies to *Question 6* from a number of advanced students illustrate how variable is the tenure of the will over our imagery:

"Since I came to college my images have been almost wholly voluntary, formerly they came at random;" "Distinct images rarely, confused images

frequently, come involuntarily: the latter may be made more clear by especial attention;" "Very often I cannot drive such images from me;" "My brightest images come when I do not call them; some faces which I can never recall come unasked."

As to the trouble which many experience in recalling faces as compared with more stable objects, M. Taine, among other writers, offers the correct explanation: "And so when I think of a person, I know my memory wavers between twenty different expressions, smiling, serious, unhappy, the face bent on one side or the other." Several students write that when they are unable to recall a face they try to visualise a photograph of it; here the image is strengthened by repetition since the original never varies. Nevertheless it is probably true of imagery as of memory for abstract facts, that the repeated impressions even of a fixed object may sometimes tend to obliterate each other. Various other devices are resorted to to assist a feeble imaging power. Some construct a face by a halting process, adding feature to feature until the whole is complete. Analogous to this is the statement of one student that when in poor health he can only see a portion of a face, say three or four of the features at a time. Galton has treated of these peculiarities quite fully.

A question enters here which is of the greatest interest. Does the mind ever automatically blend the different memories of a face or of a number of different faces into one generalized image, or can such a blending be effected by any voluntary or conscious process? Have we, for example, an image for the class Chinaman which is not taken from any particular individual that we have seen, but is a resultant of the faces of a number of Chinamen? In other words, have mental pictures been formed by any process which corresponds even in a remote degree to a composite photograph taken from a number of faint impressions superposed? It is true we unconsciously combine separate features of different faces or landscapes, or, as frequently happens where memory is indistinct, we may mistake a general resemblance for identity; but such pictures, which are among the ordinary products of imagination, are radically distinct from a composite, which as a whole resembles all, but in its parts is unlike each. Mr. Galton, if we understand him aright, answers this question in the affirmative, but it seems to us still open to very

considerable doubt. Is it not probable, among other explanations that might be offered, that such memories may be of particular scenes or faces which we mistake for generalized images because we cannot locate them, the reference points of associated time or space having been forgotten?

There can be no doubt that the mind's eye ordinarily reverts consciously or unconsciously to the appearance or expression of a particular moment.

"Accuracy and distinctness decrease," says one writer, "as I depart from particular instances." Another says, "I try to remember some vivid experience in which that person figured conspicuously; I can then recall the exact expression of the face as it appeared when it engrossed my attention."

Others rely upon association with a particular locality, dress, or attitude of the body. This for example is apt to be the case with mothers when they try to recall their children at different periods of life.

"There is an absence of flexibility," writes Mr. Galton, "in the mental imagery of most persons. They find that the first image they have acquired is apt to hold its place tenaciously in spite of subsequent need of correction." In imaging a friend's face the favorite or most frequent expression naturally rises. We have met two cases which illustrate the occasional obstinacy of our visual memory. One often hears the expression "rooting out old ideas;" the same phrase may be aptly applied to images. In the first case the substitution of a later for an earlier image progressed without the subject's being at all aware of it.

"I recall a lady aged about twenty-five," says the writer, "who lost her father when she was twenty. An artist was subsequently engaged to paint a portrait of her father from an old photograph. He made many changes at the suggestion of friends and relations so as to make it conform as nearly as possible to the appearance before death. Said this lady, 'It is a poor likeness, and does not look like my father at all.' She was accustomed to call up his image as he sat in his usual seat, but he always bore the image he bore before death. In about two years she discovered that she could only recall her father with the likeness which he bore in the painting. From association she had become familiar with the picture and gradually lost the true image of her father. It was just as easy to recall him, but when she did so he looked exactly as he did in the picture, and she could not summon his face at all as it appeared in life."

The second case is a remarkable one, and is well authenticated; we give the writer's account of it:

"A year or two ago I was suffering from near-sightedness and seeing everything double. I had an operation performed by Dr. A., which, with the use of glasses, restored my eyesight and corrected the imperfect co-ordination. If I attempt to recall scenes that I saw while my eyes were out of order I invariably see them as they appeared during that time, altho I may have seen them many times since the operation. For instance, in the case of the minister in the pulpit at home I see two images of him, no matter how much I may try to get rid of one of them. My recollections of the Examination hall and of the Examiner, upon entrance to college, are affected in the same way, altho I have since attended several courses of lectures in that room. When I think of the Examiner, his several positions are all very clear, but all double. My recollection of the office in which the operation was performed is also of everything as double, altho I saw it only twice before the restoration of my sight and many times after. The objects which I have seen since the operation are always single when recalled."

The images formed in childhood are with most persons clearer, brighter, and more numerous than those of later years. Among twenty-eight students three believe that their powers of imagery have improved, thirteen say that they have not varied, twelve say that they have diminished. This is due in many cases to disuse, for there can be no doubt that the elaborate imagery of some older minds is far more wonderful than anything found among children. Children's images, apart from the natural strength of their Phantasy, are vivid because they see form, color, and outline dissociated from any distracting ideas which would enter the mind of an adult. A child looks at a pony engrossed with its external characters, rough coat, long mane, and so on without thought of price, age, or disposition. This concentration and simplicity of the mental concept affects the memory as sharp focussing affects a sensitive plate. The earliest images recalled from childhood are amusingly trifling; they are often of objects which touched the childish vanity, such as the first long trowsers or new blue dress, the first day at school, the first steamboat. But it is unquestionable that besides these little events which can be recalled there are images stamped upon our childish minds which are only roused years afterwards by some strong *instigation*.

Our very earliest recollections are in the form of images, not of abstractions. Judging from the average obtained from many writers, most persons can recall one or two scenes of their fourth year, a few can recall objects which were seen between the second and third year. One lady writes :

"When I was eighteen years old I suddenly recalled a vivid picture seen from a steamer deck while held by my nurse, the oblique lattice below the steamer rail and the silver reflection of the moon on the water forming a path over the lake. I learned from my mother subsequently that I was nineteen months old at the time, and was on a journey over Lake Chautauqua."

We have other cases which are similar. Carpenter gives an instance of visual memory extending back to the age of eighteen months. Still earlier impressions may have been recorded by others. The suspicion in regard to such early images is that where the associations are forgotten we cannot be assured of their genuineness. They may either be of objective or subjective origin, the former produced on the retina by external objects, the latter mere coinage of the imagination. We can clearly visualise our dreams, and conscientious as our self-scrutiny is, such visualisations may be mistaken for images of real objects. Here is the key to the ludicrous mistake which young people sometimes fall into of insisting upon their recollection of scenes which happened before their birth, as in the case of a little boy who declared he had been present at his mother's wedding, "because he saw it all so plainly."

One point worth reverting to here is the evidence we have of images recorded in the mind, which, if ever recalled, arise so vaguely that our consciousness only gets the dimmest glance at them; they suffice merely to give us a vague sense of recognition. Hawthorne, in "Our Old Home," describes his first visit to Stanton Harcourt, near Oxford. All the interior details of the famous old kitchen seemed unaccountably familiar to him; there was no freshness or sense of novelty about it, and he was quite at a loss to account for his apparent familiarity with the place. Several weeks afterwards he suddenly recollected that when only eleven years old he had read Pope's description of the kitchen. The vivid subjective image formed at the time had never been effaced.

The mistaking of images for reality is as common among children as it is rare among adults. In advancing age we become skeptical, not only of facts, but appearances: every mental state runs under a fire of scrutiny; we have acquired a hearty contempt for visual deceptions of every sort as implying a lack of mental control and contrary to the whole tendency of good education. An image attains the force of reality only when the faculty has the ascendancy over every other; when the attention is riveted upon the object, the gates to the outer world are fast closed, and we are in a world of phantasy. Illustrating how liable we are to sense-deception while in this strongly subjective state is the following:

"Once after reading of Lady Dedlock in a chapter describing a stormy evening in 'Bleak House,' I took an umbrella to go out, and was surprised to find it a clear night; I was positive I had heard the rain on the windows." Again, "Once, while seated in my room reading, I thought I heard some one sweeping in the next room, the door between being open. Finally the dust became so disagreeable as to cause me to cough; I arose to close the door, and was surprised to find the supposed noise of sweeping was made by a dog's tail wagging on a straw matting not far from me."

A thoughtful reply to *Question 6* may be quoted here: "I realize that a mental image is formed within the mind and thence projected outwards—a reversed process which I could never mistake for reality. The image is of a different nature and effect from that of a real object." With children there is no such sifting process. We find numerous examples of their deception; similar stories to the one below are often met with in family lore:

"I have been told," says the writer, "that when I was a small child I possessed an imaginary friend, to whom I was often overheard talking an hour at a time, and apparently satisfied with the reality of the conversation. Having ceased to speak of or to this imaginary friend for some time, I was asked what had become of him. I answered that he had been killed in the war (then raging), and was never heard referring to him again. I have only been told this by my family, and cannot tell how far I was myself deceived."

We have been dealing thus far with visualisations of color and form; the replies to *Question 4* have given us an opportunity of comparing these with the recalled sensations of touch,

taste, sound, and smell. Only a few persons can recall odors ; one writer asserts, on the other hand, that odors are the most vivid of all his recalled sensations. Touches are the next rarest, then sound, then color, while form is most frequently recalled. Of twenty-five writers, all say they can recall form in some degree, and two thirds of these recall form more distinctly than anything else which comes to the senses. Colors, according to this series of replies, can be fairly recalled by about two persons out of three, but not so vividly as form. With only one fourth the number was the recalling of form and color equal ; with one tenth was the recalling of form, color, and sounds equal. Those who recalled sounds could in few instances recall colors readily, and in many cases there was a vivid recollection of color with a dim idea of form, or *vice versa*. Nineteen could recall form best, eleven could recall colors best or as well as form, nine for sounds, three for touches, and two for odors. These proportions probably indicate but roughly those which would be obtained from a larger number of persons. Among individuals they partly attest the relative inborn acuteness of the various senses, as well as individual preferences for certain qualities of objects ; objects of distaste are naturally suppressed from our imagery as far as we can control it ; throughout all is the principle so well brought out by Mr. Galton that our powers of reviving the impressions of different senses are very uneven.

There seems to be no invariable correlation between power of imaging objects and that of reviving states of mind or feeling, (*Question 11*) ; while many persons possess both, others vividly recall emotions with no power of imagery, or the reverse. In the original impress upon the mind they are somewhat akin. A careworn face rouses a sudden sympathy ; associated together, the face and the emotion make a lasting stamp on the memory. Why are they dissociated in their revival, the sympathy actually, perhaps painfully, felt again ; the face perchance a mere recollection, as of a dry fact with no mental picture ? This is an unexplainable inequality in the action of the reproductive powers, which is without question characteristic of many minds.

Here are two instances selected from a number :

"I can only recall states of mind with a great effort, and then imperfectly, the results being of a volatile character. In recalling natural scenery the image is fairly clear, the objects are defined pretty much as they are in nature, and the colors are quite distinct."

"I recall emotions or states of mind much more vividly than images of external objects. The image of my room at college is very dim, few of the objects are well defined at once, and I have little power over color in my images."

It is a familiar fact that images have certain physiological and emotional states, as the condition of their making a strong impression upon the memory; but it is a curious and rather unlooked-for truth, that similar states of body and mind effect very diverse results in different people. With the majority, the various stronger emotions are associated with the formation of lasting images; with one person, joy gives rise to the most vivid pictures; with another, sorrow; but the brightest pictures are formed in some minds when undisturbed by physical or emotional excitement.

"When the mind has been in a perfect state of relaxation," says one writer, "I have formed nearly all the images which I can now recall." Another writes: "The state of mind in which the most vivid images were formed was one of rest, when I could take in slowly or comprehensively the occurring events."

So with our physical states, their influences are quite as diverse. Our facility in recalling natural scenery is undoubtedly due in some measure to the healthy lung action of out-door exercise and pure air, and resulting purity of blood circulating in the brain. A member of a Hare and Hounds Club speaks of the accuracy with which he recalls the minutest details of a stretch of country covered by a long run; while after repeated trials the interior of his college room rose in a very confused manner before his mind's eye. With many persons, on the other hand, bodily exercise is not conducive to the clear exercise of this faculty. "I can bring objects most clearly before my mind," writes one student, "when nervous stimuli are aroused and muscular are not."

In this paper a mere outline has been given of the information which we have received. Abundant as our material is, it

would still appear that we are merely upon the threshold of the knowledge which this method of psychological research opens out. The meagreness of what has been already learned is apparent when one thinks of the countless similar channels of inquiry as yet untried.

HENRY F. OSBORN.

III.

So far Professor Osborn. I have a few remarks to make in closing.

There are mistakes in some of the replies, arising from a failure to apprehend the relation between the visualising or imaging power and memory. The phantasy is an element in memory. There may be images without any recognition of time in our past experience; but in all memory there is a representation of the object. When the query is put, "What sort of image have we of an emotion, say of fear?" the person answering thinks we are asking about a figure, and says he has nothing of the kind, whereas he has a very vivid remembrance of his fear as a mental affection.

There is often a vagueness in the answers because there is no test to apply. If we put the question, "Was the day cold?" to a number of persons, we may get discordant answers when they trust to their sensations, and do not try them by a thermometer. In like manner, when the question is put, Was your idea of such a thing vivid? we are apt to get varied answers.

This article is meant to be a contribution to a psychological subject which invites to further investigation. It proceeds on the method which Bacon held in view: "Does any one doubt (rather than object) whether we speak merely of natural philosophy, or of the other sciences also, such as logics, ethics, politics, as about to be perfected by our method?" "We certainly," he replies, "understand all these things which have been referred to; and like as the vulgar logic which regulates things by the syllogism pertains not to the natural but all science, so ours which proceeds by induction embraces them all. For thus we would form a history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty and the like, as also examples of civil affairs, not omitting the mental emotions of memory, composition, divi-

sion, judgment, and the rest, just as we form such of heat and cold, of light, vegetation, and such like." Investigations on this plan are diligently pursued in the present day : as an example we have Prof. Stanley Hall's article in this REVIEW (May, 1883). I rejoice in these researches as throwing light on secondary and subsidiary topics of deep interest. But I deny that this is the only or the main method in which the mind is to be studied. After all, we come to know what perceptions are, what judgments, reasonings, remorses, hopes, fears, resolves are, by self-consciousness or the internal sense. The statistical or tabular method is to be called in as auxiliary to the other.

JAMES McCOSH.

THE MORROW OF THE GLADSTONE ADMINISTRATION.

ONE is sometimes obliged to contemplate that which one least desires to occur. The Gladstone Ministry has, we are convinced, been of the very greatest advantage to England, to Europe, to the world. It has checked "jingoism"—it has substituted moderation and a regard for the rights of others, in the place of a cynical assertion of supreme indifference to anything but self-interest. Europe and America equally see in the continuance of Mr. Gladstone in office a pledge for the continuance of peace. It is just possible that a Gladstone Ministry may "drift into war;" but it is, morally speaking, quite impossible that it should desire war, provoke war, or continue war unnecessarily. Recent years have seen, instead of a restless egotism, bent on astounding the world by vast projects, strange *coups de théâtre*, and novel phrases, a recurrence to the justice, calmness, and reticence which were the characteristics of English policy towards foreign countries in former times. Mr. Gladstone is one of the few statesmen who can control the British lion in his bellicose humors, can induce him to own himself in the wrong, and, if need be, to apologize. His ministry favors at once external peace and internal tranquillity. It is conservative without being reactionary, progressive without paving the way for revolution. England and the world at large are to be congratulated on a rule that is strong without being provocative, and conciliatory without inviting attack.

But alas! it is too true that "all things come to an end"—dynasties, states, nations. Least of all are ministries exempt from the common doom. In France, since Sedan, the average duration of a government has been six months. In England ministerial longevity is somewhat greater; but still the average

term falls considerably short of three years. In the fifty-three years from 1827 to 1880—which is the period over which our recollection extends—the number of ministries has been nineteen. Thus, on the mere doctrine of averages, and apart from any special considerations, the Gladstone Administration, which came into office in November, 1880, should now—October, 1883—be approaching its term. It has already surpassed in duration eleven ministries out of the last nineteen. It must be exceptionally vigorous if it is to last much longer.

Unfortunately, instead of exceptional vigor, there attaches to it an element of exceptional weakness in the advanced age of its head. Mr. Gladstone was born in the year 1809, and is consequently now seventy-four years of age. He has been in Parliament for above fifty years. Equally indefatigable in office and in opposition, he has had cares on his shoulders during the whole of that extended period, which would have utterly worn out any ordinary man. He has been the chief speaker of every government whereof he has formed a part. He has familiarized himself with every branch of administration. He has mastered the deepest problems of finance. Literature has occupied him scarcely less than politics; and each interval between his terms of office has been marked by the production of a book. The words “rest” and “holiday” convey no meaning to his ears, or at any rate he does not conceive of them as having any personal application to himself. We have known him, at the close of a session longer and more exhausting than usual, when the world imagined that he was doing nothing but inhaling sea-breezes or wandering upon Welsh mountain-sides, rush headlong into the study of a German quarto of eight hundred pages on the derivation of certain tribes in Albania from the Pelasgi. However magnificent the *physique* with which nature endowed him at the first, it is impossible that time and toil should not have impaired it, or that he can continue to make the calls, which he is always making, upon it for long. He has often spoken of retirement. Tho his mind is as vigorous as ever, and the maxim, “Solve senescentem mature sanus equum,” has no application at present to his intellectual powers, yet he would do well to spare the feebler physical nature, which cannot but have been weakened by the wear and tear of years.

It may be expected that ere long the advice of physicians and the tender concern of close friends and near relatives will prevail to bring about the retirement so often announced, so imprudently delayed, so regrettable, yet so necessary. If Mr. Gladstone will consent to take moderate care of his health, his friends may look to see him exceed the term of life laid down for "the strong" by the Psalmist, and perhaps outlive the century. So long as he lives he will be a political force, affecting the world by his written, if not by his spoken, oratory. And he may do good service in literature also. His Homeric Studies are still incomplete, and would be improved by compression and rearrangement. There was a time when he meditated a "Life of Homer"—an exhibition of the man as he reveals himself to the careful student of his works. May not the literary world still hope to receive this gift from his hands? It would fitly close the literary career begun at Oxford, and covering more than half a century.

Such being the situation, politicians both in Europe and in America are asking, "What next, and next?" What is to happen when Mr. Gladstone ceases to lead his party, and accepts the retirement he has so well earned? What is the Future of Parties and Politics? Who is the Liberal "coming man"?

There are four persons who stand out from among the statesmen of the Liberal party as politicians of large capacity, to whom the task of forming a government might conceivably be entrusted—Lord Granville, Lord Hartington, Sir William Harcourt, and Mr. Chamberlain. Lord Granville is conciliation itself. Not only has he never made himself an enemy, but he has gained the affection of almost all who have ever been brought into contact with him. He is an excellent speaker,—judicious, ready, persuasive, winning,—a good administrator, and a most amiable man. He would find no difficulty in obtaining colleagues. His appointment would be popular abroad. But he is not a strong man. His Liberalism is of a very mild type. He is not gifted with the power of exercising ascendancy over others. A cabinet under his gentle rule might soon develop irreconcilable differences for want of proper control. Moreover, his position as a member of the Upper House is against him; since the time of Sir Robert Peel it has been

an accepted tradition, more especially with the Liberal party, that the Prime Minister ought to be in the House of Commons. These reasons have operated in the past to prevent the formation of a ministry from being entrusted to Lord Granville, and they will probably continue to operate in the future. The conjuncture must be a very peculiar one which would lead to the construction of a Granville Cabinet ; and nothing points to such a conjuncture at present.

Sir William Harcourt's qualifications for the office of Liberal leader are almost exactly the opposite to those which recommend Earl Granville. Sir William is essentially a strong man. His views are pronounced and decided. In action he is prompt and bold. In speech he is as ready as his brother secretary ; but he despises conciliation—he is hard, bitter, cutting. Every one has heard the story of the three *blasé* dinner-givers, who, desirous of a new sensation, agreed to dine together at their club, and each to invite for the occasion the most disagreeable man of his acquaintance. The day came, and only one guest made his appearance, the three hosts having each invited the same person. The story has been told no doubt at different times of a hundred different individuals : just now in London society it attaches to Sir William Harcourt. The fact is that Sir William is too plain-spoken to make many friends. He is not mealy-mouthed. When under the excitement of strong feeling, or even sometimes without that excuse, he uses hard words—he calls a spade a spade, and not “an agricultural implement.” Thus he is what is called “unpopular.” Men respect him, fear him ; but they do not love him. Were he entrusted by her Majesty with the task of forming an administration, he might have some difficulty in obtaining colleagues. Men will serve with him, but would feel a reluctance to serve under him. Further, he is by education and early practice a lawyer ; and there is a prejudice in England against lawyers for the first post in the kingdom. Lawyers, of late years, have not even been allowed to lead the Commons. Great as are Sir William Harcourt's abilities, and excellent as has been his conduct of the Home Office for the last three years, clever and powerful as have been his speeches, bold and brave as has been his demeanor towards the disaffected, he can scarcely look to obtain

the highest position open to a British subject, being a lawyer, whatever his merits.

Lord Hartington's claims to be considered when the vacancy in the leadership occurs are too obvious to need much exposition. He has twenty years of administrative experience; has been Postmaster-General, Chief Secretary for Ireland, Secretary of State for War, and Secretary of State for India; he led the opposition in the House of Commons during Mr. Gladstone's semi-retirement from 1876 to 1880; and he was sent for by the Queen to form a ministry in the last-named year. It is admitted even by his political opponents, that he "might then have formed a ministry with the entire approval of the people" of England, having "thoroughly well earned success and deserved it." He would be accepted with equal readiness now. Tho not an eloquent speaker, he is a fair debater; he has judgment, tact, and self-restraint. He has won the confidence of the Liberal party by a straightforward and fearless honesty, as well as by a rare readiness to yield his own claims to those of others. Members of Parliament feel that they can thoroughly depend upon him. To what he has once pledged himself he will adhere, "tho it were to his own hindrance." There is no one in the Lower House who is better liked, whether by his own party, or by that to which he is opposed.

There is, however, one obstacle to his adoption as the Liberal leader. Lord Hartington, tho now in the House of Commons, is the heir to a dukedom, and his father, the Duke of Devonshire, is seventy-five years of age. The selection of the noble Marquis for leader of his party would either be a temporary arrangement, a postponement of any real solution of the existing difficulty, or it would involve at no remote date a departure from the political maxim, that the head of an administration should be in the Commons.

Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the eyes of some Liberal politicians have been turned towards Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Chamberlain, tho young as a man and still younger as a statesman, is a man of vigor and power, one of the best speakers in the House of Commons, and, according to the *Quarterly Review* (July, 1883), "the foremost representative of the Radical school." He first became generally

known as chairman of the Birmingham School Board, an office which he held from 1873 to 1876. In the last-named of these years Birmingham elected him as one of her members; and it is thus little more than seven years since he entered on the Parliamentary arena. He rapidly, however, won his spurs, and when the Gladstone Ministry was formed in April, 1880, it surprised no one that he was selected by the Premier for the important office of President of the Board of Trade. Mr. Chamberlain has since distinguished himself, partly by his speeches in the House, but still more by his extra-parliamentary utterances, which however have been more remarkable for their boldness than for their discretion. It is early for him to be put forward as a possible future Premier; but he is certainly so put forward by his friends, and in forecasting coming political changes we must of necessity take into account his pretensions.

Such being the candidates for the post of successor to Mr. Gladstone whom circumstances, or their friends, put forward at the present time, it follows to inquire which of them is most likely to obtain the preference. Now here we touch upon somewhat delicate ground. It is the prerogative of the Queen, on occasion of a vacancy in the office of Prime Minister, however produced, to summon to her presence any one out of the whole number of her subjects, and lay her commands upon him to attempt the formation of a ministry. There have been times when personal likings or dislikes, recollection of past quarrels, anger at supposed slights, have been allowed to actuate the sovereign at such a moment, and to determine the person for whom he should send. But nothing of this kind is at present to be feared. Her Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria has shown herself throughout the whole of her reign the most constitutional of sovereigns. She has suffered no personal motive to step in between herself and her duty. Beyond a doubt she will send for the individual who, when the vacancy occurs, shall be pointed out by the circumstances of the time as the proper one. On the last occasion, in April, 1880, she sent for the Marquis of Hartington. The Marquis has been blamed for not jumping at her offer, and told that in declining to undertake the formation of a cabinet, and recommending Her Majesty to summon Mr. Gladstone to her counsels, he let slip a chance which

will never come back to him again. But the bold prophet who makes this prediction is not infallible. The Marquis rose rather than fell in the estimation of most people by his act of self-renunciation and self-denial. It has yet to be proved that Her Majesty viewed his conduct differently. With the exception of a few bitter partisans, politicians of all shades are agreed that in the year 1880 Mr. Gladstone was the indispensable man. No ministry could have stood without him, and in no ministry of which he formed a part could he have been less than head. Lord Hartington discharged a plain duty in informing Her Majesty of the true position of affairs, and would have failed in his duty if he had not done so. He gave the Queen excellent advice; and his conduct in the past proves his fitness to be her chief adviser in the future.

If Her Majesty has shortly to exert once more her constitutional privilege of selecting her Prime Minister, it will be natural for her thoughts to revert to the noble lord whom she honored by her preference in 1880. It is possible, however, that she may be differently advised. When a Prime Minister resigns his office on any ground whatever, it becomes his privilege and his duty to advise the sovereign as to his successor. Lord Beaconsfield in 1880 recommended the Queen to send for the Marquis of Hartington; and Mr. Gladstone, if he resigns, must point out some person or persons to Her Majesty as suited for the position which will become vacant. The Queen is not bound to take his advice, but it is his duty to offer it. And in doing so he may either recommend strongly a single individual, or he may point out that there are several fully qualified persons, who would probably be willing to undertake the task, and leave Her Majesty to make her choice among them.

It is supposed by some that Mr. Gladstone, tho he began his political life as a Conservative, has now strong Radical leanings, and that he would regard Mr. Chamberlain—"the foremost representative of the Radical school"—as his most fit successor. Who but Mr. Chamberlain, it is said, can be counted on to carry out that programme of reforms, duly signed by Mr. Gladstone and published in the *Nineteenth Century*, which has been thus summarized :

1. London Municipal Reform; 2. County Government; 3. County Franchise; 4. Liquor Laws; 5. Irish Borough Franchise; 6. Irish University Question; 7. Opium Revenue; 8. Criminal Law Procedure; 9. Responsibility of Masters for Injury to Workmen; 10. Reduction of Public Expenditure; 11. Probate Duty; 12. Indian Finance; 13. Working of the Home Government of India; 14. City Companies; 15. Burial Laws; 16. Valuation of Property; 17. Law of the Medical Profession; 18. Law of Entail and Settlement; 19. Corrupt Practices at Elections; 20. Expenses of Elections; 21. Reorganization of the Revenue Departments; 22. The Currency; 23. Law of Bankruptcy; 24. Law of Banking; 25. Law of Distress; 26. Law of Charities and Mortmain; 27. Loans for Local Purposes; 28. Game Laws; 29. Distribution as well as Redistribution of Seats; 30. Savings Banks Finance; 31. The Bright Clauses of the Irish Land Act.

Who but Mr. Chamberlain can secure that support of the advanced Liberals, without which the party is powerless, and must yield place to its rivals? Mr. Chamberlain, we are assured, is "the Coming Man"—the probable next Prime Minister. He will be recommended by Mr. Gladstone and accepted by the Queen; he will dissolve Parliament, obtain a Radical majority, and direct the destinies of England for the next ten, fifteen, or twenty years.

Certainly, if there is any reasonable prospect of such a result, the outlook is serious. Mr. Chamberlain's views may not be so pronounced as they are assumed to be, and time may modify them, as his mind and judgment ripen. Most people become more conservative as they grow older. But Mr. Chamberlain's present opinions are assuredly such as, if carried into action, would cause, or perhaps we should rather say constitute, a revolution. Mr. Chamberlain has declared himself in favor of manhood suffrage, equal electoral districts, and the payment of Members of Parliament out of the general revenue of the country. He believes the Church of England to have been a continual hindrance to all political and intellectual progress, and holds that the Liberal party "will be blind to the teachings of the present, and deaf to the evidence of the past, if they do not take the first opportunity to remove that perpetual stumbling-block" out of the way. He is opposed to the existing Land laws, and would have them completely remodelled. He thinks that "the present condition of things with regard to land involves a great injury and wrong to the laborers employed on

the soil." What alterations he would make we have not been told ; but we see no reason to doubt that they would be violent and sweeping. Perhaps the responsibility which attaches to power, and the hesitation naturally felt by every one who has to translate thought into act, might have a sobering effect, if from President of the Board of Trade Mr. Chamberlain became First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister, and the course of action which he would then pursue might fall very far short of the programme published to the world in the Bradford and Rochdale speeches ; but the risk is too great, the harm that might be done too vast and irremediable, for us to contemplate with calmness the supposed probability of the Queen's choice of a Premier to replace Mr. Gladstone falling upon the junior member for Birmingham.

We do not believe that Mr. Gladstone will make the recommendation which is supposed. Tho it suits the purpose of the Tory party to represent the existing Prime Minister as a Radical and a revolutionist, opposed to all the time-honored institutions of the country, and at heart a foe to monarchy itself, a calm and dispassionate consideration of his political course will easily convince any reasonable man that the facts are otherwise. Mr. Gladstone began his public life as a "Peelite," or Moderate Conservative, and remained firmly attached to Sir Robert Peel up to the day of his death. It was as a "Peelite" that he entered the Ministry of Lord Aberdeen in 1852 ; and tho subsequently he joined the ranks of the Liberal party, and consented to hold office under Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell, yet a substratum of Conservatism has always underlain his Liberal opinions. It is true that he devised the Succession Duty, for which the landed interest has never forgiven him, and probably never will forgive ; but otherwise his name is coupled with no measure which has even seemed to be levelled against the aristocratic class. He has been led on to measures from which he would once have shrunk, but only when public opinion anticipated him and demanded the change. The concessions which he has made in Ireland are not concessions to democracy, but to Nationalism, and have been granted with the object of stopping disaffection, not of injuring landlords. Mr. Gladstone has upheld the Church, the House of Lords, and the Crown, at

a time when large numbers of Liberals denounced them and predicted their downfall. He has strengthened, if not even enlarged, the royal prerogative on more than one occasion, has upheld the dignity of the Peerage by rare and well-deserved creations of new Peers, and has done much to increase the popularity of the Church by a series of excellent ecclesiastical appointments. In opening the churchyards to all he did indeed make a step towards dis-establishment; and if the English were a logical people, the step might have been a fatal one, but as they are not, the concession has done little harm, and is likely to do little harm. The disservice thus done the Church has been small, and it has been amply compensated by the appointment of the Cathedrals and Ecclesiastical Courts Commissions—the one calculated to popularize and invigorate cathedral establishments, the other to remedy crying evils and prevent conflicts between the Church and the law. Mr. Gladstone has won confidence as much by what he has refused to do as by what he has done; he has accepted no democratic nostrums, has abstained from tinkering the Constitution. His great triumphs have been administrative and financial. Accepting the principle of free trade, he has remodelled and simplified the tariff till it presses upon no industry and hampers no branch of commerce; he has kept the balance even between direct and indirect taxation, and has thus made the "Upper Ten Thousand" and the masses contribute respectively their due shares to the revenue; he has steered clear of a graduated income tax; he has not threatened the bishops; he has not denounced landlordism; he has not spoken of the House of Lords as an effete institution. Briefly, his policy has been constructive rather than destructive, and his aim to make the various parts of the political machine work better together rather than to pull it to pieces.

It is not at all clear, therefore, that Mr. Gladstone would desire the advent to power of any statesman who entertained opinions resembling those of Mr. Chamberlain. It is one thing to accept an advanced Radical as a colleague in a ministry, and to assign him a subordinate place; it is quite another to lend a helping hand towards his elevation to the post of Premier. And Mr. Chamberlain's own antecedents scarcely mark him out so clearly for the position as to render it necessary that he should

be pressed on the Crown by a retiring ministry of a very different way of thinking. Premiers are not usually chosen from among those whose parliamentary experience extends over no more than seven years, or from those whose official life is limited to three. Transcendent merit raised the younger Pitt to the headship of a ministry when he was as new to Parliament in 1783, and very exceptional merit might do the same now that the world is a century older. But can it be said, even by his greatest admirers, that Mr. Chamberlain's merits are so very exceptional? Mr. Chamberlain is a ready, but scarcely an eloquent, speaker. He "has the ear" of the House, but not more than twenty other members. He is not wanting in parliamentary tact, and certainly piloted the Bankruptcy Bill through the shoals and quicksands that threatened it in the Grand Committee with considerable skill and discretion. But discretion is not his strong point generally. It is scarcely discreet to offend Churchmen, who are still a majority, and are likely soon to be a very large majority, of the electors, by describing the Church as "a political manufactured, State-made machine," and "a hindrance to all political and intellectual progress." It is not very discreet to declare war at one and the same time against the Church and the Land, and to proclaim, "I care little which of these great questions we attack first." We doubt if it is discreet to advocate the payment of members of Parliament, for where one elector may entertain the hope of making profit by such an arrangement, there will be hundreds to feel that it will take a certain sum out of their pockets. Mr. Chamberlain is chiefly noticeable at present for the loud and bold avowal of extreme opinions at public meetings and on the hustings, combined with a profound silence on such topics within the walls of the House of Commons. He has been called "the People's Tribune," but he has done nothing as yet to deserve the title; he has not associated his name with any law, unless it be with that for the detection and punishment of fraudulent bankrupts.

We do not believe then in Mr. Chamberlain as "the coming Premier." We hold that "the wish" has been "father to the thought" where the thought has been honestly entertained. We believe, further, that publicity has been given to the thought mainly by those who have not honestly entertained it, but have

wished to cause a general scare throughout the upper classes by the "bogy" of a Chamberlain administration. In love and war all stratagems are considered to be fair; and the exigencies of political strife will always be regarded as justifying the publication of simulated apprehensions. Mr. Chamberlain's claims and prospects are paraded before our eyes with the object of inducing us to lend our aid towards giving the Tories a majority in the next Parliament.

Setting Mr. Chamberlain aside, the candidates for the leadership of the Liberal party, in the event of Mr. Gladstone's retirement, are reduced to three—Lord Granville, Lord Hartington, and Sir William Harcourt; and we regard it as almost certain that one of these three will be the next Liberal Premier. The exact position of affairs at the time when the retirement occurs may to some extent affect the selection; but, unless something very unexpected should occur, we think that the Queen's choice will fall on the Marquis of Hartington.

Having thus settled, so far as we are able, the personal problem, let us further ask, What is likely to be the effect of the impending change on parties, and what influence it may be expected to exert on England's internal and external policy?

There are some who tell us that the existing political parties in England will have to be completely broken up, and then recast and reorganized. Others declare their belief that the result will infallibly be the dissolution of the Liberal party—the absolute and final separation of the Whig section from the Radicals. The writers who advocate this view maintain that Mr. Gladstone is, and has long been, the sole bond of union between the two sections of Liberals, and that his removal from the political arena must be followed by an immediate disruption. The Radicals, they say, are utterly sick of the Whigs, whom they regard as a "Venetian Oligarchy;" they are increasing in strength, and they know it; they have come to despise their weak-kneed allies, and no longer care to dissemble their feelings; they want the "loaves and fishes" of office for themselves, and do not care to share them with colleagues who always contrive to take the lion's portion and leave them the ass's—they are anxious, and intend to get rid of their Whig allies, believing themselves strong enough to do without them. Mr. Gladstone's retirement

will be the signal for the "break-up"—Radicalism will disencumber itself of the old man who has so long sat upon its shoulders, and will set up "on its own hook," leaving Whiggery "out in the cold" to follow what course it pleases. Then will the Whigs be "dished" indeed; and the professors of the "pure faith" of Radicalism will go in and possess the good things which have been too long the heritage of the "weaker brethren."

For our own part we do not anticipate any such consequences. We see no reason to believe that Radicalism is gaining in strength, or that the Radicals are so foolish as to imagine that they have the ball at their feet and can dispense with their old confederates. The band which connects the two sections of the Liberal party is not, in our opinion, Mr. Gladstone, but necessity. Neither section can do without the other. There is still a vast amount of Conservatism in England, and the "Conservative Reaction," of which so many writers in Tory newspapers are wont to speak, is not altogether an unreality. Reactions in political feelings or leanings are continually taking place among the electors; and, while the firm adherents of the two main political creeds are tolerably evenly balanced, the unstable mass of those who have no strong attachments and no very definite views is continually changing its side. The elections of 1873 and 1880 have shown what little dependence can be placed on a large proportion of the electors, and how readily and lightly they transfer their weight from one scale to the other. It will not at all surprise us if at the next General Election—which cannot be farther off than three or four years hence—the Conservatives have a majority. Now, so long as this contingency looms up as probable or even as possible in a not remote future, the Liberal party is in no danger of disruption. The instinct of self-preservation will save it from such a catastrophe. It will not be cajoled into performing the "happy despatch" by the persuasions or the prophecies of its adversaries. The Whigs are too cautious and the Radicals too sensible to push their differences, under the circumstances of the time, to extremities; there is no fear but that they will find a *modus vivendi*, as they have done in the past, so also in the future; the retirement of Mr. Gladstone will make no alteration in their relative strength, and can therefore scarcely affect their position one towards the other.

But it will, no doubt, considerably affect the relative positions of the Conservatives and the Liberals. Mr. Gladstone is a force—a power—the exact value of which in the political equation it is difficult to estimate. He has been the backbone of his party—the tower of strength on which it could always depend, and which has never failed it. The foremost orator of the day—nay, of the century, for we hold him superior even to Canning, the first financier, the best statist, his loss cannot but be severely felt by those whom he has so long led and so often led to victory. The ministry will be seriously weakened by his withdrawal. It cannot replace him. Already it has suffered severe losses by the resignation on various grounds of several of its most prominent members—as Mr. Bright, the Duke of Argyll, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Forster. The single important gain that has accrued to it since its formation—that of Lord Derby—is far from counterbalancing these defections. Lord Derby is a sensible man, a good man of business, and a hard worker. But he is no orator, no originator of new ideas, no political genius. The Cabinet as originally formed in 1880 included at least three men of genius—Mr. Bright, Lord Selborne, and Mr. Gladstone. Should Mr. Gladstone retire it will possess but one; and he is precluded by his position as Chancellor from holding the office of Premier. The adversaries of the ministry will characterize it, so soon as Mr. Gladstone is gone, as “a Cabinet of humdrums,” and it will be difficult to say that there are no grounds for the designation. The Conservatives will be able to show on paper an array of names quite as respectable, quite as brilliant, as those which will remain on the ministerial list when that of Mr. Gladstone has ceased to adorn it.

Still, we see no reason to expect that the loss of strength to the ministry and the ministerial side will be such as to place them at their adversaries' mercy. The present Parliament contains so large a majority of Liberals that neither elections nor individual caprices can make any important change in the balance of parties within the walls of St. Stephen's. The world at large may safely count on the continuance of a Liberal ministry in power, so long as the present Parliament continues. And it need not be dissolved until 1887. England's policy at home and abroad is therefore likely to remain unchanged for the

next three years. That policy may be briefly summarized as consisting in the maintenance of amicable relations with foreign powers by abstention from all acts of an aggressive or provocative character, in the encouragement of colonial freedom and self-development, and in the progressive adaptation of laws and institutions at home to the needs of a continually changing society. Some enlargement of the county franchise and some redistribution of seats must necessarily take place ere long, since both sides are pledged to it; but no transference of political power to new and untried classes, no fresh "leap into the dark," like that taken in 1867, is to be apprehended. Practical measures of an administrative character, such as the reform of the Corporation of London and of the City Companies, simplification and codification of the law, rearrangement of County Government, reorganization of the Revenue Departments, Cathedral Reform, and Ecclesiastical Courts Reform, will probably occupy the main attention of the government during the remainder of the present Parliament's existence. Revolutionary changes will scarcely be introduced by a ministry whose leading spirit will be either the heir to a dukedom and £200,000 a year, or an earl of the mild and moderate character of Lord Granville, or a baronet of ancient descent, sound legal training, and old Whig principles, the brother of a large landed proprietor, and the grandson of an archbishop.

Beyond the termination of the present Parliament any forecast that can be made must be in the highest degree conjectural and problematical. He must be a bold man who would venture to predict what will be the verdict of the constituencies at the hustings of 1887. For one thing, it is wholly uncertain who the electors will be, since the question of the County Franchise is one of those with which the present Parliament is certain to deal. And even if we assume that the new electors will be of very much the same mind as the old, it is impossible, since the experience of 1873 and 1880, to anticipate what that "mind" will be with any confidence. For our own part, looking to the facts, first, that every government commits mistakes, and that its accumulated mistakes are brought up against it and thrown in its teeth at a general election; second, that every government makes enemies, and that its enemies all look forward to dealing it

a kick on that occasion ; and, third, that the new electors will be mainly from a class deriving its subsistence from the land, and therefore likely to vote with the landed interest, we are inclined to expect the return of the Conservative party to power in the year 1887. We may, of course, be mistaken. The new electors, having the protection of the ballot, may yield to the seductions of agitators, and give their votes against the farmers and the landlords. They may throw their weight into the Radical scale. In that case the new Parliament would probably be even more Liberal than its predecessor, and the party now in power would have a fresh lease of life for another *septennium*.

GEORGE RAWLINSON.

THE COLLEGE OF TO-DAY.

[A supposed address before citizens of the city of Hygeia, proposing to found a college.]

IN this new city, at the junction of two great rivers, where the iron highways of the land meet the highways of the water, destined by nature to be the centre of a great industrial community and the depot of a great internal commerce, and dedicated by you in wise forethought to the health and best life of that portion of mankind which shall here make its dwelling,—you desire to crown and complete your wholesome system of free education with an institution which shall offer to your youth the opportunities of the higher learning and, by at once centralizing and radiating a wise culture, shall conduce to the intellectual health and wealth of your community.

And the first question that meets you is: Is it wise to do this at all? are the most of people better citizens and better men and women for possessing this higher culture?

Now it must be admitted that a college can do harm and that culture may be a bad thing. Not a true college or a noble culture, mind you. But it has become an axiom among philosophers that the finer a thing is the more vile is its corruption. Also, a tool is the worse for being a good tool, if it be used for bad ends. The finest skill in moulding and tempering steel may be put into a burglar's jimmy. So then if culture be but a carping and inactive criticism, in the nature of a chronic and irremediable disease that sees the world only through jaundiced eyes, and if a college produce this culture, it is unutterably a bad thing that you should found such a college and possess such a culture. If your college is to sap the vitality of men, to wither their brains by spring-forcing, to make them know so much that they avail nothing, to send forth graduates who

are a perpetual sneer at their less learned betters, then let us have no colleges. But are we thus to slap civilization in the face, and because animals can run into evil courses, become vegetables which cannot? This indeed amounts to throwing up the game of life and admitting that the world is worse off the older it gets; we will take to the woods, and play innocently again with our fathers, the monkeys. I do not so read the Bible, or history, or Mr. Darwin; indeed, it is the business of the true culture to point out the landmarks that verify progress, to add to the experience of the individual the experience of the race, to prove that no effort is possible without its result—and no result possible without effort; to send the young man out into life equipped to make a place in it, and with faith which shall never grow old that whatsoever of good, however humble, he puts into the world shall abide in it forever. That there are college weaklings, as there are weaklings everywhere, is not to be denied; but it is the purpose and mission of the true college to add “strength to strength.” Its graduate is to be a wider man, of deeper resource; if a farmer, a better farmer, at all events a better citizen and a better man. So far as this result is not produced, it is the fault of the man himself, of training that is bad instead of good, or of the social and political conditions into which he emerges. Some of these elements in a present difficulty we may not at this moment consider, but let us here agree that it is not culture but its abuse that is at fault. In a word, the question is not, Shall we have colleges? but, Shall we have good colleges? It is resolved just here into, What kind of college shall we have?

It is well to bear in mind, first of all, that as a part of general education you want a college, and that you do not want a university. I use the words not in their historical sense, in which the college was one of the halls of the university, nor in their etymological sense, in which college means a body of men, particularly students, collected together, and university a place where universal learning, the circle of the sciences, is taught, but in the modern sense into which they are clearly differentiating. According to this view, looking upon the university as a collection of special schools, including also, it may be, a general one, the college is the place where one goes to learn “something

about everything," and the university where one goes to learn, in this or that of its professional schools, "everything about something." We may keep this in mind by the fancied etymology that college means a collection of knowledge and university the turning of all knowledge to one end. In this sense the great schools of this country—Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, Michigan—are universities, with the peculiarity of having as their originating centre each a college proper. (Harvard in particular, with its elective courses, attracting older men who are already A.B.'s of other colleges, is becoming really a university, and its methods are to be discussed accordingly.) Now there is no objection to this, except it be the tendency in these great institutions, desiring to make all the use possible of the great scholars who as university professors centre there, to confound the college course with the university, as by the adoption in their colleges proper of this very system of elective studies; but there is an objection, brought out clearly by this distinction, to the colleges, on the other hand, attempting to be universities. This is one of the weaknesses, perhaps the one weakness, which brought obloquy upon the "fresh-water colleges," and particularly the small colleges of the West. They were pretentious, for one thing,—a high school was often a State University,—whereas the first duty of scholarship is to be honest and modest; and they set their graduates the bad example of attempting to seem more than they were. It is the business of a college to be a college and of a university to be a university; and we shall see that while, from the nature of things, there is need of and can be, worthily, but few universities, great and rich centres, there may be colleges everywhere, so long as they are not so small or so poor as to be ill fitted for their work.

The university, to quote again a happily put *dictum* of education, is to teach everything about something; that is, the professional schools of which it is composed are to do this for their respective students. For this purpose a great centre of learning is needed, with great facilities, where specialists will reside and where great libraries and museums may be collected. The professional schools unite for this. Hither comes the man of general education to aim himself for his special work in life, and

here he selects the courses and masters best fitted to give him the technical education he requires. His fellow-collegian, not dedicated to the learned professions or to special science, goes meanwhile to the farm, if he is to be a farmer; to the machine-shop, if he is to be a mechanician; to the counting-room, if he is to be a business man—each, when he enters his special school, better qualified because of his college education to succeed in his peculiar calling. The college does not aim; it makes ready the gun to fire true when it is aimed. It completes general culture, by teaching everything about something. It takes the young man before he is ready to do something in particular and makes him ready to do anything in particular. In particular, let me emphasize, not anything or something in general. It is peculiarly necessary, therefore, that the college should recognize and enforce from the start, what the university man must see for himself, the limitations of human knowledge. If you will go into the woods and throw yourself down by the first hand's breadth of turf, and consider for a few moments the infinite play of life that there is about it, the putting forth of the leaf, the flitting of the insect across it, the dew and the winds that water and tend it, you will learn for yourself that there is more in the smallest segment of nature than a lifetime of man's infinite mind will suffice to know. A cursory examination of the tariff bill will teach the same thing as regards trade. This is the first lesson that must be learned. It is indeed impossible to learn everything about however small a something, or very much about anything. The college, then, must refrain from attempting to teach too much, else it will succeed only in teaching nothing. But a well-educated man needs to know at least the general relations of all knowledges; full equipment and concentration are the keys to happiness and success. The college gives one, the university the other. This discriminates at once between the work of two classes of teachers: the university professor of chemistry, a great chemist, teaches his students to be in some measure chemists; the college professor of chemistry, or the department in which chemistry is included, perhaps not a chemist at all, teaches his pupils the general principles of the science, its relations to other sciences and to life, and uses its methods toward the general development of the intellects

under his charge. The college course is a general education; the university course is a special education.

Now general education is a question of the subjects to be taught, special education is a question of the person to be taught. The one depends on what is known, the range of present knowledge, which is not an individual matter; the other depends upon personal choice of a life specialty. A chief purpose of the general or college education is to afford that comprehensive view of the world of knowledge and activities which shall enable the student to make intelligent choice of the special field to which his tastes lead him and for which his personal qualities fit him. But what this general education should be, he has not the means to decide. Others must determine that for him, and these others must be those already acquainted with the wide field of general knowledge—educated educators. From this point of view elective studies have properly no place in the *college* course; they are an infusion of the university idea into the college, and they have the decidedly bad effect of encouraging the American tendency to “save time” by crowding general education into fewer and fewer years so as to put the boy “at his work” at the earliest age possible. It is a heritage from the old idea that to become a good merchant a boy must not go to college, but begin by sweeping out the store. We give little enough time for preparation as it is, without college authority for the forcing process. It is of course alleged, as the plea for these elective studies, that they are intended to prevent forcing, to save the student from attempting many things he cannot do, that he may do well the one thing he chooses to do. But this is at once a surrender of the principle of general education, a confession that knowledges have already increased beyond our powers of classification. The elective system is the device, in fact, for eluding the difficulties of a transitional period, in which knowledge has taken a surprising leap, so that we don’t yet know how to handle the new results. But the key is given in the simultaneous growth of that power of analysis and generalization which, selecting only typical details, displays the more clearly the great principles and relations of arts, sciences, and letters. The history of the world can yet be written in one volume, and more satisfactorily than of old; tho with our present accumulation of facts no number

of volumes can fully cover a single administration. Our dilemma imposes a difficult task upon the governors of our colleges, but let us not admit that a man can no longer be well educated.

The duty imposed upon the college, then, is one of self-limitation on the one side and approximate completeness on the other. But let us not be charged with forgetting that education is something more than knowledge. Knowledge in itself is naught; it is useful only when applied as wisdom. It is more important that a man's mind should be a good tool than that it should be a wide storehouse. That is just the design of the college course. The extreme classicists look with alarm upon the incursion of the natural sciences, because they fear that in the multiplicity of subjects studied there will be no opportunity for thoroughness in any one. Their mistake lies in forgetting that thoroughness is not a quantity, but a quality. Nothing more influences the development of character and the direction of activity, personal or national, than the methods of thought; the philosophers of England have been perhaps quite as effective in her material development as her legislators. It is all the more important, therefore, that the methods taught shall not be one-sided, that the scientific method and the literary habit shall be placed side by side. And as far as thoroughness is concerned, as to use, no one requires it more than the physical experimentalist; as to training, it depends after all more upon the teacher than upon the subject or the quantity of it taught. We may all agree, then, that the well-ordered college must open the store-house of general knowledge, furnish the key to its treasures, and teach their proper use; it must, in other words, impart general principles, inform as to the sources of detailed knowledge, and train to correct methods of thought.

The main question, then, between large and small colleges is the sufficiency of the faculty to cover the wide field of general knowledge. The organization and relation of departments is the matter of prime importance, and if a college cannot command sufficient income to insure equipment in each, it must give way. The new college has this advantage over the old, that while the latter holds to the traditional division of departments that existed when natural science was only knocking at the door, the former may map out its division lines in view of

the new and splendid acquisitions. In the light of the new demands and the old experience, the faculty of the average college may perhaps be best mapped out as follows :

- { Law—a proper chair for the President.
- { Historical Sciences.
- { Social Science and Metaphysics.
- { Art.
- { English—which may include the office of Librarian.
- { Ancient Languages.
- { Modern Languages.
- { Mathematics.
- { Mixed Sciences.
- { Natural Sciences.

This scheme suggests, with the minimum number of chairs, a comprehensive classification of the subjects of study, in logical divisions. It recognizes three great groups, of what may be called social, philological, and natural knowledges.

Upon the efficiency of the President depends the harmony and the completeness of the college work, and his chief care therefore should be neither teaching nor police duty, but the exercise of his executive skill. A great educator will make his college great in its results and single in its workings without interfering with the individuality of the several instructors. And without the central control of a capable man, the college will lack the essential unity that should characterize it. The activity of present investigation is so constantly adding facts to each department of knowledge that each professor is as constantly pressing for more of the student's time, altho his peculiar function is so to generalize these new facts into principles that he may take less. In this continuing emergency, as well as in the many relations in which departments or professors trench upon each other, it is the President who must hold the even hand of control and balance, while he takes means to bring the efficiency of each professor up to the standard of the highest by the improved methods he may suggest from one class-room to another. It is for him also, following the example of a distinguished American college president, to show to the students themselves

the relations of the special departments of the curriculum to their general education.

It is the President who must, more than any one person, give its tone to the college, as Arnold did to Rugby; he must be the shining example of the educated gentleman, the "whole man," the man of knowledge, of enthusiasm, of moral force, who can inspire younger men and to whom they may aspire. To such presidents the American college system already owes much; nor can any man desire a higher life-work than earned for one college president the sobriquet, quite as much in earnest as in kindly jest, of "Mark, the perfect man."

Your wise choice of a president, therefore, will be a first condition of success. Take care, when he is chosen, that his office is not hampered by the petty details of an officer of police. Take care also that he is left otherwise free for his higher work. He cannot be everything else and the president too. But there is one department of teaching, requiring a *minimum* of the professor's and of the student's actual time, yet whose influence might be made the most vital, of which he may well assume the chair,—the department of Law and political (not economic) science. In this department he may best prepare the student to become a well-ordered thinker and a good citizen. In the general sense of the word law, it would be his function to infuse the young mind with the sense of the universality of law, of the relations of natural laws underlying and harmonizing the several departments of knowledge, and of the necessity of conforming the intellectual and moral powers, by the cultivation of habit, to those fundamental laws by whose aid man reaches his highest development, against which man must gain but a losing victory. By such teaching the President may open the way for the highest usefulness of each department, and establish the most direct influence on the development of his students. He voices the highest results of the science and philosophy of our day, which concentrate their teachings in the one thought of the unity of law.

The importance of the study of law in its specific sense, especially of the history of law, has been too much overlooked in our colleges. Meanwhile most of our law schools, training men technically to become lawyers, have also subordinated that

general and historical view of law which should properly form a part of general education. Yet the forms of law have been one of the most important factors of social development, and one of the most influential agents in determining methods of thought. The educated man should certainly know the facts and the reasons of the development of "customary" law as the rule of earlier communities; its gradual supercedure by the invention of statute law; the wonderful influence of Roman law, the law of codified abstract principles, applied by the deductive method, in all modern thought; the English system of "case law," following the inductive method, which is in direct competition with code law in the States of our own Union; the relations of law and equity; the growth of law by judicial and professional interpretation in accordance with the current development of institutions; the rise and progress of international law; and the other phases of law which have made part of him as he is, and which underlie the facts he reads in his daily newspaper. All this might be taught in a very small proportion of the college time, and yet it is now scarcely taught at all.

Following the same line, the work of this chair should include political science, giving the college alumnus that practical acquaintance with the growth of governments which shall enable him to do his part as a voter in mitigating and shaping the "practical politics" of the day. There is nothing more important to this country than that a large educated class should recognize the truth that government, of a great country or of a petty village, can progress only in the direction of accord with the social and economic conditions which produce it, and the instinct of the practical politician which recognizes this principle by leading him to use "the materials at command" gives him an immense advantage over the *doctrinaire* who refuses to read past history or present facts. The educated man, again, ought to know how government has developed from the patriarchal to the constitutional form, and the relations of government to society in typical countries; the rival bases of government, the basis of family, or race, at the foundation of ancient peoples, the basis of territory, or property, at the foundation of modern states, still producing conflicts which appear in to-day's journals under the guise of "the Eastern question," or

discussions whether taxes should be laid on persons or on property; the constitution of his own country, in its practical workings as well as in its legal theory, and the comparison it calls for with the constitutional system of England; the historic view of the principles and work of parties whose conflict has produced our political history and the status of to-day. All this is quite possible without dangerous partisanship, and it would do much to make the college alumnus an intelligent citizen.

The Chair of Historical Sciences should cover a vastly wider field than the old professionship of history, and it is perhaps not too much to say that its methods should be diametrically opposite to the old methods. It may now almost be called the chair of the comparative sciences *par excellence*, so all-powerful has the comparative method become in their development. It should include comparative philology, the key to history and the necessary introduction to the useful study of specific languages; something of comparative mythology, and, finally, comparative history itself, traced from primeval man and ancient society through its manifold development into "to-day." It is not dates that are wanted—a dollar's worth of chronological dictionary can give them much more usefully than any memory—but the key to them. Properly taught, History is the experience of the race added to the experience of the individual—an inspirer of faith, the key to progress.

The Chair of Social Science and Metaphysics is, in its first-named division, closely connected with the chairs already named, and the three together afford an excellent example of the necessity of Presidential control, which shall establish lines of demarcation and prevent controversy between the several departments. In none of these departments are views absolutely settled; but while students should be fully warned of this fact, and thus taught to develop individual judgment, it would be most unfortunate to find professors of differing views waging war over mooted points in the border lines between their respective fields. Social Science properly deals with general laws for which history furnishes the facts and principles. It is a still higher generalization, an abstraction from the philosophy of history. This includes, of course, economics (or political economy), on the teaching of which, especially in a commercial, self-taxing

community, too much stress can hardly be laid. In the present view of metaphysics, that department resolves itself into the teaching of the history of thought, and the chief demand to be made of the teacher is that he should present fairly, from the point of view of the author and under the light of modern discovery, the great systems of secular and theistic speculation; from the savage's simple conceptions through the magnificent dreams of Plato to the Evolution philosophy which colors the sunlight of the present day. It is in this department that the training in method of thought, *i.e.*, Logic, has also place.

The Chair of Art is on debatable ground. Yet I suppose it will not be denied that a man is not fully educated unless he has made some acquaintance with the flower as well as with the roots of human activity, not to speak of the enlargement of the faculties of observation and enjoyment which art knowledge gives. The student should be taught, by lectures and by display of or direction to examples or copies, at least the principles, the history, and the great achievements of the graphic and plastic arts, of architecture, and, I should certainly say, of music, for the name and work of Beethoven has been of some importance in the world. It is manifestly impossible, however, that practical education in these arts, which must be an individual matter, should form part of the general education of the college. The rule still holds good, that the relations of any one art or science to general culture, rather than the practice thereof, are the concern of the college. An exception might be made in the case of drawing, altho this should properly be sufficiently pursued in the school. It is now generally acknowledged that knowledge of art is an essential part of a completely educated man; and so far as elementary practice is essential to that knowledge, it should somewhere be given.

The Chair of English, including language and literature, is of far more importance than most of our colleges have recognized. Half a generation ago there was no such department, except in one or two pioneer colleges. But the intellectual and practical importance of thorough training in the full knowledge and accurate use of our own tongue, and of acquaintance with the treasures of its literature, is becoming more and more recognized with each year. It is in this department that the

modern ideas of education are revolutionary from the old. Grammar, the analysis of speech for the discovery of its laws, was considered one of the elementary studies; it is now known to belong properly to the advanced stage of education. The child learns correct speech by imitation and correction, not by the study of laws, which should be a part of elementary education only in so far as they are necessary to elucidate and assure practice. The child's attention should therefore be directed chiefly to those external features of language to which its senses naturally open; it is observation, memory, the sense of rhythm and other beauty that should first be trained, by reading, the repetition of prose and verse, and by talk, which is the first step in composition. This basis being obtained in the schools, the college is ready to introduce the student to the analytical study of language. He must know the relations of his mother tongue to other languages; its direct origin in the Anglo-Saxon, whose elements should be given him; the derivation of its words, with the careful training in synonymy which is alike the key to accurate thought and certain expression; the laws of its construction, grammar, and its departures from "general laws"; the science of expression, rhetoric; the history of the development of the language in its literature, and, finally, a philological knowledge of its authors and their leading works.

Within the province of this chair come also several auxiliary departments, notably composition and oratory, the latter, of course, requiring for its practice a specially trained instructor.

The Professor of English naturally holds also the Professorship of Books and Reading insisted on by Emerson, and, even tho the college organization permits a separate keepership of books, should be in the relation of the library to the students, the Librarian. Otherwise that important office is apt to be a keepership and nothing else, whereas it should serve one of the most important functions of the college. It is of course the business of each professor to acquaint his students with the literature of his department, and to stimulate a knowledge of these books; but a general officer is also needed, who shall fulfil the high office which the leading librarians of the day recognize as theirs, the development of taste in reading, of the easiest methods of actual work, and of a practical acquaintance

with books as the keys to knowledge. It is an essential feature of the proper use of the college library that the students, under reasonable restrictions, should have access to the books themselves, to the shelves. This helps to make the scholar a man commanding the sources of knowledge. It would be useful also if the librarian should make the library to some extent his instruction room, advising personally and particularly acquainting the student, through the methods and literature of bibliography, with the means of searching the world over for the books or book he may need.

The Chair of Ancient Languages and Literature is of course concerned chiefly with Latin and Greek, the fountain-heads of our present secular culture, and without which, despite elective systems, no man can rightly be called a scholar. Let us not, in the conflict between ancient scholarship and modern science forget this, nor let us, on the other hand, overlook the fact that to speak or to write Latin or Greek is no necessary or desirable part of general education. Philological training is as important as, and no more important than, scientific training; and it must not be forgotten also that philological training has been in good part transferred to the domain of English. English synonymy is more important than Greek accentuation; yet we still need to be trained in the subtleties of expression best exemplified in the Greek aorist. The college knowledge of these tongues should include a reasonable (reading) acquaintance, especially with their laws of construction, through grammars and the authors selected as text-books, and a general knowledge of other authors connected with the development of the literature and life of Greece and Rome. The world will never grow so old that it can forget Plato, and yet, in a college paying not a little attention to long-since-forgotten details of Greek orthography, a student may scarcely more than hear of Plato. This is no true scholarship. The Chair of Ancient Languages should also, taking up the work from the department in which philology is taught, give an outline view of that magnificently organized tongue, the Sanskrit, the mother tongue of our mother languages, and of that other speech, the Hebrew, which connects us with another family of tongues and is the language of our earliest Sacred Books.

The Chair of Modern Languages and Literature must also recognize its limitations. Spain, Italy, and other modern countries have their languages, and the student should know where they belong, the character, relations, and great names of their literatures, and thus place them in his general scheme of culture; but instruction must chiefly be confined to the great representatives of the Latin and Teutonic branches which flow together into our own tongue, *viz.*, French and German. The construction of these languages, and their literatures, should be treated of fully, and, while the college cannot be expected to make expert conversationalists in French or German, it is natural and proper that living languages should to some extent be studied in practical speech. Here, as in English, one of the most useful methods, at the same time storing the mind with enjoyable treasures, is the committing and recitation of noble verse.

The Chair of Pure Mathematics must be relied upon for that exact training possible only in the exact sciences. Its teaching deals not with things, but with symbols, and, as a process of abstract reasoning, its study requires a mind well advanced into the reasoning age. On the other hand, the observation of form, upon which geometry is built, is one of the first things to which the mind opens, and we need a portion of mathematics, arithmetic and much of algebra, early in the course of education, as a key to knowledge beyond. Between which lies this truth, that the facts and properties of form as shown in ocular demonstration should be a part of the earliest education of the child, preparing him for the rational and exact proof left to the college; that the use of figures, especially on the metric system, and algebraic symbols, including the practice of logarithms, taught much as the child learns the use of language, should be placed, for practical purposes, as early as possible, leaving to the college the higher development of both. The college course should then include the higher algebra, arithmetic in the rationale of logarithms; geometry, plane and spherical, in its analytic relations, and trigonometry; and the science of the calculus, taught on the newer rationalistic basis. At the head of this department should be a patient and exact man, representing to the student the absolute certainty of mathematical method, anxious to satisfy honest inquiry to the utmost detail

of exact proof, and not satisfied himself until his students are satisfied. That half-teaching which has been too common in the pure mathematics, surrenders the entire value of mathematical discipline.

The Chair of Mixed Sciences has the special function of linking together the most abstract and most practical results. Its educational work consists in proving this connection. It is the linking professorship. It applies the processes of mathematics to the facts of physics, and thus discovering and developing the great laws which control the universe, applies these in turn to practical usefulness. Its work is the great proof to practical minds of the direct value of science and education. So far as these have not been previously provided for in education, it teaches the facts of physics, static and dynamic,—sound, light, heat, and electricity, in their relations to their source and to the human apparatus, and physical astronomy. The scientific study of acoustics, optics, etc., and of analytical astronomy, follows, in association with the final triumph of the mathematics, the analytical mechanics, which presents the equation of the universe. The application of mathematical principles in surveying and navigation and in the constructive (descriptive) geometry, the teaching of which associates itself, however, practically with the art department, concludes its work. Here must be a man who combines with breadth of generalization a keen sense of practical adaptation.

The Chair of Natural Sciences teaches observation, classification, and induction. It deals with inorganic matter and its transmutation into organic life, through the round of chemistry, geology, botany, zoology. The facts of these the child should be led to teach himself, by observation and simple experiment; the college work should complete the collection of typical facts, induce comparison, arrange classification and discover law. The department needs representative collections and satisfactory tho simple apparatus; and the student, in qualitative and slightly quantitative chemical analysis, and in the analysis of plants, should essay for himself acquaintance with scientific methods. I know in my own experience of no more useful college study, in cultivating habits of observation and careful judgment, than that of blowpipe analysis, conducted by

the professor at the cost of a few inexpensive specimens and reagents, and an apparatus of a watchglass and a clay-pipe.

Such a curriculum, indeed, fulfils the round of knowledge, the circle of the sciences; but it is met at once by the severe criticism of practiced and working teachers, that it is theoretical and ideal, and not practical and possible. It is quite impossible, they object, to "cram" so much into the limited course of the average student. Prof. Jevons has already entered protest against the use of this word "cram" as a weapon against all innovations, and it may fairly be replied also that much of the memorizing of insignificant details under the existing system is "cram" of a sort to which the word should be applied with obloquy. But the premises of these critics are entirely correct. It is true that, however knowledge grows, human nature and capacity, at least for any immediate term of years, remain much the same. We must make concessions to human limitations and imperfections. Above all things, let us not increase "the noble army of smatterers,"—those aimless unfortunates who are "jacks of all trades and good at none." Let us not overlook the fact that wisdom is above knowledge, that training is at least as important as learning in the purpose of the college, and that concentration is the final condition of success in life. In these premises, which are fundamental principles, all must agree. It is in their application that the mistake of the criticism lies. The natural conservatism of the professional mind misconstrues the nature of the proposed change. It is not proposed to increase the amount of mental exertion, but rather by re-arrangement and better adaptation to decrease it. Details are omitted here, that principles may be taught there, and under well ordered generalization, founded on typical facts obtained during the early years of observation, culture becomes more complete and training more instead of less thorough. Each process of development, each method of reasoning, becomes a part of the mental outfit, and thus the well-trained mind possesses a comprehensive and well-organized plan, in which every after-acquired fact, law, or experience may be assigned to its proper place and be the more easily assimilated by association.

A second criticism asks whether the college ought, by demanding so much, to narrow the range of those who may enjoy

its benefits; whether it should not give a less complete education to more people. This brings us face to face with the at present difficult problem of the relations of the college to the general education out of which its curriculum must proceed. It is noticeable that while there has been much activity in the improvement of the higher education, and much progress, following the suggestions of Froebel and Pestalozzi, in primary education, the intermediate education remains much where it was, and blocks the road in the middle. Our common schools are still "grammar schools," altho, as has been noted, educators are in agreement that "grammar," as such, is the one thing that should not be taught until the very highest grades are reached. And the colleges cannot do their proper work, nor can an approximately correct curriculum be put into practice, until many features of the middle schools are not only reformed but revolutionized. The scheme of the proper education, following the child from its first lessons, should be developed in view of two chief conditions: the order in which the natural development of the mind fits it for the reception of successive studies; the practical fact that, since the number to be educated decreases each year beyond the early years, the essential subjects must be presented early in the course. Happily these two conditions largely coincide. The present curriculum of the middle schools has developed from the practical recognition of this last condition, in ignorance of the first, but through much misconception as to which are essential subjects. It is, of course, important that every child should be taught to speak, to write, to read, to figure, correctly; but it is now known that the child learns correct speech, for instance, chiefly through its observing faculties, by imitation, and not through its reflective faculties, by study of grammar. The child develops through the what, the how, the why—first the fact, next its relations, lastly its causes; and yet the lower schools will be teaching the laws of grammar, and leaving the facts of nature, as the elements of botany, for which the child-mind is hungering and thirsting, to the advanced student. The college professor of the natural sciences, for instance, should find the foundations laid for him when the student enters college, whereas now he

must begin at elementary facts. A correct college curriculum is scarcely possible as middle education stands now.

Recognizing, then, the fact that the order in which the mind can best learn is the order in which it can best be taught, it becomes of the utmost importance that the college, admitting the necessity of present compromise, should exert its full influence to reorganize the education below. It must compel a high standard in the lower schools by the quality of its entrance examinations, for their sake as well as its own. The best baking cannot make good bread of poor dough; and if the dough is rejected, the mixers will be more careful how they work up the flour. The college will do no service by admitting ill-prepared youth—no service to them, certainly none to any one else. It is its business to act in general education as the controlling head—as the governor of the steam-engine.

The plan of the college is of great importance; but of still greater importance, practically, is the question of its theory and methods in its relations with students, their discipline in conduct and study. There are two opposing systems. The one considers the student still a boy, hedges him about with close paternal government, stimulates him with merit-marks for successful study, and punishes him with demerits for ill-conduct; ranks him by examinations, rewards him with prizes dependent on his marks, and sends him out with a certificate of excellence. The other patterns the freedom of the German universities (which do not correspond to our colleges), would treat the student as a man responsible only to himself, permits him to be present or absent at his choice, and otherwise regards him as a free and independent American citizen. The one argues that the student must be trained to enter the world through close supervision and with immediate motives in view; the other believes that he must learn before he enters the world that he must depend on himself. The tendency of professionalized teachers is to follow the first system; and it must be admitted that the liberal innovators who have reached out toward the freer method have often been sadly disappointed in the practical results. Their students did not accept the responsibility. But perhaps their failure came because they threw themselves upon an ideal method, not modified to conform to actual condi-

tions. The truth is that the American college-student is both boy and man ; he comes in, a boy, with very little sense of responsibility, and yet he is often qualified to vote long before he takes his degree. The college, receiving him a boy, should send him forth a man. And it should treat him in view of his transitional character during this period. The college theory of discipline should contemplate an increasing development of responsibility during the successive college years. You cannot successfully appeal to public opinion unless there is a public opinion to which to appeal ; and the failure to recognize this truism has been the cause of the disappointment of many liberal educators who have trusted to a sense of responsibility before they have taken any pains to develop such a sense. And yet the unmitigated paternal government, with its fallible infallibility, into which college methods often return after spasmodic attempts toward a better system, has, it seems to me, been a great curse to this country. College-students, removed from the associations through which they would naturally develop into political activity, are subjected, just as they approach the age of political responsibility, to a system of paternal government which, by practically assuming all the responsibility itself, destroys the sense of individual responsibility. "College politics," for this reason, often become notoriously corrupt, the field of mere bargaining among cliques ; and the college alumnus is prepared to take "rings" as a matter of course, and to assume that air of *blasé* do-nothingism which has brought culture into disrepute. While, on the one side, our colleges have trained numbers of men to enter usefully into public life, they must, on the other, be arraigned for causing much demoralization. And now that our earlier training-schools, as the New England town-meeting, are losing their educational function, and the flower of our youth are more and more seeking our colleges, this matter becomes of inestimable importance.

What, then, are the relations which shall develop responsibility? First, the central college authority must be absolute and autocratic ; but it should never be necessary to exert its absolute power. It should represent to the student that absolute and inflexible natural law against which the man in active life throws himself in vain, which opposes to him the abso-

lute resistance of a wall of rock against which the headstrong can only be dashed to pieces. This is the most important lesson the young soldier in life can learn—the absolute necessity of obedience to moral and physical law. Let him be kindly spared, by this apprentice training, the severe penalties which unforgiving Nature must otherwise inflict. Now it is the misfortune of any paternal government that, in undertaking to do everything, it betrays itself into a network of inconsistent mistakes, which involve it in constant and weak compromise with individual cases and belittle all ideas of law. Moreover, Nature does not intrude her law. It is felt only when a man runs against it. Nature never “nags.” The college authority, then, should be exercised seldom if ever; but it must be exercised, when need comes, with rigorous inflexibility, tempered by forgiveness only as far as mercy can safely temper justice.

Secondly, this necessity of absolute law should be forestalled by concentration of the governing power upon the development of the sense of responsibility. If an upper-classman has not a sense of responsibility which may be practically appealed to, I say boldly that it is somehow the fault of the college authorities. You cannot at once expect it in under-classmen, just out of the school leading-strings. Arnold of Rugby defended, against a public opinion strong in his day and overwhelming now, the two English abuses of whipping and fagging. Why? Because they seemed to him a part of his one purpose—the development of a true responsibility instead of a false independence. His younger boys were yet boys, and he kept them dependent as fags upon the sixth-form scholars, that they might call forth the sense of responsibility in his upper men, who were responsible only to him. It was his way of saying that “the leaders lead.” If the sixth form did not support him, he used to say, he must go. But they did support him. He had created a public opinion which never failed to honor his appeals. And what he did in modelling Rugby school according to English responsible aristocratic government of his day, needs to be done in our colleges in accordance with our system. The students should be in the main self-governing, as Fellenberg made his boys. Demerit-marks—a fine levied in the college currency—may be necessary in the lower classes, but there should be

steadfastly developed a student-feeling which may be trusted to take upon itself the punishment of misconduct, either by tacit public opinion or in some organized method, as a wrong done to the student-community. The superfluous energy which now finds its escape to the cost of the weakest disciplinarian of the faculty might then be absorbed by finding "an object in life." Kindred questions admit a like solution. Prizes and marks, considered as achievement, instead of the symbol of achievement, are bad: here is the root of that common distemper which confounds money with wealth. This is a matter, again, of student public opinion; and student public opinion should be within the reach of the faculty, if the faculty be wise. Examinations, it may be added, stand on a basis of their own, useful for the grasp of subject a general review imparts, but still more because they represent to the student, as Prof. Jevons has pointed out, those crises in life in which all that has gone to make the man finds at once its test and its opportunity—supreme moments, it may be, in which the whole life finds its focus. Their influence may be the more important when no marking system has preceded them, since there is nothing more vital than that a man should learn to conduct his daily life in view not of immediate but of ultimate ends.

A college thus widely planned, officered by men who can inspire as well as teach, with a student-body self-disciplined and eager for advancement, cannot but be a blessing to any community by whom liberality is fostered. The student-body in particular, neither rioters nor young prigs, should be as helpful as now often it is harmful. And the faculty should give it, and the community, their help and their example. They should be a band of working scholars, not hesitant to take their part in outer life, and eager to instruct and inspire beyond the limits of their class-rooms. It is for them to bind together with their influence the microcosm of student-life and the macrocosm of the outer world.

Such an institution will not fail to produce for us that temper of mind, derided rather than encouraged by a culture less wise, in which efficient work must find assurance; the temper which results from those cardinal virtues of the soul—reverence, enthusiasm, and faith. These, and the need of them, a

wise training, catholic and wholesome, must emphasize. That grateful reverence which finds in the less favored but fruitful past the seeds from which the happier present flowers—a reverence venerating age; that responsible enthusiasm well ordered to direct its divine desire for the present help of humankind—an enthusiasm honoring manhood; that patient faith, the prophetic reward of daily toil, which sees in an assured future the ever-perfecting fulfilment of this imperfect yet sufficient present—a faith recognizing in every child the possibility of the supreme man;—such reverence, such enthusiasm, such faith are the fruit and the seed of a true culture, vital to progress and to the welfare of mankind.

R. R. BOWKER.

THE STUDY OF GREEK.

THE address of Mr. C. F. Adams Jr., before the Alumni of Harvard College, at the last Commencement, has caused to break out afresh an opposition—which had slumbered for some time—to the requirement of Greek for admission to our colleges. It is understood that the President of Harvard is among those who would permit to be substituted for the Greek in the preparatory course one or more of the modern languages. The number and zeal of the advocates of this innovation, with the help of so energetic a leader, may give success to the effort. In this case the example of Harvard is likely to be followed by a greater or less number of other colleges. This would produce a very serious alteration in our system of education, and one that ought not to be adopted without grave deliberation.

At the outset, it is best to concede to the champions of this projected revolution all that can be fairly claimed on their side. The defence of the classics is often based on exaggerated statements, and is really weakened by being placed on narrow grounds.

1. It is idle to pretend that the study of the classics is as indispensable to culture now as it was three or four centuries ago. In the period of the Renaissance, there was very little in the way of literature except the ancient authors. In the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth centuries there were the great Italians, Dante and Petrarch, and there was Chaucer. The "revival of learning" brought up from their tombs the poets, and orators, and philosophers of Greece and Rome. The mediæval era accomplished a work for intellectual discipline which it is now the fashion to underrate. But its achievements were chiefly in the province of logic and philosophy, and in the

departments of theology and ethics. It was an illiterate era. It preserved, however, the remains of ancient literature. In some parts of Europe—in Italy especially—the love of letters was never wholly quenched; altho, to use Dante's expression, even the voice of Virgil, who was held in special honor in the middle ages, had grown hoarse from long silence. But there is truth in Macaulay's sharp saying, that if "ancient literature was the ark in which all the civilization of the world was preserved during the deluge of barbarism," still we do not read "that Noah thought himself bound to live in the ark after the deluge had subsided." At present there is an abundance of good reading in the modern languages. If the choice were given us whether to give to the flames the entire English literature of the last three centuries, or all the writings of the Greeks and Romans, the classics would have to perish. If we superadd to the English authors the German, French, and Italian writers of the modern period, there can be no question as to the literary value of the aggregate of these treasures when compared with the literature of antiquity, collectively taken. A man who has *studied* Lessing, Goethe, and Kant, Pascal, Molière, and Sainte-Beuve, Shakespeare, Milton, Locke, and Wordsworth, with Luther's Bible or the Authorized English Version, cannot be regarded as an uncultured person, even if he has never opened the covers of a Latin and Greek classic. Still less can he be thus stigmatized if he has acquainted himself with Homer and Thucydides, Tacitus and Horace, Plato and Cicero, through the medium of fairly good translations into the vernacular. We can look back on centuries during which the civilized nations now on the stage have been intellectually active and productive, and during which they have created rich libraries in every department of thought—in metaphysics and politics and theology, as well as in history and belles-lettres. Besides, in these latter days, the natural and physical sciences have experienced an astonishing growth. There is a great body of recent scientific writings which contribute to education in their own peculiar way.

2. It is a very narrow view which holds that there is only one method of education—one beaten track on which all must walk. What is education? If we consult authorities on this

point, Cardinal Newman tells us that intellectual education is præeminently a discipline in *accuracy*. "One main portion of intellectual education," says Dr. Newman, "of the labors of both school and university, is to remove the original dimness of the mind's eye; to strengthen and perfect its vision; to enable it to look out into the world right forward, steadily and truly; to give the mind clearness, accuracy, precision; to enable it to use words aright, to understand what it says, to conceive justly what it thinks about, to abstract, compare, analyze, divide, define, and reason, correctly." "Boys are always more or less inaccurate, and too many, or rather the majority, remain boys all their lives." It may be added that many go through college, and are decorated with degrees, who do not think or speak accurately. These are not educated. On the contrary, not a few who never cross the threshold of a college, by trade and commerce, by intercourse with disciplined men, or by reading and digesting a few strong books, acquire that accuracy which Dr. Newman so justly exalts. They are so far educated men. The range within which their judgment exercises itself may be limited. Yet they may know what the limit is, and may be masters in their own field. Nay, they may have acquired a keenness of intellectual action which qualifies them to step over into other provinces if the occasion should call for it. Of course, all that Dr. Newman would say is that accuracy is a very prominent, the primary, element in education. Culture, or education in the full sense, embraces much more.

The sweeping assertion sometimes hazarded, that classical training is in all cases necessary for distinctively literary excellence—for perfection of style—is contradicted by too many facts. Every one who has read the pages of John Bunyan, or the speeches of John Bright, knows better. Johnson was much more of a classical scholar than Goldsmith, but Goldsmith's English is far better than Johnson's. Native genius and tact have too large an influence in this matter to admit of any such universal rule or test as the classical bigots would lay down.

It is not all persons who aspire after an intellectual life who are to be recommended to spend their time upon Greek, or even upon Latin. There is no good reason why many young persons who devote a series of years to mental training in

schools and colleges should not, in case their aptitudes and intended vocation so prompt them, dispense with Greek, and pursue, in the room of it, the natural and physical sciences, or the modern languages, or both. Such establishments as the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale and the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard have their *raison d'être*. They are open to graduates of colleges; but, properly enough, they do not require graduation at college as the qualification of membership. They have a curriculum of their own. For obvious reasons they require Latin for admission. Even if one desires to study the tongues of Latin origin,—the French, Spanish, and Italian,—he will lose no time by beginning with the Latin and first obtaining a mastery of it. The uses of Latin in the pursuits for which “Real-Schulen” and our scientific and technological schools specially fit their pupils, are evident and acknowledged. The relation of Latin to our own English tongue constitutes, it need not be said, an important claim in behalf of that language. The point which is here made is, that whatever peculiar advantage arises from the study of Greek and Latin, it is pushing their claims too far when it is expected that every extended curriculum of education should include them, and when it is pretended that nothing that deserves to be called education or culture can exist which does not embrace an acquaintance with them.

3. When the high value of classical studies is affirmed, it is not of necessity implied that the sources of that value are always discerned by classical teachers. It may be that important, even principal benefits, possible to be derived from these studies, are not perceived, or are placed in the background. Nor is it to be assumed that the methods of teaching Greek and Latin which have come into vogue are above criticism. It is quite conceivable that the ancient tongues may be so taught that the time given to them is half wasted or utterly misspent. There may be theories and there may be ways of instruction the results of which are diminutive in proportion to the labor which they require, and insufficient to justify so large an expenditure of time.

Having made these concessions, if concessions they are to be called, we lay down the proposition which, in our judgment, is sound and capable of proof. In a course of liberal education

par excellence; in a course of education leading to the degrees in the Arts; in a broad and complete culture, the study of Greek as well as of Latin is essential. In such a course the classics must continue to fill a very prominent place. No step should be taken which tends to lower the *prestige* of this type of education—liberal education—or to lead young men to feel that they lose nothing by failing to embrace the opportunity to acquire it,—provided there are no particular reasons which make a different and less complete course of study in their case expedient.

The ends of education are discipline and knowledge. Of these, discipline, if the word be taken in a broad sense, is to be ranked first. Power is worth more than acquisition. The capacity to reason well is a higher possession than an acquaintance with the recorded reasonings of others. To be eloquent, to be able to persuade and move men, is to be preferred to familiarity with orations and addresses. To discern beauty in art, to detect deformity,—much more, the ability to paint well or to sing well, or to excel in the actual work of an artist in any department,—is something more precious than a learned acquaintance with what artists have done. In general, it is the increase of mental force, the refinement of sensibility and of perception, the facility in use of the faculties, whether strictly rational or æsthetic, which constitutes the main end and aim of culture. When this result is not attained, the best fruit of education is missed. Where life, and force, and the creative impulse are absent, learning sinks into pedantry. There are such degenerate periods when originality dies out. Such, for instance, was the age of the Byzantine writers in the decline of the Greek Empire. Knowledge performs its best office when it spurs to independent activity and furnishes materials for advancement in discovery and invention. We may find an illustration in the military art. In the wars of the French Revolution, the Germans at first followed in general the tactics and strategy of the Great Frederick. He was a soldier of genius. Against Napoleon, a greater genius still, they were beaten in every encounter. At length they learned Napoleon's ways, and combined Europe overcame him.

The objection to the study of Greek and Latin that they are "*dead languages*," hardly merits attention. This phrase, which

seeks to attach the gloom and uselessness of things that are dead to classical studies, is a part of the clap-trap of the adversaries of learning. It is an old and stale method of decrying these studies. If no language could be worth studying which one did not wish to speak, or which is not spoken to-day, the objection would have weight. But as there are living tongues—for example, the dialects of Patagonia and Central Africa—which it is not advisable to bring into the college curriculum, so it is possible that there are nobler types of speech which belonged to nobler races now no more, that it is expedient to study for what they are and for what they help us to learn.

The objects of study, the object-matter, are the world and man. The "world" is here the synonym of nature. It embraces the physical universe, including the earth, its productions, and its inhabitants other than men. This is the realm of the natural and physical sciences. The grand progress of these studies is the most striking feature of the times, as regards the advance of knowledge. No one can be called an educated man at this day who is ignorant of the departments of inquiry which deal with nature. They provide when earnestly pursued a discipline of their own. But they can never supersede as a means of culture the study of MAN. This is the "proper study of mankind," the supreme object of curiosity, and source of mental and moral development. In this statement, religion is not forgotten; but it is through the contemplation of man primarily, and of nature, that we learn of God. Man—what he is, what he has thought and done, the civilization which he has created—this is that object of study, to which belongs a transcendent worth. In this study, embracing history, philosophy, politics, literature, religion, are the fountains from which cultivation is to be derived. To an individual cultivated thus, the sciences of nature gain a new quality, an ideal element, a suggestiveness, of which, independently of this advantage, they are destitute.

Now at the foundation of a thorough and comprehensive survey of nature there lies one branch of knowledge. At the foundation of the thorough and comprehensive study of man there lies another. Each of these two fundamental studies is essential to the full understanding of things that now are—of nature as it is spread out before us, and of humanity in its pres-

ent advanced condition. In other words, the present scene, in order to be radically comprehended, must be looked at in the light of these two fundamental studies.

Mathematics, which deals with the relations of number and space, is at the basis of the physical and even of the natural sciences. Physics and astronomy rest upon it. It is the key to the understanding of the astronomic system. Its formulas are the scheme of the creation. There is so much of truth in the speculation of Pythagoras, who made number the life and essence of the universe. The combinations which chemistry has to explore, even the disposition of the leaves on the bough of a tree and of the blossoms on a stalk, are, we are told, conformed to mathematical formulas. Mathematics, then, in relation to nature, which is one of the two grand objects of study, is the fundamental science. It necessarily holds a throne of honor in a system of liberal education.

We are now looking predominantly at the objects of study. It is well, however, to consider at the same time its disciplinary value and effect. There are not wanting those who think lightly of the influence of the mathematics on the intellect. It is frequently said that, instead of qualifying one to reason, mathematical science not only furnishes no help in this direction, as regards probable reasoning, with what we are chiefly concerned in practical life, but that it positively weakens the capacity to judge correctly in cases where demonstration is out of the question. It leads one to demand a sort and degree of proof which the nature of the case does not admit of. Hence it may engender an unreasonable and hurtful scepticism. These considerations have been insisted on by many writers, among whom are Sir William Hamilton and Macaulay. Nor are they without force. But mathematical study does cultivate the attention and the power of definition. It is a discipline of the attention. A bright-minded boy, with his classical author and his dictionary open before him, may look out a word, and then look out of the window; he may intermit his attention; he may carry forward an undercurrent of thought on heterogeneous topics; and yet his progress in making his translation, sorely hindered tho it may be, is not utterly suspended. But such a boy cannot advance an inch in Euclid without an absolute concen-

tration of his mind upon the process of ratiocination with which he is concerned. Now to gain the habit of attention is half the battle in education. He who has learned to keep his mind fastened on the work before him has advanced a long step in mental training. So in mathematical studies accuracy of definition is indispensable. The proposition must be exactly stated, and so must each of the premises and of the inferences. Loose statement goes for nothing. This precision in thought and expression, it need not be said, is an invaluable attainment.

Analogous to the relation of the mathematics to the sciences of nature is the relation of the Græco-Roman history and civilization to our modern society. The ruling nations on the borders of the Mediterranean, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Hebrews, stand in this seminal relation, if one may so say, to modern civilization. The legacy which they left is incorporated into the existing institutions and culture of the European nations and of their offshoots. The roots of the present are to be sought in the past—in that “monarchy of the Mediterranean” which included under its sway the Greek with his science and letters, the Hebrew with his religious faith, and which centred in the Romans, with their genius for rule, their civil law and polity. This genetic connection of the existing civilization with the literature, philosophy, ethics, jurisprudence of antiquity belongs to the providential order. It is the course which the world’s history has taken. As God has made nature mathematically, so He has governed the life and development of mankind as here indicated. We are on the bosom of a broad river, which is to be traced back to its fountains in Hellas and Rome. New nations have come upon the stage, tho of the same Aryan family. New factors have mingled in the historic development. Christianity has supplanted the “gods many and the lords many” of the ancient peoples. Still the traces of antiquity are everywhere discernible.

Thus it is impossible to study humanity in the course of its development to that degree of advancement which the European nations have reached, and it is impossible to understand profoundly the present scene in which we are acting our part, unless we go back to antiquity and acquaint ourselves well with the peoples that have exerted this deep, potent, abiding influ-

ence in moulding the character and shaping the destiny of the nations coming after them. The geologist might as well aspire to understand the earth by merely inspecting what lies on its surface as the student to understand the present without exploring the past, and, in particular, without an intimate acquaintance with the literature, the polity, and the composite life of Greece and Rome.

How shall this knowledge of Antiquity be obtained? It can be obtained, after a fashion, at second-hand. But for a "liberal" education, for that direct and penetrating view of ancient society which alone satisfies the ideal of such a culture, the languages of Greece and Rome must be learned. In the study of them the youth is put into immediate intercourse with the mind of the ancients. The veil is lifted. Such is the vital relation of speech to thought that the peculiar genius of a people expresses itself to the discerning student in their language. Moreover, say what one will of the value of translations, the literary works of antiquity can never be fully comprehended and appreciated through them. If this were possible to a genius like Goëthe,—and it is not possible to such as he,—this would not prove that it is equally possible to ordinary men. Then as instruments for the investigation of the monuments of the mind and work of antiquity—not to speak of historical study in general—the ancient languages, Greek as well as Latin, are of the utmost consequence. The necessity for the study of these tongues we found, then, mainly on their importance as a part and a means of the study of antiquity—a study indispensable in a liberal course of training.

This general consideration may be followed by a more special remark on the literary value of the products of the Greek mind. These are of unmatched excellence. One writer, Shakespeare, excels all others in a certain exuberance of genius, an abounding wealth of invention; and he has the advantage of being pervaded by the Christian element. On the whole, however, when we take into view both matter and form, the finest productions in literature are the dramas of Sophocles. Homer and Sophocles! Where shall we look for another two upon a level with them? There are no philosophical writers equal to Plato and Aristotle. No orations have ever surpassed those of

Demosthenes. No historian has ever outstripped Thucydides. The verdict of ages which affirms the transcendent merit of the Greek authors is not a groundless tradition. It is not the result of a prejudice inspired by a peculiar training. It is a verdict not to be set aside by the preference of an individual. It has a catholic character; it is the united judgment of men of taste and culture through a long course of generations. Can the student of literature who aims at a truly liberal culture in this department alone, afford to pass by the masterpieces of Greek genius, or know them only through the medium of modern versions, the best of which must fail to reproduce the color and flavor of the original?

The adversaries of the position here taken are prone to say that the Greeks themselves had no Greeks before them; they were the authors of their own literature and culture; why should we not exercise a like self-reliance? The answer must be an exhortation to modesty. We are not Greeks. The simple fact is that the Greeks were a pre-eminently gifted people. They stand at the head of that section of mankind which exhibit a power "to light their own fire." They learned much from older nations. But they were original and creative beyond all precedent and beyond all example in subsequent ages. Plato did not claim too much for his countrymen when he contrasted them with other nations, like the Phœnicians, through their intellectual life and proficiency in knowledge. It is no disgrace to a nineteenth-century American to go to school to the Greeks. They are still, in their own lines, the leaders of mankind. They are the masters. The objection to which we here refer is of a piece with the logic of one who should infer from certain instances of self-taught individuals who have climbed to the pinnacles of science that it would be well to abolish schools and colleges. It is an example of the fallacy of making a rule out of the exception. Dr. Franklin ran away from home and stood before kings; therefore, whoever would stand before kings should run away from home. Attica was about as large as Rhode Island. Rhode Island is a noble little commonwealth. Yet it has enjoyed political liberty longer than the democracy of Athens lasted, and in the midst of the blazing light of this much-lauded century. What now is or will be the influence of

Rhode Island on the world's history compared with the unmeasured and imperishable influence of Athens? Whence the difference? When men plume themselves on their ability to do for themselves what the Greeks did in their day, the question to be settled is whether they manifest a just self-confidence or self-ignorance and conceit.

In connection with what has been said above, there is an important thought which there is only room here to indicate. There is an expansive effect of the study of the ancients, which is well likened to the influence of foreign travel. We take a journey not in space but backward in time. We *live* for a while in the distant past. The want of this wide, genial, but subtle cosmopolitan spirit is felt in the case of not a few able men who have never been students of Antiquity—"self-taught" men, perhaps. In their mental view we miss an "atmosphere." It is a picture without a background. Their intellectual horizon is too near. There is no underlying sense that there were brave men before Agamemnon.

Viewed on the side of discipline the study of Greek is a study of language and a gymnastic in the art of interpretation. In both of these respects it is of unequalled efficacy. Its whole structure, its precision and flexibility, its capacity for expressing the most delicate shades of thought, its harmony, make it without a rival as affording an insight into the nature and possibilities of human speech. The same qualities raise it to the same rank as a means for the training of the interpretative faculty. Apart from all reasoning, experience shows that equal effects are not capable of being produced by the study of the modern languages. As to the oral use of these tongues, it is common to find in Europe those who speak them glibly, but have not the least claim to be thought educated. The knowledge possessed by couriers and ciceroni has its uses, but it is not culture. It is found that those who are taught in the *Real-Schulen* of Germany are not even, as a rule, so competent to pursue the studies of natural and physical science as are those who have passed through the classical curriculum. It may be said that if the modern languages were taught as elaborately as the Greek is taught the result might be different. In the first place, this is a thesis for which there is no proof. In the second place,

if the modern languages were taught after a more exhaustive method, if philological analysis and researches into the genesis of words and grammatical forms were introduced, an outcry would be raised against this mode of study as an unwarrantable and unpractical consumption of time. The disciplinary value of Greek has been established, beyond all dispute, by its perceived results. Nor is it impossible to point out the *rationale* according to which this benefit follows.

If Greek were given up as a required study in the liberal course, the danger is that it would go where Hebrew is gone. It would come to be studied by ministers almost exclusively. The result of such a change to the tone of culture would be most disastrous.

At this point we are brought to the grand objection against the requirement of Greek among the studies preparatory to college. It is the objection frequently urged against classical studies generally. As a matter of fact, it is alleged, these languages are not learned. At the end of a period of study varying from five to ten years the average pupil cannot read the Greek and Latin authors with any facility. Unable to read them, he lays them aside forever. Not unfrequently he sells the books which he has laboriously conned. As for any keen relish or genial appreciation of the ancient authors, it is very seldom gained. And so far as they are a means of giving an insight into the Greek (or Roman) genius and life, and thus of bringing a large and profound understanding of history and of modern civilization, their influence on college students is not very potent. How can it be thought wise, when there is so much to be learned, to spend a large portion of the precious years of youth in poring over Greek text-books? Is not a good knowledge of French and German worth more, in this stirring age, than a smattering of Greek?

This objection cannot be confuted by a sneer. It is, to say the least, plausible. It amounts in our judgment, however, to nothing more than a deserved rebuke to methods of teaching which have come into vogue, and to a loud call for reform. Far less is done than might be done in the years given to classical study. The philological motive has unduly predomi-

nated, at the expense of what may be termed the literary and historical, in the modes of instruction. Discipline, valuable as it is, has been turned into a fetich. Classical teachers have come to be satisfied with the gymnastic benefit gained by the student in these long years. They have said practically, and sometimes have avowed, that it is of little consequence whether the pupil acquires the power to read the ancient writers or not.

Let not the philological discipline be undervalued. The mature man profits by the muscular plays which made so great a part of his business in the years of childhood. Constantly, tho insensibly for the most part, he was gaining vigor, and laying up a store of health. The careful study of a few Greek writers, the weighing of the value of the particles, the precise discrimination of the shades of meaning, the constant exertion of judgment in determining the sense of words in the light of the context, leaves a lasting effect on the intellect, even tho the Greek alphabet itself, in the course of years, should be forgotten.

But this effect is far from being all that may be fairly demanded, considering the time and labor expended by the young in these studies. There has been great progress in Greek and Latin scholarship within the last forty years. Competent teachers are far more accurate in their instruction than was the case formerly. Grammatical researches have been pushed much further. Comparative philology, and especially the opening of the Sanscrit, have thrown light on all the Aryan tongues, and the Greek and Latin among them.

It is clear, however, that there has not been a corresponding advance in the interest taken by young students in the classics, or in the appreciation of their contents. Virgil, and Horace, and Homer were read often with more relish in old times, and better retained in memory, than now. With all the accuracy of knowledge and of teaching, compared with the more slovenly scholarship of a previous day, few attain to any considerable facility in reading the ancient authors. They are laid aside, as was remarked above, without a pang. The reasons are not far to seek. Many teachers proceed on the assumption that their pupils are all to be philologists. Their drill is fashioned with a view to make them adepts in this line. They cram boys with

the minutiae of grammar, instead of letting them learn the essentials, and allowing them to widen their grammatical knowledge gradually in connection with the reading of authors, and their advance to higher stages in culture. Novices are harassed, burdened, wearied, and, in many instances, permanently disgusted by a daily bath in the endless details of grammar. They must dissect the verb, find out the reasons and laws of word-changes, etc., and work their way through a mass of matter of this sort, of which Plato and Demosthenes knew little or nothing. Instead of setting the pupil, after giving him the essential concrete facts, and even while doing so, to make sentences and to read easy lessons, which contain something in the thought or story to interest his mind and reward him for his labor, the effort would frequently seem to be to make his path as hard and loathsome as it can be made. All this cumbrous pedantry is dignified with the name of thoroughness. One consequence is that by many bright-minded boys the study of Greek and Latin is pursued not a day longer than they are driven to it. In many, literary aspiration is chilled. Why should instruction be made a soulless treadmill? Why should there not be elementary reading-books, as formerly, which should entice the pupil to "get out" the translation partly for the pleasure which an amusing anecdote or an interesting passage in ancient history affords? The consequences of this grammatical fanaticism, this mania of pedagogues, are deplorable indeed. Under the method which has extensively prevailed of late, the pupil does not read enough to get any considerable stock of words. He can put on his accents and analyze his paradigms, but he has so slender a vocabulary that he cannot read his authors. This, in brief, is the execrable Dryasdust method which has done more to bring classical studies into disrepute than all the declamation of their avowed enemies. If such a method were adopted in teaching the modern languages, the results would be similar; and no talk about "discipline" would avail to save such a method from general condemnation, if not contempt. "Gerund-grinder" is a not inapt designation for the practitioners of this sort of teaching. They should take for their patron saint the old German who lamented on his death-bed that he had not concentrated his attention on the dative case. They should lay to heart Matthew

Arnold's witty saying that "the aorist was made for man and not man for the aorist."

Not only must the purely philological motive and interest be reduced to its proper place; there is likewise an imperative need that the study of Greek and Latin should be, from the beginning, the open door to the study of Antiquity. When Arnold of Rugby carried his classes through Thucydides he made the study of the author at the same time a study of the author's times, of the art of war as then practised, of civil polity, diplomacy, statesmanship, etc. There is no reason why, in close connection with the study of the Greek and Latin writers, students should not be initiated into the investigation of ancient religion, of ancient art, of the growth and characteristics of the communities whose languages they are learning. In a word, ancient history, in its comprehensive meaning, should be made an inseparable part and concomitant of classical study. It is practicable, with a right method and with inspiring teachers, thus to give young men as early as about the close of the Sophomore year in college, such a knowledge of ancient history that they shall be well equipped for engaging in the study of modern history, and in the branches of knowledge usually pursued in conjunction with it. It is not requisite for the purposes of discipline that the linguistic interest should be all in all. The literary, the æsthetic, the historical motive may have its rightful prominence, and the discipline to be drawn from exactness of philology will come of itself. There are welcome indications of a reaction against the theory and practice which have done so much to provoke hostility to Greek and Latin. There are the beginnings of a reform. Attacks on classical study will not be without use if they stimulate those who value it aright, to adopt a more rational and fruitful method.

The propositions which the foregoing remarks are intended to sustain are these:

1. While the study of Greek (as well as of Latin) is relatively less important now than at a former day, it is still essential to a complete, a "liberal" culture.
2. The ground of this necessity does not lie any more in the intellectual discipline gained in linguistic study, than in the whole genetic relation of Antiquity to modern civilization.

3. The study of Greek (as of Latin) should therefore be a part and a means of the study of the literature and the institutions of the ancient nations.

4. There is need of a reform in the spirit and method of teaching which shall adapt it to these motives and ends : grammatical drill must be subordinated to the attainment of the language as a key to the contents of the literature, and to a knowledge of the collective life, of Antiquity.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

OUR COLLEGES BEFORE THE COUNTRY.

THERE is no subject which is to-day so submerged in cant and humbug as education. Both primary and secondary education are suffering from this cause, but in different ways. Primary education is afflicted by the cant and humbug of progress and innovation, and secondary education is afflicted by the cant and humbug of conservatism and toryism. The former affliction is less grievous than the latter, because it pertains to life—may proceed from an excess of vitality; the latter pertains to death and leads down to it.

It is not my present intention to discuss primary education, but it belongs to my subject to notice one fact in the relation of secondary to primary education. There is a notion prevalent in college circles that the colleges have an important public duty to perform in marking out the line of study for the preparatory schools, and in keeping them up to their duty. It seems to me that this is a mischievous notion. The high-schools and academies of the country are doing their duty far better than the colleges are doing theirs. The teachers in the schools have as high a standard of duty as the teachers in the colleges, and the former have more care and zeal to devise and adopt good methods than the latter. Methods of instruction are yet employed in college which have long been discarded in the schools, and, if either has anything to learn from the other, it is the colleges which need instruction from the schools. The colleges, by their requirements, do exercise a certain control over the curriculum of the schools. It is an open question whether this control is generally beneficial to the education of the young men of the country. If the colleges have prescribed courses of study, and if the schools have to follow a prescribed course of study leading

up to it, then a few gentlemen with strong prejudices and limited experience of life obtain power to set up a canon of what things may be taught and learned in the country. That such a power has been possessed and used, that it still remains to a great extent unbroken, and that it is purely mischievous, I take to be facts beyond contradiction. In no civilized country is mandarinism in education so strong as in the United States. Its stronghold is in the colleges, and they use such control as they possess to establish it in the schools. One great gain of the reform which is now needed in the colleges would be that they would confine themselves to their own functions and leave the academies and high-schools to follow their own legitimate development.

I ought not to speak as if there had been no improvement in American colleges within a generation. It is well known that, both by founding new institutions and reforming old ones, great improvements have been made. A great college has a life of its own. It grows by its own vital powers and pushes on even the most timid or reactionary of its *personnel*. Probably bigotry and stupidity could kill it in time. One knows of ancient seats of learning which have met that fate. But it does not come all at once. Still, I believe that if the question had been raised in a class of graduates twenty or fifty years ago, whether the college course had been valuable, more would have said that they looked back upon it as a grand advantage than would say so now.

It is affirmed, and from such evidence as has come to my knowledge I believe it to be true, that the youth of the country do not care for a university education as the youth of former generations did. They consider that a high-school education is education enough. They do not look upon the colleges as offering anything of high and specific value which it is worth four years' time and a large expenditure of capital to get. Of course there has always been a large class of people who despised a culture which they never understood. The present temper of the youth and their parents is, as I understand it, a very different thing. They look upon the colleges as the gate of admission to a caste of people who are technically "educated" and "cultivated," who have a kind of free-masonry of culture amongst

themselves, but who are not educated or cultivated, if we take those words in any liberal and rational sense, any better than large masses of people who are not college graduates, and so not members of the guild of the learned. Facts are indisputable that free and generous familiarity with the best thought and knowledge of the time, as well as intellectual power, activity, and elasticity, are displayed by men who have never visited a university, but have devoted time judiciously to intellectual pursuits. Therefore a notion has found place that college training only confers artificial accomplishments which serve to mark the members of the learned caste. Once it was thought that the only learning fit for a gentleman was heraldry, and that his only accomplishments should be those of arms, music, and gallantry. A flunkey once said that a certain woman could not be a lady: she played the piano so well that she must have been educated for a governess. In the old guilds a man could only become a master by producing a very costly and useless masterpiece. A belle in Siam lets her finger-nails grow inches long, so that she cannot even dress herself, and every one who sees her knows that she is helpless and elegant. All these instances, heterogeneous as they are, have elements in common with each other and with the traditional work of our colleges. They present the notion that what is useful is vulgar, that useless accomplishments define a closed rank of superior persons, and that entrance into that rank should be made difficult. However, we live in a day and country where these notions have only a feeble footing. Our people are likely to turn away with a smile and go on to things which are of use and importance, and no elegance of rhetoric and poetry, devising subtle and far-fetched explanations of the real utility of classical accomplishments, will avail to hold them. Such I take to be the significance of the fact that the youth do not appreciate a college education or feel an eager desire for it as their fathers did.

I have heard it argued that it is a great misfortune that the boys should be contented with a high-school education, and should not care to go to college; also that something should be done to persuade them to seek a college education. I do not so argue. A college or school ought to stand on its own footing as a blessing to anybody who can get its advantages, and its

advantages ought to be so obvious and specific that they should advertise themselves. If a college does not offer such advantages that any one who can may gladly seize them, then the young men may better not enter it. If especial inducements are necessary to persuade men to go to college, then the condemnation of the college is pronounced. It has no reason to exist.

It is no doubt true that a classical education once gave a man a positive and measurable advantage in the career which he might choose in life. At a time when the sciences which teach us to know the world in which we live were still in their infancy; when the studies by which the mind is trained to high, strict, and fearless thinking were as yet undeveloped; when history was still only a record of curious and entertaining incidents in war and diplomacy; when modern civil institutions were yet in many respects below the standard of the ancients, and still on the same military basis; when no notion of law had yet found footing in the conception of society;—at such a time no doubt study of classical types and models was valuable; ideas were obtained from an old treasure-house which could not have been obtained from the experience of actual life; literary culture was the only possible discipline; grammar stood first as a training in thought and expression; formal logic was a practical tool; perhaps even introspective metaphysics was not entirely a scholastic and dialectic exercise. In those times a young man who possessed a classical education, with a few touches of metaphysics and theology to finish it off, was put on a true superiority to his uneducated contemporaries as regarded his stock of ideas, his powers of expression, his horizon of knowledge, and the general liberality of his attitude towards life. He felt this his whole life long. It made him earnestly grateful to the institution which had educated him. Every young man who grew up saw distinctly the superior advantages which a college man possessed, and, if he felt at all fit for it, was eager to win the same advantage. There certainly never has been, in the United States, any appreciation of the rose-water arguments about “culture” which are now put forward in defence of classical training. We, when we were boys, sought classical training because it was *the* training which then put the key of life in our

hands, and because we saw positive and specific advantages which we could obtain by it.

At the present time all is changed, and the changes which have come about have made necessary a great change in the character of our colleges, in their courses of study, and in their whole attitude towards the public. I do not say that they need to come into direct and close relations with the life of the nation to-day: I say that they must take heed to themselves lest they fall out of that intimate relation to the life of the nation in which they once stood, and out of which they have no importance or value at all. A college which is a refuge for mere academicians, threshing over the straw of a dead learning, is no better than a monastery. Men who believe that they can meet the great interests of mankind which to-day demand satisfaction, by a complacent reference to what satisfied them when they were young, are simply building for themselves a fool's paradise.

It must be said here that college officers are, for many reasons, unfit for college management. They are open to all the pitfalls of every pedagogue. They have to guard themselves against the vices of dogmatism, pedantry, hatred of contradiction, conceit, and love of authority. They, of course, come each to love his pursuit beyond anything else on earth. Each thinks that a man who is ignorant of *his* specialty is a barbarian. As a man goes on in life under this discipline he becomes more self-satisfied and egotistical. He has little contact with active life; gets few knocks; is rarely forced into a fight or into a problem of diplomacy; gets to hate care or interruption, and loves routine. Men of this type of course are timid, and even those traits which are most admirable in the teacher become vices in the executive officer. Such men are always over-fond of *a priori* reasoning, and fall helpless the moment they have to face a practical undertaking. They have the whole philosophy of heaven and earth reduced, measured out, and done up in powders, to be prescribed at need. They know just what ought to be studied, in what amount and succession of doses. That is to say, they are prepared to do any amount of mischief at a juncture when the broadest statesmanship is needed to guide the developments of a great institution. Certainly, the notion

that any body of men can now regulate the studies of youth by what was good for themselves twenty, forty, or sixty years ago is one which is calculated to ruin any institution which they control. It is always a hard test of the stuff men are made of, when they are asked to admit that a subject of which they have had control would profit by being taken out of their control and entrusted to liberty.

On the other hand, the system of heterogeneous and nondescript electives, jumbled together without co-ordination of any kind, and offered to the choice of lazy youth, can never command the confidence of sober teachers. A university ought to teach everything which anybody wants to know. Such is the old idea of a university—a universe of letters. It ought to give complete liberty in the choice of a *line* or *department* of study, but it ought to prescribe rigidly what studies must be pursued in the chosen department by any one who wants its degree. A Yale diploma ought not to mean that a man knows everything, for that would be absurd; nor that he knows “something about the general principles” of all those things which “every educated man ought to know,” for this is a formula for superficiality and false pretence. It ought to mean that he has acquired knowledge in some one line of study, sufficient to entitle him to be enrolled amongst the graduates of the institution, and the college ought to define strictly the kind and quantity of attainment which it considers sufficient, in that line or department, to earn its degree.

Now, however, the advocates of the old classical culture, ignoring or ignorant of all the change which has come over human knowledge and philosophy within fifty years, come forward to affirm that that culture still is the best possible training for our young men and the proper basis for the work of our colleges. How do they know it? How can anybody say that one thing or another is just what is needed for education? Can we not break down this false and stupid notion that it is the duty of a university, not to teach whatever any one wants to know, but to prescribe to everybody what he ought to want to know? Some years ago, at a school meeting in one of our cities, a gentleman made an argument against the classics. A distinguished clergyman asked him across the room whether he

had ever studied the classics. He replied that he had not. "I thought not," replied the clergyman, as he sat down. He was thought to have won a great victory, but he had not. His opponent should have asked him whether he had ever studied anything else. Where is the man who has studied beyond the range of the classical culture who retains his reverence for that culture as superior to all other for the basis of education? No doubt a man of classical training often looks back with pleasure and gratitude to his own education and feels that it has been of value to him; but when he draws an inference, either that no other course of discipline would have been worth more to himself, or that no other discipline can be generally more useful as a basis of education, he forms a judgment on a comparison one branch of which is to him unknown.

I am not in the same position on this question as Mr. Adams. I may say that I profited fairly by a classical education. I believe that I am in a position to form a judgment as to how much is truth and how much is humbug in the rhapsodies about the classics to which we are treated. The historical sciences and language will always have great value for certain classes of scholars. Clergymen will always need the ancient languages as a part of their professional training. Teachers in certain departments will always need them. No professor of modern languages could be considered equipped for his work if he were unacquainted with Greek and Latin. Philologists and special students in the science of language contribute in a high degree and in an indispensable manner to the stock of our knowledge. Literary men and some kinds of journalists, classes who are sure in the future to seek a more special and detailed training than they have enjoyed in the past, will find utility in classical study. All these classes need, not less Greek and Latin than hitherto, but more. One evil result of trying to force the classics on everybody is that those for whom the classics have value cannot get as much of them as they need. Of modern languages, two at least are to-day indispensable to an educated man. As nations come nearer to each other, and as their literatures grow richer and richer, the need of being able to step over the barrier of language becomes greater. It is easy for any one who watches the course of things to see how, from one decade

to another, the necessity of learning the modern languages makes itself more distinctly felt. Those languages were formerly accomplishments. Now they are necessities for any one who intends to pursue literary or scientific work, or even practical work in many departments. Hence language will always enter into the scope of education, especially in its elementary stages. Latin has especial utility and advantage. If one wanted to learn three or four modern languages, it might pay him to learn Latin first, and Latin will always have value for an introduction to the ancient classical world. Greek is a rich and valuable accomplishment to any man of literary or philological tastes, or to an orator or public debater, or to any one who needs the art of interpretation. I know of no study which will in general develop gifts of expression, or chasten literary style, like the study of Greek. That language more than any other teaches the delicate power of turns in the phrase, of the collocation of words, of emphasis, of subtle shading in synonyms and adjectives. Then, too, surely no student of politics and political economy can pass over the subject-matter of Aristotle, or Demosthenes and the orators, nor the life and polity of the Greek state.

When, however, all this is admitted in regard to the uses of a classical training, what does it prove in regard to the claims of the classics to be made the basis of all higher education, or the toll which every one must pay before he can be admitted to the guild of the learned? Nothing at all. I have known splendid Greek scholars who could not construct a clear and intelligible argument of six sentences. They always became entangled in subtleties of phrase and super-refinement of words. I have known other great Greek scholars who wrote an English which was so dull that scarcely any one could read it. On the other hand, there are men whose names are household words wherever the English language is spoken, because they can say what they mean in clear, direct, and limpid English, altho they have never had any classical culture at all. I have known whole classes to graduate at our colleges who had never read a line of Aristotle, and who had not a single correct notion about the life and polity of the Greeks. Men graduate now all the time who know nothing of Greek history and polity but the fragments

which they pick out of the notes on the authors which they read. It is grotesque to talk about the recondite charms and graces of classical culture when one knows what it amounts to for all but here and there one. It is a rare thing for a man to graduate who has read Grote or Curtius altho he has studied Greek for five or six years. Any one who reads no Greek and never goes to college, but reads Grote or Curtius, knows far more of Greek life, polity, and culture than any but the most exceptional college graduate. I do not believe that this was formerly true. It appears that faithful students in former times used such means as then existed for becoming familiar with classical life and history far more diligently than is now customary. Classical studies, having sunk to a perfunctory character, now stand in the way of faithful study of anything.

I go further, and if the classics are still proposed as the stem of a liberal education, to be imposed upon every student who seeks a university training, I argue that classical culture has distinct and mischievous limitations. The same may no doubt be said of any other special culture, and whenever any other culture is put forward as possessing some exclusive or paramount value, it will be in order to show that fact. I do not doubt that I gained great profit from a classical training. Part of the profit I was conscious of. I think it very likely that I won other profit of which I was unconscious. I know that it cost me years of discipline to overcome the limitations of the classical training, and to emancipate my mind from the limited range of processes in which it had been trained. For the last ten years I have taught political economy to young men of twenty-one years or thereabouts who had been prepared for me by training in a curriculum based on classics. They have acquired certain facilities. They have a facility in "recitation" which is not always produced by familiarity with the subject. The art of recitation is an art all by itself. Very often it is all a man has won from his college training. Sometimes it consists in beating out a little very thin, so as to make it go a great way; sometimes it consists in "going on one's general information," and profiting to the utmost by any hint in the question; sometimes it consists in talking rapidly about something else than the question. Some men never can come to a point, but soar in lofty circles around and over the point,

showing that they have seen it from a distance ; others present rags and tags of ideas and phrases, showing that they have read the text, and that here and there a word has stuck in the memory without sequence or relation. The habit of reading classics with a "pony" for years has produced these results. Many of these men must be regarded with pity because their mental powers have been miseducated for years, and when they try to acquire something, to make it their own, to turn it into a concise and correct statement and utter it again, they cannot do it. They have only acquired some tricks of speech and memory.

The case of men who have studied honestly, but who have been educated almost exclusively on grammar, is different. No doubt they have gained a great deal, but I find that they hardly ever know what a "law" is in the scientific sense of the word. They think that it is like a rule in grammar, and they are quite prepared to find it followed by a list of exceptions. They very often lack vigor and force in thinking. They either accept authority too submissively, if the notion which is presented does not clash with any notions they had received before, or if they argue, they do so on points of dialectical ingenuity. They do not join issue closely and directly, and things do not fall into order and range in their minds. They seem to be quite contented to take things and hold them in a jumble. It is rare to find one who has scholarship enough to look up a historical or biographical reference. It is generally assumed by them that if "no lesson has been given out" they have nothing to do. One of the most peculiar notions is that a "lecture" has no such importance as a "recitation;" that to cut the former is of no consequence, but that to cut the latter is serious. In short, the habits and traditions in which men have been trained when they reach senior year in college are such that they are yet boys in responsibility, and, altho they are very manly and independent in many respects, they are dependent and unmanly in their methods of study, in their conception of duty, in their scholarship, and in their code of conduct in all that affects the institution. It has been claimed for the classics that they give guidance for conduct. This is, to me, the most amazing claim of all, for, in my experience and observation, the most marked fact about classical culture is that it gives no guidance in conduct at all.

In contrast with what I have stated, it is most important to

notice that, in every class, men distinguish themselves in political economy who have been very poor scholars in the classics, and have lost whatever mental drill a classical training might have given.

I shall be asked whether I attribute the facts which I have mentioned about the mental habits of students to the study of the classics. Evidently many of them are attributable to a system of school discipline continued until a too advanced age, and to a puerile system of discipline. Others are due to a textbook and recitation with marks system which breeds into a man unscholarly ideas and methods. But I affirm from my own experience and observation that the most serious of the mental faults and bad intellectual habits which I have described are caused by a training which is essentially literary, grammatical, and metaphysical. No doubt it is true that a large fraction of the men will shirk work; that they are slovenly in all their mental habits; that they will be as idle as they dare; that they seize gladly upon a chance to blame somebody else or "the system" for their own shortcomings. These facts, however, belong only to the imperfection of all things earthly. They are true; but if they are put forward as an excuse for routine and neglect on the part of university authorities, then those authorities simply lower themselves to the level of the bad students. A rigid discipline in prescribed tasks, with especial care for the dull scholars, is in place for youth up to a certain age, but, in any good system of education, the point must be judiciously chosen at which this system shall yield to a system of individual responsibility. The point at which this change should be made is certainly some years before the point at which young men become men by the laws of their country. That more responsibility would bring out more character is beyond question. The present method of prolonging tutelage and inculcating character by big doses of "moral science" is certainly a failure. I maintain that it is an impertinence for any authority whatever to withhold from young men twenty years of age anything which they desire to learn, or to impose upon them anything whatever which the authority in question thinks they ought to know.

The tendency of classical studies is to exalt authority, and to inculcate reverence for what is written, rather than for what is true. Men educated on classics are apt to be caught by the

literary form, if it is attractive. They are fond of paradoxes, and will entertain two contradictory ideas, if only each come in a striking literary dress. They think that they prove something when they quote somebody who has once said it. If any one wants to keep out "new ideas," he does well to cling to classical studies. They are the greatest barrier to new ideas and the chief bulwark of modern obscurantism. The new sciences have produced in their votaries an unquenchable thirst and affection for what is *true* in fact, word, character, and motive. They have taught us to appreciate and weigh evidence and to deal honestly with it. Here a strong contrast with classical training has been developed, not because classical training led men to be false, but because the scientific love of truth is something new and intense. Men of classical training rarely develop the power to go through from beginning to end of a course of reasoning on a straight line. They go on until they see that they are coming out at a result which they do not like. Then they make a bend and aim for a result which they do like, not regarding the broken continuity, or smoothing it over as carefully as possible. Classical training, in the world of to-day, gives a man a limited horizon. There is far more beyond it than within it. He is taught to believe that he has sounded the depths of human knowledge when he knows nothing about its range or amount. If any one wants to find prime specimens of the Philistinism which Matthew Arnold hates, he should seek them among the votaries of the culture which Matthew Arnold loves. The popular acuteness long ago perceived this, and the vile doctrines of anti-culture have sprung up and grown just in proportion as culture has come to have an artificial and technical definition, as something foreign to living interests.

An American college ought to be the seat of all the learning which would be of value to an American man in the American life of to-day. It ought to offer that training which would draw out and discipline the mental powers which are to-day useful. It ought to offer to its pupils an opportunity of becoming acquainted with all which is, or is coming to be, in the great world of thought, and it ought to offer such opportunities that those who profited by them faithfully would be highly trained men, drilled and disciplined for any of the tasks of life. If a college were such a place as this, its usefulness would be recognized at

once. Every young man in the country would desire, if possible, to enjoy its advantages, because he would feel that, if he could get a college education, he would be as it were lifted upon a higher plane for all the work of his subsequent life, no matter what career he might choose. His ambition would have won a new footing. In the competition of life he would have won new skill and new weapons. No college can possibly take any such place if it "clings to the classics." In face of the facts it is ludicrous to talk about maintaining the old classical culture. We might as well talk of wearing armor or studying alchemy. During the last fifty years all the old sciences have been reconstructed and a score of new ones have been born. Shall a man be educated now at our highest seats of learning and not become acquainted with these facts and doctrines which are revolutionizing the world of knowledge? Shall he only be allowed a bit here and a fragment there, or spend his best years in pursuits which end in themselves? In every journal or conversation, and in many sermons, topics are treated which belong to the substance of modern thinking. Shall the colleges ignore these topics, or only refer to them in order to preach them down?

History does not any longer mean what it meant twenty years ago. As a disciplinary pursuit it has changed entirely from an exercise of memory to an analysis and investigation of relations and sequences. Constitutional history has grown into a great branch of study of the highest importance to the student of law, political science, jurisprudence, and sociology. It has totally altered the point of view and mode of conceiving of those subjects since the days when the study of them began with the classical authors. The years spent on Greek grammar and literature would be priceless to the whole mass of our youth if they could be spent on this study. Sociology is still in its infancy. Only its most elementary notions are, as yet, available for purposes of education. It is sure to grow into a great science, and one of the first in rank as regards utility to the human race. It is plain that progress in other directions is producing problems in society which we cannot meet because our social science is not proportionately advanced. Biology is a science which is still young and new, but, with its affiliated sciences, it holds the key to a number of our most important

problems and to a new philosophy destined to supersede the rubbish of the schools. Physics in all its subdivisions, dynamics, anthropology, archæology, and a host of other sciences, with new developments in mathematics, offer just the stimulus which is proper and necessary to draw out youthful energies and to awaken youthful enthusiasm. The studies which I have mentioned and others are ready at our hand to-day to give our young men intellectual training and high scholarship, and to carry them on to heights of enjoyment and useful activity of which they have no conception. In the mean time they are studying Latin and Greek, and the college authorities are boasting that they cling to the old curriculum and to classical culture.

Our colleges cannot maintain themselves in any such position before the country. They must have the best possible learning, and they must impart it freely. They cannot do this if they "run themselves" or live on their reputation. There is nothing else which now calls for such high statesmanship as the guidance of our old colleges into the new duties and functions which they ought to fulfil. It is a task which calls for great sagacity and good judgment, but, above all, for constant study and care. There is one remarkable encouragement. A great university can be subjected to experiments without any harm at all. It is a great mistake to think that an experiment, if it fails, will leave permanent evils behind. It will not do so. Every academic year stands by itself. Every year it is possible to begin anew, adopting a new plan or recurring to an old one, and no harm at all is done. No one proposes to do away with the study of the classics. For those who desire to pursue that study we desire far fuller opportunities than now exist. The assault is aimed entirely at the pre-eminent and privileged position which is claimed for the classics. We desire that the universities should offer equal chances for a liberal education on the basis of any of the other great lines of study. If it should prove, upon experiment, that men educated in other sciences could not hold their own in life in competition with the classically educated, there would undoubtedly be a revival of classical study, and a return to it by those who were seeking an education.

WILLIAM G. SUMNER.

THE TARIFF ON WORKS OF ART.

THOSE who have endeavored to extend in this country the influence of the fine arts by fostering a just appreciation of their value have been seriously hampered in their efforts by the state of the tariff laws. A duty is imposed on the importation of every work of art not the production of an American artist, exception being made only in favor of those things that are directly and expressly imported for public institutions. This duty being in proportion to the value of the object diminishes at one time the number and the quality of the works of art imported. It tends to prevent the introduction of many works that would otherwise be brought to this country, and it materially enhances the cost of all that are brought. The obstruction applies to ancient as well as modern productions, and operates as effectually against those that illustrate the growth and historical development of the arts as against those that exhibit the most recent achievements in them. Under the tariffs of 1846 and 1857 paintings and statuary (not merchandise) had been free. The duty upon them, which had been 10 per cent since 1861, was raised by the tariff which went into effect July 1st, 1883, to 30 per cent. This unexpected action was taken in the face of the fact that a large and influential body of those most interested were heartily in favor of the total abolition of the duty. Works of art of other descriptions less capable of definitive classification are still more harshly treated by the tariff; their purpose—as works of art—is altogether ignored, and they are recognized only as manufactures of the material of which they are chiefly composed. It is the effect of the new tariff to increase the already excessive duty on some of these articles.

DUTY ON	OLD TARIFF. Per cent.	NEW TARIFF. Per cent.
Old silver.....	40	45
Lacquer.....	35	35
Bronzes.....	35	45
Cloisonne.....	45	45
Porcelain.....	50	60
Carved ivory, horn, and bone.....	35	30
Embroideries (if silk).....	60	50
Tapestries (if wool), 50 cents per lb. and	35%	40% and 35c. per lb.

It ought to be evident that works of art, as the direct product of an artist's brain and hand, are a different kind of commodity from those things which can be reproduced by a mechanical process. In respect of the vast field of art outside of painting and sculpture, interest has not hitherto been sufficiently general to make this distinction felt in our tariff laws; but that paintings and statuary have remained for so many years free or at a comparatively low rate indicates the existence of the impression that they are something other than mere articles of trade. If the requirements of government and the general welfare make it permissible to direct by legislation the channels of trade, the aim is not to prohibit but to divert the action of the individual. The result desired, so far as articles of manufacture are concerned, is the substitution not of one kind of commodity for another, but of a domestic product for a foreign product. The laws say in effect not 'Thou shalt not buy this thing,' but 'Thou shalt buy of this fellow-citizen rather than that foreigner.' The conditions of purchase are altered, but there is offered to the purchaser as alternative substantially the same thing.

Even in the case of books, which occupy a middle ground, so to speak,—being as to their contents the direct offspring of the mind, but as to form reproducible indefinitely without loss to their power,—the result is less detrimental to the object for which they exist. The tax in this instance enables American publishers to take advantage of the incidental benefits of reproduction and distribution, and the time allowed them for that purpose is limited. Twenty years after publication all books are duty-free.

But works of art are each and every one the immediate expression of the artist's mind. Their full power can only be felt by actual observation; they cannot be mechanically multiplied;

they cannot be adequately represented by the medium of any reproductions. Form, secondary to utility, in usual objects of manufacture is of the essence of art. A sufficiently accurate description would enable a man who had never seen a sewing-machine to reproduce them at will; but the most detailed description, even the most admirable photograph, is but a dim reflection of the Delphic Sibyl or the Venus of Milo.

A high duty amounts to prohibition, and is therefore an infringement of personal liberty. If you are forbidden to buy a certain work of art, you are offered as alternative not the same thing under changed conditions as before, but an entirely different thing. You wish the individual work of one man's brain endowed with the form which he alone can give it, and the law preventing your getting it, there is offered as alternative another work of another man's brain.

Works of art, therefore, as to their origin and the manner of their production, differ radically from the ordinary objects of manufacture. This difference is as marked in the purpose for which they exist; namely, as instruments of education and a means of cultivation, whose presence benefits alike artists and the public. Enough has been said to prove that no fair economic principle can class works of art with the ordinary objects of manufacture. It will now remain to show that to so class them will defeat the purpose had in mind and inflict a serious and most unnecessary loss on the community at large.

First look at the question of revenue. In the absence of a separate classification for works of art in general, it is impossible to estimate the revenue derived from the various duties imposed; but from paintings and statuary at 10 per cent the average revenue for the nine years ending 1880 was less than \$125,000. For the year ending June 30, 1882, the amount received was \$255,000; and the largest sum collected from this source was in the year 1883, \$308,000—an increase partially attributable to the fact that four months elapsed between the passage of the new tariff law and the date of its taking effect. It will hardly be supposed that in the present plethoric state of the public purse the tax is primarily maintained for purposes of revenue.

The first ostensible reason for the tax, then, is found in the

expectation that it will afford assistance or protection to American artists. The intended benefit may be believed, on the one hand, to accrue to the artist's training and education,—to the influences that surround him and shape his mind; it may be supposed to attach to the sources from which his ideas, his conceptions, and his skill are drawn,—the artistic raw material, so to speak,—or, on the other hand, it may be designed to promote his pecuniary well-being by favorably disposing the market in which his completed productions are offered for sale.

In the absence of direct aid by subsidy or the maintenance of public art-schools, the first object can be attained only negatively; the artist can be shielded from some of the evil that too free an intercourse with the art-world would expose him to. In pursuance of this aim attention has been called to the debasing tendencies of certain foreign schools, and legislative coercion has been invoked to rescue the artistic infancy of America from the calamitous results that would ensue upon its being brought into contact with the great and naughty world. But in the realization of this effort no attempt is made to distinguish the good from the bad. The meritorious is included in the ban pronounced upon the meretricious; and lest those who have given their lives to the study of this distinction should err and through ignorance permit themselves to be influenced to their own disadvantage, a barrier is erected to screen them from all outside influence whatsoever. If it be conceded for the moment that the tendencies of modern European art are so deleterious that American artists must at all hazards be protected from their baneful example, why is not exception made in favor of those productions which have stood the test of centuries and are universally regarded as the masterpieces and models of excellence in various spheres of artistic activity? The gates are as firmly closed against these as against the later productions. In apparently wanton disregard of their value, even the mechanical reproductions which are possible are met by the same or a severer obstruction. To architects, painters, sculptors, to all draughtsmen, photographs and plaster-casts are exceedingly serviceable objects of study. A duty of 25 per cent is laid on photographs, engravings, etc., and that on plaster-casts has been raised by the new tariff from 40 to 55 per cent. The present

law, it is true, expressly exempts antiquities from duty ; but the clause is nullified by the interpretation placed upon it by the department. In common parlance, as well as trade use, antique is applied to an object as distinguished from modern or contemporary. If, however, the term be interpreted in contradistinction to mediæval, there is shut out from the operation of the law the vast amount of art-works commonly recognized as antique, which at all events cannot be reproduced to-day and in no sense interfere with the field of contemporary manufactures. By reason of this interpretation works of art which pay export duty as antiquities on leaving Italy are obliged to pay import duties here as modern manufactures.

Aside from the exclusion of a deteriorating influence, it has been argued that art as an expression of national sentiment should be original, spontaneous, national. "We want in American art originators, not imitators. Art is indigenous to America ; if it had remained unknown in Europe it would have been developed, as all elements of true art exist here." Why, then, should we be dependent on others for that which we can do for ourselves? In an age of rapid communication between all civilized lands, Mrs. Partington's project of sweeping out the Atlantic is not more hopeless than the expectation of attaining nationality in art by the exclusion of other than native influences.

The same position applied to other branches of industry or departments of knowledge would be regarded as too childish to be noticed. We do not feel devoid of national sentiment because we adopt an Asian or European invention, nor regard our patriotism defunct in accepting the Copernican system. Yet it would be difficult to name a field of effort in which the accumulated experience of ages is more essential to a proper exercise of power than in the fine arts. This is largely true because the producer is not guided and limited by the universal notions of utility and interest. The manufacturer is governed in his operations by the general knowledge among his customers of what is useful to them and what outlay brings the best return. The artist's constituency is actuated by the subtle and cultivated faculty of taste. Experience alone can give power to detect that which is permanent and enduring in artistic expression. The

best genius of the world has recorded its experience for our enlightenment in the masterpieces of art that have come down to us. It is this experience, this record of difficulties overcome and triumphs won, that is essential to the artist, and the power of availing himself of it is of incalculable advantage.

So obvious does this seem that it would not deserve mention but for the fact that the present increased rate of duty is reported to be actually due to a successful appeal to the *e-pluribus-unum* spirit: this is the greatest country on earth; the American brain is equal to any; it can consequently produce high art in any desirable quantity, the producer of which ought accordingly to be protected against the pauper studios of Europe.

We may be forgiven for recalling a few lines of Goethe:

" Says Quidam, ' None makes of me a tool,
No master counts me in his school;
Nor may it ever of me be said
That I'm indebted to the dead.'
That is, if his meaning I rightly took,
' I am a fool on my own hook.' "

So much for the attempt to shape by legislation the course of an artist's ideas, and decide by a majority of Congress the proper sources of his inspiration. Net result: he is "protected" from the advantage of acquaintance with the richest storehouses of information regarding his art.

It may be, however, that by protection to American art is designed only a financial guardianship, a fiscal tenderness of a paternal government, which by increasing the difficulties of purchasing foreign works of art shall facilitate the sale of domestic productions. This view is complimentary neither to the native artist nor to his patron the public. It assumes that the American work of art cannot on a basis of equality stand comparison with foreign works; that it must have the advantage of a handicap in addition to the natural protection afforded by the expense of importation. It implies, too, that if the American work is capable of standing this test, the American purchaser is incapable of perceiving it. The fallacy of this view arises from the error above mentioned of classing works of art with the or-

dinary objects of manufacture. That classification rests on the assumption that a work of art is simply an object of sale ; that its sole economical function has been performed in the transfer to the purchaser. The very nature of art gives to the terms producer and consumer in connection with art a wider than ordinary significance. The artist—the producer—is possessed of an investment or plant (his gifts and acquirements) which, in order that he may effect his sales, must be constantly and progressively improved. The consumer is not only a purchaser but a possessor of an object of study, capable of permanently instructing and aiding other producers. A piece of cotton has performed its economical function when it has passed from the hands of the maker to the consumer. A work of art, on the contrary, is not consumed in the ordinary sense : its economical function continues in the permanency of its value ; in the part it takes in the education of artists and the community ; in the constant value it imparts to the investment, the plant of the whole body of producers. Every work of art introduced in the country increases the advantages of study of the native artist. The greater these advantages can be made at home, the less need will there be of prolonged foreign study as an element in artistic education. It will be a direct benefit to him by lessening the expense and difficulty of the process by which he fits himself for his profession. Furthermore, it tends to create and foster an artistic sentiment in the community on the very existence of which his success depends.

No requirement of our nature demands the acquisition of any definite amount of works of art. The desire to be surrounded by objects of beauty is one that comes after the body is provided with sustenance and raiment, and a certain degree of safety and comfort has been attained in the dwelling. It is an accompaniment of a high civilization ; of a more complex and intricate mode of life. No natural law prescribes the limits of this desire, or pronounces a penalty or forfeiture for non-compliance with it. Necessity of the highest kind demands a normal amount of food, covering, and shelter, but the degree to which one will gratify his appreciation of beauty is controlled by no such regulations. It is subject to an individual trait ; and those who find pleasure in works of art and are able to indulge

that taste are those who in general will not be coerced by an arbitrary restriction. Such a restriction means to them less of that which they want, not more of that which they do not want. Taste is too subtle a quality to be regulated by law. Hence American works of art without merit cannot be benefited by any such pretended aid. Those with merit stand above the reach of it.

If the argument be properly stated, it should thus appear that the result of a factitious support of the American artist is to diminish his power to produce

By narrowing his field of observation and study ;

By retarding the cultivation of the public, regarded as owners of objects of study :

to diminish his power to sell

By impeding his full development, and, with it, his capacity to please and attract ;

By obstructing the spread of appreciation in the public regarded as purchasers of his wares.

It looks as if, in the effort to prepare a market for the golden egg, the permanent interests of the digestion of the fowl had been overlooked.

Even among some who would not look for benefits in protection to American artists, an impression is current that the tax on works of art is a tax on luxuries, and therefore falls only on the rich. This aspect of the question should be looked at in its less immediate effects. Does not the tax, by whomsoever paid in the first instance, ultimately result in a direct loss to the entire community? The purchaser of works of art is analogous to the consumer of manufactured articles only so far as his relations to the producer are concerned. The article bought is not consumed ; it is not restricted to his benefit as wine, tobacco, clothing, horses, are restricted. Works of art have a much wider constituency : they do not minister solely to the selfish desires of an individual ; their value, if genuine, is far-reaching and permanent. It is a positive and demonstrable benefit to the community to have them in its possession. Even if for the hour they appear immersed in the inaccessible depths of private galleries, it should be remembered that from this source are fed the numerous and valuable loan-exhibitions. The force of cir-

cumstances opens doubly barred doors, and the lack of permanence in our life throws upon the market the tightly held treasures of the preceding generation. The Uffizi and Pitti collections at Florence, the Hermitage (St. Petersburg), the Berlin Museum and National Gallery, the Amsterdam and Munich galleries, are instances of the numerous public collections which had their inception in private collections. The commercial value of a political convention or a *mardi-gras* festival is in some measure calculable, but who will deny that as a power of attraction in a community the possession of noble works of art—with all that implies, the opportunities for exhibitions, the possibilities of sales, gifts, and bequests—far outweighs them?

A recent loan-exhibition in New York contained articles that were insured for a million dollars; their value has been estimated at twice that sum. These articles, for the most part products of other countries, paid from 10 to 60 per cent duty. Half a million or more was doubtless paid for the privilege of bringing them into a free country. Was that a loss only to the exhibitors? or is it nothing to the thousands of spectators and the community that the money expended is not represented by half as much more?

Is it a tax that falls only on the rich that obstructs and hinders such exhibitions; that goes far to restrict the beneficial influence of the fine arts to the very rich? A gentleman lately bequeathed a superb collection of works of art to a museum in New York. Their value is estimated at a hundred thousand dollars. On these he paid from 10 to 75 per cent in duty. In that proportion he expended without return what should now be represented by works of art in the public possession. Was he the only sufferer? If the community be enriched by the amount he paid in tax, is it not impoverished by the loss of the exercise of his taste, his judgment, and opportunities? Every dollar paid out in duty is so much inducement to a man not to leave such a bequest. Yet it is from just such sources—bequests and gifts—that our museums are filled. Few or none are endowed; and in consequence the free admission of works of art specially imported for public institutions is by no means so far-reaching a benefit as could be wished.

There is a sense in which everything outside of the barest

needs of existence is an article of luxury. Luxury has come by tropical use to mean that which is beyond the reach of many; but economically the term should be confined to its more derivative sense of that which in excess causes harm. The purely selfish ministering to the bodily appetites, and gratifying of passing fancies with objects that are consumed in the indulgence, should not be confused by word-juggling with a department of knowledge that has for its aim the giving an intellectual pleasure of the most elevating and refining description.

This is the conception that governs the admission of instruments of knowledge in other forms. If it were not that books can be, and in numerous instances are, mechanically reproduced, a tax on them would be too serious a burden on intelligence to be tolerated. The tax on books is a serious impediment to cultivation. Its defence, however, is, not that there are enough American books to supply the reading public, not that we possess all the elements of literary animation and, independent of the outside world, would produce a national literature, not even that the American brain is as big as any,—but that the contents of foreign books can be mechanically reproduced, and to the extent to which they are so reproduced the extension of their influence is not impaired. No such excuse can be urged in favor of restricting the importation of works of art.

If, however, the tax be laid upon works of art as luxuries, it can only be justified as a basis of revenue. There is no desire to exclude works of art because they are works of art; nor can it be supposed that the tax is aimed at a particular class in a spirit of vindictiveness. If, then, a basis of revenue, the tax should yield as high a revenue as possible. In this case the rule as enunciated by Robert J. Walker is that luxuries should bear the maximum revenue duty. It cannot be pretended for a moment that an almost prohibitory duty conforms to that description.

To sum up: a tax on works of art falls on the entire community and tends to confine and restrict the influence of the fine arts. A tax on luxuries should not include works of art which are engines of education; but if made to include them, a low rate can alone produce the sole effect for which it can exist.

It is not unusual to hear the opinion expressed by artists

and dealers that the greatest liberty should be afforded to real works of art, but that steps should be taken to exclude the trash. If an attempt were sought to exclude the works of merit and offer a premium on the importation of trash, it would seem that the present law afforded a solution. Some are inclined to prefer a specific to an ad-valorem duty, for the reason that the latter tends to exclude pictures in proportion to their value, or, in other words, tends to welcome pictures in proportion to their lack of value. Thus, at 30 per cent ad-valorem, a \$10,000 picture pays \$3000, a \$100 picture pays \$30; but at a specific rate, say \$50 per picture, the former work pays one half per cent, the latter 50 per cent. The change would have the advantage that it would remove the present gross discouragement to the importation of valuable pictures; but at the same time it would press with unfair severity on meritorious works of small monetary value. It would tend to keep out trash only so far as price is an accurate measure of merit. The present position would be simply reversed; instead of bearing most heavily as now on high-priced pictures, the tax would, irrespective of merit, bear proportionately most heavily on low-priced works. The change would be a partial benefit if the specific duty were low enough to make the aggregate burden on works of art less than at present, but it would not keep out trash. The only way to do that is to make the public appreciative of what is better than trash by permitting them every possibility of study and observation, and every freedom to decide for themselves.

A final reason for this attempt to protect American art is found in the not unnatural aim of those who are wedded to a protective system to maintain a symmetry and coherence in their system. It is the object of this article to show that the whole province of art lies quite beyond the sphere of protection and is amenable to different economic laws. Protectionists cannot consistently support for reasons of protection a measure that injures producer as well as consumer. The question of revenue is seen not to enter materially into the discussion, and a burden designed to be laid upon a rich man's extravagances is proven to be a needless and heavy weight laid upon the community at large.

The objects aimed at in this discussion could be attained by

a measure that should commend itself to protectionists and free-traders alike: a measure that, without interference with domestic producers, would remove a serious obstacle to the cultivation of a valued department of knowledge. The measure advocated would admit free of duty all paintings and sculptures whatsoever; photographs and plaster-casts; together with those works of art of every description which are more than fifty years of age. At a time when barbers, tailors, and bootblacks assume the name of artists, there is scarcely a commodity that would not claim the immunity due to works of art. The inclusion in the free-list of only those works of art besides paintings and statuary which are fifty years old would obviate the almost insuperable difficulty of a suitable discrimination. As manufacturers can fear no competition from commodities fifty years old, no "vested interests" would feel aggrieved, while lovers of art would find the impediment removed from a very large proportion of works of art.

This country has the disadvantage of distance from the art-centres; from the fund of antiquities—products of an age of leisure and concentrated wealth, the envy and study of an age of activity and general prosperity; but it has the advantage of disposable fortune. Rome after the conquest of Greece transported to her own shores many of her fallen rival's works of art. They are among the chief attractions of Italy to-day. In a purely commercial point of view, the advantage to Italy of her art-treasures is incalculable. Of the thousands of all nations who spend the winter months in Rome, Florence, and Venice, how large a proportion is attracted in chief part by those treasures! So keenly is this felt that the government obstructs (in some instances to the extent of positive prohibition) the removal of those possessions which are her chief glory and pride. This clinging to the treasures that cannot be replaced is growing in every land. Still the opportunities are rich to fill our country with the treasures that others are no longer able to hold. The purse is mightier than the sword. The South Kensington Museum and its invaluable collections had their origin in the Exposition of 1851. Younger still are the priceless national museums at Munich and Nuremberg and the Museum for Art and Industry at Vienna. The opportunities are still

rich, but not unlimited. While other governments give not only sanction but vast material aid to the work of spreading among their people a refining influence, ours most effectually seconds their efforts by laying a tribute on any American attempting the same for himself and his fellow-countrymen. We spend millions in the rudiments of education for all classes; but so soon as any have reached the point where they are ready to help themselves and others to a higher culture,—where they are aiming to extend an influence that has invariably proved refining, elevating, and humanizing,—there we begin to obstruct, to concoct difficulties, and plan defeat lest any should do too much towards the intellectual improvement of the community.

While we are endeavoring to erect an example of Liberty enlightening the World, we draw a veil lest some of that light should illumine ourselves.

The historian derives the name Antwerp from an ancient legend. A very powerful ogre had his seat at the mouth of the river Scheld, and demanded of every passer-by one half of all the goods he carried with him. In default of compliance he cut off the hand of the traveller and threw it into the river; hence hand-werpen and Antwerp. The tale is not incredible. Many centuries later an infinitely mightier ogre sat at the mouth of a larger stream, seizing the half of all that passed, and binding the hands of all who were occupied in benefiting the land; and the inhabitants of the land were so pleased withal that they left him in peace.

HENRY MARQUAND.

THE MODERN GERMAN NOVEL.

GOETHE'S "Wilhelm Meister," tho it properly belongs to the eighteenth century, struck the key-note of a theme which the novelists of modern Germany have ever since been content to vary. Gutzkow, Freytag, Spielhagen, and even Fritz Reuter and Auerbach, have all offered their expositions (I would not say solutions) of this vital problem, viz., the conflict between the feudalism of the past and the industrial spirit of the present. As feudalism is more powerfully entrenched in Germany than in any other European country, and the conflict accordingly assumes an acuter form, it is natural enough that the novelists should fight the battle of the age with such weapons and powers as they have at their command. But even apart from this consideration, it is not to be denied that problems of this order possess a peculiar attraction to the national mind. The movement of history, the conflict of social forces, which year by year imperceptibly modify the character and the relations of men—these are the things which to the German novelist appear eminently worthy of his attention. A merely piquant intrigue, affording no chances for historic outlook or illustration of social problems, he relegates to what he calls "*die Novelle*," i.e. the short story. Take any one of the eminent German novelists—Spielhagen, Freytag, Auerbach—and this predilection for large problems is everywhere manifest. A pronounced philosophical bias is also perceptible in every one of them, and it would be an easy thing to reconstruct each one's philosophy of life from his writings. This is, to be sure, to a certain extent possible in the case of every author of mature convictions, unless he happens to be as severely objective as Tourguéneff or Prosper Mérimée, whose opinions, tho scarcely to be inferred from his writings, have nevertheless leaked out through his correspondence. I think, however, that it is capable of demonstration that a Ger-

man author rarely rests satisfied until he has equipped himself with a "philosophy"—until he has acquired definite convictions concerning a thousand things which a Frenchman or an Englishman is willing to leave to the decision of those whom they may concern. A certain irrepressible tendency toward philosophical generalization is therefore perceptible in the great majority of German novels, especially those of the Young-German period. Among the moderns, Auerbach is especially brimming over with convictions, and frequently, as in "The Villa on the Rhein," forgets that he has a story to tell, flings away his mask and preaches Spinozism *in propria persona*. Spielhagen possesses much more artistic self-restraint, and his social philosophy is only to be inferred from the general drift of his plots, and an occasional little panegyric which he pronounces upon the remains of his democratic heroes who have sacrificed their lives upon the barricades. And yet I know of no English novelist except George Eliot whose views upon any vital question I could with equal certainty infer. Among the French there is no room for doubt as to what Zola thinks; but I should scarcely feel safe in hazarding an opinion as to the views on religion, art, or politics of Cherbuliez, Droz, or Daudet. As regards the two former, I should only know that their opinions, whatever they were, could not be of much consequence.

This philosophic attitude toward the century is one of the chief characteristics of Gustav Freytag's famous novel "Debit and Credit." The author possesses a profound comprehension of the industrial revolution of the century, and a beautiful consistency of sentiment pervades all his later writings. And this consistency is the result, not of impulse or of hereditary bias, but of mature culture and laborious thought. There is something admirable, too, in the ruthlessness with which he carries out the philosophical purpose in every detail of his work, enforcing his moral, not in preaching, but in the inexorable sequence and logic of his fictitious events. There can be no doubt that the old feudal civilization with its patriarchal relations, its pomp and circumstance, was a far more picturesque affair than the barren and colorless industrialism which is now driving the nobleman from his inherited acres and giving the merchant the weightiest vote in the councils of state. Thus Baron Rothsattel

in "Debit and Credit" is a much more vivid and interesting personage than his unconscious opponent, Mr. T. O. Schröter, the wholesale grocer, whose sober industry and minute adaptation of means to ends make him the predestined survivor in the social struggle. The author is perfectly well aware that the Baron would conduct himself in most relations of life with the greater dignity, and be altogether a more agreeable companion than the merchant; but he is equally well aware that Fate has small regard for picturesque advantages, and that the struggle for existence is not decided by sentimental considerations. He has, indeed, a lurking predilection for the nobleman, and it goes, no doubt, hard with him to sacrifice him; but the more praise he deserves for adhering so rigidly to the central thought, and completing his picture with such exclusive regard for the logic of reality.

"The German novel," says the well-known literary historian Julian Schmidt, "must seek the German people where alone it is to be found, viz., at its labor." This proposition, which Freytag has quoted with approbation, expresses another important change which the German novel has undergone during the present generation. We all know that labor is apt to be dry and has neither the piquant nor the picturesque qualities upon which a novel relies for its interest. It is only when a man has leisure that he can go in search of gallant adventures, or surrender himself to emotions which may arouse the sympathy of tender readers. The novelists have therefore always shown a preference for the rich man, whether he be a *parvenu* or of noble birth, and the toilers have, as a rule, been assigned inferior rôles, figuring as rascals or comic characters, or as mere "*supers*." The business of life, as the majority of novelists represent it, is enjoyment, excitement, or at best self-development. In "Wilhelm Meister" it was the latter, but it was to be acquired by association with men of wealth and station who were free from the narrow prejudices of the toiling Philistine world. In order to enable his hero to enjoy this advantage, Goethe makes him spend his time in directing the amusements of a company of noble idlers, and it hardly seems to have occurred to him what an undignified occupation this was for a young gentleman with ideal aspirations and in search of "harmonious culture." Goethe,

with all his clear-sightedness in the abstract, was too deeply imbued with respect for the nobility to perceive that there was anything anomalous in this instinctive subordination of the citizen to the nobleman. Very likely he had his reasons for thinking so, and in a certain way he was right. In the feudal organization of the state, and while society is yet semi-militant, the nobleman fulfils an important function and is entitled to a corresponding respect; but, as society emerges from the state of militancy, the function which he performed will be less and less needed, and the only salvation for the representatives of feudalism in the modern state is, therefore, to abandon their claims to superiority and engage in some industrial pursuit. It is this very thing which Rothsattel attempts to do in "Debit and Credit," but as he has had no training for such a pursuit, and moreover possesses no criterion for the judgment of men except their deference to himself, he is cheated on all sides and precipitates his ruin by the very means by which he had hoped to re-establish his position in the state. He cannot condescend, like that unpicturesque toiler T. O. Schröter, to investigate his own ledgers and see that the accounts tally; nor can he bear to give his confidence to an upright and honest man with a fair degree of self-respect. It wounds his pride to have a citizen behave frankly and independently in his presence, and partly to save this inherited pride he turns from the honest and self-respecting merchant to the obsequious Jew who fleeces him with the deepest of bows and chuckles to himself, while he draws his toils slowly about him.

According to Freytag, then, it is labor which in the end gives a man the upper hand in the struggle for existence; and it is in itself a triumph how he has succeeded in investing the various mercantile transactions in the house of "T. O. Schröter" and the establishment of Rothsattel's factory with a truly human interest. The fates of the characters for whom we feel so lively a sympathy are so intimately interwoven with these transactions that it is impossible not to follow them in breathless suspense. Even the young nobleman Fink who has imbibed a fair share of the military traditions of his ancestors, sees himself forced to enter the office of the wholesale grocer, and, gradually conquering his somewhat volatile nature, adapts himself to the

changed requirements of the age. He has been in the United States, where he has had occasion to rid himself of many of his noble prejudices and has learned the art to help himself. This man, *e.g.* the man of birth and brains and devoid of prejudice, is, according to our author, the heir of the future. He is, at all events, the successor in the industrial state to the defunct nobleman of the past. This is, in fact, the solution of the problem presented by nearly all the German novelists who have dealt with it. The *homo novus*—the pure plebeian—they are unable to stomach. And yet whoever reads the signs of the times aright will risk the prophecy that the man without ancestors will probably secure the lion's share in the heritage of the future.

In his endeavor to depict the German people at its labor, Freytag has not confined himself to mercantile toil. Besides commerce, a large portion of the German nation is also devoted to scholarly labor. This is a branch of labor in which the Germans have reached the highest excellence; and a novelist who, like Freytag, is familiar with all its joys and trials could scarcely fail to extract from it a great amount of entertainment. The novel "The Lost Manuscript," which deals with the search of Professor Werner for the lost books of Tacitus, is, to my mind, one of the most delightful books in the German language. The adorable Ilse whom the Professor finds instead of the lost Tacitus is the historic German maiden, a modern Thusnelda in the bud, in whom repose in half-slumber all the heroic possibilities of the German mind. Modern civilized life, to be sure, rarely calls for the kind of heroism that the Teutonic women exhibited at the Catalanian Fields, but in the emergencies which arise in Ilse's life, of which some, indeed, are of a mediæval character, she shows herself a worthy daughter of those ancestresses whom Tacitus glorified in his "Germania." Vividly depicted is also the Professor's deepening absorption in his search which leads him to neglect his young wife and fail to perceive the dishonorable designs of the prince in whom Ilse's beauty has enkindled a baleful passion. Of scarcely less interest to the scholar, tho perhaps a little tedious to the general reader, is the description of the various parasitical growths which flourish upon the vigorous trunk of the German tree of knowledge; particularly Magister Knix, the forger of ancient manuscripts,

who comes within a hair of wrecking a noble scholarly reputation. All these complications, dealing with the inner struggles and the outer vicissitudes of an existence devoted to scholarly investigation, form in their *ensemble* a picture of German university life which no later chronicler need hope to rival. Of the long historic series "The Ancestors," which Freytag has not yet completed, I have not the space to speak, altho it offers a tempting field for comment.

A firmer place than Freytag in the affection of transatlantic readers had Berthold Auerbach, whose recent death we have scarcely ceased to lament. His novel "On the Heights" made the round of the world and carried its author's reputation to the antipodes. And yet, ungracious as the assertion may seem, this book shows plainly enough that Auerbach was not an integral part of the nation which he undertook to describe, and could not, however much he yearned to do so, feel entirely as it felt, and depict from the inside its sentiments and experiences. Of the keenest exterior observation "On the Heights" gives abundant evidence, but all the figures, even the sturdy Walpurga and her Hansei, are more or less "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." There is a still small voice whispering, half unperceived, through every one of them, and that voice is Berthold Auerbach, or rather Berthold Auerbach's idol, Spinoza. Walpurga and Hansei certainly display a marvelous degree of religious toleration—a most unusual characteristic, as every one will admit, among peasants—and a freedom from prejudice which they could never have acquired except by passing through the Spinozistic mind of Auerbach. Old Count Eberhard, too, seems to have derived his hard-won wisdom from the same source, and Colonel Bronnen and Dr. Gunther—in fact every one whom the author regards as admirable—have all drunk, whether avowedly or not, from the pure fount of Spinoza. Now there is, to my mind, no doubt that Spinoza is the greatest philosopher of modern times, and that Hegel, Fichte, and even Kant have in no such manner, by pure inductive reasoning, anticipated the conclusions of modern scientific thought. He unquestionably deserves all the admiration which Auerbach bestows upon him. But for all that, one may question the wisdom of making propaganda for him in a

novel, especially when the value of the novel, as a work of art, is thereby perceptibly injured. Auerbach, as those who had the good fortune to know him are aware, habitually breathed this rarefied ether of philosophic thought, and with the clear-sightedness and freedom from prejudice of an "emancipated" Jew he viewed the world frankly through this medium. Apparently he did not discover until a few months before his death how isolated his position was on these upper altitudes of the mind, and how far removed even the cultured classes in Germany were from that serene and unbiassed attitude with which he had credited them. "But my God!" he exclaimed to an American friend on his return from the Spinoza festival, where the mob had only with difficulty been restrained from attacking him, "here I have labored for the German people unweariedly for nearly fifty years, and this is what I get for it. Is it not terrible?" He seemed utterly broken in spirit; and it is the common opinion among his friends that the "Judenhetze" killed him. He had contemplated humanity serenely and with kindly interest through his clear Spinozistic spectacles; and he had not been aware that humanity had all the while viewed him through a pair of intensely colored mediæval glasses. No wonder the discovery was a shock to him. It was a pity he could not have anticipated in spirit Spielhagen's noble tribute to his memory. It would have brightened his dying hour.

It is yet too soon after Auerbach's death to form any conjecture as to what posterity's estimate will be of his work. Of course posterity will drop nine out of every ten of our present immortals; and I can hardly suppress the conviction that Auerbach will not be among the latest survivors. He was not a sufficiently pronounced representative of anything (unless it be Spinozism) to survive as the exponent of any particular school of thought or the chronicler of any particular phase of civilization. Spielhagen and Freytag have depicted the age, as it shapes itself in Germany, much more objectively and with a deeper knowledge of national characteristics. "On the Heights" is a book of great ability and with a moving and beautifully developed plot. Nevertheless it seems already now old-fashioned. There is a subcurrent of didacticism in it which arrests and often breaks the narrative. The characters occasionally fall out

of their rôles and preach wisdom that is much beyond them. The same thing occurs again and again in the "Black Forest Village Tales;" for instance, in the journal of the village school-master, "The Lauterbacher," and the philosophical disquisitions of the rebellious peasant Lucian in "Lucifer." What Auerbach, has contributed to German literature is chiefly his own noble personality, and no one will deny that this is a valuable contribution. He has illustrated himself, and distributed disguised counterfeits of himself in all his works, and in their *ensemble* these form a most interesting individuality. On the Galton plan of "composite portraiture" the resulting "pictorial average" of the whole Auerbach gallery would be Auerbach himself. To a certain extent this may perhaps be asserted of every prominent author. I question, however, if it be true of the very greatest. Neither Tourguéneff nor Thackeray could be successfully reconstructed from the types which they have created, even tho the latter reveals himself freely enough in his marginal comments.

It is a notable fact that the latest school of novel-writing, of which Zola is the most aggressive representative, has as yet made no conspicuous convert in Germany. Spielhagen has even in his last book, "Theorie und Technik des Romans," entered a formal protest against the tendencies of the naturalistic school, without, however, denying the ability which is expended in its service. And when Spielhagen, who is the most radical thinker among German authors, judges in this way, it is safe to conclude that the others, with the possible exception of Paul Heyse, are even severer in their judgment. But Spielhagen's radicalism appears to be based upon philosophical convictions which antedate the scientific developments of recent years. Moreover, his method, which he has in the above-named book exhaustively explained and accounted for, was already formed, and like a well-constructed tool is admirably adapted for his purpose. No wonder, then, that he should look askance at the innovations of a fanatic iconoclast and denunciator like Zola. That he is likewise, in his estimate of Daudet, disposed to be unsympathetic is, I think, due to a certain temperamental dislike for the frivolous conception of life and the apparently shallow solutions of the social problems with which the French authors are apt to

content themselves. Spielhagen would probably be disinclined to subscribe to Mr. Charles Dudley Warner's proposition that the prime requisite of the novel is that it should entertain; nor do I suppose that he would be entirely satisfied with Mr. James's emendation that its object should be to represent life. He would, of course, admit that it ought to do both; but in his hands the definition undergoes a further and very characteristic enlargement. The business of novelists, he says ("Theorie und Technik des Romans," p. 262), is: "*Weltbilder aufzustellen—Bilder ihres Volkes und seiner Strebungen in einem gewissen Zeitabschnitt*," e.g., to give world-pictures—pictures of their nation and its aspirations during a certain period. The personal episode, then, in Spielhagen, is related primarily with a view to illustrate the national problems and aspirations at a certain period. It is necessary to bear this proposition in mind if one is to do full justice to Spielhagen's literary activity. From his very first work until the last he has been faithful to the large purpose which he has here enunciated, and the profound pleasure which I have found in reading his works is perhaps also due to the fact that I have recognized their typical quality and their direct bearing upon the great questions which agitate the century. One may agree or disagree, accept or reject his solutions of these problems, but his strong and earnest voice will never fail to stimulate one's thought and rouse one from the indolent lethargy which the fatalistic philosophy of modern life induces. The reason why his novels have never gained the popularity here that was freely accorded to Auerbach is scarcely far to seek. They were too serious for the average American reader, who cares little for the problems which, as he flatters himself, merely concern the effete monarchies; and, unhappily, popularity can never be obtained except from the average reader. The people who wept over the cheap sentimentalism of Marlitz and Werner found little to appeal to them in the tragic perspective and uncompromising logic of such works as "Problematic Characters," "In Rank and File," and "Hammer and Anvil." We are so unaccustomed to look for any deeper historic significance in the plots of our own novelists that we occasionally fail to perceive it even where it exists. That larger vision which sees not only incidents and personal relations, but recognizes their

bearing upon the grand social movements of the century, is extremely rare among us—is in fact extremely rare everywhere. But it is just this vision which distinguishes Spielhagen among German authors, and which would make his popularity problematic among any people less thoughtful than the German. Freytag, as I have endeavored to show, possesses the same gift in an eminent degree, and altogether a tendency to philosophic generalization may be said to be a national characteristic. The German critic looks for it as naturally as our own remains blind to it; and he judges the value of a novel, *cæteris paribus*, by its presence or absence, by the relevancy of its types, and by the consistency with which its philosophical purpose is carried out. It is particularly perceptible how, since the re-establishment of the empire and the centralization of the national life in Berlin, the novelist has, in this respect, gained an advantage which during the old scattered condition he must have missed. Berlin is now the only city in Germany which, in the American sense of the word, is alive, and all the other little capitals where petty courts reside have sunk into absolute insignificance. Nevertheless, it was from the narrow horizon of Weimar that Goethe contemplated the great panorama of the century, and the influence of the old "particularism" is perceptible in his character and on every page of "Wilhelm Meister." Jean Paul must have heard but very feebly the pulse-beat of the age in his rural retreat at Hof; and one wonders how Freytag could have surveyed the great movements of civilization from his villa at Siebleben, in the shadow of the little court at Gotha. His university career at Leipzig, to be sure, gave him a post of vantage, and, as we know from his own confession, it was there the material accumulated for his two important novels. If, however, he had undertaken to pursue into the present the theme which he has so ably treated in "Debit and Credit," I cannot but think that he would have shown the effect of the national consolidation as vigorously as Spielhagen does in "Sturmflut."

It is not often that social problems have received such exhaustive, philosophic, and yet thoroughly dramatic treatment in a novel as is accorded to them in "Sturmflut." The book deals with the effect of the French milliads upon the German State and society at large; the speculative mania that followed;

the decay of old-fashioned rectitude; the increased burdens resulting from official extravagance; the growing discontent of the working classes, who were debarred from enjoying the profits of the war tho sharers in its tribulations. All these things are held in hand firmly by the author, and it is a real pleasure to observe how this whole complex plot moves forward, preserving throughout its typical character. The impartiality with which the virtues and the limitations of the nobleman as well as those of the citizen are depicted indicates a more cosmopolitan view, and perhaps a riper experience, than was exhibited in the treatment of similar relations in "Problematic Characters" and "Through Night to Light." The varied and brilliant metropolitan life of the German capital is set in motion before our eyes, and the whirling activity of clashing interests which emanates from here to the remotest corner of the empire serves only to complicate the situations and to deepen their interest. Such a novel could not have been written with the same degree of vividness and power in the old languid ante-bellum capital of Prussia; and a lively sense of the contrast between the old state of affairs and the new can be realized by comparing the novels of Spielhagen's first period with those of his second. The "problematic character"—the man who was destroyed by his own genius, and fit for no position which the State could then offer—was the typical and ever-recurring hero, as in fact he was in life. The German State had no need of genius, unless perhaps it were a strategic one. There was no public life to speak of: the State was a private military corporation, which could be best administered by mediocrities. Therefore those who were burdened with an excess of ability or critical insight consumed their hearts in discontent or wasted them in love-adventures. Love was, in fact, the only legitimate business in those days for a man of genius, and death on the barricades the legitimate end of a life wasted in love and talk and insatiable longings.

The situation is now somewhat different; and the change is again faithfully chronicled in Spielhagen's novels. Germany has now a quasi-constitution which the powerful Chancellor is greatly inclined to ignore, and perhaps openly violate. The militant spirit fostered by the late war has brought about a reaction toward autocracy and a consequent decay of parliamen-

tary institutions. The reaction, as every clear-sighted man must know, is of course temporary, but it is dangerous as long as it lasts, and retards the industrial development of the nation. A most oppressive system of protection (only rivalled in foolish severity by our own) increases the cost of living—makes the poor poorer and the rich richer. A vast military machinery is needed to keep the discontented in order, and only feeds the socialistic sentiment which it is intended to suppress. If Bismarck lives long enough, or his rigorous policy is persisted in by his successor, an explosion must necessarily occur sooner or later, and it will be repeated until the force of the military despotism is broken. The whole force of evolution and the resistless logic of history are on the side of the rebellious masses, and in the end their cause must prevail.

Every one will admit that in a situation like this there is abundant material for a novelist with Spielhagen's ability to discern the forces at work beneath the social movements. His works, which extend over the last twenty-seven years, tho some of them deal with earlier periods, are to my mind the most valuable and faithful chronicles of German life and thought during the last quarter-century that we possess. It would give me much pleasure to enter into a more detailed examination of them, but as my space does not permit, I reserve for myself this privilege for a future occasion.

Paul Heyse, who at present shares with Spielhagen and Freytag the favor of the German public, I shall also have to dismiss more briefly than his importance warrants. It is, however, chiefly as a writer of short stories that he has gained his fame, and the short story I have excluded from my consideration in the present paper. Paul Heyse's two long novels, "The Children of the World" and "In Paradise," are, with all their undeniable ability, so remote from the horizon of American readers, that I should only do injustice to the author in attempting to characterize them. His radicalism asserts itself chiefly within the pale of ethics; the traditional barriers which civilization has gradually imposed upon society seem to him too narrow, and with much ingenuity he devises situations in which the natural feeling would seem to side with the law-breaker. It is especially the matrimonial rebel who commands Heyse's

sympathy—the youth or the maiden who, in the ardor of youth or yielding to outside pressure, has tied him or her self to an uncongenial partner and is paying the penalty of a daily martyrdom. Madame Toutlemonde, the German Mrs. Grundy, has a great dread of Heyse, and it is said she keeps his books on the poison-shelf in her locked closet. Their pages are, however, dog's-eared and well fingered.

Among the rebellious men of genius whom Germany has produced (and I have endeavored to show that a man of genius in Germany must needs be a rebel, unless he happens to be chancellor), no one holds a place closer to the popular heart than the late Fritz Reuter. Unfortunately, however, the period of Reuter's rebellion preceded his productive period, and he had the ill-luck to be sentenced to death for having belonged to a patriotic student-society (*Burschenschaft*) and having written some enthusiastic verses in an autograph-album about "fatherland" and "liberty." That was a dangerous experiment in those days; and tho Reuter was pardoned, he had to spend seven long years of his youth in being dragged about from one military jail to the other, and in drinking brandy with his jailers, who found him a jolly companion. Both the brandy and the idleness of such a life proved fatal to Reuter, and it was only to save himself from absolute ruin that, after his release, he turned in despair to literature. Oddly enough it was as a humorist that he made his fame; there is not a particle of indignation in his books against those who so cruelly wrecked his life. He drew on the early reminiscences of his boyhood in his native town of Stavenhagen in Mecklenburg, and with inimitable drollery reproduced the quaint speech and manner of his fellow-townsmen. His realism is almost photographic in its minuteness, and yet full of artistic intentions. Pathetic in the extreme is his description (written, as all his works, in the *Plattdeutsch* dialect) of his release from the fortress and his first outlook into the strange world after his long imprisonment. Several of his novels, particularly "Ut mine Stromtid" and "Ut mine Festungstid," have been translated into English, but they lose so enormously in the translation that one can hardly form any conception of their effective blending of humor and pathos in the original.

Of Professor Georg Ebers, whose Egyptian romances have gained a great popularity in Germany, I need scarcely speak at any length. With him art seems to be the mere handmaid of scholarship; and as knowledge clothed in so attractive a form could not fail to prove alluring, his easy conquest of the public is not to be marvelled at. Nevertheless, a novel equipped with learned references and profuse scholarly footnotes strikes one oddly, and the conscientiousness with which the author has studied his hieroglyphics and explored the tombs of the Pharaohs can scarcely compensate for the absence of that nameless charm which only a highly developed artistic faculty can supply. A vivid dramatic movement is, to be sure, not lacking in any of Ebers's romances, and excitement is also plentifully supplied, varied with descriptions which are full of color and animation. For all that, a book like "*Uarda*" or "*An Egyptian Princess*" taxes the patience of the transatlantic reader severely, in spite of the satisfaction one naturally feels at having acquired so valuable an insight into the heart of a remote civilization. Sensational in the vulgar sense Ebers's romances are not, altho they revel in an excess of exciting incidents; but it may well be taken for granted that the violent incidents with which they deal were as normal in the time of the Pharaohs as the eventless chronicles of Howells and James are to-day. As civilization progresses, incidents of the kind which novel-readers crave, involving some sort of mental or physical violence, must necessarily become more scarce; and to resort to insane asylums or police-courts, or any of the agencies which are provided for the care of the laggards-behind of civilization, merely because a depraved public taste demands the abnormal rather than the typical, is certainly an undignified proceeding on the part of any one who claims the name of an artist. Among the German novelists of to-day there is really no one who has the fearlessness to depend exclusively upon his charm as a narrator and to deal in the manner of George Eliot with the quiet soul-histories of commonplace people. But it may be answered that life in a semi-feudal state like Germany has necessarily more color and incident of the exciting sort than our tame and unrelieved democracy. The mere system of caste, with all the complex sentiments which it engenders, is a most precious agency to the novelist, affording him

opportunities for contrasts and conflicts which in our republican society have only feeble counterparts. Nevertheless, as this system is doomed, the German novelist of the twentieth century may have to face the problem of making a democracy entertaining.

HJALMAR H. BOYESEN.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE DIVORCE QUESTION.

AS probably the best service that can be rendered just now to the discussion of the Divorce Question, this article will, after brief outline of the facts, aim to call attention to some aspects of the problem which deserve special study, but which have been too generally overlooked. It will, therefore, touch upon the more familiar phases of the subject only as they shall be necessary to its particular aim. The facts are given in somewhat fuller outline than the necessities of this discussion require, to meet the increasing demand for an accurate and comprehensive statement of them.

Connecticut granted 91 divorces in 1849, which, to use the customary and generally fair method of comparison, was probably one for each 35 marriages of the year. In 1878 the annual average for fifteen years had become 445, or one to every 10.4 marriages. Vermont granted 94 divorces in 1860, or one to every 23 marriages; and 197 in 1878, with a ratio to marriages of one to 14. Massachusetts granted 243 in 1860, or one to 51 marriages; and 600 in 1878, or one to 21.4. In New Hampshire there were 107 in 1860, and 314 in 1882. This latter year the ratio was one to 10.9; in the former it must have been about one to 31. Rhode Island recorded 162 in 1869, or one in 14 marriages; and 271 in 1882, the ratio becoming one to 11. There were 587 in Maine in 1880, probably one to at most 10, or possibly even 9, marriages. From such reports as other States give, a similar condition of things is found. The ratio of divorces to marriages in Ohio was one to 26 in 1865, while 1806 divorces were granted in 1882, or one to 16.8 marriages. In the two most populous counties of Minnesota the ratio of divorce *suits* to marriages rose in ten years in the one county from one to 29.3 to one in 22.9, and in the other from one to 19 to one in 12. For six years the ratio of divorce *suits* begun in Cook County, Ill. (Chicago), to

marriage *licenses* issued was one to 9.5. In 1882 the ratio of divorces actually granted was found to be one to 13.4, which is almost exactly the ratio for the year before in Louisville. St. Louis granted "about 205 divorces" one year, and in the next 430 suits were entered. San Francisco divorced 333 married pairs in 1880, and 364 the next year. Making the estimate of nine marriages to the thousand inhabitants, there were actually granted in that city in the latter year a divorce to each 5.78 marriages! Yet counties in other States than California make as bad or a worse showing. Philadelphia, it is said, granted 101 divorces in 1862, 215 in 1872, and 477 in 1882.¹ There were 212 in New York City in 1870, and 316 in 1882. Complete returns show that New England granted 2113 divorces in 1878, and probably the number last year was still greater, notwithstanding important legislation which has reduced the number in some of these States. It is safe to say that divorces have doubled in proportion to marriages or population in most of the northern States within thirty years. Present figures indicate a still greater increase. No statistics from the South are yet collected, except those just given from Louisville and St. Louis, but the frequency of "spontaneous" divorces among both whites and blacks in some sections is well known. Probably legal divorce has increased since the war.

Some remarks on these statistics and the condition of things they represent will lead to those remoter considerations to which this article aims to call particular attention. This increase of divorces has quickly and surely followed a relaxation in the stringency of divorce laws. In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the numbers of divorces rose rapidly after the addition of new causes for which they might be obtained. In Vermont the

¹ Since this was written the Rev. Dr. I. E. Dwinell, of Redwood, California, in an admirable article in the *New Englander* for January, has shown that there were in a year in 29 of the 52 counties of California 789 divorces to 5849 marriage licenses, or one divorce to 7.41 *licenses*. The Bureau of Vital Statistics of New Jersey have just found that for the five years ending July 1, 1883, the courts of that State granted a total of 788 divorces, with a probable ratio to marriages of one to not less than 50. The divorces increased in the five years from 144 to 183. The explanation of these remarkable contrasts is largely in the difference in the statutes and procedure of the courts in the two States, the latter element being the greater factor.

transfer of jurisdiction from the supreme to the county courts worked badly. On the other hand, the restrictions of the facilities reduced the number granted. The repeal of the notorious omnibus clause in Connecticut, now followed by a like but greater change in Maine law, and the restrictions upon the remarriage of divorced persons, now made in Vermont, Massachusetts, and Maine, have tended to reduce divorces. Changes for the better in methods of procedure affect the granting of divorces by causing parties to withhold cases or to transfer them, if possible, to more lenient courts. Procedure is often bad. Personal service of the libel is frequently entirely evaded; and when printed notice of it is given, it is sometimes done in ways that defeat the design of the law. Instances continually come to light in which the proceedings are based on fraud, and occasionally all the papers have turned out to be forgeries even to the signatures of the officers of the court. Collusion between the parties themselves, or the so-called opposing counsel, is notoriously frequent. The celerity with which causes are often heard, and the frivolous evidence on which their decision is made to turn, add to the evil and to its increase. Competent authority asserts that fifteen minutes is the average time spent on a divorce suit in the courts of one State. There are many honorable exceptions to this haste, but probably no causes of any importance have so slight work done on them as divorce suits. A dozen families will be declared non-existent in half as many hours by a court that has spent a day or two on an issue involving five dollars and no principle of law worth ten minutes' thought. To any one who knows the care usually taken in this class of trials in European courts, the carelessness of the American system seems extremely reprehensible.

The consequences of the evil are too well known to detain us long. Probably in every county in Connecticut some person could be found who has figured in three or four divorce suits. Even the seducer has found the courts a pliant tho unwitting tool of his trade. And in the great cities many a young man is lured to marriage by some elderly female who gets a good share of his property and—a speedy divorce. At least two members of the last Senate of the United States and two former senators, one of them “a War governor” of his State and the other a for-

eign minister, were in the divorce courts within a period of six months. The recent case of an officer of the regular army is well known. He persuaded his wife to visit Europe, and then got a divorce on the ground of her desertion, and remarried. She, however, carried the affair to the courts, and the divorce was annulled. But he indignantly resented the criticism of the newspapers, and declared the public guilty of meddling in his domestic affairs!

The worst of the mischief, however, is found in the middle and lower classes of society, which furnish by far the most of the divorces, and whose ideas of marriage are fast changing. The statute-book, or the conventional life of those around them, affords their only rule of duty in this matter. The facilities for divorce are sometimes deliberately taken into the account of the risks of an unfortunate marriage, and so hasty marriages and speedy divorces are, each in their turn, both cause and effect. And below these classes there is a disregard of marriage, similar to that which has long prevailed in the South, that needs attention. In some New England manufacturing towns, the migratory workingmen, chiefly those of foreign birth, are found to desert their wives and children in one place to form a new alliance in another,—a custom which exists to some extent among the lowest classes in the cities and in back-country districts. Some of these people are learning to secure ends in a lawless way which they say the rich can afford to get in conformity with the legal and conventional arrangements of society. The revolt against the established social order will inevitably pass beyond economics to the Family. For the notions that lead to divorce and kindred evils have their full share in fostering class feeling in a society organized politically on a democratic basis.

The effect of the conflicting laws of the several States, in increasing divorces and multiplying their mischiefs, needs scarcely a word here. The uncertainties as to whether a marriage or divorce in one State is valid in another, the forcing of the *status* of marriage everywhere to the lowest level of any other State, the increased opportunities for avoiding that publicity which is here, as elsewhere, in the long-run a wholesome safeguard of society, and the cheapening of marriage and morality, are well-known evils. They are so apparent that we think them overesti-

mated *relatively*, both in amount and in comparison with the mischiefs wrought by what may be called "home divorces."¹

The moral statistics of our country are extremely meagre, and do not, therefore, afford a very wide basis for judging of the prevalence of sexual vices and their relation to the increase of divorces. If, however, we can trust to the official reports of Massachusetts and one or two other States, illegitimate births are rapidly increasing, tho yet far below the high rates of Europe. In some States their increase has kept pace with the increase of divorces. The diminishing size of the New England Family of so-called native stock is well known. The reported number of children of school age in Vermont and New Hampshire is scarcely three fourths as large as it was thirty years ago. The prevalence of criminal abortion and similar vices in some sections is already a subject of great concern. A committee appointed by a Western State Board of Health to investigate the former, express the opinion "that in the United States the number of women who die from its *immediate* effects is not less than six thousand per annum." More than one gynæcologist asserts that the records of his practice show that it is not maternity that sends him the larger number of patients, but the needless refusal of its responsibilities. The old plea that easy divorce keeps in check various forms of unchastity is discredited by such statistics as we have. For in Massachusetts, where the convictions of crime for twenty years have been carefully reported, it is found that convictions for the various crimes against chastity greatly increased in nearly all parts of the State with two exceptions. And these exceptions of two crimes in the city of Boston, when examined, were found to prove the gen-

¹ We are inclined to think that the truth, if it is ever discovered, will be found to be that after all allowance for "foreign divorces," that is, those obtained in States by outside parties who go to them or to their courts for the purpose, is made, the vast majority of divorces are granted to actual residents of the counties granting them. The opinions of the newspapers on the abuse of the conflicting laws are apt to be formed from the data furnished by cities, in forgetfulness of their having a small percentage of the entire population. It is the constant discharge of the evil into the community where the parties are well known that most poisons the social blood.

Since writing this note the last Registration Report of Massachusetts has appeared, containing confirmation of the opinion expressed above. Congress has also been asked to provide information on this point.

eral rule. The increase far outstripped that of any other class of crimes, and even of the divorces, which more than doubled in this period. It is significant that while the foreign-born population of Suffolk County (Boston) were charged with 39 per cent of all crimes, aside from crimes against the liquor laws, only 34 per cent of the crimes against chastity could be laid at their door.

After extended and careful inquiry, the conviction is forced upon us that there is strong probability that the period marked by the increase of divorces has witnessed a serious growth of many of the more dangerous forms of licentiousness. Some localities in New England have improved vastly within this century, but this is probably not true of very many others, while certain of the worst forms of licentiousness have made alarming progress. The lower moral tone in regard to these vices is very perceptible. The growth of the opinion that adultery is a mere peccadillo, especially among married women, is painfully indicative of this. Perhaps there never were among us finer examples, or more of them, of pure, well-trained households than at the present time. But for all this, the physician and student of social life discover in some quarters a standard of morals and immoral practices that were almost unknown a half-century ago. And that this has some connection with the increase of divorces must be apparent to every close observer. Beneath the surface the physician often detects causes of divorce which the lawyer and the judge seldom discover. Sex is a tremendous factor in this problem of Divorce.

We simply touch the fact here, of which more will be said, of the relatively weakened power of the Family and the substitution of the Individual as the centre from which most duties and relations are viewed and the work of life is done. The forces of society in this respect have shifted within a half-century to a very great degree. The work of life, of almost every sort, deals more with men, women, and children as Individuals, and less as members of a Family, through and in which some of life's problems find their only full solution. There is a growing independence of one another on the part of husband and wife, as well as of parent and child. The opportunities for separate employments, the property rights of women, and their higher education, are evidence of 'this.

It is apparent then, so far, that the increase of divorces has several causes, and is attended with certain other things that are either essentially bad or incidentally so. The loose laws of this country, and the still worse legal practice under them, are greatly to be blamed for this condition of things. The adoption of a few simple legal measures would undoubtedly reduce divorces one half, and this should be secured. But then the real root of the evil, in the condition of society that tolerates existing laws and makes their reform difficult, would be untouched. The hasty marriages—in part due to the ease of divorce—the apparent increase of licentiousness, the great decrease in the birth-rate of the so-called native population, and often in the first and second generation of the descendants of immigrants, the prevalence of infanticide and criminal abortion, certain physical changes in American women, and the displacement of the Family by the Individual, introduce elements into the problem which show the need of pushing our search for causes still farther. A study of the statistics of Divorce confirms this. New Hampshire increased her divorces almost three-fold in twenty-two years, without any change in her laws during a much longer period. So, too, in Ohio, the northern counties generally have of late years twice the divorce rate of the southern counties. After all allowance for other causes, the chief one is found to be the prevalence of the New England stock in the northern counties. These were settled largely from Connecticut, but long before that State had many divorces. Some of the worst counties are those in which Mormonism took shape and other vagaries flourished.

A recent report of the Italian Bureau of Statistics enlarges our field of view. Tho the tables cover only ten years at the most, they are significant. The numbers are for each *thousand* marriages, except in some Catholic countries, where they note the separations. They show that the increase between 1871 and 1879 in France was from 4.46 to 9.14; in England and Wales from .98 to 2.17; in Denmark from 36.27 to 40.29. Between 1871 and 1880 Italy remained stationary; Belgium increased from 2.85 to 7.40; Holland from 5.20 to 7.35; Scotland from .11 to .29; Sweden from 4.96 to 7.50; and Roumania from 9.05 to 10.86. Switzerland has the highest figures in Europe,

but the increase began earlier and does not appear in these tables. Her rate is about 46, but in some cantons it is far higher. Other countries report for shorter periods. In Wurtemberg the increase is from 5.67 in 1876 to 12.25 in 1879; in Saxony from 21 in 1875 to 31.42 in 1878; in Thuringia from 14.33 to 17.48 in eight years; and in Baden from 4.53 to 7.31 in seven years; in Alsace-Lorraine from 4.46 in 1874 to 7.85 in 1880; in Hungary from 6.74 in 1876 to 10 in 1880; and in Russia from 1.33 in 1871 to 2.05 in 1877. Other statistics for England and Wales, France and Belgium, cover forty years, and fragmentary returns from parts of Germany go back about as far, while we have those of Sweden for fifty years. From these and the figures already given, together with other proofs which we cannot recount here, there is pretty conclusive evidence of a general increase of divorces common to this country and Europe. Apparently the divorce rate has doubled in those of the United States where we know the facts, and in most European countries within forty years at the farthest, and mostly within half that period. The increase is found in Protestant and Catholic populations, and even in Russia under the Greek Church, tho more among Protestants than the others. It takes place where the laws clearly lead to it, and also where there are no legal changes to account for the increase. The rate is rarely so high in Europe as in even the best of our States, while generally it is far below us. Europe, with high rates of illegitimacy and generally bad sexual morals, probably could not venture upon the American facility in divorce without disastrous results. The attempt of Switzerland to do this, certainly is unhappy. The crowding of Germans and others of foreign birth into the divorce courts of St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit, and elsewhere in the West is very likely the beginning of great mischief. A divorce system that was tolerable with the peculiar morality of New England before immigration and the hot social life of the last half-century began to tell upon our institutions, may prove simply unendurable now. It may possibly become as closely interwoven with society, and as corrupting, as slavery did under a somewhat similar change of conditions. The problem is already very complex. It practically includes the whole question of the Family, which is undergoing great and radical changes. The

causes must reach far back and run deep. They seem as pervasive as the atmosphere of modern life. The best attempts at a better public sentiment or wiser legislation must be grounded in a comprehension of all the forces at work. A sketch of a few of these forces, necessarily a meagre outline, is the chief aim of this article.

The decay of the system on which Ancient Society rested did more than prepare the way for Christianity. It sent down through the channels of the new religion some of those ideas which had powerfully contributed to the overthrow of the ancient foundations of society. Yet for all this, we must look for the great starting-point of modern social development to Christianity, in the new conception it gave of the dignity of individual life. But the conception received its greatest impulse from the Protestant Reformation. The times were then ripe for it to find better lodgment in the general consciousness of men. The necessities of the controversy with the Papal power led to a clearer grasp of the religious rights and authority of conscience. The old ideas of the relations of the Individual to the State and the claims of the Church had generally kept men from seeing some of the consequences of the Christian view of Man, and held them back from fields now familiar to all students of political science. But the turning of the mind to the individual conscience for the determination of religious duties has, in its varied applications, probably produced vaster results than any other single force in modern life. Then came the German, English, and other versions of the Scriptures, the Reformation in Scotland and England, the philosophical methods of Lord Bacon, the great political influence of Milton, the Puritan movement and its Revolution, and the Puritan and Pilgrim settlement of New England. To the same age with Luther belong the discovery of America and the printing-press.

In recent times, more than formerly, historians turn from the more strictly religious and political events of the last four centuries to take account of their social changes. These prove very great. A new world calling for conquest and settlement held out its glittering material prizes to enterprising populations, and afforded a refuge from the tyranny of Church and State, and a new field for the rights of oppressed consciences.

The human mind, quickened into special forms of activity by the very spirit and method of Protestantism, guided by Bacon and others to better observation, and spurred on by necessities, soon began to unlock the secrets of nature and bring from them that long series of inventions which are the wonder of modern times. Watt and Fulton, Arkwright and Whitney, Franklin and Morse were pioneers in a vast army that has transformed the old industries and created many new ones. The secondary effects of the modern factory, the railway, the printing-press, and the other appliances of steam, machinery, and electricity, are almost as marvellous as their more direct work. National barriers yield to them and populations are intermingled more thoroughly than was possible in ancient times. Great cities multiply, drawing into them the life of the country, and—what quite as deeply concerns us—sending back their own subtle influences. The factory takes the place of the home as the typical centre of labor, and even in agriculture, vast farms are tilled by those who neither own them nor live on them. It is in this country, where we are without privileged classes and some other historic institutions of Europe, that this modern material life shows at once its greatest strength and its weakness. We are in the centre of a mighty current. "The division of labor," the massing of people as mere laborers and of capital, and for a generation or more, the attempted treatment of wealth as little more than a struggle of individuals from sheer self-interest, with competition for its method and a devil-take-the-hindmost for the toiling multitude, have tended to the "differentiation" of the Individual in diverse ways. The modern factory is doubtless an improvement on the old domestic system of labor. Still that, and the modern corporation generally, have strong temptations to treat their workmen simply as individual laborers. The competition for a laborer tells against the Family. The liberty that seems to allow the wife, the mature daughter, and the young children to go into the mill sometimes falls short of real freedom. It is often at cost of the Family and of a nobler Personality. And from the side of the laborer come those numerous real or fictitious wants which the dissemination of knowledge, easy transportation, and the growing demand for social equality stimulate. With all his immense gains since his eman-

cipation from feudalism, the laborer has lost some things that once held him to others for his good.

The political principle involved in the Protestant theory of individual responsibility, which had but slowly emerged from the ruins of ancient society and was choked hitherto by the Church itself, has steadily advanced. Some evil, as well as much good, has followed. The Individual has come into clearest light, the great glory of modern society. But the incidents of the process should be noted. The Individual has been separated out from Tribe and Clan. Feudalism has melted away. The old conception of the State is gone, for the Individual is no longer lost in the State, but has become the special object of its solicitude if not the very end for which it exists. The Family of the Hebrew and other Semitic races and the Aryan household of our ancestors have been put farther than ever from our modern notions by the growing idea of the Individual, while the simplest Family of nature and Christianity has felt the overshadowing of this great idea. Law has preserved for us the successive steps in this change. Sir Henry S. Maine has called our attention to the drift from *status* to *contract* and from the *Family* to the *Individual*. Tho the movement is of vast extent in time and reaches over all civilization, our own times and our own country afford the most numerous and the most powerful instances of its effects, since we have inherited the largest possessions of modern thought with fewer incumbrances from the past. The volume of our legal business is overwhelmingly concerned with contracts, and that based on pure status has correspondingly shrunk. Few men now begin their daily work fixed in a status larger than themselves, to which Religion, Custom, and Law have closely fixed them, inquiring only how they may fulfil the conditions of an almost purely personal service. Nearly everybody in an advanced community starts as one of many equals, asking what suits his own free choice best. He feels all mankind more than ever, but not in the old ways. He is now free, even a sovereign. The service he now knows, tho never so imperative, is simply the incident of the democratic idea. He is one of many sovereigns who respect each other's domain in order that all may retain their authority. The American scholar may have outgrown this view of life, but it is very

nearly the working theory of the average man, whose notions must always be taken into account in any just estimate of our political system.

The laws concerning the property rights of women show many of these changes. In some of our States these have changed almost as much in this century as they did in Rome from the earliest times down to the last days of the Empire. Recent English law is equally sweeping. The emancipation of women in this respect seems well-nigh complete. However strong our sympathies with the movement may be, we must not shut our eyes to the fact and its consequences. The relations between Property and Marriage are so close that this change in the law of the former inevitably affects the latter. The history of Law is very clear on this point. And this is but a part of an inclusive movement. The education of Woman of late proceeds mainly upon the assumption of her having a mere individuality in common with Man, or with a strong tendency to reduce the element of sex to a minimum. The demand for her enfranchisement, either as a right or on the ground of expediency, grows out of this way of treating her as an individual whose relations to society are less a matter of condition and more of personal choice. And this principle is carried into a sphere entirely her own. A partial loss of capacity for maternity has, it is said, already befallen American women; and the voluntary refusal of its responsibilities is the lament of the physician and the moralist. It is true we have a protest against these tendencies from one of the advocates of the rights of the sex in a plea for "The Duties of Women," but it came late, and then not from an American.

But these changes are the crystallization into law of others more radical. For back of them and in them lies the ethical thinking of one or two centuries. The ethical systems current among English-speaking people for the last two hundred years should be studied for their subtle influence on the political and legal relations of the Family and the Individual. But here a paragraph must suggest the barest outline. Lord Bacon, as the leader of empirical thinking, gave a most effective stimulus to those who followed him. Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and others, and later Bentham, Mill, and their adherents, call to mind a

great school of more or less intense Individualism. With varying degrees of clearness and assertion, these writers conceived of duties and social relations as determined from Self. Moral and consequently Political relations were primarily of egoistic origin. The native conservatism of the English mind and its intensely practical character kept the advocates of these theories from pressing them to their political conclusions. But French Rationalism felt no such hesitancy. Rousseau, deeply indebted to Hobbes, and especially to Locke, as were many French thinkers of the last century, and who knew Hume personally, made haste to push the theory into practical politics. Finding the way prepared for him by other Frenchmen, and availing himself of the need of something which Naturalism promised to supply, and of the peculiar conditions of his country, Rousseau made his Social Contract the working basis of the French Revolution and contributed powerfully to the ferment of all Europe. While his ideas gave the death-blow to the divine right of kings and did much to set thought free from certain trammels, they gave an immense impetus to modern Individualism.

Our own country has stood in the very place to feel the thought of this school most deeply from first to last. The settlement of New England began in a desire for the self-determination of both religious and political duty. Milton naturally had influence with us. Locke was a well-known author who long held a large place in our reading. The War of Independence was preceded and followed by earnest study of the ethical and political writings of the times. It seems impossible, too, to escape the conclusion that Rousseau and the French school considerably affected Jefferson and filtered down into the popular mind. The exigencies of the new system of self-government; the problems of legislation growing out of a union of separate colonies with conflicting interests in a country forced to independent thinking and action by its whole history; the new conditions under which they wrought, and the solution of novel questions in state and national legislatures by men comparatively unskilled in a knowledge of public law; the rise and triumph of the anti-slavery reform, advocated and carried to success chiefly on the ground of the rights of man as an Individual; and the bidding

of political parties for votes—have combined to help the growth of these ideas. The common-school system has led us to forget somewhat the work of the Family in education, and the subdivision of the political units in some States below even the town into the school-district has urged on the movement. Our close relations with England, and the natural retention and propagation of inherited and imported ethical ideas long after they have been outgrown in the country of their origin, have left deep impressions upon our partially educated masses in whose hands lies so much political power.

And still farther back are some of the direct and indirect influences of the religious spirit and methods of our country. Protestantism finds here the fullest expression of its character, and here more of its peculiarities and excrescences appear. It addresses men chiefly as Individuals. Its call of duty singles men out. Each must examine its claims for himself, and with each rests the responsibility of obedience. Under the voluntary system of support religious bodies multiply and crowd each other until many a little township has from six to ten churches, with almost half its population living in utter neglect of all. In many of these churches nothing is heard or seen from one year's end to another's that is not an emphasis of the Individual. The Family as such is quite overlooked. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the typical representative of an immense class claims the right to a church of his own choice within easy reach of his door in which his own views of doctrine and life shall be duly expounded. And the neglect of all worship, and the vagaries that are neither Christian nor religious, have been fed more or less from the same stream. Theological methods, and dogmas too, have helped fill the springs. Current philosophies and ethics have necessarily affected religious thought and also been themselves shaped by it. Mechanical theories of inspiration, verbalism in the use of texts, an intensely intellectual method with its excessive reliance on analysis and definition, the controversial excesses of denominational rivalries and the consequent relative suppression of those larger views and grasp of vitalities that come from fuller faith in God and the kingdom of Christ, and which refuse their best forms of truth to the dissection and construction of a mechanical

logic, must be held accountable for some unfortunate, tho unintended, results. The supposed necessities of "systems" have sometimes led to open denial of eternal life to little children, and to a hesitating recognition, where it has not been an utter suppression, of the Family. These, certainly, are some of the whirlpools and eddies in the stream of progress, whose very dangers are commensurate with its greatness.

The Family, more than any other institution, has felt this general movement. This is natural. For it is in the Family that one feels the earliest and latest pressure that makes him conscious of others beyond himself, and it is through the Family that the Individual touches the springs of society most surely and permanently. The interaction of the two is so close that each step in this "differentiation" of the Individual has told upon the Family. The political results of the movement may be more striking, but the domestic changes are quite as sure. The intenser phases of Individualism and frequent divorces have often been found together. Tho the Individual, as we use the word, of even the last days of the Roman Empire was not much thought of by the State, those were the times of every man for himself, with a go-as-you-please method that reminds one strongly of the modern notion. The life-giving spirit of the ancient Family, which perhaps was religion rather than the natural ties of blood familiar to us, had departed. Men did not, as formerly, find themselves within strong ethical bonds larger than those of their own making. Nature also proved too strong for an unnatural religion. Life, too, in a material age grew selfish and sensual. The marriage-bond, having lost the conserving force that came from the ancient religion, was too weak to resist the disruptive evils of the times, and divorces multiplied. So, also, the bursting forth of the French Revolution and a wild riot in divorce and vice came together, and a writer tells us that in Germany, during the dominance of an individualistic school of writers, "divorce in their circle had become an every-day occurrence," and adds to his list of names the assertion that "there is something unhealthy even in those who do not break through the barriers of society." Traces of the same alliance appear in England. But the connection in this country is more striking. Here the speculations of leaders

readily become the practice of the people. The divorce rate is generally highest in New England and where her people have gone in the West. The curious facts about divorce in Ohio, already given, illustrate this. The very counties where Giddings, Wade, and Garfield lived, themselves men of great purity of character, have been about the worst for divorces in the State. The old champions of anti-slavery and "rights" have been noticeably forward in the past in making apologies for easy divorce. And then, as our political ideas find their way back to Europe through the closer intercourse of later years, they have quickened similar forces there. And there, too, the divorce rate increases. Laws may retard or hasten the movement, but they cannot account for the whole of it. It is "in the air" of modern life.

The unfortunate history of Divorce in this country reminds one of the insidious growth of slavery. The current was set wrong in part by the early Puritan dread of everything like ecclesiasticism. Marriage at the first was made a civil contract only, and a religious ceremony forbidden or discouraged. The absence of men from their families, and perhaps the frequent migrations to other colonies, led to somewhat liberal provisions for divorce. The religious regard for the sanctities of marriage made the purely civil treatment of it safe for a long time. But the War of Independence, the revolt against "the standing order," as the recognized church was called, and the attendant rise and spread of other Christian denominations—due to social as well as religious causes—some political discussions of the early half of the century, the anti-slavery reform, the introduction of the factory system, the railway, telegraph, and steam printing-press, vastly changed the conditions of our life. The cotton-gin and other agencies in their day did scarcely more in the South. Marriage laws have been improved in some ways, since the justice of the peace, and sometimes the minister, often made the service a joke, but those of Divorce have grown worse. The movement seems to have begun in Connecticut between 1840 and 1849, when the legislature of that State was the scene of unseemly raids from discontented married couples. The lax laws of the latter year gave it new impulse, and the progress downward, especially since 1860, has been rapid and

general. Western emigration and the license of new settlements, the conflicting laws of the several States, popular doctrines of rights, the War, easy transportation, cheap reading, a growing demand for social as the consequent of political equality, the pouring in of foreign immigrants often, tho not always having a low sexual morality, and the importation through foreign travel of certain European notions of chastity, have all joined in their way to increase evils that sap the Family.

There has been no fit advance in the law and doctrine of the Family to meet these new conditions. In making the Individual the centre of effort, the Family has fallen into neglect or been obscured under the conceptions of individualism. Treatises on the law of "Marriage and Divorce" or the "domestic relations" abound; the law of these *relations* is discussed; debates wax warm as to whether these relations are those of "contract" or "status," whether marriage is or is not a religious institution,—a sacrament, and so on. But discussions of the Family by itself and as the true point of departure from which to determine all laws of marriage and divorce are too rare. The defect goes farther. The morals of sex are often treated in text-books and in legislation chiefly on the assumptions of individualism. Licentiousness is held to be an individual vice, like drunkenness or theft. Its dual nature and peculiar relation to the Family, taking it out of the category of individual vices and demanding for it peculiar estimate and special care, escape the mind. After its recognition of consent and cohabitation as constituting marriage, law is quite as defective as the text-books of morals. Massachusetts now ventures to punish a man who neglects to support his children, but his wife is protected only by a divorce. New Hampshire last year granted 80 divorces for adultery and punished two adulterers. That State deals vigorously with those guilty of "cruelty to animals," but it divorced 101 women for suffering "extreme cruelty" without punishing a man, unless giving him the privilege to marry a new victim be a penalty. The two great institutions of Property and the Family have very different legal defences. Property would almost perish under the scant protection afforded the Family. The inherent difficulties in the latter case

are confessedly serious, but that does not mend the mischief nor account for much that is sheer neglect.

Mormon polygamy threatens the Territories. It is a challenge to civilization on the Family. Yet the debates of Congress rarely rise to the real issue. Slavery destroyed the Family in one race and corrupted it in another, but political reconstruction has not clearly made the home the centre of a great work the South has needed more than anything else. And but slowly have the relations of the Family to the problems of Indian civilization, pauperism and crime, capital and labor, been perceived by the many. And the call for uniform marriage and divorce laws, of which there is need enough, seems to be heedless of the vastness of the subject and its complications. There is no adequate and at all well-defined *political consciousness* of the family on which to draw for a successful grapple with pressing questions. And this is partly because the true Family of Christianity and Nature has not been wrought into the very structure of our society as was the case with the early Roman, or in fact Aryan family. Most of our utterances are little more than the reiterated platitudes of tradition. Modern thinking has not wrought in painful toil over the Family as it has done with the Individual and the State. But these great practical questions and those Sociology raises will soon compel us to look into the problems of Monogamy and the Family as we never have yet done.

Yet it is not reaction to the conceptions of the past that we need. Modern Individualism does not seem so much a retrograde movement as a pushing out of human society in one form unduly beyond others. It is not, therefore, so much a thing to be rooted out or cut back as something to be corrected and strengthened with its natural supports. It does not by any means, for instance, follow that the recovery or, better, the growth of the Family into its true place means the relegation of Woman to her old narrow life, nor the real repression of the Individual anywhere. The work we need is essentially constructive. The achievements of the Nineteenth Century for Woman may be outdone by future efforts in her behalf, tho the method of them be not just what some now think the only possible one. For her advance by her differentiation as an Individual, which is the method of the present, may, after carrying

her along in the path of the advance of Man, leave her behind her true place through operation of the very process by which her recent elevation has been promoted. Woman as a fact in social science may be much too large for the form into which Individualism now would crowd it. The deepest meaning of her nature connects Woman with the Family, and that truth may compel both parties in the controversy to halt until we all get a surer hold of the full meaning and place of the Family in political society, and so in part readjust our theories of the Individual. And so, too, the work of our first century of separate national existence which has been largely given to the rights of man as an Individual, and now incorporated into the organic law of the land, may lead us to this very work for the Family by way of advance and not of retrogression. Constitutional amendments here, as there, best come far on in the work. The Twentieth Century will be soon enough to look seriously for a Constitutional utterance upon the Family. And then it may, like other amendments, simply prescribe a uniform basis of *State* legislation according to the natural rights of the Family. Constructive work, let me repeat, should be our aim if we would meet the demands of the case.

And do not the best signs of the times point in this very direction? Here and there a scholarly leader of Individualism secretly drops into silence until his thought finds a surer foothold, and its excesses in immorality have turned away others. Its limitations in political economy are increasingly apparent. A "social law of labor" is acknowledged, in which the Family, Religion, and our complex social life generally, are perceived to be contributing something to its problems that cannot be put into the categories of self-interest and sheer competition, nor yet be wholly dismissed to a separate department of "social economy." Educational questions compel us to see that no conventional system, like that of public schools,—however necessary to our political institutions,—can supplant or ignore the Family as a natural agent for the training of children; and that, whether we send boys and girls to the same or to separate schools, it is impossible to educate them properly as mere Individuals in forgetfulness of sex—the profoundest single element of life. Perhaps the assertion of a recent writer is too strong, who says, "English

ethical philosophy is no longer purely individualistic. Both theoretically and practically the disintegrating movement of thought completed its work and exhausted itself at the close of the last century. Modern speculation is reconstructive in its tendency. It endeavors to free itself of its inherited atomism and fit the individual into his surroundings." For the Revolutions of 1848 and other events in Europe and this country must be charged to its lingering life. But surely the tendency here is towards a larger comprehension of the relations of life in ethics and religion, in economics and politics. The vitality of the old systems, which naturally enough hold their ground in new soil after they died out of the older, evidently fails. Their expositions of ethics and theology will no longer pass. Politically we have got on a good distance. The late War practically ended some old debates. Social questions are coming to the front. It is seen that society is to be accounted for and its laws applied in ways that Individualism can neither supply nor explain. Indeed, it is our American *life* that calls for better forms of expression and continually throws off those which pinch its growth. Sectionalism and State rights that found no organic principle above and inclusive of them are cast off. 'The problem now is to find a fuller freedom of the parts in the harmony of the Nation. Ecclesiastical liberty founds and pushes churches on the voluntary system until Individualism in polity confronts us with the serious dangers of license, and the cry comes for readjustment. And the spirit of theological inquiry is a spirit of life, seeking to add to the real results of past methods that which will preserve and vivify all truth and righteousness. The historical method refutes Individualism at all points, and brings positive contributions to the solution of the problem of the Family. If it shows the power of Custom over Law, it also gives views of the way the thought of the times changes Custom itself, and impresses us with the momentous character of the work to be done for the Family.

Christianity has wrought the most important modifications of the Family in all its particulars, and it must continue to do so. But historic conditions have warped its influence over the Family on this side and on that, and they sometimes have passed off on Christendom, as its own, coin that has been de-

based with the alloy of earlier times. It is difficult, often, to avoid the conclusion that the Family—especially in the matter of Marriage and Divorce—has suffered so very much more from a naturalism, which is yet not according to nature, than it has from an ecclesiasticism that in a worthy zeal for the religious has neglected the natural foundations of the institution. Let any one turn to the words of Christ, especially in the Gospel of Mark, and he cannot fail to see how careful our Lord was, in recovering Divorce from the wretched conventionalism of the times to truly religious ground, to lay the foundations of Marriage, or rather the Family, on the solid ground of natural law. The old Aryan and other early societies seem to have builded on the Family, and by the power of Religion. But it was too largely, if we can depend on certain authorities, an artificial Family and a puerile religion. Nature was too strong for such a Family, and humanity too great and too sinful for such religions. But the better religion, perceiving how many things society suffered from the wild, selfish naturalism of later Roman law, has probably been over-cautious and slow to learn the best things Christianity has had in store for men. I must think we have assumed too readily that the present is simply a renewal of the old conflict between Status and Contract, between the Family and the Individual, between Religion and Naturalism, to be fought over again and in pretty much the same old ways. From this point of view the experience of the past is discouraging enough, so far at least as we have followed it. For “the society,” says Sir Henry S. Maine, “which once consisted of compact families, has got extremely near to the condition in which it will consist exclusively of individuals, when it has finally and completely assimilated the legal position of women to that of men.” And again, “the so-called enfranchisement of women is merely a process which has affected very many other classes, the substitution of individual beings for compact groups of human beings as the units of society.” Contract, the Individual, and Materialism have confessedly gained ground as against their correlative ideas. Religion and political society undoubtedly need to put a controlling hand on the Individual; but to do this by reaching over the Family would be the repetition of an old mis-

take and the rejection of the very instruments best fitted to do the work. For it is in those ethical relations which a vigorous Family supplies that the Individual must find correction and the larger growth of the future. We must look for the remedy for Individualism not in the repression of the Individual, but rather in his growth through the Family and Society into a larger, better Personality. The "survival of the fittest" and the despair of Hartmann are the dogmas of men to whom Individualism is the final word in the philosophy of life.

It is to do a little towards showing how the Divorce Question lies in the very centre of the problems of Christian civilization as they have been gathering for centuries and as they exist in their most intricate and pressing forms in our own country that this article has taken its shape. "Sociology," says an eminent scholar, "is the coming science;" and in its sphere very likely may lie no small part of the next battle-ground between Christianity and unbelief. The Family is its fundamental element, and the Divorce Question is the vital point in the problem of the Family.

SAMUEL W. DIKE.

OUR EXPERIENCE IN TAXING DISTILLED SPIRITS.

FIRST ARTICLE.

THE term "political economy" has had many, and to some extent discordant, definitions. As a department of knowledge all will, however, probably agree that its object is to endeavor to learn from the experience of mankind the conditions for the production, accumulation, and distribution of wealth (using the term "wealth" in the sense of abundance of all material good, and the results which flow from such abundance), and to deduce from such conditions the rules or principles which, when adopted as the guide for human action, will best determine and facilitate progress in this same direction for the future. Again, some deny that political economy is entitled to be called a science. But be this as it may, all will probably further agree that, in common with political, mental, and moral philosophy, it is not an exact science in the sense that the physical sciences are so considered; inasmuch as it is founded on the results of human action, which vary greatly under different conditions and influences, and the record of which is rarely so complete and unquestionable as to compel universal and unqualified acceptance; whereas the natural laws constituting the basis of the physical sciences are so universal and unvariable, and so well defined and accepted, that deductions can be made from them with the utmost certainty. Under such circumstances, it would seem that the most important contribution which could be made to the history and progress of political economy would be a full and unquestionable record of the results of a large and complete experience in respect to any one of the subjects which are acknowledged to be embraced within its sphere of inquiry and consideration; and such a contribution, it is believed, can now be made in the record of the recent experience of the Government of the United States in obtaining revenue through taxa-

tion of the domestic manufacture and sale of distilled spirits. This record it is now proposed to make more completely than has ever before been attempted; and as the personal experiences of the writer as a former official of the Government largely intrusted with the supervision of this department of the national revenues forms a not unimportant part of the record, no further apology, it is thought, will be needed for making the narration to some extent autobiographical in its character.

As the manufacture of distilled spirits in some form exists, and always has existed, among all civilized nations, and as the use of the article is always constant and extensive, generally immoderate, and largely voluntary and as a matter of pure luxury, nearly all governments have come to regard it as an eminently proper and productive source for the obtaining of revenue through the agency of taxation. Such taxation accordingly forms an essential feature of the fiscal systems of most of the European States; but in three only—Great Britain, France, and Russia—are the present taxes so large and productive as to call for any particular notice. Thus, in Great Britain the taxation of distilled spirits is (1884) at the rate of 10s. (\$2.50) per imperial proof-gallon¹ of $277\frac{270}{1000}$ cubic inches; which would be equivalent to 7s. 4d. (\$1.83) on the *wine-gallon* of 231 cubic inches, which is adopted as the American standard. It is also to be noted in this connection that the first cost of British spirits ranges, according to the price of grain from which they are distilled, from 1s. 6d. (37½ cents) to 2s. (50 cents) per *imperial* proof-gallon; while the first cost of the American product ranges from 17 to 24 cents per wine-gallon; thus making the excise on British spirits range from five to six and a half times the first cost of production; while a tax of \$2 on the wine-gallon of proof-spirits, as formerly imposed in the United States, was equivalent to from eight to twelve times their first cost. The revenue collected from distilled spirits under the excise in Great Britain for the fiscal year 1883 (apart from licenses for the sale of the same) was £14,211,490 (\$71,057,450), as compared with £14,273,786 in 1882 and £14,393,572 in 1881. The amount which accrued in addition to the British revenue during the year 1883 from spirit

¹ By proof gallon is understood a mixture of equal parts of pure alcohol and water.

distillers', dealers', and publicans' licenses was £1,598,803 (\$7,991,015), as compared with £1,601,985 from the same sources in 1882 and £1,570,955 in 1881. From 1660, the year when taxes on domestic distilled spirits were granted "by Parliament to Charles II. and his successors forever, as full compensation" for loss of payments previously "due by landholders to the crown," down to and including the receipts of the year 1883, the amount of revenue that the British Exchequer has obtained from this single department of excise or internal taxation has been estimated at the enormous sum of £614,994,896, or \$3,074,974,480. (See "Financial Reform Almanac," London, 1884).

In France the budget for 1876 estimates the receipts of internal revenue from the tax on liquors at 364,190,000 francs, or \$72,858,000.

In Russia the manufacture and sale of distilled spirits is a strict government monopoly,—the government in the first instance selling the privilege of dealing in the article; and secondly, reserving to itself the right of distilling all domestic liquors, and supplying the same to dealers at a present rate of about one dollar (gold) per gallon. The aggregate consumption of the common distilled spirits of Russia (termed "*vodka*") is very great, and of the entire income of the government from ordinary sources more than one third is believed to be derived from the manufacture and sale of domestic liquors. In the budget for 1872 the net receipts were estimated at £61,899,000, of which £21,500,000 (\$107,500,000) were credited to excise taxes on spirits and beer.

The first attempt of the United States to obtain revenue through the taxation of domestic distilled spirits was authorized by the first Congress under the Constitution, and under a law that went into operation in 1791. Altho the rate of taxation imposed was comparatively moderate,—ranging from *nine* to *twenty-five* cents per gallon, according to the strength of the spirits, with an abatement of two cents per gallon for cash payments,—and altho the necessities of the new Government for revenue were most imperative, the enactment of this law provoked great opposition and resistance; and in 1794 the counties of Western Pennsylvania rose in insurrection

against its enforcement. A proclamation by President Washington commanding the insurgents to disarm and disperse was in the first instance entirely disregarded; and it was not until an armed force, collected from the militia of the other States, had marched to the centre of the disturbed district and had arrested the ringleaders that the authority of the Federal Government was restored. As further illustrating the very serious character of this insurrection, it may be noted, that the cost of its suppression was one and a half millions of dollars, and that at a time when the aggregate annual expenditures of the Federal Government for all ordinary purposes were only about four millions of dollars. The amount of distilled spirits produced in the United States at the time of the enactment of the tax-law of 1791 was estimated by Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, at 6,500,000 gallons, of which 3,500,000 gallons was believed to be the product of the distillation of foreign materials,—mainly molasses, imported largely by New England from the West Indies for the manufacture of rum,—and of which product from 300,000 to 500,000 gallons were sent annually at that time from the same section of country to Africa for the purchase of slaves.¹ Allowing 6,000,000 of gallons for domestic consumption, the per capita consumption of distilled spirits in the United States during this period must have been about one and a half gallons (1.52).

Upon the accession of Mr. Jefferson to the Presidency in 1800, and upon his recommendation, the obnoxious spirit-tax, in common with all other internal-revenue taxes, was repealed. In 1813, as the result of the war with Great Britain, it became necessary for the Federal Government to again resort to the collection of an internal revenue, and of the system then enacted the taxation of domestic distilled spirits through the agency of licenses for distilleries formed a part. With the close of the war, however, all these taxes were again and soon repealed, and from 1818–22 to 1862, or for a period of more than forty years,

¹ Official documents show that from 1804 to 1807 inclusive 202 cargoes of negro slaves were brought into Charleston, S. C. Of these slaves 3914 were sold for account of persons residing in Bristol, R. I.; 3488 for Newport, R. I.; 556 for Providence, R. I.; 280 for Warren, R. I.; 200 for Boston, Mass.; and 250 for Hartford, Conn. This was, it will be observed, at only one port in the South, and during a period of only four years.

the Federal Government levied no *direct* taxes upon any process or result of domestic industry, nor any excise, stamp, or income taxes, nor any direct taxes upon real property; the expenses of a simple and economic administration, and the payment of the interest and principal of a small public debt,—never in excess at any one time of twenty-one millions,—being defrayed almost entirely by indirect taxes, levied in the form of a light tariff on the importation of foreign goods and merchandise.

It was then with such antecedents, and under such conditions in respect to taxation, that the nation found itself, in the spring of 1861, suddenly and unexpectedly involved in a gigantic civil war, in which its very existence was threatened by the uprising of at least a third of its population against the legitimate and regularly constituted authorities. The most urgent and important requirement of the Federal Government at the outset was for money. Men in excess of any immediate necessity volunteered for service in the army; but to equip and supply even such as were needed required a large expenditure, and for defraying it there was, on the part of the Government, neither money, credit, nor any adequate system of raising money by taxation. Furthermore, as the necessities of the Government developed and became more urgent, there also developed on the part of Congress and the Federal officials a most remarkable timidity and muddle of ideas respecting the financial situation. From the very outset all direct or internal taxation was avoided; there having been an apprehension on the part of Congress that, inasmuch as the existing generation had never been accustomed to it, and as all machinery for assessment and collection was wholly wanting, its adoption would create discontent and thereby interfere with the vigorous prosecution of hostilities. It would be foreign to the purpose of this special discussion to here notice the various substitutes for obtaining revenue that were resorted to by the Federal Government in addition to the increase of the tariff on imports,—such as loans from the banks, the issue of Treasury notes payable on demand, the apportionment of a direct tax among the States, and an income-tax of 3 per cent on the excess of all incomes over \$800; the first to take effect eight and the latter ten months after the date of enactment;—and it is sufficient to say that it was not until July, 1862,

or nearly fifteen months after the outbreak of the war, that any systematic scheme for internal taxation was devised and put into operation. And of this scheme, as might naturally have been anticipated, the taxation of the domestic manufacture and sale of distilled spirits constituted a leading feature.

For a period of nearly a half-century previous, the manufacture of spirits in the United States, as already stated, had been free from all specific taxation or supervision by either the national or State governments; and being produced mainly from Indian corn, at places adjacent to the localities where this cereal was cultivated, and to a large extent also from corn that was damaged and so otherwise unmarketable, was afforded at a very low price; the average market-price in New York for the four years next preceding 1862 having been about 23 cents per proof-gallon, with a minimum price during the same time of 14 cents per gallon. In Cincinnati the market-price of whiskey for August, 1861, was commercially reported as "closing dull" at 13 cents per gallon. The price of alcohol in New York during the period above noted ranged from 40 to 60 cents per gallon. Under such circumstances, the consumption of distilled spirits in the United States previous to the war, for a great variety of purposes, had become enormous; affording a practical illustration of the curious varying relations between prices and consumption, and also of what may be considered in the light of an axiom in political economy, namely, that practically there is almost no limit to the consumption of any useful commodity, provided that through a reduction of cost or price it is brought within the purchasing power of those who desire to consume. Thus, for the year ending June, 1860, the product of distilled spirits in the United States, as returned by the Census, was 89,308,581 gallons (proof-spirit); or including alcohol, 90,412,581 gallons (as compared with a present taxed product and consumption in Great Britain of about thirty millions of gallons); and this aggregate, subsequent investigations proved, was considerably less, rather than in excess of, the actual production. The maximum quantity of domestic distilled spirits exported in any one year previous to the war was never in excess of 3,000,000 of gallons; so that the annual consumption of domestic spirits in the United States in 1860, for all purposes, was at the rate of nearly

three gallons for every man, woman, and child of the population.

It would be an error, however, to assume that all of this immense production of spirits was used for intoxicating purposes or in the way of stimulants, inasmuch as the extreme cheapness of proof-spirits and of alcohol in the United States at the period under consideration occasioned their employment in large quantities for various purposes which were absolutely or almost unknown in Europe, where the price of these same products, through the fiscal necessities of the various governments, has always been made so artificially high as to greatly limit their industrial application. Thus one of these employments, peculiar to the United States at this time, was the manufacture of a cheap illuminating agent known as "burning-fluid," composed of one part of rectified spirits of turpentine mixed with from four to five parts of alcohol, each gallon of alcohol thus used requiring 1.88 gallons of proof-spirits for its manufacture. The use of this preparation in the United States in 1860, in places where coal-gas was not available, was all but universal, and necessitated a production and consumption of at least twenty-five millions of gallons of proof-spirits per annum, which in turn would have required the production and use of from ten to twelve millions of bushels of corn. And so extensive was the scale on which its manufacture was conducted, that in Cincinnati alone the amount of alcohol required every twenty-four hours for this industry was equivalent to the distillate of 12,000 bushels of corn. Here, then, had been gradually created a new, peculiar, and large market, for one of the staple products of American agriculture, and also for the peculiar product—turpentine—of mainly one agricultural State, North Carolina. The excessive cheapness of alcohol also led to its most extensive use for fuel in manufacturing, and in domestic culinary operations; for bathing and cleaning; for the manufacture of varnishes, vinegar, imitation wines, flavoring extracts, perfumery, patent medicines, white-lead, percussion caps, hats, photographs, tobacco, and a great variety of other purposes. It is also to be noted as a curious part of this history that nearly all preparations, washes, and dyes for the hair, which at that time in other countries—as now almost universally—were pre-

pared almost exclusively on a basis of fats or oils or some non-spirituuous liquids, were in the United States then composed almost wholly on a basis of alcohol, the comparative difference in the price of this article in the United States and Europe giving an entirely different composition to products of large consumption intended to effect a common object. The transcript of the sales of a single distillery and rectifying establishment in New York City, put in as evidence before the U. S. Revenue Commission of 1865, showed sales in a single year of 19,040 gallons of alcohol in one case, and 12,657 in another, to two manufacturers of different popular hair washes and tonics. From the same firm a manufacturer of an "extract of sarsaparilla" bought in one year 81,300 gallons; and another manufacturer who made a "pain-killer," 41,195 gallons. A single firm of patent-medicine proprietors in Massachusetts testified their consumption of distilled spirits to have averaged one hundred thousand gallons per annum; while another in Western New York, engaged simply in the manufacture of a horse-medicine, reported a consumption, prior to the imposition of internal-revenue taxation, of upwards of 50,000 gallons of proof-spirits annually. Individual hair-dressers in the large cities also testified that the use of 400 gallons of alcohol (equal to 750 gallons of proof-spirits) yearly in their local business was not an unusual circumstance.

For the manufacture of imitation wines the demand for distilled spirits in the United States prior to 1864 was also very large; four firms in the city of New York reporting a consumption of 225,000 gallons of pure spirits for this purpose during the year 1863. Large quantities of neutral or pure spirits were also used at the time in the United States for the "fortifying" of cider, to prevent or retard acidification—especially in the case of cider intended for export to tropical countries, to the Southern States, or to the Pacific. One distiller in Western New York reported a regular sale, during the year 1862, of eight thousand gallons per month for this purpose exclusively.

The first tax imposed by Congress on distilled spirits of domestic production was 20 cents per proof-gallon, and went into effect on the 1st of July, 1862. This tax continued in force until March 7th, 1864; when the rate was advanced to

60 cents per gallon. On the 1st of July, less than four months subsequently, the rate was again raised to \$1.50 per gallon, and on the 1st of January, 1865, six months later, it was further and finally advanced to \$2 per gallon. In addition to these specific taxes heavy additional taxes on the mixing, compounding, and wholesale and retail dealing in spirits were also imposed in the way of licenses.

The immediate effect of this imposition and rapid increase of internal taxes upon distilled spirits was a series of industrial and commercial phenomena, more remarkable than anything of the kind before recorded in economic history; and yet so completely was the attention of the American people engrossed at this time in other and greater events—events affecting their very existence as a nation—that the results referred to did not so much as create a ripple in public opinion, and were barely adverted to, if noticed at all, in the columns of the public press. In short, the influence of these taxes was to entirely and rapidly revolutionize great branches of domestic industry, and in some instances to utterly destroy them. Thus, for example, the manufacture of burning-fluid entirely ceased, inasmuch as the rise in the price of alcohol from 40 cents to \$4 and upwards per gallon, together with the cessation of the supply of turpentine from North Carolina,—then a State in rebellion,—rapidly converted it from the cheapest to the dearest of all illuminating agents. Here, also, very curiously, the public did not experience any great inconvenience by reason of this change; for by one of those happy and unexpected occurrences, almost in the nature of accidents, which have so often characterized the history of the United States, and which some are pleased to regard as “special providences,” it so happened that the discovery of vast and natural supplies of petroleum in Pennsylvania, and the practical application of its distillates for illuminating purposes, was almost coincident in point of time with the compulsory disuse of burning-fluid; while the fact that the new material possessed great advantages in point of cheapness and effect over the old caused the change in popular use to be effected voluntarily and with great rapidity.¹ As a further illustration of the

¹ The first company organized to supply petroleum in the United States was in 1854; but it was not until 1861-2 that the product began to constitute an im-

compensations which invariably attend the losses immediately contingent upon industrial progress, and through the disuse of old products, methods, and machinery, it may be stated that, altho the manufacture of burning-fluid ceased, the business of collecting, preparing, and exporting petroleum rapidly became one of the most important in the country; while the demand at home and abroad for the lamps and their appurtenances devised and adapted in the United States for the use of the distillates of petroleum was alone sufficient to employ the entire manufacturing capacity of all the glass-works of the country for a term equivalent to two entire years.

Druggists and pharmacutists in the United States estimated the reduction in the use of alcohol in their general business, consequent upon its increased cost from taxation, at from one third to one half. The popular hair preparations into which alcohol entered largely as a constituent vanished from the market; and manufacturers of patent medicines and cosmetics generally abandoned their old preparations and adopted new ones. The manufacturer of horse-medicines, who used 50,000 gallons of spirits in 1863, wofully testified in 1865 that his business was destroyed. Varnish-makers, who, when alcohol could be purchased at from 50 to 60 cents per gallon, used it in large quantities, were of necessity compelled to entirely or in a great degree abandon its use when the price rose to \$4 per gallon and upward; and yet special investigation showed that the quantity of varnish manufactured was not correspondingly reduced; inasmuch as the manufacturers at once substituted other and cheaper solvents for their gums, especially the naphthas or light distillates of petroleum which were then opportunely seeking uses and a market. Within a comparatively few years, also, the continued high price of alcohol has led the manufacturers of quinine to substitute the distillates of petroleum as a solvent for the alkaloids in the cinchona barks; and with such success that it is doubtful whether the old processes would be again

portant article of commerce; and it was some considerable time later before its distillates were made sufficiently cheap and good to induce anything like general use. The average price of burning-fluid from 1856 to 1861 was from 45 to 65 cents per gallon. The average price of refined petroleum in 1863 was 51 cents; and the domestic consumption about 500,000 barrels.

adopted, even if alcohol could again be afforded at its former prices. The manufacturers of hats, who had before used a composition of gum-shellac dissolved in alcohol almost exclusively for stiffening the hat "bodies" or "foundations," and were thus large consumers of alcohol, were compelled to abandon its use, and for a time were subjected to no little inconvenience. But even here substitutes were soon found; and in addition the use of cloth as a material for hats, in the place of felt and silk plush, was largely introduced and became popular. The manufacture of vinegar from whiskey, by reason of the great advance in the price of distilled spirits, was also in a large degree broken up; and this in turn had the effect to destroy a large export business of this article, as well as to increase the market-price of pickles to the extent of from *one third* to *one half*; and also to seriously affect the manufacture and cost of white-lead, and occasion extensive importations of this article from other countries.

The business of fortifying cider for movement or export to the Pacific coast and to the tropics, before referred to, as well as the manufacture of imitation wines and of cheap perfumery, was likewise very seriously interfered with or destroyed, as was also the business of manufacturing the fluid extracts of the medicinal principles of plants; and it was represented to the Revenue Commission by members of the American Pharmaceutical Association that there was a marked tendency throughout the country on the part of physicians and others to abandon the use of alcoholic extracts and fall back upon the old custom of employing crude drugs, decoctions, and syrups as substitutes; and further, that there was an attempt to keep down the price to the consumer of many officinal preparations which absolutely required the use of alcohol, by putting them up at less than their proper officinal strength; thus inflicting a sanitary injury upon the whole community. Finally, in all branches of the industrial arts, where the continued use of distilled spirits was indispensable, and no cheaper substitute could be found, the utmost economy in its use was everywhere practised.

Another curious incident connected with this history was that the curators of the leading museums of the country—ana-tomical or natural history—attached to institutions of learning,

memorialized Congress to the effect that, owing to the high price of alcohol, they could not afford to make good the waste of this substance (by evaporation and leakage) as employed by them for scientific purposes; and that in consequence many important collections were becoming greatly impaired in value, and the progress of scientific discovery and research greatly impeded. And Congress, recognizing the desirability of giving relief in respect to this matter, empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to grant permits to incorporated American institutions of learning to withdraw spirits from bond in specified quantities for scientific purposes without payment thereon of the internal-revenue taxes.

It seems desirable to state here that the facts as above detailed, as well as some others to be presented hereafter, were the results of the investigations of a Commission authorized by Congress in the winter of 1865 for the purpose of inquiring into the condition and sources of the national revenue, and the best methods of raising revenue for the Federal Government by taxation, with full power to summon witnesses and take testimony; and that of this Commission the writer was the chairman. It will be interesting also at this point to diverge somewhat from the thread of this history and consider what information is available concerning the present and past consumption of distilled spirits in the United States for drinking purposes; and also to some extent the experience of other countries in respect to the same matter.

Previous to the imposition of internal taxes by the Federal Government in 1862, raw or common whiskey was retailed freely throughout the country at from *seven to fifteen* cents per quart, or from twenty-five to fifty cents per gallon. At these low prices, it was within the ability of every laborer to indulge freely, and this ability was largely taken advantage of, especially at the close of a week or at the periodical settlement of wages. It was also a very general custom in many parts of the country for agriculturists to buy whiskey by the barrel, for the use of their farming help, and to use it freely as a beverage during the season of harvesting. In short, previous to 1860 a man could undoubtedly get drunk in the United States with a less expenditure of money than in any part of the civilized world.

But it may well be doubted whether, with these increased facilities, drunkenness increased in the United States in any greater ratio, or more rapidly, than in other countries, where the facilities for obtaining intoxicating liquors were notably less. On the contrary, the obtainable evidence is all the other way. Thus at the time of the formation of the constitution, or more precisely in 1790, the domestic production and consumption of distilled spirits in the United States, as before stated, was about 6,000,000 of gallons per annum ; which, with the then population of 3,929,000, would be in the ratio of about one and a half gallons per capita. As there were at that time in the country no industrial establishments or processes requiring an extensive employment of alcohol, it is probable that nearly the whole domestic production of this article was then used for drinking purposes ; a conclusion which finds support in the circumstance that at the time referred to, and for many years thereafter, almost every county, and indeed almost every town, had its little distillery of spirits from fruits or grain ; the market for the products of which, in the absence of facilities for cheap transportation, must of necessity have been largely local. At the time of the whiskey insurrection in 1794, the number of distilleries in Pennsylvania alone was reported at 5000. Furthermore, at this time everybody drank, socially and in public, privately and at home ; men and women, young and old, the clergymen and their parishioners, farmers and their laborers. The last half-century has, however, through the agitation of the temperance question, the general progress of civilization and refinement, and the extensive introduction and use of the malt liquors, not only worked a change in the social habits of Americans,—a change little understood by the present generation,—but has also unquestionably largely decreased the average consumption of distilled spirits in the country. From 1790 to 1840 the Census returns in regard to production are entitled to but little respect ; but the whole weight of evidence is to the effect that the number of distilleries and their products steadily increased during this period, and fully kept pace with the population. In 1840 the Census returned the annual domestic product of distilled liquors at from 40,000,000 to 50,000,000 gallons. The population at that time was 17,069,000 ; while in 1880, with a popula-

tion of 50,155,000, the Internal Revenue Bureau was only able to take cognizance for assessment and tax-collection of an annual production of 62,132,000 gallons of proof-spirits, or 9,000,000 gallons less than in 1870, when the population was 12,000,000 smaller. (But this notable increase in 1870, as compared with 1880, and a larger population, is undoubtedly referable to a greatly increased consumption of spirits for industrial purposes, consequent upon a reduction in price and taxation of near fifty per cent.) For the year 1883, with an aggregate population of approximately 56,000,000, the number of gallons of proof-spirits of all kinds on which the internal-revenue tax was paid was returned at 76,762,063; but a considerable part of this product undoubtedly represented spirits which paid the tax and were taken out of bond by necessity, through the expiration of the permissible bonded period, and not by reason of any increased coincident demand on the part of the public for consumption. For the year 1883 the quantity of spirits produced and deposited in the distillery warehouses was 74,013,303 gallons, as compared with a similar production and deposit for the year 1882 of 105,853,161. And the extent to which production had exceeded any legitimate demand for domestic consumption is indicated by the circumstance that the taxable product remaining in the bonded warehouses on the 30th of June, 1883, after all demands for domestic consumption had been supplied, amounted to the large aggregate of 80,499,993 gallons. That the Federal authorities do not succeed in collecting the tax on all the distilled spirits annually produced in the United States is absolutely certain; but making a large allowance for evasions, and supposing the present annual consumption for all purposes to aggregate as high as even eighty millions of proof-gallons, it follows that while the population of the country has increased nearly three-fold, the amount of spirits distilled for domestic consumption in the same period, under influence of increased price through taxation and other agencies, has probably not more than doubled. The evidence, therefore, is conclusive of a diminished consumption, comparing 1840 with the results of 1880 and 1883. But this is not all. The use of alcohol in the arts and manufactures has enormously increased since 1840. Whole trades in which it is largely used have since come into existence; and altho the

amount now so consumed is absolutely and comparatively less than in 1860, when distilled spirits were untaxed, yet the quantity so used for industrial purposes is still large, and every gallon so applied reduces the proportion which can be used for stimulants. If we assume the present annual consumption of domestic distilled spirits in the United States to be about 70,000,000 gallons; and about twelve per cent, or 8,400,000 gallons, of this amount be used for industrial or scientific purposes, or is lost by leakage and other casualties,¹ then the use of domestic spirits for drink in this country must be at present at the rate of about 1.10 gallons per capita annually for the entire population. To this must also be added the consumption of foreign or imported spirits—the amount of which exclusive of wines is not, however, very considerable, less than a million and a half of proof-gallons having been imported during the fiscal year 1882–3. But adding this amount to the consumption of domestic distilled spirits before assumed, the total consumption of spirits—wine, cider, and fermented liquors excepted—by the population of the United States, would therefore appear to be at present at the rate of about 1.14 gallons per capita. During the same year the importation of wines was returned at 6,187,520 gallons in casks and 195,957 dozen bottles. The consumption of champagnes and other sparkling wines of foreign production would seem to be on the increase in the United States; the value of the importations for 1883 being re-

¹ The amount of leakage allowed during the fiscal year 1883 by the Government, on domestic distilled spirits withdrawn from warehouse, was 2,291,013 gallons, in addition to 184,770 gallons lost by casualty theft, etc. During the same year 28,725 gallons of alcohol were withdrawn from warehouse free of tax for the use of colleges and institutions of learning, and 22,359 also for the use of the United States.

In 1882 the Internal Revenue Bureau estimated the amount of alcohol annually used in the arts and manufactures in the United States to be equal to 4,269,978 proof-gallons. This estimate was not, however, founded on returns from all the collection districts in the country, and on its face was based on little other than absurd guesses; country districts of Tennessee, for example, being assigned a consumption of from 13,000 to 19,000 gallons, while the annual consumption of the 22d District of Pennsylvania, which comprises the city of Pittsburg, was put down at only 260 gallons, with the subjoined opinion that this quantity would not be likely to be increased if the tax on distilled spirits were to be entirely removed.

turned at \$4,603,722, as compared with a similar valuation of \$3,028,309 in 1882 and of \$2,883,668 in 1881.

In Great Britain, where, owing to a rigid enforcement of their excise laws, the domestic production and consumption of distilled spirits is more accurately known than in any other country except, possibly, Russia, the amount of revenue collected from the direct tax on this article for the year ending March, 1883, was £14,211,490, or \$71,057,450; indicating an annual consumption (exclusive of spirits allowed to be used for industrial purposes after having been made unfit for drinking purposes by mixing with naphtha or wood-spirit) of 28,422,980 imperial gallons. As compared with the preceding year, 1881-2, there was a decrease in consumption of 294,270 gallons in England, and of 46,254 in Scotland; while in Ireland, notwithstanding an estimated decrease of population, there was an increased consumption of 245,667 gallons.

The consumption per capita in Great Britain at different periods of the various beverages which are there made subject to taxation is shown in the following table derived from the "Report of the [British] Commissioners of Inland Revenue" for 1882-3.

	1852.	1862.	1872.	1882.
British spirits, gallons per head.916	.644	.844	.809
Duty increased in 1860.				
Foreign and colonial spirits, gallons per head.187	.177	.285	.236
Duty reduced in 1860.				
Foreign wines, gallons per head.262	.335	.530	.409
Duty reduced in 1860.				
Beer, barrels per head.608	.661	.885	.766
Tea, pounds per head.	2.140	2.694	4.014	4.679
Duty reduced from 2s. 2½d. to 6d. per pound.				
Coffee, pounds per head.	1.274	1.108	.994	.906
Cocoa, pounds per head.123	.134	.247	.339

It appears, therefore, from the above table, that the increase of duty on British spirits has been followed by decreased consumption, while in the case of foreign spirits and wines, and tea, a diminution of duty has been followed by a large increase of consumption, tea being the most notable example; and also that the present per-capita consumption of strong spirituous liquors, domestic and foreign, in Great Britain and the United States—1.04 and 1.14 gallons respectively—is not materially

different. It must, however, be borne in mind, in considering this subject, that malt liquors are used in the place of spirits to a much greater extent in Great Britain than in the United States. Thus for the year 1880 the British consumption of beer is stated by Mr. William Hoyle, an English specialist on this subject, to have amounted to 905,088,978 gallons, costing £67,881,678. The tables of the "Financial Reform Almanac" for 1884 give the per-capita consumption of beer in Great Britain as 27.8 gallons in 1881 and 27.6 in 1882. For the year 1882 the official estimate (see table above given) of the domestic consumption of malt liquors was .766 of a barrel per capita. In the United States, on the other hand, where the manufacture and sale of malt liquors is also made subject to a tax, and is so brought under the supervision of the Federal Government, the number of barrels of such liquors returned as manufactured during the fiscal year 1882-3 was 17,757,886; which quantity in turn, reckoning 31 gallons to the barrel, would represent 550,494,000 gallons. Adding 1,500,000 gallons to represent the excess of imports over exports of malt liquors, the consumption of such liquors by the people of the United States for the year 1883 would, therefore, appear to have been at the rate of nine and seven tenths (9.68) gallons per capita, as compared with a per-capita consumption in Great Britain for the same period of 27.6 gallons. If allowance be now made, as there should be, for the quantity of spirit contained in this excess of fermented liquors produced and consumed in Great Britain over and above the amount of similar liquors consumed in the United States, then the per-capita estimate of the consumption of spirits in the former country would have to be fixed at a somewhat greater figure than the ratio of 1.04 above given.

From the above facts and experiences the following deductions of general interest are warranted. First, that the consumption of distilled spirits and fermented liquors in Great Britain is not increasing in proportion to the increase of population, but is absolutely decreasing. Thus, with taxation remaining unchanged, the British revenue from duties on imported spirits has declined from £6,141,336 in 1876 to £5,331,561 in 1879, and to £4,365,383 in 1883, or at an average rate of about \$1,250,000 per annum. In the case of the excise the decline

has been somewhat smaller, but nevertheless most significant; namely, from £15,154,327 in 1876 to £14,211,490 in 1883, or at an average of \$670,000 per annum. For the year 1883 the British revenue from beer was also less by £269,000 (\$1,445,000) than had been anticipated. Commenting on these results, the British Commissioners of the Inland Revenue in their report for 1883 say:

"The decrease in the consumption [of spirits] in England and Scotland appears comparatively small, but it becomes more significant of altered habits when considered with the natural increase which must have taken place in the population. There cannot be any doubt that in some localities the spread of temperance principles has already caused a marked diminution in the consumption of intoxicating liquors, and the tendency is still increasing; . . . the past year having been, apparently, one of unusual progress in this direction."

The decrease in the revenue from beer for the year 1883 the Commissioners attribute to some extent to the influence of temperance societies, but especially to the failure of the hop-crops throughout the world, which increased the price of hops from an average of £6 10s. to above £22 per hundred-weight.

Commenting on this falling-off of the imperial revenues from wine and spirit taxes, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his budget statement for 1883, stated that in comparison with the receipts from these sources in 1874-5, and allowing for the increase of population, the product for 1883 ought to have amounted to £24,840,000; whereas it was, with the same rates, but £19,840,000; or in other words, he showed that the domestic consumption of wine and spirits during the period under consideration "had fallen off to an amount represented by five millions of duty, and, including the beer duties, the three had fallen off to an amount represented by 3*d.* on the income-tax." During the same period the population of the kingdom had increased not less than 4,000,000.

The notable decrease in the consumption of foreign wines in Great Britain since 1874-5, indicated by the decrease in the receipts of revenue from the duties imposed on their import (£1,789,855 in 1874, as compared with £1,293,833 in 1883, representing in quantity a change from about 18,500,000 to 14,000,000

gallons), finds concurrent support in the testimony of social experience. "Something of this falling-off," says *All the Year Round*, "is due, perhaps, to a distaste for wine as a beverage, brought about by a general deterioration in quality, and by the enormous adulteration of which wine is the subject. But there is also a change in the social habits of the wealthier classes. Instead of the popping of champagne-corks we have the fizzing of mineral waters. The hospitable suppers where wine and wit flowed freely are things of the past; the balls of other days, when the fair dancers refreshed themselves so freely with sparkling wines, are succeeded by parties, where nothing is provided beyond tea and lemonade."

Commenting also on these reductions in the receipts of the British national revenues from the taxes on liquors, the *London Standard* says:

"The change indicated by them in the social habits of our population is enormous. Some of these were mentioned by Mr. Caine in his address to the Central Temperance Association. Thus, to take a single instance, commercial travellers who, only fifteen years ago, were called upon to pay at hotels for a bottle of wine whether they drank it or not—being charged in consideration of this usage only a shilling for their dinner—are charged now three shillings for that meal, but are not expected to order anything for 'the good of the house.' It is to be feared that in most great commercial cities, furnished as they are with their wine 'shades' and subterranean drinking-saloons, there is still a good deal too much tipping at odd hours. But, on the whole, no one can shut his eyes to the fact that there exists a strong and growing public opinion against drunkenness even among those who are less rigidly abstemious than might be desirable. For the first time in the history of this country, intoxication, irrespective of the social level on which it may be seen, carries with it a lasting stigma. The whole tendency of the day is opposed to excessive drinking. The temperance movement is not only making a great number of teetotallers, but influencing those who are not abstainers greatly to decrease the amount they take. At the great majority of dinner-parties the quantity of wine taken after the ladies have left the room is very small; and if Thackeray were to rewrite Chapter X. in his 'Book of Snobs,' he would represent Captain Rag and Ensign Famish as ordering a 'lemon-squash' in the small hours, rather than a sixth glass of whiskey-punch."

But the points of interest in connection with this matter are not yet exhausted. It has long been the aim of the Chancellors

of the British Exchequer to obtain the largest possible revenue from spirituous liquors, to the assumed concurrent relief of all other forms of business and commodities from taxation; and the proportion of the annual revenues of the United Kingdom derived of late years from these sources is probably not recognized by the public, or even by economists and financiers generally. For the period 1859 to 1865 the proportion of the tax revenue of Great Britain derived from spirituous liquors was in the ratio of 37½ per cent to 62 from all other sources. From 1869 to 1873 the ratio was 46 from the former to 53 from the latter; while from 1874-5 to 1879-80, 51 per cent of all British taxes, except the income-tax, was levied on liquors, and 49 per cent on all other sources. But since 1880 there has been a reaction, and in 1882 the proportion had changed to 47 from liquors and 53 from other sources. The British Exchequer is therefore confronted with a new problem, namely, What provision is to be made if this decrease of revenue from a decrease in the consumption of spirituous liquors by the British public is to continue? Such a continued decrease being not improbable, there are but two courses open, new taxes or diminished expenditures; and the latter, in view of the Eastern complications of Great Britain, does not seem to be possible. But for the present it is not a little curious to find that Ireland comes to the rescue, and by increasing her consumption of whiskey to the extent, even with a diminished population, of 245,667 gallons in the single year 1883, helps relieve from financial difficulties the treasury of her Saxon oppressor.

Commenting on this reduction in the consumption of spirits in Great Britain, its causes and effects on the social condition of the mass of the British people, Mr. Gladstone in his budget speech in April, 1882, said:

"If this diminution of consumption is going on, and if a main cause of this diminution is the foundation of those valuable and useful institutions known all over the country—I believe, in all the great towns or in most of them, and even in many country places—as coffee and cocoa houses, we ought to see a large increase of revenue, at least, from other sources. But that increase we do not find. That is a curious fact. I am not going to include tea, because tea, after all, is not much used in these public places. The revenue derived in 1867-8 jointly—I will not give all the details—from

chicory, cocoa, and coffee, was £523,000. The revenue derived from the same sources in 1874-5 had fallen to £310,000; but then, in the first place, the movement adverse to alcoholic liquors had not then commenced, and, in the second place, a very large reduction had been made on the coffee duty, which in 1867 yielded £390,000; but it was reduced in 1872 from 3*d.* to 1½*d.* per pound, and in 1874 it only yielded £207,000. But while this great movement adverse to alcohol, which has been so eminently favorable to both coffee and chicory, has been at work since 1874-5, it has not produced the slightest rally in the revenue from coffee, but, on the contrary, during the last seven years there has been a further diminution on coffee. In 1874 the coffee duty was £207,000; in 1881 it was only £189,000; and altho the chicory duty had been slightly increased, it only increased by £8000, and did not make up the whole difference. The cocoa duty had increased somewhat, from £40,000 to £46,000; but the joint yield of these three articles, which in 1874 was £310,000, was only £306,000 in 1881. When we turn to tea the case is very different. There it is not in the tea houses, but the domestic use of tea that is advancing at such a rate that there you have a powerful champion able to encounter alcoholic drink in a fair field and to throw it in fair fight. The revenue on tea, which in 1867 was £3,350,000, had risen in 1874 to £3,875,000 and in 1881 to £4,200,000. The increase of the population during that period of 14 years was 4,900,000. But there was no corresponding augmentation in the revenue from coffee and chicory. One other circumstance in connection with this state of facts and with the great diminution in alcoholic drinks I have ventured to lay before the committee; for certainly I do not hesitate to say that I think we can trace the operation of this diminution in the use of alcoholic drinks precisely where we should wish to trace it—that is, in the augmented savings of the people. I will show what are these savings as far as they come under the cognizance of the government, and I hope that forms a very small portion of those savings, but at the same time for the purposes of comparison it is perfectly effectual. I look first to the old savings banks. In 1846 their deposits were 31½ millions. In 1861 they had risen to 41½ millions; in 1867, owing to the competition of the Post-Office savings banks, which paid a considerably lower rate of interest, they had fallen to 36½ millions. Since that time they have been advancing, not rapidly, but steadily. In 1874 they were 41½ millions; in 1881 they were £44,175,000, showing an annual increment of about £350,000. The Post-Office savings banks, as the committee are aware, were founded in 1861. They have advanced on the whole very steadily. Even the most unfavorable state of circumstances among the laboring classes has never done more than reduce, not inconsiderably, but still not vitally, not the amount of the deposits, but the yearly increment of the deposits. The ordinary increment of the deposits in the Post-Office savings banks has been from £1,600,000 to £1,800,000. In the first decade the lowest amount for any year is £1,533,000, and the highest £1,926,000. The lowest year in the

second decade was 1879, when there was great distress and want of employment; but even in that year the deposits were £1,600,000. In the highest of the prosperity years, 1872, the savings were £2,293,000, and for 1881-2, with a great diminution of means on the part of the laboring population, they have risen to £3,189,000. I think that shows that, whatever other effects this diminution of the duty on spirits is producing, it is clearly associated with the gradual extension of more saving habits among the people."

Another point of interest established by the records of recent experience is a very remarkable increase in the production and consumption of malt liquors in the United States. In 1863 the estimated production of all malt liquors was estimated at about 2,000,000 barrels of 31 gallons each, or 60,000,000 gallons. In 1880 the production actually assessed for revenue by the Federal Government was 13,347,110 barrels; 1881, 14,311,028; and in 1883, 17,757,892, or 550,494,000 gallons, reckoning 31 gallons to the barrel. The increase of beer production and consumption in the United States since 1863 has been, therefore, in a far greater proportion than the increase in population. How far it has served to diminish the vice of drunkenness in its most vicious form by supplanting the consumption of the stronger spirituous liquors for the purposes of drink and stimulants has not yet been shown by any statistics, and it may be difficult to do so with any high degree of accuracy; but such a supposition is, to say the least, extremely probable, and is claimed by the representative brewers of the United States to be almost in the nature of a self-evident fact. The President of the American Brewers' Association, in his address before the annual meeting in 1883, commented upon it as follows:

"A more remarkable revolution in the habits and customs of a people, nor a longer stride in the path of temperance by the substitution of a healthful and invigorating drink, nutritive and but slightly stimulant, for the fiery spirits whose consumption is so apt to lead to excess, is not to be found in the history of the world."

Attention should here also be called to a most significant and notable circumstance in connection with this matter; and that is that while the number of persons who take out licenses under the internal revenue to retail liquors in the different States and Ter-

ritories is continually increasing—163,523 in 1879-80; 170,640 in 1880-81; 168,770 in 1881-82; and 187,871 in 1883—the number of those who take out similar liquor licenses in those States where prohibition has been engrafted on the constitution or placed upon the statute-book appears to increase in an equal or greater proportion. Thus, in the State of Maine the number of such licenses in 1880 was 757; in 1881, 820; in 1882, 918; and in 1883, 1054. In Kansas there were 1132 in 1881; 1460 in 1882; and 1898 in 1883. In New Hampshire there were 747 in 1880 and 1066 in 1883. Iowa, 3965 in 1880; 4104 in 1882; and 5001 in 1883. Vermont, on the other hand, shows a decrease from 508 in 1880 to 454 in 1883. As illicit dealing in malt liquors, by reason of their bulkiness, is more difficult than in the case of spirits, it would seem as if one effect of prohibition of all retail sales of all liquors must be to discriminate against beer and in favor of whiskey drinking; but record of licenses for the sale of malt liquors in the prohibition States does not show a decrease, but rather a marked increase, in the number granted.

The aggregate exportation of American beer, altho increasing, is as yet very insignificant in comparison with the domestic production; the export in 1883 having been 220,792 gallons in casks and 215,938 dozen bottles, as compared with 61,661 gallons in casks and 3633 dozen bottles in 1875. Most of the beer exported finds its market in Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Japan, and the Sandwich Islands.

The statistics of the Dominion of Canada indicate a comparative consumption of distilled spirits largely in excess of that in the United States, approximating two gallons per capita; a conclusion which perhaps ought not to be regarded as surprising, when consideration is given to the proportion of the population of the Dominion engaged in a rigorous climate in rough, out-of-door employments, as fishing and lumbering, in which the consumption of spirits is regarded almost in the light of a necessity.

Recently published French statistics indicate a marked increase in the consumption of alcoholic liquors in France within the last fifty years, and that the present annual rate is about three

fourths of a gallon (3 litres = 3.15 quarts) per capita. The present annual per-capita consumption of wine in France is estimated at about 30 gallons (120 litres). The departments of France which consume the most spirituous liquors are those which produce no wines; and in the departments where wine is largely produced cases of "delirium tremens" are acknowledged to be rare.

DAVID A. WELLS.

FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION.

ONE of the distinctive features of government in the United States is the peculiar adjustment of Federal and State relations which permits the exercise of supreme central authority, while preserving the essential autonomy of the State. The governing power thus constitutionally reserved, by each member of the Union, is accompanied by corresponding obligations for the meeting of which the functions of the State, under ordinary circumstances, are not only to be exercised, but are supposed to be sufficient. It may happen, however, that a State is powerless, either to control evils without, which affect its own citizens, or evils within, which affect the citizens of other States, or both. In view of such contingencies, when the Union was formed, powers larger and broader than those of any one of the States, by the action of all, were delegated to a central government, which, within defined limits, should have jurisdiction over their combined territory,—to use the language of an early writer,—“for the conducting of such matters of general concern” as “equally relate to all the parts.”¹

That perils arising from the social and political evils engendered by ignorance, under given conditions, may present an exigency of the character thus clearly contemplated, and therefore justify Federal interposition, is doubtless the belief of the majority of intelligent men in Congress and elsewhere. But even when the warrant of the Constitution and all applicable precedents are urged in its favor, there ought also to be a clear understanding of the conditions, present or prospective, which warrant the interference of the National Government in affairs ordinarily so plainly beyond its province.

¹ Preface to “The Federal Constitution.” J. Debrett (London, 1795).

In considering this subject it is to be borne in mind that the extent to which the Federal Government may be concerned in an exigency affecting given States is a question apart from the exigency itself. The interest of the nation, legally rather than sentimentally considered, and the nation's responsibility, in a given case, are properly limited by the degree in which the exigency is in effect national and not purely local. An exigency which vitally concerns both local and general interests may confront the people of New York, and be so clearly subject to the control of its own legislative and civil authorities as to make Federal interference neither necessary nor justifiable. On the other hand, a contagion in the ports of Louisiana may provide an exigency, not only of vital importance to the citizens of that State, but of such general concern as to demand the prompt interference or assistance of the national legislature. Interferences in affairs within a State for the purpose of checking the spread of cholera and yellow-fever, of which we have many examples; for the purpose of checking contagion among live-stock, a matter which has just furnished occasion for heated debates in Congress; and in the matter of education as a cure for the evils of ignorance, are acts similar in kind so far as the prerogative of the National Government is concerned. In the first instance, the justification for Federal action is in the danger to human life; in the second, the danger to property; and in the third, the dangers arising out of conditions which afford nourishment for social, industrial, and political evils,—any one of which, while largely localized, may unquestionably affect the general welfare through the interdependence of the States, and the necessary intimacy of their relations.

What the nation may constitutionally do in meeting one of these dangers it may do in meeting all: neither more nor less. The limit of its prerogative in this respect is clearly defined by its repeated action in emergencies where human life has been endangered by contagion. While such perils may, and will, prompt speedier action on the part of a legislative body than those which affect property, or more remotely threaten social and political interests, there is no justification in the Constitution for Federal action in the one case which does not exist in each of the others. This truth is clearly indicated in

the words of the only warrant for such action, found in section 8 of its first article, as follows: "Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." There is nothing here which authorizes Federal legislation in the interest of human life, and denies similar action with reference to the protection of property, or the maintenance of a status of integrity in the body politic, the destruction of which would make life less enjoyable or property less valuable. If this interpretation requires support, it may be found in the Federal Bankrupt Laws; the Fugitive-Slave Acts; legislation relative to National Banks and Inter-State Commerce; the statutes intended to give force to the Fourteenth Amendment; grants for the benefit of institutions for the deaf, dumb, and blind; the bestowal of aid to schools established under direction of the Freedmen's Bureau; and provisions for the alleviation of widespread suffering caused by sudden calamities. In connection with these and many other Federal enactments may be found precedents which not only justify the interpretation of the Constitution indicated, but often point to one far broader. Whatever inconsistencies may appear in legislation of the character referred to, we discover one significant fact: that in exigencies in any State analogous to those arising from the presence of contagious or infectious diseases, the policy of the government has been reasonably uniform and consistent. These acts interpretative of the Constitution therefore embody the most authoritative definition of the limits of the Federal prerogative in any exigency affecting the general welfare. A proper examination of the constitutional grounds thus afforded for the Federal Aid to Education which its advocates have so zealously sought would certainly have provided a justification for their claims, and, it would seem, must long ago have commended them, if wisely presented, to the approval of Congress. Unfortunately, their arguments have been based too much upon the supposed precedents afforded in Federal action with reference to land-grants for educational purposes. It seems not to have occurred to them that in the bestowal of these grants Congress had in view no such conditions, either as to the need of aid or the methods of its application, as are con-

templated in the present emergency; they were not intended to avert imminent danger, nor did they contemplate direct drafts of enormous sums from the Federal treasury to be chiefly expended for any reason among selected States. But aside from being inapplicable, these so-called precedents are suggestive of results in view of which, if there are no better grounds for such action, Congress may well hesitate to bestow the aid now sought.

These results will appear from an examination of the records of the States in which the munificent land-grant endowments provided by the nation have been partly or wholly misappropriated or squandered. It is not the part of wise statesmanship to ignore the teachings of the past; and the fact that we are in the midst of an era of good feeling must not be permitted to blind the eyes of our legislators to the truth that the States into whose hands the nation is asked to so trustfully commit enormous sums of money include the greater number of those in which spendthrift use has been made of former bounties, as shown by the printed reports of their own school-officers. That there have been similar, altho less extensive, abuses in certain Northern and Western States does not affect the adverse argument, which is the only applicable one, derivable from the precedents so inopportunately cited.

It is also to be regretted that claims for Federal aid to education have been based to such an extent upon the mere statistics of illiteracy, and upon such statistics so inconsiderately presented, as to be misleading. Illiteracy, in the abstract, as related to the population of a State, is a matter of State and not National concern; nor can it become a proper subject for Federal legislation until the conditions which it fosters take the form of aggressive evils, which not only affect society within the State, but, working outward through the relations of the State to the Federal Union, affect the general welfare. The matter of the increase or decrease of illiteracy is, therefore, important only in so far as it is directly related to the increase or decrease of the evils which it originates.

It may thus happen that while illiteracy has actually decreased in amount its evils have increased, and *vice versa*. That arguments based upon its mere statistics may be mis-

leading, and are in themselves no justification for Federal interference, is evident from the following tables.

TABLE I.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Number unable to write.		Increase or Decrease.	Number unable to write in each 1000 of total population.	
	1870.	1880.		1870.	1880.
Southern.....	4,159,216	4,715,395	Inc. 556,179	300	255
Eastern and Middle.....	712,074	699,369	Dec. 12,705	58	48
Western.....	676,948	714,841	Inc. 37,893	57	44
Territories.....	64,643	84,575	Inc. 19,932	238	139
District of Columbia.....	28,719	25,778	Dec. 2,941	218	145
United States.....	5,641,600	6,239,958	Inc. 598,358	146	124

It will be seen that in the Southern States, in spite of every obstacle, such as inability to provide sufficient educational privileges, and regardless of the increase of over half a million in the aggregate of illiterates, the number of illiterate persons in each one thousand of the total population shows a decrease for the decade of 45, as compared with 10 in the Eastern and Middle States, 13 in the Western States, 99 in the Territories, and 73 in the District of Columbia. Turning to the individual States of the South, we find that the number, and the decrease in the number of illiterates in each one thousand of the population, was as follows :

TABLE II.

	Ala.	Ark.	Del.	Fla.	Ga.	Ky.	La.	Md.	Miss.	Mo.	N.C.	S. C.	Tenn.	Tex.	Va.	W. Va.
1870.....	384	275	185	382	306	251	379	173	378	129	371	411	289	270	364	184
1880.....	343	252	132	298	337	211	338	144	330	96	331	371	266	198	285	138
Decrease.	41	23	53	84	59	40	41	29	48	33	40	40	23	72	79	46

These figures clearly show that arguments as to the growth of illiteracy based upon the increase of a half-million in the aggregate of illiterates, however startling or impressive, when the corresponding increase in population is taken into account, are wholly misleading; the conditions to which they point being the reverse of true. Illiteracy in the Southern States has in reality diminished in the last decade to an extent, and under such circumstances, as to warrant the expectation that its decrease, augmented with each succeeding decade, will at no very distant day place these States, in respect of the matter in question,

where the Eastern and Middle States now stand. For example, should the decrease per 1000 from 1870 to 1910 average 75, the number of illiterates in each 1000 of population in the Southern States in the latter year would be but 48. There is, therefore, every reason to believe that under normal conditions these States may, within a single generation, reduce their illiteracy to the present average in the Eastern and Middle States of 48, or that in the Western States of 46, in each 1000 of population.

Obviously the mere statistics of illiteracy, indicating results in the abstract so hopeful, cannot be regarded *per se* as evidence of an emergency requiring Federal interposition. But the actual element with which we have to deal is not mere ignorance, which in the abstract may not legally concern the nation, but the results of ignorance as they affect the general welfare. This distinction, from a legal point of view, is as plain and as worthy of consideration as that between poverty and vice and their results. However these may affect the individual, so long as they do not lead to acts directly influencing the public welfare they are confessedly matters with which even the individual State assumes to deal only through efforts equitably applied in the promotion of thrift and morality. It must not be forgotten that ignorance, in common with the many evils which it fosters and those with which it has no connection, not only cannot be legislated out of existence, but must be regarded as a permanent factor in the body politic. Wise legislation, intended to lessen its evils and prevent its growth, is undeniably the right and duty of government. But such legislation under ordinary conditions, by the plain terms of the Federal compact, demands the exercise of State and not National functions. The early policy of the Federal Government in this respect was a consistent one; and every departure from it has been the source of evils in view of which the resulting benefits have afforded no adequate compensation. Federal enactments setting apart lands within the Territories for the creation of school-funds, the policy instituted in 1789, were legitimate measures, because they affected domains under the immediate jurisdiction of Congress. Grants for similar purposes, made to States as such, have not only given ground for grave constitutional objections, but, as we have seen, with the lax political morality engendered by the unguarded bestowal of Federal bounties, have led to notorious

abuses, in themselves sufficient to make the continuance of the latter policy a matter of more than doubtful wisdom. Under ordinary conditions, therefore, there can be no sufficient reason for Federal grants, either in lands or money, for purposes of education within the States; and claims for such grants not grounded upon evident and extraordinary necessities, and which are supported by precedents of more than doubtful authority, may well be denied.

We come now to the question, Have the evils resulting from ignorance (considered apart from the mere existence of ignorance) assumed such proportions as to create an exigency demanding the exercise of the extraordinary powers contemplated in section 8 of the Federal Constitution. An emphatic answer to this question, not to mention others, is found in two specific evils, the one a corrupted suffrage, and the other idle, lawless, and vicious elements, weaned from honest labor, and which are a menace to good government and a dangerous barrier to industrial progress.

An indication of the power lodged in these elements as now arrayed in hostility to the common weal at the ballot-box and in the avenues of trade, may be found in the following table, collated from the returns of the Tenth Census :

TABLE III.

STATES.	Males of voting age unable to write.	Per cent of whole number of males of voting age who cannot write.	Total vote Presidential election 1880.	Number of votes necessary to have changed results.	Per cent of whole number of votes necessary to have changed results.
Alabama.....	120,858	46	151,507	17,423	11½
Arkansas.....	55,649	30	106,229	9,560	9
Delaware.....	6,742	17	29,333	586	2
Florida.....	23,816	38	51,618	2,219	4½
Georgia.....	145,087	45	155,651	25,000	16
Kentucky.....	98,133	26	264,304	21,772	8½
Louisiana.....	102,032	47	97,201	15,817	13½
Maryland.....	46,025	19	172,221	7,739	4½
Mississippi.....	111,541	46	117,078	21,000	18
Missouri.....	59,683	11	397,221	27,805	7
North Carolina.....	124,702	42	241,218	4,321	1½
South Carolina.....	106,934	51	170,956	27,352	16
Tennessee.....	105,549	31	241,827	10,398	4½
Texas.....	92,754	24	241,478	49,502	20½
Virginia.....	131,684	39	211,996	6,454	3½
West Virginia.....	22,885	16	112,713	5,635	5
Total Southern States..	1,354,974	32	2,762,551	252,583	9½
" East & Mid. " ..	243,654	6	2,965,147	82,043	2½
" Western " ..	272,289	6	3,475,338	186,684	5½
" Territories.....	28,723	13	100,801	8,061	8
Total United States..	1,899,640	15	9,303,837	529,371	5½

As here shown, a change in the votes of Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia, amounting in round numbers to a total of 52,000, would not only have placed the executive control of these States in other hands, but would have altered the electoral vote by the number of 49, many more than sufficient to have changed the National administration.

The fact that the control of but a small fraction of the illiterate suffrage in the States named would have secured such important changes, and, with unaltered conditions and a full vote, may be depended upon as a means of determining the controlling political power in these States and in the Nation in future elections, in view of the startling developments of the campaign of 1876, and the less open but significant efforts for the improper control of votes in 1880 and subsequently, in several of the States named, must certainly be regarded as indicative of a perilous state of affairs. It is a matter of little consequence which political party is affected by changes secured through corruption of the suffrage, since the peril to the general welfare lies not so much in such changes, in themselves, as in the means used to effect them, and the success of which to its extent is a shameful and dangerous subversion of popular government.

The existing conditions in the Southern States are more pregnant with evil to-day than in 1876, when they gave rise not only to intrigues and corruptions affecting the control of individual States and the National Government, but to results which threatened the peace of the nation. The politician, as a teacher, has been in advance of the schoolmaster. Whatever else they have failed to learn, ignorant voters begin to appreciate the fact that their ballots are of importance in determining political results; and rapidly increasing numbers of such are found willing, for hire, to serve the ends of unscrupulous managers as pawns upon the political chess-board.

These ignorant voters, hitherto massed chiefly within a single party because through that party came emancipation and enfranchisement, held together by fear of re-enslavement and by loyalty to a sentiment, have possessed, and in many instances exercised, a power which they have lacked the wisdom, if not

the disposition, to use wisely, and which has been turned to the advantage of political adventurers and the despoiling of humiliated and helpless States. So long as overwhelming elements of ignorance thus threaten to lift the standard of misrule, there will inevitably exist conditions disturbing to the public peace and perilous to the general welfare; and should there be a mere change in the political affiliation of these elements, peace-disturbing and perilous conditions will continue to exist. Thus, whenever the negro, besotted in ignorance but taught to place a mercenary value upon the ballot, shall vote without restraint and at the behest of the highest bidder, we shall see the color-line in politics obliterated and the so-called "Solid South" broken: but following these results, instead of a wholesome change, we may expect to find rival parties conducting a shameless traffic in a corrupted suffrage. If, as has been claimed, and as is probably only too true, many of the leaders of the colored race, illiterate men whose ready tongues are uncontrolled by fixed principles, and whose "little learning is a dangerous thing," can be induced by flattery or bribery to conjure at the shrine of the Moloch of Political Corruption in the garb and with the authority of a sacred office¹ it is not to be supposed that the masses who are below them in intelligence and morality will be beyond the reach of mercenary influences.

The serious political evils which we have outlined, and which may so vitally affect the interests of every citizen of the Republic, in themselves not only afford justification for, but demand the unhesitating exercise of, every power which the Nation may lawfully employ in defence of the common welfare.

There are, however, other conditions, traceable to a like origin in the dense ignorance of great masses in the population of certain States, which equally justify the interposition of the Federal Government.

From the statistics of the Tenth Census relating to occupations, by an analysis closely approximating accuracy, we derive the facts presented in the following table:

¹ As a single indication of the drift indicated, a prominent State official in one of the Cotton States said, not long since, in the hearing of the writer, "We have discovered a better way to control the colored vote than by intimidation . . . We have only to buy up the negro preachers."

TABLE IV.
SELECTED OCCUPATIONS, BY GROUPS OF STATES.

STATES.	Popula- tion of the age of ten and over.	Agricultural proprietors.		Unskilled laborers: all classes.		Engaged in the professions.		Engaged in manufacturing, mechanical, and mining indus- tries; trade and transportation, including proprietors and expert employees.	
		No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.
Southern.....	12,783,612	1,888,906	14.8	3,272,407	25.6	226,912	1.8	938,045	7.4
Western.....	12,123,874	1,698,621	14.0	1,767,872	14.6	344,278	2.8	1,640,881	13.6
Eastern & Middle Territories.....	11,270,090	693,717	6.2	1,559,675	13.9	366,185	3.2	2,690,145	2.4
	584,031	65,433	11.2	103,014	17.6	36,212	6.2	99,796	17.1
Totals	36,761,607	4,346,677	11.8	6,702,968	18.2	973,587	2.6	5,368,867	14.6

It will be seen that the excess of unskilled laborers in the Southern States as compared with the Eastern and Middle States is 11.7 per cent, and as compared with the Western States 11 per cent; while the number of their citizens employed in the commercial and industrial pursuits named in the table is 16.6 per cent less than in the Eastern and Middle, and 10.4 per cent less than in the Western, States. While the difficulty of drawing an exact line between skilled and unskilled labor makes an entirely complete and satisfactory classification impossible, the Census statistics plainly show that the number of unskilled laborers in the Southern States is in excess of 3,272,000, or more than a quarter of their entire population of the age of 10 and over. The number of those engaged in agriculture in these States, including proprietors, tenants, and all tillers of the soil, constitutes a percentage of the population referred to of 14.8, or a percentage slightly in excess of that similarly employed in the great agricultural States of the West, and 8.6 per cent less than that thus employed in the Eastern and Middle States. Careful investigations, supported by statistics, indicate that, at a low estimate, not less than 500,000 of those engaged in agriculture, and most of them negroes, must, in respect of special fitness for the occupation, be classed with the great body of other unskilled laborers, by whom (however little encouragement may be drawn from the comparison) they are surpassed in

intelligence and enterprise. With this addition, the total of unskilled laborers in the Southern States is increased to more than 3,700,000 out of a total engaged in all of the commercial and industrial pursuits named of about 6,100,000; or, if we add the number of those pursuing professional callings, out of a total of 6,326,000. In other words, in these States the number of unskilled laborers included in the total of those reported as engaged in all occupations is in excess of one half by more than 500,000, and equal to nearly 30 per cent of the entire population of and over the age of 10.

To appreciate the significance of these facts, it must be borne in mind that the industrial change in the South, little short of a revolution, now in progress, is compelling an almost complete re-organization of the activities of this immense area. A rapid increase in the number of landholders by deed or leasehold, due to the partition of plantations; changes in agricultural methods; the phenomenal developments in manufacturing industries, are all conspiring to create a demand for labor of a kind and quality hitherto needed only in small degree. Inexorable conditions require that this demand shall be met promptly; the necessary material, in crude condition, is at hand; every consideration of expediency suggests the desirability of utilizing it, and every effort is being made on the part of the employer to do so. Nevertheless, the demands of the South for labor of the kind required, under present conditions, is not and cannot be met. The explanation is simple. The intelligent, progressive spirit which is working a transformation in all other respects has thus far influenced the ignorant and unskilled laborer, for the most part, only to the extent of making him restless and discontented. Free from the exactions of ante-bellum days, labor weds itself to indolence, and exerts itself only to the extent necessary to meet the more ordinary of every-day needs. There is a general absence of the industrious application in special fields of industry which leads to skill; and while there is thus little real progress in the conditions necessary to the betterment of his condition, the laborer subjects the employer to exactions and caprices, and hangs like a drag upon the wheels of progress. This condition of affairs can end only in one of two ways: the Southern laborer must meet the demands of the new South, by

becoming fitted to its uses, or, to the extent required, it will supply its needs otherwise, and do without him. So serious has this problem already become, that in many instances, some of the most notable of which have come under my own observation, laborers whose industry and skill can be depended upon have been imported in colonies from abroad. This serious question, only beginning to attract attention, unless speedily solved, will soon overshadow all other problems affecting the welfare of the Southern States. Every addition to a laboring population, already excessive, is an addition to what may become an army of malcontents, whose power for mischief, under the inspiration of the prejudices and passions born of ignorance and poverty, and the direction of demagogues, will be exercised to the detriment of every public and private interest—political, social, and industrial.

That the conditions thus sketched in outline afford exigencies which justify the Federal interference, invited alike by the patriotic and thoughtful citizens of the States directly and indirectly concerned, is undeniable.

The remedy for these perils is plainly suggested by the fact that they have their source in ignorance. Ignorance must be displaced by intelligence, and this must be the work of education—and education applied with special reference to industrial necessities.

The fact that the Southern States by their unaided efforts have accomplished so much in the direction of educating their ignorant population, and at a point where their abilities are exhausted are met by an exigency like that now existing, is assuredly not only a ground for Federal action within the warrant of the Constitution, as interpreted by the indisputable precedents established as we have seen under analogous conditions, but an occasion for prompt and willing legislation. If it may legitimately interfere, in the face of such evident dangers, why has Congress so long withheld action? While apathy, and engrossing attention to legislation affecting selfish interests, may be assigned as among the reasons for the neglect by our National legislators of this as well as other matters of National importance, their inaction, in the present instance, may be attributed in large degree to the fact that those who have directed

the efforts to secure the legislation desired, have not been fortunate in the framing of measures or in the presentation of grounds for their adoption. In the respect last named, as we have indicated, the question has been needlessly complicated by the importance attached to previous legislative acts, not only irrelevant but antagonistic to the action desired, while there has been an obvious failure to sufficiently emphasize the only valid ground for such action—the existence of an exigency not only within the warrant of the Constitution, but analogous to those clearly recognized so to be. In the respect first named, the framing of measures for the bestowal of the desired aid, those approved respectively by the Senate and House Committees of the last two Congresses, have been vitally defective in the following essential particulars: (1) as to the amount of aid; (2) as to the limit of its continuance; (3) as to provisions for its proper application. As to the amount of aid sought, each of these bills (the one providing in the first year \$10,000,000, and the other \$7,000,000) have contemplated at the very outset the bestowal of a fund of such magnitude and under such conditions that few, if any, of the Southern States could or would put it to wise or proper use. They have in effect proposed to put the Federal Government in the attitude of saying to many of these States: We expect you to expend for school purposes within a year from a given date (say June, 1884) a fund, which we will put into your hands, equal to twice or thrice the amount you are now expending from your own school revenues, and which shall be spent, not in place of, but in addition to, these revenues.

In the enactment providing for Federal aid which has just passed the Senate, among other amendments in the direction of a wise exercise of the power in the premises which Congress may legitimately exercise was one reducing the initial sum to be bestowed from \$15,000,000 to \$7,000,000. While it cannot be urged against the bestowal of the sum last named that it will provide in many States an amount equal to twice or thrice that which they themselves now expend for school purposes (as \$15,000,000 would have done), it is nevertheless a question whether even so large a sum as this can be wisely expended in the first year.

TABLE V.

STATES.	To be apportioned by House Bill, waiting action.	To be apportioned by Senate Bill as enacted.	Amount of final appropriation, Senate enactment.	Amount as per state-ments following.	Amount expended for public-school purposes in 1880.
United States.....	\$10,000,000 ¹	\$7,000,000 ¹	\$5,000,000 ¹	\$4,071,190 ²	\$79,339,814
Alabama.....	694,631	526,339	347,316	332,790	430,131
Arkansas.....	323,750	217,810	161,875	166,672	382,637
Delaware.....	31,112	24,040	15,556	10,034	172,455
Florida.....	128,499	99,814	64,250	59,090	117,724
Georgia.....	834,005	634,945	417,003	402,810	653,464
Kentucky.....	558,324	367,003	279,162	265,862	1,025,659
Louisiana.....	510,228	422,619	250,114	209,556	373,081
Maryland....	215,527	158,333	107,263	67,952	1,117,145
Mississippi.....	598,083	448,632	299,042	274,580	679,475
Missouri.....	334,544	197,325	167,272	156,946	3,092,332
North Carolina.....	743,555	522,990	371,777	346,772	328,717
South Carolina....	592,709	457,399	296,354	270,900	308,230
Tennessee.....	658,213	560,605	329,107	330,098	634,587
Texas.....	507,106	364,212	253,503	258,976	713,908
Virginia.....	689,671	512,432	344,835	290,016	716,153
West Virginia.....	136,821	73,975	68,410	64,994	527,090
Southern States.....	\$7,556,878	\$5,588,473	\$3,778,439	\$3,508,048	\$10,755,588
Other States and Ter...	2,443,122	1,411,526	1,221,561	563,142	68,584,226

Should the amount of Federal aid granted be \$4,071,190, the average amount received by the Southern States would be, in round numbers, equal to one third of the entire sum expended by them, from their own resources, in 1880, while in the States of North and South Carolina and Louisiana the sums on the one side would very nearly equal those on the other. That the National Government can, in wisdom or justice, properly expend for school purposes in these States in any one year a larger sum than the one indicated is a matter of grave doubt; and yet the Senate enactment at the outset would increase this sum by 75 per cent, while the House bill, with phenomenal prodigality, would increase it by nearly 150 per cent. Examining more closely, we find that the amounts provided by the House bill in seven States exceed their school expenditures in 1880 by from twelve to sixty per cent, while those provided by the Senate enactment are also in excess of State expenditures in four States.

If it be urged that the school revenues in a majority of the Southern States have largely increased since 1880, this increase, if it has exceeded in proportion the increase in the population

¹ Distributed on the basis of the whole number of illiterates, including adults.

² Distributed on the basis of \$2 per capita for each illiterate of the age of 10 and under the age of 21.

of school age, only adds force to the arguments which may be urged against lavish Federal appropriations.

In effect, for a greater or less period, under the terms of these measures, the Federal Government, in several States, will be called upon to assume the major support of the public schools, the States in question being graciously permitted to retain the privilege of contributing a moiety of the school-fund expended within their borders, and under such accommodating conditions as to make it possible for whatever officials are in control to adjust even this amount, in large degree, to suit such uncertain standards as they shall themselves create.

In the serious work which lies before the citizens of the New South,—the substitution of intelligence and thrift in the wide fields occupied by ignorance and idleness,—the development and exercise of their own abilities, under the influence of an honorable spirit of self-dependence and patriotism, is of more importance than any money aid which can be bestowed from the overflowing treasury of a paternal government. That would be an unwise exercise of Federal generosity which would in any degree break down the patriotic, independent local spirit upon which the success of the public-school system must chiefly depend. To stimulate and encourage this spirit should be the first object of Federal aid; and it should be prevented, with jealous care, from passing the limit beyond which its bestowal will supplant and destroy it, by removing the incentive to private effort, and by providing a temptation to official corruption.

That the smallest of the sums named in Table V. would be sufficient to meet the present needs of the States engaged in a contest with ignorance is not only evidenced by the progress which they have made in their brave struggle within the last decade, but by the measure of the financial aid proposed as compared with their own expenditures, and which will represent, as translated into force, an addition to that now in use of one third. To properly utilize this added force will require new schoolhouses, more teachers, the kindling of the sentiment which brings these, and other materials, into form and shape, and arrangements for that wise supervision as the result of which the machinery of the school system shall be adjusted to

the successful application of the increased power. That two dollars per capita for each illiterate, excluding adults, will provide a sum sufficient for this purpose, is best evidenced by what it will accomplish.

The whole number of public schools in the United States in 1880 was 225,880, of which 72,465 were in the Southern States. The entire expenditure for public schools in all the States in the same year was \$79,339,814, of which the Southern States expended \$10,755,588, or an average amount for each school of nearly \$150.

If National aid should be bestowed in these States to the amount of \$3,508,048 (see Table V.), and should be devoted wholly to the establishment of new schools, at the average named above, it would provide for 23,386 such schools in a single year, or an average for each State of one less than 1500. As the average number of public schools in the sixteen Southern States in 1880 was 4529, an average addition of 1500 would be equivalent to the planting of one new school for every three now existing. On the other hand, if the amount of aid named be used for the better support of existing schools, the average expenditure per school will be increased by the sum of \$48.50, or to a total amount of \$198.50 per annum, which is within \$18 of the average sum per school expended in Maine, \$13.70 less than in New Hampshire, and \$24.20 more than in Vermont. While it is undoubtedly true that the sum expended in the three States named is insufficient for the best interests of education, if the Federal Government shall assist in the immediate establishment of schools, in their sister-States of the South, which shall be maintained at equal cost and approach these in usefulness, it will certainly have done all that it can be reasonably asked to undertake.

If it be thought wise, however, in view of the importance of securing the resultant benefits at the earliest possible moment, to extend Federal aid in such degree as to enable the States to provide for the better support of schools while establishing new ones (which would be a concession on the side of liberality), an increase of the amount bestowed per capita of illiterates between the ages of ten and twenty-one, amounting either to fifty cents or to one dollar, would add to the sum named \$2,035,595 [a

total of \$6,106,785] or \$1,017,797 [a total of \$5,825,214], the latter of which amounts probably, and the former of which certainly, would represent an additional expenditure as large as would be on any ground justifiable.

To secure the proper application of this aid, it should be apportioned, not upon the basis of the entire number of illiterates, which would include 4,204,363 adults who are beyond the reach of common-school instruction, but upon the basis of the number within its reach. These, as nearly as determinable from the published statistics of the Census of 1880, are the illiterates of the age of ten and under the age of twenty-one years, numbering in the United States 2,035,595, and in the Southern States 1,754,024. Whatever aid is extended should also be apportioned among the several counties¹ of the States, payable in drafts upon the U. S. Treasury, or in such other manner as shall secure to each its proper share of assistance—a precaution which would serve to protect the funds from misuse, and to the adoption of which there can be no valid objection, since the moneys are to be expended in accordance with State laws. The Federal enactment should in this connection provide for the withholding of aid from any county not complying with such wise terms relating to its use as it may seem proper to enact, the State officials to be the judges in such cases, and to have authority to devote funds thus withheld, under approval of the Commissioner of Education, to Normal-school or similar purposes.

Beginning with an appropriation of two dollars per capita, in view of the probable ability of the States to then wisely use an increased sum, Federal aid could, if deemed expedient, be annually increased fifty cents per capita of the illiterates before referred to, reaching a maximum sum of \$7,016,096 in the fifth year, after which it should be annually reduced fifty cents per capita, with which amount per capita, a total for the Southern States of \$877,012, it should also end. By this policy the aid would be so gradually withdrawn as to enable the States growing in prosperity to supply without serious difficulty, from their own

¹ The bestowal of a stated sum per capita of illiterates, as in the fourth column of Table V., will make apportionment among the counties a simple matter.

yearly increasing revenues, the amount required to maintain and advance the efficiency of their public schools.

The bills to which attention has been directed are alike fatally defective in the item of the (ostensibly) final appropriation. By the provisions of the Senate enactment, this appropriation, at the end of ten years, is to be \$5,000,000; and by the provisions of the House bill, at the end of six years, \$10,000,000. From what sources are the States expected to supply the large deficiencies thus suddenly to be met? After ten years' enjoyment of the prodigal bounty of the Nation, if it shall cease with an appropriation of \$5,000,000, will there be cheerfully added to the local budgets, in a single year, an increased school-tax in Alabama of \$347,000; Arkansas, \$161,000; Georgia, \$417,000; Kentucky, \$279,000; Louisiana, \$250,000; Mississippi, \$299,000; North Carolina, \$371,000; South Carolina, \$296,000; Tennessee, \$329,000; and Virginia, \$344,000? And if these deficits are sufficient in amount to arouse serious question as to the ability or willingness of the States to meet them promptly, what may we expect if they are doubled in amount, as proposed by the terms of the House bill? There can be but one answer to these questions. In either event the States named (and is not this the expectation of some of the interested advocates of these measures?) will come again to the National Treasury with the plea that a continuance of Federal aid is essential in order to save their school systems from sudden collapse. If they shall then obtain aid on grounds which have not the validity of those now presented, conditions intended to be temporary will be made permanent, and the dangerous precedent established by unwise legislation will begin to bear fruit.

There is also to be noted, in the measures referred to, an absence of such simple and wholesome provisions as are required in order to secure the proper expenditure of even a fraction of the amounts which they would bestow. Apparently influenced by the sentimental consideration that to accompany the bestowal of Federal aid, with safeguards for its proper use, would be a reflection on the integrity of the States, or an impertinent interference in their domestic concerns, it is proposed to make the conditions so generous as to leave the widest margin for its misuse at the hands of careless or corrupt officials.

There ought, surely, to be no question as to the right or duty of the National Government, in an emergency which demands the expenditure of Federal moneys for the general welfare, to exercise the same authority in arranging for the proper disposition of its aid which it exercises in its bestowal. And the States most deeply interested, in view of the delinquencies of their trusted officers in the past, and the contingencies suggested by the possible control of political machinery through the corruption of ignorant voters, ought to regard with satisfaction, and to accept without cavil, such safeguards as are calculated to ensure the wise use of the school-funds provided from the National Treasury.

The willingness of the representatives of the States chiefly benefited to receive lavish appropriations whose bestowal requires the abandonment of doctrines with regard to the relative prerogatives of the Federal Government and the States, which they have hitherto held with tenacity, instead of leading the friends of good government to the adoption of a line of policy not warranted by the Constitution, or which may be productive of future ills, should put them on their guard. Nor should the unwillingness of any State to accept aid, on reasonable conditions, in the meeting of needs however pressing, win concessions from the friends of education, as the result of which their beneficent plans for the promotion of the general welfare may be defeated. If the evils of ignorance can be met only under conditions which shall invite others, hardly less hateful, Federal inaction may be the policy of wisdom.

Finally, as the aid bestowed, to be within the warrant of the Constitution, must contemplate the meeting of an evident exigency, its bestowal must be confined to those States, or parts of the Union, where such an exigency exists. While there may be difficulty in satisfactorily determining within what limits an exigency such as the Constitution contemplates may be said to now exist, it is safe to exclude the States whose illiterates constitute less than twelve per cent of the population. All of the States thus excluded are beyond doubt themselves abundantly able to care for their ignorant population, the chief part of which, it is worthy of remark, is of adult age. The portions of the Union included would then embrace the only area within

which there can be any justification for Federal interference,—the sixteen Southern States, the Territories, and the District of Columbia.

A measure embodying the essential features outlined, and free from the objectionable ones noted, would not only meet the exigency, but be in harmony with the various Federal enactments germane to the subject.

These, as we have seen, both in themselves and in the discussions antecedent to their adoption, have indicated a fixed determination not to transcend the limits of the National prerogative by any action which could possibly lead to the permanent establishment of a system which, under normal conditions, would infringe upon the proper functions of the States. The fear that such results might attend Congressional action, whenever Federal aid has been sought for the relief of any State or section in the presence of imminent peril, has roused the jealous defenders of the Constitution, and led to heated and sometimes acrimonious debates. This watchfulness, unquestionably wholesome in its effects, when the National bounty has been granted in the face of any pressing need, has with few exceptions led to its bestowal on conditions and under limitations which may be studied with profit at this time.

While it is to be hoped that no unworthy considerations, such as a desire to secure for any State appropriations which are either excessive or wholly unwarranted, will influence the members of the two Houses in the final action which they shall take in this most important matter, immediate assistance should be rendered to the ex-slave States in the development of an educational system suited to their political and industrial needs.

"Slavery," says Robert C. Winthrop, is but half abolished, emancipation is but half completed, while millions of freemen with votes in their hands are left without education." He adds, "Every year brings another instalment of brutal ignorance to the polls to be the subject of cajolement, deception, corruption, or intimidation." In the words of President Garfield's inaugural address, "All of the Constitutional powers of the Nation and the States and all the volunteer forces of the people should be summoned to meet this danger." But the Federal power exer-

cised to meet the danger must be stayed within the area where it exists.

Federal aid to education should, therefore, be devoted to the enlightenment of the negro, as the only lawful means by which to disarm this Goliath in the hostile forces which menace our institutions.

HENRY RANDALL WAITE.

THE PSYCHICAL RELATION OF MAN TO ANIMALS.

IN this REVIEW for November, 1878, I published an article on "Man's Place in Nature." The present article may be regarded as a continuation of the subject from a different point of view. In the former article I tried to show how, without violating the laws and analogies of nature, the spirit of man may be conceived to have arisen by progressive individuation out of the forces of nature, through the vital principle of plants and the anima of animals. In this I wish to fix attention on the last and most important step, and to determine, if possible, its nature. I wish to show in what consist the essential differences between the *spirit* of man and the *anima* of animals.

This question undoubtedly lies at the very basis of all philosophy. It is the question most fundamental of Locke, of Hume, and of Kant, viz., the origin of knowledge from sense-impressions. It is more: it is a question which touches the origin of all that is characteristic of man, of art, of language, of society, of morals and religion, and is thus closely bound up with all our dearest hopes and noblest aspirations. It is and must ever be, therefore, a question of the most transcendent importance; but under the new light shed upon every department of biology by the theory of evolution, it must now be approached in a different way and reinvestigated in a new spirit.

In the past, man's nature, both bodily and spiritual, has been studied too much apart from that of animals. Human anatomy, human physiology, human embryology, and human psychology have been treated as separate sciences. This is no longer possible. The method of comparison is the characteristic and most powerful method of discovery in all the more complex departments of science, such as biology, sociology, psychology, etc.

This method has already been applied with the most admirable success to all departments concerned with the human body, and the time has come when it must also be applied to what concerns the human spirit. Anatomy did not and could not take on true scientific form until it became comparative anatomy. Physiology and embryology did not and could not become truly scientific except through comparative physiology and comparative embryology; so, also, psychology can never take on true scientific form until it consents to become *comparative psychology*—until man's psychical nature is studied in relation to those foreshadowings and beginnings which we find in the lower animals and in infants. The method which has been found so successful in the lower departments must be applied here also.

There is, however, a danger against which we must guard. The older philosophers assumed, and rightly, an immense gap between man and animals, and therefore thought lightly of the apparent likeness; the tendency of modern evolution-methods, on the contrary, is to insist upon and even exaggerate the likeness, and to minimize the difference. This tendency shows itself in two opposite ways, often in the same individual. On the one hand, we project our own nature into animals, and thus elevate them into the human plane; on the other, we drag man down to the animal plane, or both man and animals down even to the physical and chemical plane. On the one hand, we hear much talk about "*plastidule souls*," and on the other, of animal and even human *automata*. Thus we oscillate from fetichism to materialism. Now, the only true rational attitude is to admit with the older philosophers the immense, yea, infinite gap, and with the newer science the wonderful resemblance and even possible genetic connection, and then to try to reconcile the one with the other.

Admitting, then, both the close resemblance, perhaps genetic connection, and the immense difference, I wish to show in the most general way in what the essential distinction consists. This, I know, is no easy task. The greatest philosophic thinkers have striven in vain to make this point perfectly clear. I am fully aware that I am not able to solve completely so difficult a problem. This can be successfully done only by a profound critique, combined with far more extended observations on the

psychical phenomena of animals and of infants, and more careful induction from these phenomena, than have yet been attempted. All I can hope for is to contribute something, however small, toward the solution of the problem, by bringing together an *assemblage* of differences of the same kind and pointing in the same direction, each by itself perhaps doubtful and unsatisfactory, but each strengthening the others, and therefore all together in their combined effect convincing. Also, I may hope that all these lines of difference pointing in the *same direction* may suggest the common point of departure. In view of the strong tendency at present among biologists to minimize the distinction between man and animals, and thus to make man a higher family of animal *and nothing more*, this attempt cannot be considered unnecessary either in a philosophical or a practical point of view. All I shall attempt, however, will be to touch lightly each point, barely indicating the line of thought, leaving to others of greater metaphysical acuteness the harder task of complete development. Of the several points of difference taken up, I will treat first those which seem to me the simplest; in the hope that these will furnish a key which will help us to understand the others.

I. LANGUAGE.

This has always been regarded as one of the most important distinctive marks of man, and many have made it *the* one essential distinction from which gradually all others have arisen. I will not stop to discuss this point, but only draw attention to the familiar fact that animals, as for example dogs, may be taught to understand human speech, and that parrots and some other birds may even be taught to speak intelligibly. What, then, is the distinction betwixt such parrot-speech, or such human speech as understood by dogs, and true human speech? Many will say that parrots speak only the words which have been taught them; that their speech is pure imitative speech, mere idle sound signifying nothing, because carrying with it no corresponding idea in the mind of the parrot. But this is certainly not wholly true. In the mind of the speaking parrot the word or phrase is undoubtedly sometimes associated with a *thing* or an *action*. When the parrot says, "Polly wants a

cracker," she means what she says. When she says, "Bring in breakfast," she desires and expects that food be set on the table. Doubtless there is usually much idle repetition, but there is often at least some dim association of word and thing. Is there any difference between such speech and ordinary human speech, except such as may be found in less degree in the speech of men of different degrees of culture? I believe there is, *and it is just the difference between sign-language and rational speech.*

Sign-language vs. Rational Speech.—Sign-language is used by all higher animals, and even by many insects. Cries of distress, terror, pain, notes of pleasure, of joy, of love, are the natural language of emotion whether in animals or man. So, also, pointing to an object or place, or imitating of an action desired, comes under the category of sign-language. Social habits necessitate a more elaborate system of communication, and therefore social insects, especially ants, undoubtedly communicate with each other freely. This species of natural language, as might be expected, is carried to the highest degree of perfection by savage races of men, especially by the nomadic American Indians, as a means of communication between tribes speaking different languages. The sign-language of deaf-mutes is mostly of the same character. The alphabetical deaf-mute language is of a higher and more strictly human kind.

Now *sounds*, also, as well as gestures, may be signs: and *words* are only sounds. So that word-language or speech may also be only sign-language. Words may be only signs of things and associated in the mind with things, so that by frequent collocation the word suggests the thing, and the thing the word. Now this, and this only, is the highest significance of parrot-speech or of the speech of man as understood by a dog. Such speech has no more significance than the sign-language of an intelligent dog who wishes to make known his wants to his master, or than the sign-language of the ant who wishes to tell his fellows of some fortunate find. It surely can make no essential difference that the signs in one case are sounds or words. It is true that the words and phrases are never any but such as have been learned and imitated, but by frequent collocation the words become the signs of things and not mere idle sounds.

But it will be asked, Is not this the case with all speech?

Does not the child, too, *learn* the words, and by practice to utter them? Does not the child, too, learn by frequent collocation to associate sounds with things? Yes, it is true that all the speech of earliest childhood is nothing more than this sign-language, this imitated parrot-speech. But true rational speech is very different, and we may see the one pass into the other, often somewhat suddenly, in the history of every child, if we only observe closely. The process is as follows:

The child, by observing their frequent collocation, learns to associate certain words with certain objects, and vice-versa; then to *use* the words as signs of the objects; then several words or a *phrase* (to him only a long word) to indicate certain actions. This is all parrot-speech, tho doubtless far more perfect than in any animal. But at a certain time, sooner or later, there comes something more: not only more perfect, but different, not only a *growth*, but a *new birth*. At a certain time the child perceives the *power* of words *in relation* to each other. He analyzes phrases which were before only long words, and perceives the power of each part in relation to other parts. Immediately he *makes* new untaught combinations, *invents* new phrases, *creates* original sentences. There is now for the first time a *grammar* in language, altho only intuitively perceived by the child. Now there is no longer any limit to new combinations. In the history of every child, some of these attempts at new combinations give rise to strange and even laughable phrases which are treasured and repeated by the fond mother as the smart sayings of her darling. Now just here true *rational* speech, characteristic human language, begins. All before is sign-language, and does not differ except in degree from the sign-language of many animals. Many animals might be taught such speech if their vocal organs and their tongue were suitably formed; but the second stage no animal can attain for want of the mental faculties necessary.

Sign-language, however, may doubtless serve the purpose of rational speech, but only because Reason supplies the relations which are wanting in the signs. In rational speech these relations are expressed by appropriate words. A grammar may be injected into sign-language by the rational spirit, but is not expressed, as it is in true rational language.

The difference between word-sign-language and rational word-language is similar to, and may be illustrated by, the difference between *spoken* and *written* language. As in rational speech the phrase-word is analyzed into its components, and the separate powers of these components in relation to each other is perceived, so in written language the analysis goes one step farther, and each word is again analyzed into its separate sounds, and the separate power of each sound in relation to other component sounds is perceived. But the first analysis seems to be connected with the *birth* of human reason, the second only with a *stage of culture*.

I leave to others of greater acuteness to follow out in detail the distinction here pointed out. My object now is to give a whole assemblage of similar distinctions, each one only in outline, trusting to their combined effect for the conviction which I seek to produce. I wish to show that in all the faculties and powers of the human mind, as compared with the corresponding ones in animals, and especially in the manifestations of these in art, there is a distinction similar to that just pointed out.

2. USEFUL ART.

The gradation between the constructive art of animals and the lowest art of man seems at first sight very complete, and therefore it is more difficult here to draw sharply the distinction. But a little reflection, I think, will show where it must be drawn, and also that it is of the same kind as that already pointed out.

The constructive art of animals, as shown by the nest-building of birds, the dam-building of beavers, the complex galleries of ants, and the cellular honeycombs of bees, is apparently the final result of a succession of blind divergent trials and survivals of the best methods, continued through successive generations and conserved in inherited brain-structure, until a really marvellous excellence is sometimes attained. The successive improvement under such blind divergent *trials* and survivals seems to be wholly unconscious and unintentional, and therefore exactly like the improvement of the organism itself under divergent *variation*—struggle for life and survival of the fittest. It is, in other words, *unconscious evolution* of constructive methods. This is what we call Instinct: and it is in this way, undoubtedly,

that the most wonderful instincts have been gradually formed. That we have rightly interpreted the significance of such art is shown by the fact that its excellence is not at all in proportion to the intelligence, but rather to the fixedness of the habits, and therefore the narrowness of the line along which improvement takes place.

But the constructive art of man, even the rudest, has always also another element. In man's work there is always a distinct conscious purpose which he deliberately tries to attain. Furthermore, there is always in man a *perception of law*: unconscious, intuitive perception, it may be—i.e., perception by methods which he does not stop to analyze, and could not analyze if he would—but still a perception of the laws of nature underlying his work. As beauty is harmonic relations perceived by imagination or æsthetic sense, so law is harmonic relation perceived by the reason. The one is the basis of fine art, the other of useful art and science. In other words, in art man is always *inventive, creative*, and even the inventive genius of a Watt or an Edison is only a higher form of that which distinguishes man in the lowest stage from animals.

But as in language so also in art there are at least two grades on the human plane, and the distinction between these is perhaps more easy to draw than that between the human and the animal. The two grades here referred to are empiric art and scientific art. As already explained in a previous article,¹ empiric art is the result of unconscious intuitive perception of law, scientific art of the conscious perception—the rational knowledge—of the laws of nature. Man first *originates* and improves art by incessant trials,—not wholly blind like those of animals, true, but guided only by the rushlight of intuitive reason. By this method alone, through successive generations, and perhaps aided, as in the case of animals, by an inherited capacity, a high degree of perfection is sometimes attained. But sooner or later such art is arrested in its growth. But if under the stimulus of such art the self-conscious reason be fully awakened and applies itself to the understanding of the principles and processes involved in art, then art becomes scientific and thereby becomes

¹ PRINCETON REVIEW, Nov., 1881.

endowed with new and higher life and indefinitely progressive. Thus in *this*, as in every department, there is for man a human life and a *higher* life. The first separates him from animals—a birth into humanity; the second separates him from his lower self—a new birth into a higher plane of life.

3. FINE ART—MUSIC.

I suppose that most persons imagine that in music, in song, some lower animals, e.g. birds, approach very near to man. Who has not been charmed by these songsters of nature? Who will deny that the pleasure thus derived, too, is of a very high order? Yes, of a *very high* order; but this very fact ought to lead us to suspect that the source of this pleasure is far different from what is usually supposed. There is, as I believe, a profound difference not only in degree but also in kind between this bird-music and human music, and that the pleasure we derive in the two cases has an entirely different source. I would even go much farther and affirm that as the speech of parrots is no true speech, so the music of birds is no true music, and the pleasure we take in the two cases is of an entirely different order.

Beauty vs. Sense-agreeableness.—Sugar affects our gestative nerves agreeably, and quinine disagreeably; but no one thinks of calling this pure sense-pleasure *beauty*. So odors produce in us pleasure or pain; but no one thinks of dignifying such pleasure by the name of *beauty*. The reason is because these lower senses are not closely connected with the higher faculties of the mind. But in the higher senses the connection is so close between sense-agreeableness and the higher emotions that the two become confused in the mind, and therefore in popular language. Thus we often speak of a beautiful sound or a beautiful color, whereas the proper word is "*sweet*," for the pleasure derived from a pure sound or a pure color is on the same plane and of the same order as that we derive from sugar. It is pure sense-agreeableness and nothing more. But if we take *two* pure colors, place them side by side and compare them, something more and higher is at once perceived. Each color by itself, indeed, as before affects us agreeably (sense-pleasure), but in addition we perceive also the relation between them, whether

of concord or discord. This is an *intellectual* perception, not a *sense*-perception. It is a perception not of a *thing*, but of a *relation*. The impression or effect is not on the plane of *sense*, but on the plane of *mind*. Here, then, is the simplest perception of beauty. The harmonious combination of colors in various ways with colors, and of form with form, and these two again with each other, becoming more and more complex, and higher and higher, constitutes the whole art of painting.

So, also, is it with music; and in fact the principle is best illustrated here. A simple, sweet, pure sound produces in us not the feeling of beauty, but only a sense-pleasure. The æsthetic feeling, the so-called *sense* of beauty (see how hard it is to avoid the language of sense), is and must be at least one step removed from the plane of sense. But if we make *two* sounds, whether consecutively or together, we may compare them. Now we perceive as before each sound (sense-perception), but we perceive also something more which is not mere sense-perception. We perceive the *relation* between the two, whether concordant or discordant. If concordant, we call it *harmony*, whether *consecutive* or *chordal*. This is beauty and æsthetic feeling reduced to its simplest terms. These are the simplest elements of music as distinguished from mere sense-pleasure. These simple harmonies, consecutive and chordal, may be combined again into more complex harmonies; and these again into still more complex and higher, thus *creating* new combinations without limit, until the complexity of the relations becomes so great that it is only by long culture that we are able to perceive and enjoy them.

The outcome of all I have said is this: The simplest element of beauty, the lowest possible æsthetic feeling, is still one step above the plane of mere sense. It is an *intellectual* perception, not a sense-perception. It is a perception not of a thing, but of a *relation* between two or more things. Or to express it differently, it is the perception not of a *material* thing, but of an *intellectual thing*. As art becomes higher, the perceived relations become more complex and difficult to grasp; the intellectual thing becomes higher and higher, and therefore more and more removed from the plane of sense.

It is easy to see, then, why fine art is confined to the two

senses hearing and sight. It is because of the infinite variety of the kinds of sensuous impressions in these, and therefore the complexity of the *relations* among these impressions. It is conceivable, however, that there may be, and perhaps there is, a low species of fine art connected also with the lower senses of taste and smell. By the skilful combination of tastes with tastes and smells with smells, and these two again with each other, it is possible that the arts of cookery and perfumery may rise one step above the plane of sense. But from the dominance of the sensuous element, there is danger that in the cultivation of taste in this art the intellect may be dragged down to the plane of sense and thus debased, rather than the senses raised toward the plane of intellect and thus refined. The latter, I need not say, is the true end of fine art.

But to return and apply these principles. I do not think that birds either make or appreciate music in the sense above defined. I am aware that many think differently. I know that some have even attempted to set bird-song to scale; but for myself, altho I have a keen perception of harmony, and perhaps for that reason, I have never been able to assure myself of any true purposive harmonic relation amongst the notes of birds. Sometimes there seems to be such a relation and sometimes not. When there is, it seems to me to be accidental and unintentional. The very best which we can accord to bird-music is what we have already accorded to the constructive art of animals. It is probable that by blind divergent trials and survival of the *sensuously* best or most agreeable results continued through successive generations, not only have the notes of birds become sweeter, but also some simple harmonic relations have been attained; not, however, because these harmonic relations were perceived and enjoyed *as relations*, but because there is probably also a *sensuous element*, a sweet *nerve-thrill* in harmonic *vibrations*. In any case, even those who think they perceive real music in bird-song, and attempt to set it to scale, must admit the profound difference between it and human music. Sing it, play it on an instrument, and see whether we derive any pleasure at all from it. The difference is fundamental. Man *creates* combinations of sounds purposely and indefinitely. He combines chords into musical phrases, phrases into strains,

strains into songs, and songs into choruses: birds never reach beyond simplest phrases, and these not *created*, but, parrot-like, *learned and repeated*, or else *inherited*, and even then only sensuously, not æsthetically, enjoyed.

I have often, and again recently, listened carefully to what might be called choral music of birds. Red-wing blackbirds and the Western meadow-larks often sing together, filling the air with their sweet jargoning. But altho the effect is delicious, I could detect nothing like true concord; it was after all only sweet jargoning. The pleasure is of a different order from that derived from music, and similar to that derived from the sounds of nature, such as murmuring of streams and rustling of leaves.

Whence, then, the question returns—Whence, then, the exquisite delight we derive from the song of birds? Why the ecstasy of poets over the skylark and the nightingale; and why do we who are not poets, but who love poetry, sympathize so deeply with the poets on this subject? I will try in a homely way to explain the source of the pleasure and of the poetic inspiration.

Suppose, then, all the conditions favorable: bright spring morning, deep forest, romantic spot, and murmuring stream. Suppose, further, a small boy with glass-tube whistle and tumbler of water, hidden from view and imitating perfectly the joyous notes of the canary. There can be no doubt that so long as we really believed we were listening to a bird our enjoyment would be of a very high and refined order, higher and more refined just in proportion to the nobleness and refinement of our nature; but would wholly vanish so soon as we detected the imposture. But why? If there be any real music in bird-song, we ought surely to enjoy equally the whistle. But, on the contrary, all that is left is some sense-pleasure of sweet sound, and perhaps some intellectual pleasure from clever imitation; but of æsthetic pleasure, such as that derived from music, there is not a trace.

What, then, is the source of the high delight in bird-song? Doubtless there is here some mere sensuous pleasure of sweet sounds; but what besides is added, elevating, dignifying, refining this mere sensuous pleasure? I answer, Not æsthetic pleas-

ure of music, but sympathy with *joy*, with *happiness*, in even the humblest of God's creatures. There is nothing nobler, purer, higher than this deep sympathy of the spirit of man with nature in all its aspects and all its grades—with murmuring streams, rustling leaves, and singing birds. It is the sympathy of the spirit of man with the infinite spirit of nature, which is the Spirit of God in nature. But its noblest form is sympathy with the happiness of animals; for happiness is the harmonious activity of the whole being according to its nature, and animal happiness is therefore the symbol of that higher spiritual happiness which is the unattained holiness and blessedness after which we all sigh. The pleasure above mere sense which we take in the song of birds is of the same order as that which we take in all exhibition of pure joy—in the gambols and skipping of lambs, the mad bounding of colts, or the merry laughter of children. If we call it music, then is it the grand chorus of nature, in which bird-song is but one insignificant twanging string.

But if there are some who would object to this view, and would make bird-song a real music, differing from human music only in degree, not in kind, thus raising birds into what I believe the characteristic human plane, there are not wanting others who would accomplish the same result by dragging down human music, in fact everything human, to the plane of the animal. Many of the materialistic school of modern philosophy will doubtless say that all music is in the plane of sense only—is naught else than a *succession of pleasurable nerve-thrills*; that harmony, or what we have called perception of relation, is but unison of thrill with thrill, making a still more pleasurable compound thrill. The answer to this is plain. In consecutive harmony the two or more notes are combined in *memory* only; and there is therefore no compound nerve-thrill at all. But above all, think of the ecstasy of DEAF Beethoven in composing his exquisite symphonies! Is this pleasurable nerve-thrilling? Pleasurable thrilling of the auditory nerve in the deaf! Is it not rather noble soul-thrilling?

I need hardly add that the pleasure which animals take in human music—if indeed they take any at all—is of a purely sensuous kind, and not at all an æsthetic pleasure. It is an enjoy-

ment of sweet sounds, not of harmonic relations; it is a delicious quivering of nerves, not thrilling of soul.

What I have said of music applies, of course, to all other forms of fine art. Music, tho capable of such high development, must be regarded in its lower kinds as the most elementary form of beautiful art. It is not even pretended that any other form of fine art is ever attempted by animals or possible to them.

4. THOUGHT.

Thus far we have spoken only of sensible results, of characteristic manifestations of human activity, as language and art, both useful and fine art. Now we come to speak of the powers underlying and determining these characteristic results.

Perhaps in no department has there been so much discussion concerning the relation between man and animals as in the department of thought. What is the relation of instinct and intelligence in animals to reason and thought in man? What is the origin of rational knowledge so characteristic of man? These are among the deepest questions in philosophy. Of course I can touch them only in the lightest way. Perhaps I ought to apologize for touching them at all.

First of all, in order to make myself intelligible, it is necessary to distinguish between instinct and intelligence in animals, and then between animal intelligence and human intelligence, or reason. It is this latter distinction with which we are chiefly concerned.

Instinct and Intelligence.—It is common to imagine that instinct and intelligence are corresponding but mutually excluding endowments, the one characteristic of animals, the other of man; but it is certain that both coexist along the whole line from the lowest animals up to man, but in varying, almost inverse proportions. In man and animals alike there is a variable and an invariable element in conduct or activity; the former belongs to intelligence, the latter to instinct. Under a previous head, in speaking of the constructive art of animals, I said that it was the result of blind divergent trials and survival of best methods integrated through successive generations by inheritance, until finally the integrated sum may be very large, and the

resulting art even more perfect than the lowest art of man. Now the integrated sum is called instinct, while the small individual additions must be accredited to a different and more voluntary faculty which we will call animal intelligence. All wise conduct or activity adapted to ends is the result of experience, but the experience is partly individual and partly ancestral and inherited. Of the whole experimental *wealth*, the inherited bank-account belongs to instinct, the individual acquirement is due to intelligence. Now it is easy to see that in proportion as the conditions of life are narrow and fixed, and the conduct of the animal is limited to certain lines, in the same proportion is such conduct easily fixed in habits, and such habits finally petrified in inherited brain-structure as instincts. Thus it is that perfect instincts are incompatible with a high degree of intelligence, and therefore that in animals, especially insects, instinct, in man intelligence, greatly predominates. In animals the inherited bank-account is large, the individual acquirement very small; while in man, tho the bank-account is still large, far larger than is commonly supposed, yet the individual acquirement always predominates.

Animal vs. Human Intelligence.—So much for a brief characterization of instinct and intelligence. But there is a profound and fundamental difference between animal intelligence and human intelligence, or reason; a difference which is shown in the inevitable tendency of the former to integration and fixation as instinct. Intelligence works always by individual experience, but the individual experience is very different in the two cases. Experience, whether in man or animals, comes by constant trials, but the trials of animals are blind trials in all directions (divergent), and only by survival of best methods the end is reached; while those of man are *directed* by thought to desired end. Thus, as already explained, the individual acquirement of animals is the result of blind trials in all directions—of divergent variation of conduct—and survival of the best in useful habits, which are again finally embodied by inheritance in instincts; while the acquirement of man is the result of creative, purposeful thought. It may, indeed, be hard to draw sharply and clearly the line of distinction between the blindly experimenting intelligence of animals and the thought-

ful intelligence of man, and all the more so because there is so much of the animal kind in man himself ; but there is undoubtedly in man a wholly characteristic element, small it may be at first, but constituting a new departure with infinite consequences. We will attempt, very briefly, to suggest the nature of this new element.

Perhaps it may be put in one word, thus : Animals perceive objects or things only ; man perceives also the relations and properties of things as abstracted from the things themselves, and thus forms conceptions or general ideas. Comparing with art : As there is a sense-pleasure (nerve-thrilling) and an intellect-pleasure (soul-thrilling), so there is a sense-perception and an intellect-perception (*conception*), and all rational knowledge is founded on the latter. Or again, comparing with language : As rational language is based on the capacity of perceiving the power of words in relation to each other, and therefore, also, the meaning of words expressing such relations, so rational knowledge is based on the perception of such relations and properties abstracted from the things themselves, and must therefore precede rational language. *External, actual* things are the objects of *sense* ; properties, relations, *internal, ideal* things are the objects of *thought*. And this is only the lowest plane of thought, for the thoughts themselves about these relations and properties become in their turn the objects of thought. Thus in the realm of thought also, there is a human life and a higher life. In a word, animals perceive *things* only ; or if, in some sense, relations and properties also, only as embodied in,—as belonging to,—never as abstracted from, the things. Man perceives not only the things, and not only relations and properties as embodied in things, but also abstracts such relations and properties from the things, and considers them separately. Animals *have* *percepts* only ; man *forms, creates, concepts* also. And such concepts being not *given*, but *created* by him, there is no limit to their number and variety. They become more and more general, more and more complex, more and more abstract, as we rise higher and higher in the scale of reason. Now, since all true knowledge is based on concepts or ideas only, it is evident that what seems like knowledge and wise conduct in animals is blind instinct, which is in its turn but the inherited sum of the re-

sults of divergent purposeless trials, and never the abstraction of general ideas applicable beyond the limits of actual experience. In other words, in all knowledge there are two elements, an external and an internal. Nature through sense furnishes the materials; mind by thought shapes, lays, and cements these according to a plan or idea in the mind. Now, animals are the absolute slaves of sense; with them there is no creative work of mind. Of the elements of knowledge they have but one: they have materials, but no builder, and therefore no edifice of knowledge; or if a seeming edifice, *it grew, was not built.*

5. IMAGINATION.

I think from the preceding we may assert that animals only *re-present* in the mind as *images* what had already been *presented* to it in *experience*. In them, therefore, there is only slavish reproduction of experience. There cannot, therefore, be in them any real, i.e. *creative*, imagination. It is true that man also is absolutely limited to experience for the materials out of which he makes pictures by the imagination; but *only for the materials*. These materials he combines in an infinite variety of ways, and thus *composes* pictures which never existed either in his own or in any other experience. No such creation of pictures by new and original combination of materials, it is believed, ever occurs in animals. But it will be objected, Do not animals, dogs for example, dream, and are not dreams pure creations of the imagination? I answer, Tho we cannot enter into their consciousness, and therefore into the nature of their dreams, I think we may be sure that nothing appears in their dreams which had not already appeared in their experience. In their dreams they merely again go through all the exciting details of the chase previously enjoyed. On the contrary the dreams of man tho they are compounded out of materials furnished by experience, these materials are united in an infinite variety of ways to form new and often improbable combinations—are woven into strange and fantastic patterns. Human imagination is therefore literally *creative*. The power of making new combinations, of *creating* pictures by the imagination waking or sleeping, is essentially characteristic of man; the power of combining these with beautiful result is characteristic of

Genius. It is this alone which makes the artist. If, then, creative imagination be characteristic of man, how much more must the higher form of creative imagination and its beautiful result, fine art, be also characteristic of him!

Reveries are but waking dreams. In a waking state, also, we may exercise the creative imagination in constructing fantastic and improbable pictures; only in this case we recognize them as subjective creations, not mistake them for objective realities as we do in dreams. We build castles in the air both dreaming and waking; but in the latter case we recognize their unsubstantiality. Now if we are right in what precedes, then *reverie* is also characteristic of man. But if *reverie*, then also *hope*; and if *hope*, then also true *memory*, is characteristic of man. Animals live wholly *in the present*; man alone, also in the past and future. If it be objected that animals *profit* by experience and therefore must have memory, I answer, So, also, many of them provide for the future, and yet, obviously, they cannot have any idea of the future. As provision for the future is, in them, only conduct without purpose continued from generation to generation because the result is good, and therefore, in the struggle for life, prevails over other conduct—a mere survival of the fittest conduct in the (to them) purposeless struggle for life—even so, memory with them is only *apparent*, not real. They profit by experience; yet I suppose such experience does not appear to them as localized in the *past*, but as present, as in their dreams. The *representation* or reproduction of a past experience is to them, I imagine, almost, if not quite, *like a present reality*. The law of struggle and survival has determined their conduct in wisdom without any real, wise purpose on their part. We will allude to this again under another head, and therefore dismiss it now.

We have used for our illustrations the phenomena of dreams and reverie because we have in these the simplest operations of the imagination according to its own laws, unchecked and unguided by reason, thought, or will. Rational, thoughtful imagination is far more complex in its operations and in its results. It is this which produces art, both useful and fine. These, therefore, must be characteristic of man.

One pregnant thought we throw out by the way, and pass

on. If animals live wholly in the present—if to live not only in the present but also in the past and the future be characteristic of man, then the elevation of man to higher and higher planes must be by increase of his life in the past and future; and he reaches his ideal when past, present, and future are combined as equal elements in his being.

6. CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

External objects affect the sense-organs. The impression is carried as a vibratory thrill along the sensory fibres to the nerve-centres, and determine there certain physical changes which in their turn determine, how we know not, changes in consciousness which we call sensations, perceptions, images, etc. Immediately there is set up a return-series of changes: change in the consciousness which we call Will, physical change in the nerve-centres, vibratory thrill along the motor-fibres, contraction of the muscles, movement of the limbs, changes in the phenomena of the external world. Thus through the nerve-system, with its receptive organs, the senses, and its executive organs, the muscles, is established action and reaction between an outer and an inner world. In animals this is absolutely all. But in man there is something more. The sensations, pleasurable or painful, the perceptions, images, ideas, etc., thus produced, become themselves the objects of thought (reflection). Still more: the mysterious self in which inheres feeling, consciousness, and thought, becomes itself the object of consciousness and thought (self-consciousness). Thus there is a consciousness the objects of which are the facts of the external world; and there is also an inner consciousness the objects of which are the facts of consciousness. There is a consciousness, and a consciousness of consciousness—a consciousness in the second degree. There is a sanctuary and an inner sanctuary of consciousness. Now it is this higher, inner consciousness, this consciousness in the second degree, this consciousness of self, which is the characteristic of man. In the history of every child there is a time when self-consciousness emerges or is born out of mere animal consciousness. At that moment, it seems to me, the child rises from the animal into the human plane of existence.

I remember with great distinctness the time when the con-

sciousness of *self* first became clearly present to my mind, and the sense of mystery, the wonder, the awe, it produced. I well remember the difficulty of imagining that others felt as I did this infinite mystery of *selfhood*. With this, also, undoubtedly comes the sense of *personal identity*, and therefore of continuous personal history, and therefore, also, *true memory*. It may seem strange and paradoxical, but, as I have already said, I do not believe that animals have what we know as memory. Images of previous experiences are certainly reproduced to their minds and determine appropriate action corresponding; but the idea of personal identity, and therefore of these experiences as belonging to a self existing at a previous time, is, I believe, not possible. A sense of continuous history, and therefore a true memory, is impossible. The proof of this is, I think, found in the observation of the phenomena of infants, taken in connection with the facts of our own remembered history. There can be no doubt, as shown by Preyer,¹ that the child a year old is already farther advanced than any, even the highest, animal. Yet such a child has no consciousness of self, of personal identity, no true memory of experiences as belonging to self, no sense of continuous existence, and therefore no future or past, no memory or hopes. All this comes, according to my own experience, at the age of about three years, and therefore at a time when the child is very far raised above the condition of any known animal. If our view is correct, this is the reason why our remembered history extends back only to the age of about three years. It extends only over the period of self-conscious, rational, personal existence.

7. WILL AND FREE WILL.

The difference here is similar to the last, but even harder to draw the line of distinction, because there are many degrees of freedom with almost insensible gradations between. There is confessedly no question in philosophy more difficult than that of the freedom of the will. I shall not attempt, therefore, to define its exact nature, for this would be but a bootless task.

¹ Die Seele des Kindes. Beobachtung über die geistige Entwicklung des Menschen in den ersten Lebensjahre. Von W. Preyer. Leipzig.

My attempt will be far less ambitious, but I believe more important—viz., to show the various degrees of freedom of animal conduct, and that the most marked of these degrees commences with man, and is therefore characteristic of him.

There are some, yea, many in these latter days, who cut the Gordian knot of this difficulty by asserting that there is no such thing, not only as *free* will, but as will of any kind, such as we imagine. They assert that the animal, yea, the human body with all its functions, physiological and psychological, is naught else but pure mechanism. The whole phenomenon of life is naught else but action and necessary reaction between the external world and nerve-centres. If the process is attended with consciousness, as it sometimes is, then we call the reaction *will*, but it is none the less necessary on that account. According to these philosophers, an animal or even man himself is a pure *automaton*, altho a *conscious* automaton—an automaton conscious of what is going on within, but wholly unable to modify the automatic phenomena. Consciousness is present, true, but not as a controlling agent, not as a force affecting the result; only a passive, helpless observer of phenomena. This view is presented in a masterly way by Prof. Huxley in his Dublin address.¹

To most persons, and I believe with reason, a sufficient answer to this view is found in an appeal to consciousness itself; but the competency of this witness is disallowed by the other party. In default of this appeal, the easiest answer, it seems to me, is the *reductio ad absurdum*. If consciousness be not a factor in the result of reaction of nerve-centres under the stimulus of sense-impressions, then would this result, viz., the conduct of animals, be precisely the same if there were no consciousness. This seems sufficiently incredible: but more remains. If consciousness and self-consciousness be not a factor in human conduct, then history or all the results of human activity, both individual and social, would have been precisely the same as we now find it, even tho there had never been any consciousness or self-consciousness at all. Society would have progressed; wars, revolutions, and parliamentary debates would have occurred:

¹ *Nature*, vol. x. (1874) p. 362.

telegraphs, cotton-mills, and railways would have been built; masterpieces of poetry, painting, and music would have been achieved; science, philosophy, and religion would have arisen and blessed mankind; in fine, all the details of work done, and every word written or spoken, would have been precisely the same, even tho man had been all along, and were still, entirely unconscious of what was going on. Man's body and mind, and human society, according to this view, are each a wonderful complicated engine rushing along at rapid rate without engineer except necessity, law, first cause, or what not. Consciousness is on the engine, true, but only as passenger, not as engineer: altho understanding clearly and sympathizing deeply with every movement, tho affected with joy or grief, with hope or terror, wholly unable to modify in the least the course of events. Everything happens by necessity, and would happen just the same even tho consciousness were not present! It seems to me impossible that any sane mind unsophisticated by metaphysical subtleties and fully realizing the logical consequences of this view, can maintain it. Consciousness *must* be a factor determining the course of conduct, even in animals; much more in man.

And yet, certainly, most complicated and wonderful machinery in the animal and human body works perfectly without consciousness. Complex, delicately adjusted, and appropriate purposive work goes on without conscious engineer. Here is the difficulty. How shall we explain it?

The animal body, as already said, is an apparatus for action and reaction between the external and the internal world; but there are many degrees in *the freedom of the reaction*. In its simplest and most automatic form the steps of the process are briefly as follows: *Action*—*a*, sense-impression; *b*, centripetal transmission; *c*, change in the nerve-centre. *Reaction*—*d*, centrifugal transmission; *e*, muscular contraction; *f*, change in external phenomena. In the simplest case this is all. Thus, if the centre be the *spinal cord*, or the medulla oblongata, action is followed by reaction with certainty and precision, and the most complex movements may be perfectly and yet wholly unconsciously performed. The whole series is in the domain of *physiology*. But if the centre be the *cerebrum*, then at least two

more links are added to the chain from the domain of *psychology*. The incoming current determines changes not only in the brain, but also in *consciousness*, as sensation, perception, etc.; and the outgoing current is started not by brain-changes only, but by the *will*. Now if the incoming current started by external impression is followed immediately and automatically, like the rebounding of a ball, by the outgoing current determining movement, and without the intervention of consciousness, we call the movement *reflex*. On the contrary, if changes in consciousness and will intervene and control the result, then we call the movement *voluntary*. We are not to suppose, however, that the nerve-systems which determine these two kinds of movements act separately, one in one, the other in another, portion of the body. On the contrary, the reflex system operates in every part and in all animals, the conscio-voluntary being super-added in some of the movements of the higher animals and then assumes control. In these cases the reflex underlies and conditions, the conscio-voluntary stands above and dominates. If the conscio-voluntary be paralyzed, or its activity be withdrawn by sleep or coma, then the reflex is far more distinctly and universally operative.

Thus, then, there are two primary and strongly contrasted groups of animal movements, the reflex or automatic, and the voluntary. But there are gradations in each approaching the other. In the reflex group there are: 1. Purely automatic movements wholly withdrawn from consciousness and will. Movements of the alimentary canal, of the heart, etc., come under this head. 2. Movements withdrawn from will, but not from consciousness. Such are the movements of swallowing, coughing, sneezing, etc. 3. Movements attended with consciousness and *partly* affected by the will. Such are the movements of breathing, etc.—So also, on the other hand, voluntary movements are of various grades approaching the reflex. 1. Movements which are perfectly voluntary—*deliberate* movements requiring the whole attention, and in some cases of complex movements even painful attention. Such are nearly all movements performed for the first time. 2. *Habitual* movements. These require only a *dim* consciousness and a *general* superintendence of the will. They are withdrawn from the undivided

attention, and are therefore semi-automatic. Ordinarily they go on without decided consciousness or direct control of the will; but if anything goes wrong, consciousness and will quickly intervene to rectify, and again they relapse into semi-automatism. Walking, flying, speaking, writing, playing on a musical instrument, come under this head. These at first belonged to the first class, but were rendered easy by frequent repetition; they are therefore acquired by individual experience. 3. *Instructive movements*. These are more nearly automatic. They are the result not of individual experience, but of ancestral experience inherited. They are therefore withdrawn from individual experience in their formation, but not from consciousness, nor wholly from will. 4. Reflex or automatic movements. These are finally withdrawn from consciousness and will, but in various degrees, as already seen.

Now all these kinds of movements belong to animals as well as to man, altho the first or deliberately voluntary only to a very limited extent, and only in the incipency of the formation of habits and instincts. Nearly all the so-called voluntary acts of animals are habitual or instinctive, determined by impulses, not by motives. But there is in man still another and higher form of activity not yet mentioned, viz., that in which consequences, especially moral consequences, are presented to the mind and weighed: when impulses, solicitations, motives, are weighed one against another; when all these mental conditions become themselves in their turn the objects of conscious thought, and we feel distinctly conscious that we ourselves determine, and are therefore responsible for, the final result; that we are undoubted umpire and hold the balance. The determining force in this case is will in a *higher, freer* sense. This is the free will characteristic of man. No such weighing of motives (if motives there be at all in them, and not mere impulses), no such reflection on motives as objects of thought, exists, or can possibly exist, in animals. We call it *free* will, not because it is absolutely free and unconditioned, but because it is free in relation to any other and lower form of will. As already said, there are many degrees of freedom of activity. Instinctive acts are free in relation to reflex; habitual acts are free in comparison with instinctive, and deliberate acts of animals are free in

relation to habitual. So, also, self-determined moral acts are free in relation to all other lower forms. Thus there is a gradually increasing freedom of activity as we go up the animal scale. The increase between animals and man is an immense one, so great that we may well speak of the will of man alone as free. But perfect unconditioned freedom of will belongs to God alone.

Finally: We have already in several departments shown that there is a human plane and a higher human plane; that there is a human life as distinguished from animal life, and a higher human life as distinguished from a lower. So is it here, also. There is a free will distinguishing man from animals, and a freer will distinguishing a higher from a lower type of manhood. There is a free will—which is free only in the sense of *self-determined* and therefore morally responsible, but is nevertheless *unwillingly restrained* by, and chafes against, the impassable bounds set about it by the all-embracing will of God, which is the perfect law of righteousness—and there is a freer will: freer because no longer restrained by law; because the law of righteousness is freely accepted as the law of its activity; because it moves in loving accord with the absolute will.

Out of the last two characteristics treated above, viz., self-consciousness and free will, grow the moral and religious nature of man. These, therefore, must be characteristic of man. In fact, they are the most obvious of all characteristics. We do not count these among the essentials, only because they so obviously flow from the simpler elements given above.

Now, of the seven characteristics of man enumerated above, which is most fundamental and essential? Which, if any, underlies, determines, and includes all the others? Some have thought that the use of language is that essential characteristic from which all others flowed.¹ But it is quite evident that ideas must precede at least *rational* language, as defined in the early part of this article; the perception of relations and properties abstracted from things must precede the use of words expressing these abstractions. In the history of every child, abstract

¹ Lloyd Morgan, *Nature*, vol. xxvi. (1882) p. 523.

ideas are formed before the words expressing them are used. On this account others, with much more show of reason, have regarded thought as most fundamental—the power of abstraction; the power of forming general ideas abstracted from things. This is undoubtedly more fundamental than the other, but it seems to me there is still another more fundamental than these—than all—viz., *self-consciousness*. This is the most comprehensive and most fundamental of all abstractions. The recognition of self as separate from psychical phenomena is *the* abstraction which includes and determines all other abstractions, and therefore, also, the possibility of rational speech, rational art, and all else characteristic of man. Properties and relations have no *real* existence apart from things; and yet we must think of them as so existing, for they are the necessary material of thought. Why is this? Why, but that *one* most fundamental abstraction in which all other abstractions inhere *is indeed a reality*. The consciousness of *self* is the recognition of *the* reality of which all other abstractions are but the signs and shadows—a true *reality of spirit*, which underlies and gives potency to all other abstractions and ideas. In this fact we find the foundation of a true realism, or rather a true reconciliation of realism and nominalism.

But self-consciousness is but the necessary result, and therefore the sure sign, of the *completion of spirit-individuality*, or personality. In a word, the view which I presented in my article on “Man’s Place in Nature”¹—that spirit alone is essential energy, that what we call the physical and chemical forces of nature are different forms of Divine energy immanent in nature in a generalized condition, and that throughout the whole geological history of the earth there has been a progressive individuation of spirit, first as the vital principle of plants, then as the anima of animals, until at last completed in man—explains all the phenomena as no other can. According to this view, it will be remembered, the anima of animals is spirit in embryo fast asleep in the womb of nature, unconscious of self and incapable of life separate from gross matter. In man, spirit came to birth as a distinct entity, capable of independent life, with the sudden

¹ PRINCETON REVIEW for November, 1878.

awakening of new and higher spiritual senses. This view, as I have already shown, completely explains the close resemblance in every faculty, and yet the infinite difference, between man and animals. It completely explains the significance of human life, and makes entirely reasonable our hope of immortality.

JOSEPH LECONTE.

LAND-OWNER AND FARMER IN ENGLAND.

THE agricultural interests have during the past few years received an unusually large share of attention in England, and numerous plans for modifying the laws and customs relating to owning, transferring, and renting land have been discussed by the press, on the platform, and in Parliament. Undoubtedly the poor crops have been the most important cause of the depression that has led to these discussions. There had occasionally been a series of years when the crops were very poor, but there is no record of any such long succession of years unfavorable to the farmers as that which has just occurred. Four of the six years following 1872 yielded crops much below the average, while the crop of 1879 is said to have been the poorest since 1816, yielding less than half the average. Since 1879 the harvests have been better, altho by no means averaging the yield of the years preceding this disastrous series. So many poor crops in such quick succession could hardly fail to produce distress in any circumstances. In former times, however, when the crops were short, prices rose, and the farmer often made up in part for the smaller quantity that he had to sell by getting a higher price than usual. In view of this fact it has been said that "the years of plenty in the olden time were years of agricultural distress, and the years of scarcity years of agricultural prosperity." But now foreign supplies are so abundant and cheap that when crops are poor prices do not increase. On the contrary, in bad seasons the quality of the home product is often poorer than usual, and the farmer is compelled to take a lower price per bushel for it than for the ordinary good quality produced in a good season. With cheap and easy transportation to all parts of the world, farmers everywhere will

suffer more than formerly from a partial failure of crops. The farmers in the eastern part of this country have suffered hardship from this cause. While there are some who hold that the interests of English farmers will not be permanently affected by American competition, but that "a few seasons of sunshine will remove the depression," there is a pretty widespread conviction among the more intelligent Englishmen that the cheap products of our well-nigh boundless wheat-fields will continue to be a formidable obstacle to the success of the English farmer. In one of his Midlothian speeches four years ago Mr. Gladstone characterized the struggle which the farmer has to undergo as "a struggle of competition with the United States." The Agricultural Commissioners, in their report made after taking a great deal of testimony, say that, "Next to unfavorable seasons, foreign competition is alleged to have produced the most disastrous results. Altho it is suggested that, notwithstanding foreign competition, British farmers will be able to hold their own, and that the alarm at the competition has subsided in a great measure lately, yet the preponderance of opinion is in accordance with the view that foreign competition must be reckoned upon in the future as permanently affecting the price of British agricultural produce." I have frequently heard similar views expressed by English farmers. Germany, Austria, and other continental nations also feel the pressure from American competition, and their statesmen and economists have suggested various means of relief. Dr. Alexander Peez, a member of the Austrian Reichsrath, in a pamphlet which has been quoted at length in a special report of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, strongly urges the necessity of a combination among the other states of Europe to protect themselves against the manufacturing and commercial enterprise of Great Britain and the enormous grain importations from Russia and America. Some of the German writers and statesmen advocate a similar course. Others urge the necessity of the utmost care and energy, with the best scientific skill and money-saving machinery, and that government aid be given, particularly in fixing very low rates for transportation of agricultural products and in controlling the forests, so as to improve the climate. The prospects are that with the further opening up of extensive wheat-fields in the

United States and Canada, with the increase of wheat-growing in India and Africa and better facilities for transportation, foreign competition may exert a still more hurtful influence on English agriculture. With a constant and abundant supply at low prices there will undoubtedly be a much greater consumption. As our population increases we shall need more grain for home consumption, and there will no doubt come a time when the cost of production will be greater. It will, however, be hard for the countries which find it necessary to keep large armies and navies and expensive government establishments, involving high taxes, and in which the capital invested in land is very great in proportion to the area, to compete with the United States, where taxes are likely to be very low and land very cheap for many years to come.

The wisest English statesmen and farmers realize the necessity of adapting their agricultural system to these new conditions which foreign competition has created. The discovery of the best methods of farming by assiduous experimentation, the use of the greatest skill and economy, the reduction of taxes on agricultural interests, and the substitution of the raising of fruits, vegetables, milk, butter, poultry, and flowers for grain are strongly urged as means of relief. Protection for English farmers against American farm-products has in recent years been frequently advocated in newspapers and in speeches before constituents and in Parliament. These proposals, however, have not met with general favor. In a country where the great majority of the people are in some way concerned in manufacturing and commercial pursuits, it is of the utmost importance that there should always be a good supply of food at low prices. One of the chief reasons for the repeal of the corn-laws was the conviction that, in order to do the manufacturing and trading of the world, England must always be able to get cheap and abundant supplies of food for her people. England is therefore not likely to put a tariff on grain, however desirable such action may seem to her farmers in their distress.

Besides the bad weather and foreign competition, the hardships of the English farmer have been increased by the higher rents and wages that he has been compelled to pay. Estimates made by a writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, based on the con-

clusions of Mr. Giffen and Sir James Caird, and apparently reliable, place the average loss from diminished production for the three years 1877-9, as compared with the three years 1867-9, at £18,000,000, the loss from the fall of prices at £14,000,000, from increase of rent at £5,000,000, and from rise of wages at £5,000,000, making a total loss of £42,000,000 for each year. Of the average value of agricultural products, which is put at £260,000,000, £70,000,000 are said to go to the landlords as rent, and £138,000,000 to labor, fertilizers, and other expenses, leaving £52,000,000 to the farmers as their profits. It is thought that two thirds of the entire £42,000,000 lost each year was borne by the tenants, the landlords allowing an abatement of rent equal to the remaining third. The farmers would, according to this estimate, lose £28,000,000, or considerably more than half their profit, each year. As results of these losses through these years many of the farmers have become bankrupt or deeply involved in debt, a large number have been compelled to quit the business, and large tracts of land are now allowed to lie uncultivated for lack of farmers who will occupy them even at a very low rent.

In view of this state of things there have been frequent demands for changes in the system of land-owning and farming. There is a disposition to charge much of the depression to the peculiarities of this system, which, as is well known, differs greatly from those in vogue in other civilized countries. In this country we have a large number of small farms, commonly farmed by the owners, and the transfer of land is effected cheaply and easily. This general distribution of land we are accustomed to regard as a great good for the people and the country. The consciousness of ownership begets a feeling of manly independence, fosters a patriotic conservatism in politics, and incites the farmers to use the greatest industry and economy.

There has been during the present century a general tendency throughout Europe to subdivision of land and to peasant-proprietorship. Much has been said about the results of this tendency in France. The provisions of the *Côte Napoléon* have compelled the breaking up of the larger estates and led to the somewhat minute distribution of landed property. The law provides that a testator with one child may dispose of one

half, with two children of one third, with three children of one fourth, of his property, and that the remainder, or in case of intestacy the entire property, shall be divided equally among all the children. The result is that many of the farms are quite small. About one third of the land in the country is divided into small lots averaging about seven and one half acres, another third into larger tracts averaging about fifty acres, and the remaining third into large farms averaging seven hundred and fifty acres. About one half the land is farmed by the owners. During the last fifty years the value of agricultural products in France has increased much more rapidly than in England. This increase has been mainly on the smaller farms, and can without doubt be attributed chiefly to the general introduction of the system under which the land is owned by those who till it. While there are some who claim that many of these small peasant-proprietors are in a wretched condition, the advocates of peasant-proprietorship for Ireland and England point with great confidence to the results of the French system. In Prussia and the North-German Confederation there is a similar tendency to subdivision, produced chiefly by legal provisions relating to the descent of lands similar to those of the French code. The design of these provisions was to distribute the land among a large number of people, and to raise a large body of day-laborers to the rank of peasant-proprietors. The result has fulfilled the expectations of the legislators. In the Rhine provinces and in Westphalia the subdivision has been carried so far that each proprietor owns on an average only ten acres. The land there is in a very high state of cultivation. "The Palatinate peasant," says Dr. Morier, "cultivates his land more with the passion of an artist than the plodding spirit of a breadwinner." Of the 440,000 proprietors in Wurtemberg 160,000 have estates of more and 280,000 of less than five acres. In Austria the law favors a general distribution of land, and almost everywhere throughout the empire the farmers own their farms. In Switzerland and Belgium, and, tho not to the same extent, in Holland, there is a similar tendency to subdivision and peasant-proprietorship. The results of this tendency are generally admitted to have been beneficial to great numbers of the people in those

countries, elevating them from the rank of tenant or laborer to that of proprietor.

In England, on the other hand, there has been a tendency toward the concentration of land in the hands of a few owners. There are, it is true, small estates in England, but, like the large estates in the other countries of Europe, they are the exception and not the rule. According to the most reliable estimates there are in England and Wales a little more than 150,000 proprietors, having more than half an acre each; nearly one half the land is owned by 2250 proprietors, averaging more than 6000 acres each, and four fifths of it are in the hands of 7000 owners. The fondness of English gentlemen for country life, the pride in ancestral estates, and the social and political importance belonging to great land-owners often lead to the retention of great estates in the possession of families, and to their enlargement in cases where money might be more profitably invested in commerce or manufactures. The laws of primogeniture, settlement, and entail, and the great expense attending the transfer of land, have often kept large estates from being broken up. The law of primogeniture is nowhere else in general use, nor are entails and settlements so common in any other country as in England. It is impossible to ascertain just how much of the land of England is under settlement, but reliable estimates place it at from one half to three fourths of the whole. In these cases the free sale of the property has been impossible, and the landlord, having only a life-estate in it, has not had the same incentives, and often not the same power, as an absolute owner to make improvements. Entails and settlements have often prevented the making of long leases and caused the more general introduction of yearly tenancies. Progressive English statesmen have long regarded them with disfavor, and there have been a number of enactments providing for cutting off the entails under certain conditions, and for increasing the powers of limited owners. The Settled Land Act, passed in 1882, is the most recent and one of the most important of these enactments. It gives tenants for life power to sell any portion of the land with the exception of the family mansion. Mr. Shaw Lefevre says of this Act: "It has, in fact, thoroughly undermined the principle on which primogeniture and family entails are founded.

When land and personalty under settlement have no longer any practical distinction and can be converted the one into the other by the tenant for life, the legal distinction between them cannot long be defended. . . . When, also, it comes to be thoroughly understood that, no matter how the landed property may be tied up, or how great the desire of the settler or testator to keep the land in the family and to put it beyond the danger of dispersion, his next heir, immediately on coming into possession, may sell it and convert it into personalty, and that it is impossible, therefore, to secure the preservation of family property from conversion into personalty by the temporary owner, it is certain that a great change of opinion will occur in the family view of such arrangements." While there is no doubt that hereafter there will be more of a tendency to sell and distribute land, still family pride in ancestral estates, and social and political reasons, and the trouble and expense of conveyancing will continue for some time to be great obstacles to the dispersion of great estates.

Only a small portion of the soil of England is cultivated by the owners. Even where the farming is nominally done by the owner, it is often in reality entirely in charge of a bailiff, and carried on for purposes of experimentation or fancy stock-raising instead of grain-growing. While a few of the tenants hold under leases, the majority hold from year to year. The history of the rise of these yearly tenancies and of their substitution for leases and tenancies at will is very interesting, but beyond the limits of this article. While almost all the tenancies are from year to year, in the great majority of cases tenants live on the same farms for many years, often for their whole lives, and not unfrequently their sons are their successors. The landlords commonly make and maintain all the permanent improvements. Many estates are well managed, the improvements wisely made, and the most approved methods of farming, the results of the latest scientific experiments, and the best money-saving implements are used. On the other hand, landlords are sometimes careless in regard to making improvements. Entails and settlements giving landlords only life-estates and preventing the sale of any portion of the land for the purpose of properly improving the remainder have often prevented

landlords who were in straitened circumstances from making greatly needed improvements. In these cases the tenant must build the houses, barns, and fences, drain the land, and make and keep up the other improvements or suffer greatly from the lack of them. Where the best methods of farming are in use, there is always a large outlay by the tenant of money and labor in boning, liming, chalking, manuring, or fertilizing in some other way. The increased productiveness resulting from such investments often continues for many years and adds greatly to the value of the farm. If soon after the tenant has expended a large sum in this way his tenancy should be terminated, he would lose the greater part of his investment. In some parts of the country it had long been the custom for the landlord to pay the tenant for these unexhausted improvements. In most places, however, there was no such custom. When there was a possibility that a notice to quit might be served, or the rent increased at any time, the tenant was often slow to invest his money in improvements which his landlord had a legal right to appropriate. The number of instances of hardship was probably not large, as the changes of tenancies were not frequent. The general effect, however, of this feature of the system was to prevent the making of needed improvements and to create discontent.

The failure of crops and the pressure from American competition increased the discontent, since the changes in tenancies and the instances of losses on the part of tenants became more numerous. While some of the inconveniences and losses and hardships which were really due to unfavorable weather or other causes have been attributed to the system of tenure, there has no doubt been good ground for some of the objections urged against it. The agitation and discussion in connection with the Irish land-laws called the attention of the English tenants repeatedly and emphatically, and at a time when they were suffering severe hardships from several causes, to those features of their system which presented grounds of complaint similar to those from which the chief complaints of the Irish tenants arose. The greatest grievance of the Irish tenant was that he was forced to make and maintain all the improvements, and that his landlord could virtually appropriate them at any time by

increasing the rent, or turn him out without giving him any compensation. True, custom and his landlord often allowed him to sell his interest, but he had no legal right to do so. The law of 1870 gave him, on quitting his holding, a right to compensation for his improvements, and also to compensation for disturbance, when forced to leave by his landlord. It did not, however, provide against the landlord's so increasing the rent as virtually to appropriate the entire value of his improvements. The Act of 1881 remedied this by providing a court that should fix a fair rent to stand for fifteen years. The tenant's interests—his right to live on and farm the land indefinitely at a fixed fair rent, and his right to his improvements—were recognized and secured to him. He can now use and enjoy or sell them for the best price he can get for them. The law even goes further, and proposes to lend the tenant three fourths of the purchase-money, if he wishes to buy the landlord's interest in this quasi-partnership. To the English tenant, thoroughly familiar with the discussions which led to these results, increase of rent, notice to quit after a long tenancy, and the power of the landlord to appropriate improvements which he had made, became much more serious matters than before. Altho the conditions of his tenancy were in many respects entirely different from those of the Irish tenant, it was perhaps not unnatural that he should demand for himself the same rights that had been secured to the latter. There has accordingly been a rapidly growing demand in England for compensation for tenants' improvements, tenant-right, and peasant-proprietorship. Thus far, however, legislation has not made much progress in the direction of the last of these demands, altho it has gone far towards securing the first and has come to the verge of recognizing the second.

Long ago the law permitted the tenant who had left his holding to return for the crop which he had sowed but not yet harvested, so that he might not lose the just fruit of his investment of seed and labor. By and by it extended his right somewhat, and, in order that he might not incur loss or be put at disadvantage by the sudden termination of his tenancy, provided that he should have six months' notice to quit when his landlord wished to resume possession of the holding. In

process of time in many parts of the country there was added to these two legal rights, of possession for a certain period and of reaping the crop sowed before leaving, the customary right to compensation for unexhausted improvements. There were from time to time complaints of the injustice of the tenants' not having a legal right to such compensation. The Agricultural Holdings Act of 1875 was the first important step in the direction of remedying this grievance. The Act provided for compensation for certain classes of improvements under certain conditions, but, as it could be avoided by either landlord or tenant giving notice to the other within a definite period, and, as the great majority of the landlords availed themselves of this privilege, the results were disappointing to the tenants, and there was a general demand for a measure that should give them adequate security for their improvements. This demand was met by the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1883, which is similar to the Act of 1875, but goes considerably further.

Like its predecessor, it divides improvements into three classes. The first of these classes comprises (1) "Erection or enlargement of buildings, (2) Formation of silos, (3) Laying down of permanent pasture, (4) Making or planting of osier beds; (5) Making of water meadows or works of irrigation; (6) Making of gardens; (7) Making or improving of roads or bridges; (8) Making or improving of watercourses, ponds, wells, or reservoirs, or of works for the application of water-power, or for the supplying of water for agricultural or domestic purposes; (9) Making of fences; (10) Planting of hops; (11) Planting of orchards or fruit bushes; (12) Reclaiming of waste land; (13) Warping of land; (14) Embankments and sluices against floods." The improvements of this class are mostly such as affect the permanent character of the holding, and have commonly been made and maintained by the landlord, who still retains the right to make them, and cannot even under the act be compelled to give the tenant who makes them, without his consent, compensation. When the landlord does consent to the tenant's making them, he may make a different standard for compensation, from that provided by the Act. The non-compulsory feature of this portion of the Act is quite unsatisfactory to many of the tenants and land reformers. It has

been thought by some that the establishing of a legal standard of compensation, with ready means of applying it, will often lead landlords who wish to have their property improved but are unable to bear the expense and tenants who are able and willing to improve to consent and undertake to make improvements.

Drainage constitutes the second class of improvements. This has sometimes been done by the landlord, sometimes by the tenant. On large estates, comprising many farms and requiring extensive systems of drains, the landlords are commonly much more competent to undertake the work than the tenants, who occupy only portions of the estates. On the other hand, the experience of the tenant in tilling the soil often enables him to judge much better than the landlord of the need of such works, and the quick returns from them in increased harvests give him an immediate interest in making them. While they often change the character of the holding, they have a very close connection with the cultivation of the soil—the proper work of the tenant. The tenant therefore is given the right to make them or to secure their being made by the landlord. In order, however, that his claim for compensation may be good, he must, not less than two months nor more than three months before beginning to execute such improvements, give the landlord notice of his intention, and of the manner in which he proposes to execute the intended work. Upon such notice being given, the landlord and tenant may agree on the terms as to compensation on which the tenant shall do the work, or the landlord himself may make the improvements and charge the tenant an annual sum, not exceeding five per cent on the amount expended. If the landlord does not agree to give the tenant satisfactory compensation for executing the works, or execute them himself within a reasonable time, the tenant may proceed to make the improvements, and shall be entitled to compensation as provided by the Act.

Improvements of the third class consist of (1) "Boning of land with undissolved bones ; (2) Chalking of land ; (3) Clay burning ; (4) Claying of Land ; (5) Liming of land ; (6) Marling of land ; (7) Application to land of purchased artificial or other purchased manure ; and (8) Consumption on the holding by cattle or pigs of cake or other feeding stuff not produced on the holding."

These improvements are very intimately connected with the tenant's work of tilling the soil, and have usually been made by him. He finds the need of them more quickly, and can often make them more cheaply, than his landlord. They repay the money invested in them quicker than improvements of either of the other classes. Still it is often many years before they are exhausted; and this fact, in the absence of any legal right to compensation, has often prevented the tenant from making them, since he might be compelled to quit his holding while it contained a considerable portion of his capital. The law now allows the tenant to make improvements of this class without the consent of or notice to his landlord, and secures him compensation for whatever part of them remains unexhausted on quitting his holding.

The standard of compensation fixed is the value of the unexhausted improvements to an incoming tenant. There has been much diversity of opinion in regard to what would be the fairest standard for fixing the compensation. The act of 1875 made the cost of the improvements the basis, and deducted a certain per cent for each year that the tenant occupied the holding after they were made. After much discussion, the Irish Court of Appeals, in the famous case of *Adams vs. Dunseath*, much to the disappointment of many of the Irish tenants, decided that "improvements" under the Irish Land Law Act of 1881 meant "improvement works" and not the increased value of the holding caused by the improvements. These improvements the Irish tenant may sell for the best price he can get for them. It has been strongly urged that there ought to be included under the term improvements the increased value of the holding arising from energetic and careful farming as well as from improvement works. Good farming by careful and systematic methods often involves a considerable expenditure of money and labor, and adds far more to the value of the holding than some of the specific improvements provided for in the Act. It was with this view of the matter that the Farmers' Alliance, the strongest farmers' organization in England, urged that "any work or operation executed by a tenant upon a holding which adds to its letting value as a farm" should be considered an improvement. The Act of 1883 declares that the award of

compensation shall specify the several improvements, acts, and things in respect whereof compensation is awarded, the time at which each was done, and the sum awarded in respect of each, and that there shall not be taken into account as part of the improvement "what is justly due to the inherent capabilities of the soil." The amount of compensation may be fixed, by agreement, by arbitration or by the court. The tenant is entitled to compensation only on quitting his holding.

"The sitting tenant" has no right to compensation, nor any security against such an increase of rent as will render his improvements practically valueless to him. He may quit when an increase of rent is proposed, but moving is expensive and troublesome, and he will often prefer to pay more rent rather than undergo the trouble and expense involved by moving. The failure of the Irish Land Law of 1870 to provide against a similar increase of rent was, as we have seen, supplied by the provision of the Act of 1881 establishing a court that should fix a fair rent. The Farmers' Alliance has taken advanced ground in regard to this matter, and declared its purpose to secure a system of judicial rents for the tenant-farmers of England. Most English statesmen, however, shrink from the adoption of judicial rents and the principle of quasi-partnership which they imply. Neither of the great political parties has yet ventured to favor the movement which is nevertheless growing in strength. Slight as the immediate prospects of its success appear, there is something quite significant in the tendency of legislation to recognize more and more rights as belonging to the tenant. This recent Act not only provides for compensation in the manner described, it has further secured the tenant against sudden interruption, by requiring the landlord to give him a year's notice to quit, and has reduced the landlord's power to distrain for six years' rent to the power to distrain for only one year's rent. It has, moreover, well-nigh completed the revolution in the old law of fixtures by which whatever was fixed to the soil became the property of the landlord. Contract and custom had often given the tenant his fixtures, and early in the eighteenth century he was allowed before leaving to remove fixtures set up by him purely for purposes of trade. An Act passed in 1851 allowed the tenant who had with the con-

sent of his landlord, erected buildings or machinery at his own cost to remove them. The Act of 1875 considerably extended this right and made the landlord's consent unnecessary. The Act of 1883 enacts that where a tenant affixes to his holding any engine, machinery, fencing, or other fixture, or erects any building for which he is not entitled to compensation under the Act or otherwise, or which has not been erected in pursuance of a contract or instead of some fixture or building belonging to the landlord, then such fixture or building shall be the property of and removable by the tenant. The landlord, who is to have a month's notice of the tenant's intention to remove the building or fixture, has the first right to purchase it, "paying the tenant the fair value thereof."

While in all the discussions in connection with this measure the government were careful to repudiate the idea that judicial rents would speedily follow the provisions of the Act, the discussions outside of Parliament and some other indications certainly point in that direction. A system of judicial rents would be very obnoxious to most land-owners, who would regard it as an unwarrantable interference with their right of ownership, and would be regarded by many who are not land-owners as altogether too great an interference with freedom of contract. The present Parliament, in passing the Irish Land Act, the Arrears of Rent Act, the Ground Game Act, and the Agricultural Holdings Act has, in the opinion of many, gone much too far in the direction of interfering with the freedom of contract. It remains to be seen whether, in view of further agricultural distress arising from bad seasons, foreign competition, and other causes, and of the growing feeling that public policy demands that the government encourage the best possible farming, and that to this end the tenant must have greater freedom, more entire control over his holding, and every encouragement to make all sorts of improvements, the opposition to judicial rents will be forced to yield. If the same causes which have brought about the recent legislation shall continue to operate, there will no doubt be still further and perhaps greater changes.

I have already referred to the increase of rent as an element in the recent distress. Sir James Caird has estimated the rise of rent in England for the past eighteen years at twenty-one per

cent. Mr. John Clay, in his special report in 1882, as a member of the Agricultural Commission, says: "The case is so urgent and pressing, that nothing less than a reduction of from twenty per cent to thirty per cent will save the present tenantry from ruin." It has been the custom in many parts of the country for the landlords to allow an abatement of rent on the partial failure of crops. The Civil Law provides that the produce of the farm shall exceed the rent, and that if the crop fails the landlord shall share the loss with the tenant. The somewhat primitive custom of farming on shares in vogue in many parts of this country has the same equitable principle as its basis. It would be natural to enact into a law the present custom of the landlord's allowing the tenant an abatement in the rent in bad seasons.

Any legislation that would still further interfere with the rights of owners and with freedom of contract would no doubt lead many landlords to sell their land, while others would prefer to manage their estates themselves rather than admit their tenants to a quasi partnership in the event of judicial rents being established. The dual ownership which would practically be established by a system of judicial rents is objectionable from almost every point of view. It may be said, however, that the Ulster Tenant Right, which is somewhat of this character, has on the whole worked well. Many of the tenants in England now pay their landlords as rent not more than from one and one half to three per cent on the money which the latter have invested in the land. If the tenants should undertake to borrow money to buy out the landlords they would have to pay a considerably higher rate than this for the money. It is a question, therefore, whether, so far as the tenants are concerned, it would not be better to have tenant-right with judicial rent than peasant-proprietorship. The general introduction of labor-saving machinery has made the minute subdivision of land for grain-growing purposes undesirable. The expense for machinery for a farm of two hundred acres is nothing like four times as great as for a farm of fifty acres. This consideration would seem to suggest that where grain raising is the chief thing it would be more desirable for a farmer with limited capital to own the tenant-right and the improvements on two hundred

acres than the fee-simple of fifty acres. It is a significant fact that during the past few years the number of small holdings in England has decreased while the large holdings have increased in number.

The proposals made by Mr. Henry George, Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace, and others, that the state shall take possession of all the land in the kingdom, paying the present owners no compensation or a comparatively small amount, letting out the land to the tenants, collecting the rents, and in general acting as landlord, attracted a good deal of attention among the laboring classes a few months ago, chiefly because of the brilliant way in which they were presented. No English statesman or economist, and no editor of any standing, has, however, taken them up; while all the political parties, even the Irish land reformers, have hastened to disclaim having any sympathy with them. They are evidently not yet within the range of practical politics. In fact the interest in them seems to have in a great measure subsided. The proposals to provide better dwellings for agricultural and other laborers, and to settle them on land with state funds, have much more support, and may shortly take some practical shape that may result in important legislation. If the Representation of the People Bill now before Parliament becomes a law, it will add to the 3,000,000 voters now in the United Kingdom upwards of 2,000,000 more, the great majority of whom are workingmen, and about 1,000,000 of whom are agricultural laborers. As Parliament is exceedingly sensitive to the desires of the constituencies, important results are certain to come from shifting so much of the balance of political power in the direction of these laborers.

DAVID B. KING.

MYSTICAL THEISM.

MYSTICISM is a symptom, rather than a philosophy. It is to be studied as a phenomenon, rather than analyzed as a truth. Science seeks its causes in psychology, rather than its foundation in logic. Yet the historical developments of mysticism have always been interesting. There is something very attractive in those strange theosophies of the East; like all Eastern jugglery, they fascinate us. We respect the struggles of the Eleatic. Plato the poet charms us even more than Plato the philosopher. We are, at least, amused by the many absurdities of Neo-Platonism and the puerilities of scholasticism. But there is something of the quiet worship of a cathedral in the aspirations of Spinoza. The constructive philosophy of the Absolute attracts us by its very difficulties, tho we turn away from it with a sad suspicion that we are growing stupid. And,—what is it, is it the July sun or—something else which makes us feel a little bewildered at Concord?

Varied feeling mysticism produces in us, because its phases are varied as feeling itself. It starts with feeling; it appeals to feeling; it ends in feeling. It is audaciously illogical and triumphantly inconsistent. It is the asylum of impotent intellect and lame logic. Shattered systems take refuge in it. Wounded argument crawls through its portal in search of narcotics. Sentiment, jarred by rough-edged fact, hides behind its heavy curtains, to dream its fancies into realities.

Even asylums may be architecturally beautiful. We use flowers in the sick-room and at funerals. Tombstones may be ornamental. There has been in mysticism much beauty and pathos. To many minds it is religion, and the whole of religion. To all minds it is a temptation. The wise psychologist will

treat it tenderly. Still, as a phenomenon, it belongs to the pathology of mind. It has no place in the material used in the construction of truth. Truth may stop with a mystery deep as eternity. Heaven itself may be the roof of its structure. But all foundation-work, to be reliable, must consist of blocks which are handled, and measured, and weighed. Logic is a science of definite measurement: it has all the heartlessness of mathematics. Feeling and aspiration have nothing more to do with its processes than a nightmare has with the tariff-bill. Are we gods, that our desires should create facts?

Psychology explains the mystical tendencies of certain minds and of certain nations. But when those tendencies work in constructive metaphysics, Logic calls a halt and demands a purification of material. Mysticism in the individual faith is well enough. Let it alone. Like any other reverie, it may give pleasure and may even be of use. But mysticism in Philosophy is a danger which threatens to undermine Science.

It is a disagreeable task to criticise the arguments of those whose conclusions are your own. Nothing but a firm conviction that the mystical method of theistic proof will inevitably produce more evil than good would justify the present attempt to show the weakness and the danger of that method. An illogical faith in God is better than no faith at all, if it leads to the desired practical results; for religion, after all, is life, rather than logic. The question, then, need not concern him who already believes.

But the unbeliever—what shall we say to him? The poor in faith, like the poor in purse, are always with us. We find the unbeliever everywhere. He is always ready to argue; but he is equipped with an argument of his own, which claims to be scientific. He is frequently honest and open to conviction; but he demands, with right, that you shall meet his science with science and prove yours to be the better.

The argument against the existence of a personal God, as presented to-day, is a scientific one. It has escaped from the cynicism of French wit. It has outgrown the crudeness of British egotism. It is no longer made ridiculous by the metaphysical ignorance of the laboratory. It comes to the questioning mind, to the college-student, from the lips and pens of men

of pure life, of honest purpose, of keen judgment, of scientific method, of attractive expression. To many a young man it comes as a revelation, a science of fact, and a fact of science. What have you to say, Christian preachers and teachers? Is there a God? Show him to us.

This is the fundamental problem of modern science, as it is the central question of human life. It is the live question of the day; and the conflict is a battle of giants. Systems clash with systems. A superficial analysis, a silly illustration, a careless statement, a weak argument, on either side, is aid and comfort to the enemy. Have we time to waste in dallying with mysteries, and playing with rosaries, and kissing relics? Is there a God? It is a simple question of fact. Worse than useless is the attempt to bewilder the questioner with unintelligible mutterings. We must give him clear-cut common-sense, or, whatever they may be to us, our rhapsodies are, to him, hysterics.

The first principle, then, which we would urge is that the modern theistic argument, to be successful, must be *scientific*. We cannot now compel belief. Even our little social inquisition serves us no longer; and socially, as well as politically, man is free to think. Theism is put upon the defensive by the attack of science. It must meet that attack of science upon the ground of science, and with the weapons of science, and to the satisfaction of science, or else it must go under. Faith may be beautiful, sublime; but if faith is all, science will coolly explain it on principles of heredity, tradition, early education, prejudice, and will quietly plod along by it as the pedestrian in the Alps passes by the crucifix at the roadside,—relic of an ancient and curious epidemic of superstition.

Science is right in refusing to take the trouble even to investigate the clairvoyant who begins by turning off the gas and hiding behind a curtain. So, too, when science, asking the fair question "Is there a God?" is told that "the existence of God cannot be proved," and that "we can know God only through God," why should it try to masticate the stone given to it in the place of bread? The questioner asks for proof of a fact. We cannot blame him if he refuses to accept as proof a figure of speech. The theism of the future must be a science, commanding respect in the brotherhood of sciences, or else take its

place in the museum, by the side of idol-worship and witchcraft.

Again, modern theism can be scientific only as it is *logical*. Science *is* logic. It is the inference of facts from facts by legitimate method. It has established canons which must not be ignored. Non-logical theism is illogical theism; and illogical theism is superstition. It may satisfy the believer. Superstitions generally do. But, beyond the mystic circle of the few who believe because they believe, such theism has no force of conviction, because it lacks the first principle of conviction. If we cannot logically prove the fact of a God, there is no God to the greater part of the race to-day, and to the whole of the race a hundred years from now. Is there a God? It is not the question of sin, or of prejudice, or of ignorance. It is the natural question of the honest mind, which demands *reason* for its belief.

Further, the theistic argument, to be logical, must have *facts* for its major premise. One may sail with reasonable accuracy by dead reckoning. But to do it he must start from a definite, well-known point. Put the sailor suddenly into an unknown somewhere in the middle of the ocean, and log and compass and logarithms are of little use to him. It is an axiom of science and of sense that we can reason to facts only from facts. We might as well use the paper of a plumber's bill in the place of lead pipe and expect water to come from it, as to try to prove the fact of a God by an appeal to fancy and to metaphor. We can construct a reality only upon a reality. A God is certain only as the argument for a God starts from a certainty.

But, again, a logical argument for a God must be based upon facts which are *definite*, *intelligible*, and *defensible*. There is no use in arguing with a man unless you and he can start out from common ground. To secure the acceptance of your major premise is the first step in conviction. No matter whether that premise is true to you or not, it is of no use in the argument unless it is true to your opponent. If he cannot understand what it is, or, understanding, denies that it is, your subsequent reasoning is a mere waste of time. To that man you can never prove your conclusion from that premise. We do not need to prove the fact of a God to the man who already knows that there is a

God. But to him who fairly questions, we can prove this ultimate fact only by starting with other facts which he understands and admits.

And this leads us to the assertion that *mystical feeling* can never be a satisfactory ground for belief in scientific theism.

It is a discouraging task to try to extract the truth from Father Malebranche's famous doctrine of "Vision in God." With French perspicuity he carries us up to it; with ornate rhetoric he enounces it; and then, just as we are prepared to measure its length and breadth and depth with a logical yard-stick, its outlines become blurred and indistinct, and it fades away from our grasp like a half-remembered dream. When Arnault, the Dr. Bacon of that age, brought his merciless logic to bear upon the mystical doctrine, the priest of the Oratoire could meet him only with evasion and abuse.

Equally intangible has been this doctrine of Vision in God in all of its more recent phases. What is this ground of faith which is to be found in feeling? The German philosopher calls it a feeling of dependence. The German theologian claims to know God through God. To the English philologist it is, even in primitive man, a sense of the Infinite. In recent American theology it is an organic necessity: something given in the spiritual life to be realized in thought as belief.

Yet we encounter great difficulty as we seek to examine this mystical doctrine. The thing wriggles when we try to pin it down; it is almost impossible to grasp it firmly, and to hold it long enough to detect its species. The vagueness of such mysticism is its strength as well as its weakness. It fails of persuasive force, but, for the same reason, it has the self-protection of evasive slipperiness. We must "think ourselves through God first." It is hard to tell whether logic or psychology is the more helpless before such a statement.

In the attempt to analyze this doctrine we can, at least, avoid some confusion by setting aside the claim of an immediate intellectual apprehension of God. As we understand it, the disciples of Schleiermacher and of Dorner do not make this claim. If they should do so, it is enough to say that historical discussion has settled that point once for all. Anselm, and Descartes, and Dr. Clarke have done their best, and have failed to win a re-

spectful hearing for their *a priori* arguments. The Boston lecturer who talks of an "immanent idea of God" challenges the established verdict of centuries of psychological criticism. As a simple fact of mind, there is no such immanent idea: and that is the end of the discussion.

But the Sensibilities, we are told, have not been given their proper place in the theistic argument. Our theism is too much rationalized. We have neglected the "organic and dynamic" elements. Feelings are realities, not "states of mental temperature." Christian theology must explain the "formation of intellectual feelings into rational beliefs."

For the moment let us disregard the psychological vagueness of this. We might say, with Professor Flint, that "mere feeling is mere absurdity." But, admitting that there is some such mysterious feeling, in what possible way can it be used to establish the objective fact of the existence of a God? Either the feeling itself is God, or else God, as a fact, is an inference from the feeling as a fact. The first statement is too meaningless to admit of discussion. Only in the second part of the alternative can a justification of belief be found. What is its value as an argument?

If the appeal to feeling has any force in establishing the fact of a God, it must be by means of some such inference as this. This feeling of the Infinite, of dependence, of moral obligation, —whatever it is,—exists in man; therefore God, the objective correlate of this feeling, exists. But this is an inference; and an inference is a logical process; and a logical process is true or false as it satisfies or defies the established tests of legitimate reasoning. It is easy to say that the "belief in God is not founded, ultimately, on processes of argument." But subjective feeling can establish an objective fact only by a process of argument. The feeling itself must be established scientifically as a valid premise; and the inference to the objective fact must be defended as a valid process of argument. If this appeal to feeling cannot stand these tests, both in metaphysics and in practical life, it is of no more value, in convincing of the fact, than is the confidence of the maniac in the reality of his illusion. Logic has nothing to do with it, you say. It is higher than logic,—superior to the tests of reasoning. On the

contrary, logic has everything to do with it if it asserts an objective fact. The derailed engine, ploughing over ties and through the sand, is more trustworthy than the human feeling, which, plunging from the tracks of legitimate thought, precipitates itself upon facts. Feeling may establish a fact, as the fire in the locomotive may carry the train safely to its destination. But it must keep to the rails, to do it. We can test the value, then, of this appeal to feeling, in the theistic argument, only by the methods of established logic; and only as the process is verified by those methods can we have any confidence in the result.

The statement of the argument, as given above, is not an immediate inference, but is an enthymeme with a suppressed major premise. In full it would read somewhat as follows: Every natural feeling in man has its objective correlate in real existence. This feeling of God is a natural feeling in man. Therefore God, its objective correlate, really exists. To render this conclusion valid, both premises must be established as scientific facts. Is either premise true?

Properly qualified, the major premise may be true. But certain very explicit qualifications must be introduced; and, even then, the principle depends for its truth upon the very fact which it is here used to prove, namely, the existence of a wise Creator. To render the statement true, in any case, we must take the words "man" and "natural" in the broadest sense possible,—as involving absolute universality and absolute originality. And, even then, the argument falls into that most suspicious of all forms, the argument from analogy. Empirical psychology teaches us that certain feelings in man, as hunger, and the desire for society, are universal and original; and experience shows that, as a matter of fact, the correlates of those feelings, as food, and fellow-beings, are really existent. Hence we infer that other similar feelings probably have their own objective correlates, ready to satisfy them. This probability increases, of course, under the established principles of inductive method, as the number of verified cases in experience increases. But if we take a step beyond that,—as this argument must, to be of any value,—and assert that every universal and original feeling *must* have its correlate, the only reason which we can

urge for this statement of a general principle is that God is good and will not distort his creation by originally imperfect adjustments. This is valid reasoning. The appeal to benevolent intelligence in creation establishes the principle claimed. As thus established, we have a right to use it, in psychology and in metaphysics. But, as a part of the theistic argument, it assumes the very point to be proved—that there is a God at all. Properly qualified, the major premise of this syllogism is true, as a matter of fact; but we can know its truth only after we have, in some other way, proved that there is a God, whose wisdom is the guarantee of this principle. The theist who appeals to feeling may claim a fair logical presumption, based on the analogy of experience, in a limited number of similar cases; and this may fairly be used, as one element in a cumulative theistic argument. But, taken alone, it can have but little weight. Yet, if more than this is claimed for it, the critic has a right to refuse to be convinced by an argument the major premise of which is valid only as it implies its own conclusion in a whole system of theistic metaphysics.

Moreover, a fatal objection can be urged against this appeal to feeling, on the ground that the feeling appealed to is neither original nor universal. Within a very few years, Intuitionism has been compelled to change its ground completely, in its treatment of the feelings. Psychology, in this respect, has been revolutionized by the doctrines of Evolution. It is unscientific, to-day, to trust to the evidence of any one matured, intelligent mind as proof of the originality of a feeling. Many feelings are clearly instinctive with us; but they are as clearly resultants of variable and contingent ancestral experience. The principles of Heredity and Adaptation have made such havoc with our inherited psychology that we can have no confidence in the originality of anything which does not bear the distinct impress of absolute necessity. Time is a formal principle of all thought, because thought itself can exist only under that form. Pleasure or pain is a formal principle of all feeling, because feeling can be feeling only as it involves pleasure or pain. But, because it has, in the past, made so many false claims, modern psychology is very cautious, now, in its assertions of originality. It wisely yields to development everything which can be shown

to be a possible product of experience, individual or ancestral, and claims for original nature only that which can be proved to be necessary.

But this mysterious feeling of God, to be of use in this argument, must be original, a necessity of man's nature. Experience is full of accidents, perversions, misinterpretations. A feeling generated by experience may be utterly unreliable as a test of fact. I have an innate and intense physical repugnance to a certain article of food. No *trieb* of my nature is stronger than that dislike. Yet the books tell me that the article of food is one of the healthiest given to the race. Of what value is my inherited feeling, as evidence of a general divine plan? What right have I to argue from this uncontrollable aversion to the objective and general harmfulness of the article concerned? It is very different from the assumption that because all men are created with the necessity of eating, in order to maintain life, therefore there must be, somewhere, food to be eaten. This feeling of God, to have any force in proof of the fact of a God, must be freed from all contingent, experiential elements, and shown to be original and necessary.

It can be claimed as a primitive norm of man's nature only in one of two forms,—either as a feeling of moral obligation or as a feeling of dependence. Modern anthropology, however, quickly overthrows the argument which holds that there is, in man, an innate feeling of moral obligation to a personal God. Recent developments in the study of primitive races have settled that point. In fact, it is not necessary to look beyond the nursery, in our own advanced civilization, to see the process of education, by which the child learns the fact of moral obligation, to parents first,—and to a God afterwards.

There is a certain truth, however, in the claim that the feeling of dependence is original. There is, and must be, in every mind, from the very first act of consciousness, a feeling of repressed energy, arising from experience of conflict with external force. This is original, because it is necessary to that duality without which consciousness itself cannot begin. In psychology we call this simply the consciousness of the *non-ego*. It may loosely be termed a feeling of dependence; that is, it is a recognition of a Force other than my own, a Force which, in

its manifestations, is, or may be, superior to my own. Human reason, by the use of the despised methods of logical argument, may infer the God behind the Force manifested. Historically it has done so in most primitive races. But this is a rational process of inference; it is not the dogmatism of feeling. The original feeling is simply that of repressed energy, giving the consciousness of another Force. It is heaping a whole system of metaphysics upon this very simple feeling, to say that it gives to consciousness, in itself as feeling, knowledge of the existence of a personal God. It may be a personal devil; it may be a finite human power; it may be matter and motion. The original feeling of the non-ego gives only two elements, externality and activity. All further predication comes, not from feeling, but from the processes of logical thought. It is a rather startling feat of legerdemain which transforms this primary recognition of external Force into the immediate apprehension of a thinking, loving God.

Neither, then, as a feeling of moral obligation nor as a feeling of dependence can this mysterious feeling of God be shown to be an original necessity of man's nature. But, beyond this, the feeling is neither uniform nor universal, tho it must be both to be of use in the theistic argument. The appeal, here, to primitive man is an unfortunate one. The argument, if it proves anything, proves too much. Such a feeling, as innate, must be purest in its simplest form; and its simplest form is its primitive form. But its primitive form gave, almost everywhere, a polytheistic physiolatry. Christian mysticism derives little comfort from the facts of the genesis of the religious sentiment. Starting, thus, with an incomprehensible perversion, the feeling, so far as there is any, has developed into strange incongruities. "We feel God; therefore there is a God." But some men have felt many Gods. Are there, then, many Gods? Most men have felt differently from all other men in regard to God. Does God change his character with the convolutions of each human brain? Where shall we draw the line, here? There are whole volumes of heresy in the mere suggestion of such relativity. A natural feeling, adduced as proof of a fact, ought to be reasonably uniform. If one man feels a Jehovah, and another feels an Agni, an Indra, and a Surya, all at once; if one man

feels a God who loves, and another a God who hates, the presumption is that their feelings are very unreliable, even as regards the fact of any kind of a God. There ought to be no difference in the primary and essential attributes of the thing felt.

If it is urged that these variations of form only are experiential and can be accounted for by the influences of the environment, but that the belief in a God of some kind remains, and that no more than the fact of such a concept is claimed, the answer is a very prompt one. This belief itself, even in its most abstract form, is not universal, and therefore it is not innate. It is true that some persons have a highly developed and positive feeling of a God. A child inherits the piety and reverence of a godly ancestry. He is taught, in the nursery, not to reason, but to pray. His emotions are developed by the Sunday-school and the church. Faith, love, reverence, are stimulated by all his most sacred associations. Arrived at manhood, he does not stop to reason. His education has made his feelings facts. Is there a God? What an absurd question. Of course there is a God. He knows God through God; and if wicked worldliness suggests a question which threatens trouble to this complacent self-sufficiency of personal desire, he wraps the cloak of his feelings all the more closely about him and defies the chilliness of penetrating scepticism. But another child comes into being, with the blood of generations of brutal crime in his veins. His object-lessons are those of sin. The filth of the street is his home, depraved desire his development. You rest your theistic argument on human feeling. Go to him and ask if *he* feels a God. See if *he* knows God through God.

This feeling of a God, tho it may exist in many as an inheritance or an emotive development, is far from being universal. Some men do not feel God at all. Is there, then, no God? Why not? If the argument from the presence of a feeling is conclusive, the absence of that feeling is at least suggestive. If this mysterious feeling, which is the only proof of a God, is a divine gift limited to a part of the race, as one of the neglected remainder I protest against the injustice done to me in creation. I can find no such feeling in my own conscious-

ness. The Force outside reveals to me the limitations of my own power at every turn of life; but in that consciousness of a mechanical non-ego I can find no responsive feeling which springs to the assertion that this repressive Force is the God of the Christian revelation. From facts of existence I infer a First Cause; in the forms of manifestation I read the characteristics of that First Cause. By what I believe to be a scientific process of logical *a posteriori* inference, I have learned, and therefore I know, that there is a God.' But it has been a process, a thought-process, a laborious thought-process. If the mystical theologian is right in his predication of so deliciously simple a short-cut to blissful certainty, in the name of many a believer, and of every unbeliever, I protest. It is a partiality, unjust tho divine, which has created so many of us only half-made at this most critical point.

It is an insult to say that some men fail to feel God properly because they are blinded by sin. I know atheists to-day who honestly, earnestly desire a God. With tense nerve they are searching after God. They cry out for a God, sometimes, in an agony of despair. Dare you go to such a man with a pretty phrase about knowing God through God; and when he says that he does not understand you, answer that it is because he is a sinner who lives on too low a plane to have a normal intelligence? Which is the worse—such psychology as that, or the theology which it supports? Granted that a mysterious feeling of God is God's best evidence to man and in man that he exists, and we all have a right to demand an innate share in that feeling. Divine justice, to say nothing of divine love, would give that proof to every creature.

The fact that such a feeling does exist in some men (we take their word for it) can be explained on principles of heredity and development. Psychologically it means simply that a man lets his feelings run away with him, and allows instinctive desire, unsupported by reason, to postulate external realities. But the fact that such a feeling does not exist in most men proves that it is not a reasonable ground for the theistic argument, and that, therefore, it is a dangerous position for the defenders of theism to assume.

As has been said, this is a question of method rather than

of fact, and one which concerns, primarily, the practical working value of the theistic argument as a force of conviction. Since it is thus a question, not of theoretical result, but of practical use, I trust that I shall be pardoned if, in support of my criticism, I present evidence from my own experience in the lecture-room. Of course there are all around us men and women of an inherited faith which is so strong as to make them sublimely indifferent to any possible interrogation-point of the human reason. To such persons all metaphysical science is unintelligible and the throbbing discussions of the day are a mystery. But, as an instructor, I have never yet met with a single mind which, when once made fairly acquainted with the tremendous problems of modern speculation, could in any way be satisfied by an appeal to a mystical feeling. I find that intelligent minds searching after the truth *insist* upon knowing the grounds of their faith. With deep respect for the authorities who support it, I have tried to use, for all that it is worth, this appeal to the feeling of a God in support of the fact of a God. And I have failed. It is not a working argument. It does not meet the objections which must be met. It does not answer the doubts which come spontaneously to every mind which seeks self-justification in Christian belief. Whatever may be true of the assembly of believers in the church prayer-meeting, Christian theism must have a better defence than this in the metaphysical lecture-room, or else be set aside, as other illogical systems are set aside, as unscientific and indefensible.

The substance of this whole criticism has been well expressed in a few sentences by the keenest philosopher of the day. "The proofs of the existence of God," says Ulrici (*Gott und die Natur, Einleitung*, p. 1), "after having for a long time played an important part in philosophy and theology, have, in our own day, fallen into disrepute—especially since the famous criticism of Kant. Since then it has been the general opinion of believers and unbelievers alike that the existence of God cannot be proved. Even theologians readily agree to this; they ridicule the vain attempts at proof, and seem to think that they are thus doing a service to the faith which they preach. But the proofs of the existence of God coincide with the reasons for the faith in God. They are simply the objective reasons of this

faith, scientifically established. If there are no such proofs, then there are no such reasons: and a faith without any reason—if it were possible at all—would not be a faith, but only an arbitrary, self-made, subjective opinion.”

M. STUART PHELPS.

RICHARD BRINSLEY SHERIDAN AND HIS BIOGRAPHERS.

RICHARD BRINSLEY BUTLER SHERIDAN, dramatist, orator, and wit, was born at No. 12 Dorset Street, Dublin, Ireland, in September 1751. He produced the comedy of the "Rivals" in January 1775, and the opera of the "Duenna" in the following November; he bought out David Garrick and became the manager of Drury Lane Theatre in 1776; he finished the comedy of the "School for Scandal" in May 1777, and the farce of the "Critic" in October 1779. In 1780 he entered the House of Commons as the chosen representative of the independent borough of Stafford. In February 1787 he brought forward with Burke the chief charges against Warren Hastings. This was the height and climax of his splendid career, and from this time forward his fortunes declined. He sank into poverty and sickness, and when he lay on his death-bed he was neglected. He died in Saville Row, London, England, on July 7, 1816, and was buried in the Poet's Corner of Westminster Abbey.

"Most men," says Sainte-Beuve, "have not read those whom they judge; they have a ready-made opinion got by word of mouth, one scarcely knows how." No one has suffered more from these off-hand judgments than Richard Brinsley Sheridan. A ready-made opinion of a man who found so many and such various means of expressing himself, an opinion got by word of mouth, one scarcely knows how, can scarcely be other than unjust. Ordinarily the biographers of a celebrity correct these current misrepresentations and, by leaning to the side of mercy in their statement of his virtues and his vices, his failings and his merits, enable us to reconstruct again the man

as he was in the flesh. But to Richard Brinsley Sheridan the biographers have been merciless. They have been ignorant and careless like the latest of them—Mrs. Oliphant; or hostile and careless like the earliest—Dr. Watkins; or they have thought more of themselves and their living friends than of their dead subject—like Moore. It is only by a careful comparison of all the biographies and by a careful selection of references from contemporary memoirs that we are able at all to reconstruct Sheridan as he was and to get a clear understanding of his complex character.

The first of Sheridan's biographers was a certain John Watkins, LL.D., who was a bookmaker by trade. His "Memoirs of the Public and Private Life of the Rt. Hon. R. B. Sheridan" were compiled hastily and appeared in two volumes quarto in 1816, within a few months after Sheridan's death. So great was the public interest in Sheridan that even as dull a life as Watkins's was eagerly bought, and a second and a third edition, in octavo, followed within two years. Neither as an author nor as a politician did Sheridan fare well at the hands of Dr. Watkins, who was not critic enough to understand Sheridan's writings nor honest enough to understand his sayings and doings as a public man. Dr. Watkins suggested that Tickell had lent Sheridan material aid in the writing of the "Critic," and that Sheridan was perhaps not the real author of the "School for Scandal," which was the work of an unknown young lady who had gone to Bath in a decline and there died: and the most of the learned Watkins's criticism is no better than this. Fortunately, Watkins's literary criticism, sprawling as it is, fills only a quarter of his bulky and unnecessary book. Unfortunately the other three quarters are filled with an account of Sheridan's political career quite as misleading and as mischievous as the account of his literary career. But the blundering in the literary discussion is the result of ignorance, while the blundering in the political history is intentional or, at least, the result of a strong bias against the principles of the party to which Sheridan belonged.

In the library of the late John Forster, the biographer of Goldsmith and of Dickens, now preserved in the South Kensington Museum, there is a thick bundle of MS. notes and scraps of all shapes and sizes relating to the life of Sheridan.

It had not been carefully examined when Mr. Sketchley, the librarian, courteously placed it in my hands. I soon found that it contained the materials used by Watkins, arranged in chronological sequence. Apparently it had been provided for him by the hack whom he had hired to do the rough work of research in magazines, newspapers, and debates. This hack was a Tory and hated the Whigs as sturdily as any Dr. Johnson. A perusal of these hasty, ill-digested, unverified notes, with their insinuations and innuendoes and their contemptuous allusions to the Whigs, and a comparison of these notes with Watkins's biography as published, will account for the worthlessness of the latter.

After Watkins came Moore. Mrs. Norton has told us that Lord Melbourne, than whom there could have been no more competent person, had begun a life of Sheridan when he heard that Moore had agreed to write the biography. Lord Melbourne, with a generosity recalling Irving's to Motley, relinquished his attempt and turned over to Moore all he had written and all he had collected. "Lord Melbourne afterwards said he never regretted anything more than having resolved to give up those papers and to abandon the idea of writing a memoir, which again, in Moore's hands, turned out to be so utterly unsatisfactory." Mrs. Norton adds aptly and curtly, "It is a singular fact that, in all the biographies Moore wrote, he contrived to lower the subject of his biography in the public estimation. Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Byron, Sheridan, all fared alike in this respect." To disprove Watkins's allegation that Sheridan had not written the "School for Scandal," Moore reprinted the several drafts and outlines of the comedy, and, taking the reader into the workshop, revealed the slow shaping and ceaseless toil by which the play was brought to its brilliancy and its beauty. The result was that it is now believed by many that Sheridan was a dull man who labored hard at the manufacture of jests, while from other parts of Moore's book others have derived the incompatible impression that Sheridan was lazy and careless and incapable of sustained effort. That Sheridan had written the "Rivals," the "Duenna," the "School for Scandal," and the "Critic" before he was twenty-eight is all the evidence we need to assert positively that he was not lazy, not

careless, and not dull. That these diverging accusations should be brought against Sheridan is not a little his own fault. He affected a reckless ease and he carefully concealed the long labor he gave ungrudgingly to the perfecting of his work. Like a prudent wit, he stored up shafts for future warfare, polishing them to the finest point and laying them away in his arsenal. But because he prepared himself whenever he could, he was none the less ready when taken unawares. Lord John Townshend bore witness that no man was quicker than he in the writing off-hand of party squibs and paragraphs; and there are numberless anecdotes of his repartee in positions where no preparation was possible.

Moore's biography has other faults quite as mischievous as these. Its treatment, for instance, of Sheridan's political career is wholly inadequate; in all the latter portion of his book it is evident that Moore relied on Watkins while denying him when possible. The fact is that Moore tired of the work early, and so confessed in his own *Memoirs*. He wrote the first four chapters in 1818 and then did nothing for six or seven years, when the book was finished as best he could. The result is that the early chapters devoted to Sheridan's literary career are in many respects admirable, and that the later chapters rapidly fall away in interest and in value. Nevertheless, it must always remain the standard biography of Sheridan, from its fulness of detailed information. Perhaps the nearest approach to an ideal biography of Sheridan would be a new edition of Moore's, scrupulously respecting Moore's text, but accompanied by frequent and elaborate notes in which Moore's mistakes might be corrected and in which the information available since Moore wrote might be utilized.

For fifteen years after the publication of Moore's biography Sheridan was allowed to rest in peace, and no further attempt was made upon his life. But in 1840 there was privately printed at Leeds a little book of less than a hundred pages, purporting to be a "Memoir of Mr. Sheridan" and written by William Smyth. This William Smyth was a Professor of History in the University of Cambridge, and had served in Sheridan's family as the private tutor of Thomas Sheridan, the elder son. In this capacity he was enabled to take an inside view of Sheridan's

home. He was a man of querulous temper, high conceit, and little knowledge of the world: and he was also lacking in the decency which ought to have kept him silent as to what he learned in the sanctity of private life. His memoir might have been valuable if carefully controlled, but it is disfigured by slanderous insinuations and indiscreet revelations. Professor Smyth reveals unhesitatingly things which he says Sheridan tried hard to conceal—the manner of the death of Tickell, his brother-in-law, for instance; and he sets down these things with an unblushing absence of any feeling that he is playing a contemptible trick on the man who by his own showing always treated him with respect and regard. He contradicts Watkins who falsely declared that Sheridan was unaffected by his wife's death, and shows that Sheridan's grief was almost uncontrollable and that its effects were lasting; and then on hearsay, and the tittle-tattle of old women, he takes away the character of Mrs. Sheridan. When Professor Smyth's discreditable pamphlet appeared Richard Brinsley Sheridan had been dead nearly twenty-four years, and his son Thomas Sheridan, to whom Smyth had been tutor, had been dead nearly twenty-three years—for he had died but a few months after his father. There was no one authorized to protest but the widow of Thomas Sheridan, and she wrote a letter to Professor Smyth which probably took effect even on his conceit. This letter has never been published, but I am enabled to print it by the kindness of the son of the writer, the present Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Esq., of Frampton Court, Dorchester, whom I take great pleasure in thanking publicly for the many courtesies shown in my search for facts concerning his illustrious grandfather:

Mrs. Thomas Sheridan to Prof. Smyth.

46 GROSVR. PLACE [BATH], March 30 [1840].

DEAR SIR: On hearing that you had written a little account of your tutorship in the family of Mr. Sheridan, I felt great impatience to read what I conceived would contain some new anecdote, or at least some kind mention of your pupil, which might be gratifying to his children and to me. You may imagine that I read the book with equal pain and surprise. You had a right to judge the character and conduct of those whom circumstances had exposed to you as severely as you chose, but had you a right to print that judgment?

A friend, a tutor, a governess domesticated in any family must witness their joys, their sorrows, become acquainted with their weaknesses and their faults, and, if so constituted as not to feel any sympathy with the former, is at least bound by discretion, good taste, and Christian charity not to print the latter for the information of the public, even if "found to amuse a friend" and "thought likely to amuse others."

Your book is, in fact, not an account of your tutorship, but a very unfavorable commentary on Mr. Sheridan's character and a painful exposition of his difficulties.

This was enough to annoy his family, but there is a graver charge of which I am entitled to complain.

You state that you were wholly unknown to our family till you entered it. Mr. Sheridan's lovely and accomplished wife was already dead. You could not therefore have had a personal opportunity of forming any judgment respecting her conduct and character. Yet from *hearsay* you found a scandalous accusation against her when she has been more than half a century in her grave. Has any gentleman of the many who fill similar situations in the distinguished families of Great Britain ever been known so to outrage the charities of private life?

You state that you sought employment in our family in consequence of a bankruptcy in your own. Such events rarely occur without eliciting accusations (however unfair)—involuntary injustice—unkind reflexion on the sufferer. Had your pupil been your tutor at that time and collected such matter not merely to "*amuse a friend*," but printed it, "*thinking it might amuse others*," should you have approved that self-imposed task?

Your pupil always spoke of you with kindness and respect; neither have I or any one of my children given you the slightest offence. How can you feel justified in making this causeless attack on a family who have already so often suffered from printed injustice? How can you (who close this very attack with religious reflexion) think it consistent with Christian charity to print forgotten defamation of one who never offended you and of whom you know nothing?

In an age when private scandal is so welcome to the public, this memoir will probably be published after your death. Will you not avoid doing a posthumous injury by recalling the copies which you have distributed among your friends and *at least* cancelling that very offensive passage, if not the whole book, which, I assure you, is considered to do you little honor, even by those entirely indifferent to our private injury?

I am, Dear Sir,

Your Obedt. Servt.,

C. H. SHERIDAN.

In 1841 Leigh Hunt wrote, in his usual flippant and chirpy style, a brief biographical and critical sketch of Sheridan, in the course of which he contrived to be both careless and cruel. Far

better is the careful account of Sheridan's career put together in 1847 by Mr. G. G. Sigmund to precede Sheridan's plays in Bohn's Standard Library. And in 1859 there was published "Sheridan and his Times, by an Octogenarian who Stood at his Knee in Youth and Sat at His table In manhood" (2. vols. London: J. F. Hope), which contains much good-humored gossip and a few characteristic anecdotes. The authorship has been well concealed, altho the writer gives us a clue to his identity when he declares (volume ii. page 273) that he was a member of the managing committee of Drury Lane Theatre when Edmund Kean and R. W. Elliston were first engaged there. In marked contrast to the gentle and genial gossip of the Octogenarian was the scurrilous sketch of Sheridan contained in a book called the "Wits and Beaux of Society" and purporting to be the work of "Grace and Philip Wharton." It was this wretched compilation which called forth from the Honorable Mrs. Norton, the granddaughter of Richard Brinsley Sheridan, a letter published in the number of *Macmillan's Magazine* for January 1861, which scorches and scourges the latest assailants of her grandfather's memory as sharply as her mother had dealt with Professor Smyth. It is greatly to be regretted that Mrs. Norton never carried out the project promised in this letter: no more delightful book, at once entertaining and instructive, would have been found in the literature of the last half-century than her "Lives of the Sheridans," had it ever been written. And beside the pleasure and profit we should gain from its perusal it would have conferred a negative boon also; for if Mrs. Norton had written out of the fulness of knowledge a history of the Sheridans, Mrs. Oliphant might have refrained from a monograph on Richard Brinsley Sheridan written out of the fulness of ignorance.

But between Mrs. Norton's proposal and Mrs. Oliphant's performance came a book by Mr. Wm. F. Rae, "Wilkes, Sheridan, Fox—the Opposition under George III.," in which is to be found altogether the best account of Sheridan's career with which we are acquainted. Within the limited space of a scant hundred pages Mr. Rae found room to be both just and generous. He had sympathy with Sheridan's politics and a knowledge of the inner political intriguing of the time sufficient

for the appreciation of the rectitude of Sheridan's course. Mr. Rae, too, was the first to draw attention to the exact shorthand report of the great Begum speech, a reference to which shows that Sheridan was guiltless of the bombast put into his mouth by the concoctor of the ordinarily accepted speech. Sheridan's style as an orator was not beyond reproach: he violated the first principles of decoration and of declamation in that he was wont to construct his ornament instead of ornamenting his construction. While his style in level passages, in narration, in satire, was always admirable, racy, idiomatic, he had a tendency to "tall talk" and "fine writing" whenever he sought to be elevated. But he never sank to the depths of flowery rhetoric which we find in the inaccurate report. Mr. Rae's study of Sheridan originally appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* when it was edited by Mr. John Morley; and it is greatly to be regretted that when Mr. Morley planned the brilliant series of biographic and critical monographs known as the "English Men of Letters" series he did not recall Mr. Rae's essay and intrust Mr. Rae with the preparation of the volume on Sheridan. Unfortunately the task was confided to Mrs. Oliphant, a lady whose novels are many and delightful and whose frequent biographies are a delusion and a snare.

To those who have made any study at all of Sheridan's life and works and times, these two hundred pages of Mrs. Oliphant's monograph on Sheridan are simply astounding. Mrs. Oliphant is not interested in Sheridan and does not really understand him. She has made no personal research whatever: that she made no application to the family for the papers, documents, and manuscripts in their possession we happen to know. As a result her book contains absolutely nothing new—except a few blunders naturally resulting from the copying of the blunders of her predecessors.

A few of Mrs. Oliphant's minor blunders must be set down here—her major blunder being the book itself. Sheridan's first venture into print was with a free translation from the Greek of the equally free "Love Epistles of Aristenetus," done in partnership with his friend Halhed. Mrs. Oliphant takes the dubious Greek poet for a "Latin author" (p. 17), and then proceeds to suggest that there was no original at all, and that the

whole thing was a literary hoax—altho any dictionary of biography would have told her that the original did exist, and a glance at "Allibone" would have shown her that Sheridan's translation figures at the present day among the English versions of ancient authors included in Bohn's series, familiar to all college boys. Mrs. Oliphant follows Moore in declaring that the "Love Epistles" failed to sell satisfactorily; this may be so, but at any rate the book managed to get itself into a second edition. Mrs. Oliphant follows Moore again in her account of Sheridan's purchase of Drury Lane Theatre, but it is on her own responsibility that she declares that "Sheridan eventually bought Lacy out at a further expenditure of £45,000, partly obtained, it would appear, from Garrick, partly by other means" (pp. 74, 75). Now, there is no evidence that Garrick ever lent Sheridan a penny; and there is no evidence that Sheridan paid Lacy £45,000 for his share. As a matter of fact, he did nothing of the sort; he assumed a mortgage and he agreed to pay Lacy and Lacy's partner an annuity for two lives. Of course, Mrs. Oliphant sheds no light on the vexed question of how Sheridan, having nothing, managed to buy Drury Lane Theatre, a question which we believe Moore could have solved had he chosen, and which the present writer believes he has solved for himself—as he hopes to show in the introduction to a forthcoming edition of Sheridan's comedies.

Even more frequent is Mrs. Oliphant's blundering whenever she touches the stage. She declares that Sheridan's revision of Vanbrugh's "Relapse" called the "Trip to Scarborough" did not attract the public (p. 75); but this is not so, for after the first shock of disappointment that the young manager should offer an adaptation in place of a new and original play, the "Trip to Scarborough" began to be judged on its merits and it held the stage for years. After declaring that Sheridan was not "a playwright by science, but rather by accident"—whatever this may mean—Mrs. Oliphant informs us that he preserves "the unities of time and place because it suits him to do so" (p. 94): it would be interesting to know just what Mrs. Oliphant means by those much-abused words, "the unities of time and place," and to have her point out in what play or plays Sheridan

observed either the unity of time or the unity of place—two things he never thought about in any way. Mrs. Oliphant also ventures to speak of Sheridan as the “stage-manager” of Drury Lane, which he never was; and she suggests that “it would no doubt have been higher art [in the screen-scene of the “School for Scandal”] could the dramatist have deceived his audience as well as the personages of the play, and made us also parties in the surprise of the discovery” (p. 90)—as tho our enjoyment was derived from a single shock of vulgar surprise instead of arising from our full knowledge of the situation and our humorous anticipation of the coming catastrophe. An emphatic protest must also be entered against Mrs. Oliphant’s most unwarrantable assumption, at first, and assertion at last, that Sheridan’s wife, the Maid of Bath, was the model from whom he drew *Lydia Languish*. This is Mrs. Oliphant’s one contribution to the history of Sheridan’s works, and with the misplaced pride of a discoverer she recurs to it again and again, rising from the first insidious insinuation to the final reiterated assertion, as tho it were a fact.

Nowhere, does Mrs. Oliphant present us with a satisfactory sketch of Sheridan’s character; and yet in no one volume of the series is a psychological outline of the subject more needful than in this. Sheridan’s character is enigmatic, and Mrs. Oliphant has not taken time to think out the difficult problem. She has formed for herself no distinct idea of Sheridan. She treats him now harshly and now kindly, now like a spoilt child and now like a bad man. But Sheridan cannot be taken in this way. His character is not to be read off-hand and at random. It is complicated and unequal and variable; and it is to be understood and explained only at the cost of effort.

Sheridan was good-natured and warm-hearted; he never did any man an intentional injury: but he brought trouble on all who trusted him. He was gentle, kind, and affectionate, but his wife had reason to feel neglected and his father parted from him in anger. He earned enormous sums of money and his advice to others was always admirable, but his own affairs were in ever-increasing confusion. He was always involved in debt; yet his accounts as a government officer were scrupulously accurate. To continue the antithesis would be easy, for the story of his life is a series of antitheses: but to suggest a clue to

the labyrinth of his character is not so easy. Briefly, I am inclined to think that it is to be found in the uncommon conjunction in Sheridan of two irreconcilable things, a very high standard of morals with an absence of training and discipline. The latter failing vitiated the former virtue. Incapable of keeping himself up in the clear air and on the high level of exalted principle to which he aspired, he was far less careful in the ordinary duties of life than those whose aim is not so lofty. When he found that he could not attain the high standard he had set before him, he cared little how much he fell short of it—and so sank below the ethical mean of ordinary mortals. There was nothing venal or sordid about him; he was liked by all, tho all who liked him did not respect him; he was a humorist even in his code of morality. He always meant well, but while the spirit might be willing the flesh was often weak. He intended to be not merely generous with everybody but also to be absolutely honest and upright; his heart was in the right place, as the saying is, but his views were too magnificent for his means, and he had neither self-denial nor self-discipline: when, therefore, he had once put himself in a position where he was unable to do exactly what he had agreed to do and what he always desired to do, then he ceased to care whether or not he did all he could do. When he failed to keep his word, he failed completely; he “let things slide,” to use an expressive Americanism, and he never tried to make the best of it. In time this habit grew on him, and the frequency of failure to accomplish what he had intended blunted his aspirations. He always meant well, as I have said, and as time went on people more and more had to be content to take the will for the deed. This type of character is not as uncommon as it may seem at first sight. Substantially it does not differ greatly from the *Thérèse* of “*Elle et Lui*” which George Sand’s latest biographer declares to be “a faithful picture of a woman not quite up to the level of her own principles, which are so high that any lapse from them on her part brings down more disasters on herself and on others than the misdemeanors of avowedly unscrupulous persons.” In Sheridan this type was modified for the worse by an ambition perilously akin to vanity and by an indolence accompanied by an extraordinary power of hard work whenever spurred to it by an extraordinary motive. This

vanity and this indolence were the contending evil spirits who strove for the mastery in Sheridan's later days. The indolence encouraged his carelessness in money matters, and the vanity, or ambition or pride stiffened his impracticably high code of morality. He was always paying his debts in a large-handed, reckless way; but he was never out of debt. He scorned to examine an account or to catechise a claimant; when he had money he paid, and when he had none he promised to pay—and he kept his word, if reminded of it, when money came in. All or nearly all of his shares in the rebuilt theatre were given to creditors without any question of their claims. Sheridan stripped himself and died in poverty and left but few debtors unpaid. From sheer heedlessness he probably had paid far more than he actually owed, but he never made an effort to investigate his liabilities or to set them off against his assets to see where he was. He had not the mercantile morality as he had not the mercantile training which would have stood him in good stead so often in his checkered career. But he had personal morality in money matters, and he had political morality. His nice sense of honor led him to withdraw his wife from the concert-stage as soon as they were married. He told a creditor who had his bond, and who found him in unexpected possession of money, that he had to use the money to meet a debt of honor, whereupon the creditor burnt his bond before his face and declared his debt was thereafter a debt of honor, and Sheridan paid it at once. In his political career he more than once sacrificed place to principle.

As Carlyle says of Schiller, "we should not lightly think of comprehending the very simplest character in all its bearings; and it might well argue vanity to boast of even a common acquaintance with one like" Sheridan's, which was even more complex and enigmatical than Schiller's. "Such men as he are misunderstood by their daily companions, much more by the distant observer, who gleans his information from scanty records and casual notices of characteristic events, which biographers are often too indolent or injudicious to collect, and which the peaceful life of a man of letters usually supplies in little abundance." From this injudicious indolence of biographers no man has suffered more than Richard Brinsley Sheridan.

BRANDER MATTHEWS.

SHALL WE HAVE A SECOND FEDERAL CONVENTION ?

THE material progress of the United States for the decade 1870-80 must be looked upon as one of the most noteworthy features of the time. To those who realize that economic laws work as surely on the minutest as on the grandest scale, the phenomena are not so much a surprise as an interesting and valuable opportunity to study economics with all the advantages of the microscope. Most minds, however, are best impressed by ultimate statistics, by such evidences of prosperity as are summed up in the facts that one sixth of the world's wealth is now within the limits of the United States ; that the wealth of the country is increasing at the rate of \$2,000,000 a day, more than twice as rapidly as its nearest rivals, Germany and Great Britain, and nearly six times as rapidly as the most prosperous of its other rivals ; and that the American people are already doing one third of the world's mining, one fourth of its manufacturing, one fifth of its agriculture, and one sixth of its banking, on a territorial capital of but one eighteenth of the world's land-area, and that, too, but very partially reduced to use. In the face of such evidence of material prosperity, criticism of still tolerable evils generally seems ungracious, and the usual organs of public opinion are disposed to take a much more rose-colored view of public affairs than was presented by the lugubrious centennial orations of 1876. The newspapers are inclined to confine their indictments for rascality to a more limited portion of the opposite party. Political platforms find it more difficult to specify the evils which they propose to cure, and more convenient to declaim about the blessings which they pro-

pose to increase. There are even a few contented optimists, generally assistant-deputy-postmasters or presidents of ward associations or of surviving campaign clubs, whose limited political ideal is already completely attained, and who unhesitatingly pronounce our army, our navy, our civil service, and our politics respectively "the finest on the planet."

But the "plain people," to whom Lincoln was wont to look, and who are still the national jury, do not share in this complacent feeling. Whatever may be their material prosperity, the wheels of government do not seem to them to move with the smoothness and certainty which they have a right to expect from the workings of their admirable Constitution in a time of profound peace. There is a frequent jar and rumble and friction, which is not only uncomfortable, but suggestive of absolute peril. It is not easy to say which party was more grateful in 1880 that Garfield's electoral majority was unimpeachable; and both parties, knowing that the Presidential election of 1884 has hardly any more administrative safeguards than that of 1876, are entering upon it with only the usual American confidence in the good fortune of the Republic. Polygamy has ceased to be a simple sore and risen to the consideration due to a growing ulcer; and yet remedies, theoretically the most drastic, prove to be nullities in practice. The complex organization of national life has passed beyond the two simple factors, State and nation, and has evolved a third, the city. The proportion of urban population has risen from one thirtieth in 1790 to one fourth in 1880. National political evils have reacted upon the smaller constituencies until, in very many of the cities, government by the people has confessedly ceased to exist; and a Governor, when he desires to be relieved of a pest in the State Senate, addresses the petition for his suppression not to the people who are legally presumed to have elected him, but to the unofficial city Boss. Our cities have long ceased to afford to taxpayers the protection to life, liberty, and property for which taxes are paid. Now the mass of citizens are beginning to feel the pressure, and apply the wild justice of revenge. City government in the United States is fast becoming a régime of public plunder and protection to vice, tempered by riots, lynch-law, and individual vengeance. Surely here are new grooves

for which there are no wheels, or in which the wheels provided by the Constitution do not fit as they once did.

In addition to these failures to work at all, there is an equally startling inefficiency in the accomplishment of work by the national political machinery. The people pay cheerfully and liberally for the fourth largest iron-clad navy of the world, and get in return a naval force beneath the contempt of a South American republic. They pay enough for the maintenance of their little army to make it a model machine of its kind, and get in return a force of officers' servants, of whom one man per annum in every seven deserts. They cannot afford to allow their coasts to be properly fortified, or their insubordinate rivers to be reduced to control, for fear their rapacious representatives will seize the opportunity to plunder the Treasury for the benefit of their respective "destricts" and their own prospects of a reelection. They elect a Congress, and it invariably proves incompetent to do anything more useful than to talk, pass upon special legislation, and adjourn. Every year a long pent-up sigh of relief breaks out when Congress adjourns, and the country is left with no worse government than a Judiciary to interpret the laws and a President to enforce them.

It would be idle to expect contentment with such a state of public affairs from a people who are intelligent, who do their private and corporate work intelligently and well, and who have as little respect for public as for private incapacity or inefficiency. The people are not satisfied: they have exhausted every ordinary remedy without encouraging success, and an extraordinary occasion would only bring more plainly to the surface a dissatisfaction whose existence has already been quietly made known. Election after election has come and gone; each political party has met and triumphantly surmounted its alternate "tidal wave;" desperate and unavailing efforts have been made to organize a third party; private societies for political education, for the abolition or reformation of the caucus, or for other kindred purposes, have not yet achieved any marked success: who can suggest any ordinary remedy that has not been tried already, and has not failed completely? Gulliver was not more scientifically and securely tied down by the minute and multitudinous threads of the Lilliputians than the political action of the peo-

ple of the United States is controlled by that indispensable, always useful, but often troublesome class of public servants called politicians. Evidently it is high time for the American Gulliver to bestir himself, and perhaps his determination to do so may be quickened and rightly directed by recalling to his recollection the manner in which he burst, at the first effort, the far stronger meshes in which the same class had bound him in 1777-87.

The Articles of Confederation, which preceded the Constitution as the organic law of the United States, were proposed by the Continental Congress, Nov. 15, 1777, were ratified within a year by eight of the States, and went into force, March 1, 1781, on the ratification of the thirteenth State, Maryland. The formal proposition of this scheme of government was the work of Congress, but the work of preparing it was in reality done by the local politicians of the various States, assembled in their State Legislatures. Congress was no free agent in the matter. It was the Legislatures that sent the delegates to Congress, and recalled them at pleasure; it was the Legislatures that were to ratify or reject the scheme of government, when completed; and the Articles had to be so drawn as to meet fully the ideas of the politician class, which controlled the Legislatures, in those days of limited suffrage, more directly than, and perhaps as completely as, its successors control our modern Legislatures.

And never was a State politician's notion of an ideal national government more perfectly worked out than in these Articles of Confederation. The national government was to have, practically, only the power to recommend action to the Legislatures; of its own power, it was to raise no armies, equip no navies, levy no taxes, and exert no control over commerce. Shays's Insurrection might shake Massachusetts to its centre: Congress could do nothing. The "King of New York" might levy imposts on the products of New Jersey or Connecticut: Congress could do nothing. The principal and interest of the public debt, the ordinary running expenses of the national government, might remain unpaid: Congress could do nothing. Treaties with foreign nations might be violated in every article by State Legislatures or by individuals: Congress could do nothing. And to cap the climax, and tie a treble hard knot in

the last of the bonds which held the sleeping giant down, a provision was added that no alteration should ever be made in any of the Articles without the consent of the Legislatures of *every State!*

Having dealt themselves such a hand as this, the State politicians might well be content with the state of the game. Their object was the conservation of their own power in their States, not the welfare of the national people, or the care of national interests; and their object seemed to have been securely and permanently attained. They had so tied the people down in the forms of law that their own tenure of power in all the States seemed secure so long as they could retain control of a single Legislature. And they played with "the rigor of the game," as politicians always do. Time and again the most obviously essential alterations were proposed by Congress, with the strongest popular approval; but they were defeated by the veto of three Legislatures, or two, or even one (Rhode Island). Then, as now, the public servants were determined to do nothing, and in the forms of law there was no remedy.

In 1786-7, after a long correspondence and consideration, a little knot of really national politicians, headed by Hamilton, loosed the thunderbolt against the powers that were, by calling for a Federal Convention, nominally to propose alterations to the Articles of Confederation. Against this demand, backed by popular approval, the Legislatures were powerless. They might find plausible excuses by dozens for vetoing any particular alteration which might be proposed to them; but they could not resist the concentrated popular clamor for a Federal Convention. One Legislature after another yielded and appointed delegates to the Convention which Congress had sanctioned; and its meeting in May, 1787, was the death-warrant of the Legislatures' carefully contrived Articles of Confederation. It is not necessary to consider the work of the Convention any further than its ousting of the State politicians from their apparently impregnable position. It is sufficient to notice here that the Legislatures, which alone had the legal power to even alter the Articles of Confederation, were not to pass upon the Constitution at all; that the ratifications were now to be by

State Conventions; that unanimous ratification was supplanted by a three-fourths ratification; and that Gulliver was free.

The ordinary process which was then settled upon for future Amendments to the new Constitution is familiar enough. If an Amendment can secure the favorable vote of two thirds of each House of Congress, and the ratifications of three fourths of the State Legislatures or State Conventions, it becomes a part of the Constitution. The question then arises: Why not resort to this familiar process for the purpose of securing remedies for existing evils?

It is true that an Amendment is ratified by federal, not by national, action; and yet it requires a singularly national support to be successful. Failing of this, it will fail somewhere, or everywhere, in the long process of ratification, no matter how necessary it may appear to be. The Amendment proposed by Congress in 1861, forbidding Congress to interfere with slavery in the States, is not the only still-born Amendment in our history. It is not generally known that in 1809 Congress formally approved and proposed an Amendment depriving of citizenship any citizen of the United States who should accept from a foreign power any title, or (without consent of Congress) any "present, pension, office, or emolument;" and that this Amendment still remains *in limbo*, not ratified by a three fourths majority of the States, nor rejected by more than one fourth. The first eleven Amendments were really a concession to the class which had opposed the Constitution, the furthest concession that Congress was willing to make. The twelfth Amendment was very similarly the result of the party needs of the new order of politicians which was already growing up under the Constitution. Behind the last three Amendments there was a strong popular impelling force which saw, or thought it saw, the evil and the remedy, and compelled its legislators to act. A successful Amendment, whether it comes from the politicians or from the people, must have behind it an unusually definite and decided impelling force, and a general consensus of opinion upon the exact remedy which is required for the particular case.

But our present difficulties are all the more dangerous in that they are as yet only superficial, and have no such pronounced symptoms as to attract general consideration and

definite agreement. The people at large are too closely occupied by their legitimate struggle for existence to be able to seek out and agree upon the exact remedies for the pestiferous pustules which afflict the body politic. Their legislators are made incompetent to prosecute any reforms by the continuing force of the evils which demand reformation. The Washington correspondents reported, last December, a practically unanimous agreement among Congressmen of both parties against amending the Constitution in any particular. It is to be expected that both State and national legislators should be content with a state of affairs to which most of them owe their official existence. Considering the composition of Congress and the Legislatures, he must be at fault, either in his judgment or in his sincerity, who professes to hope, first, that, without any official summons to do so, the thirty-nine legislative bodies of the country will for a season drop the business which is dearer to them, and discuss Constitutional Amendments; second, that Congress will be at all likely to hit upon the exact remedy required; and, third, that the wisdom and authority of Congress will so impress twenty-nine of the thirty-eight State Legislatures that they will ratify the remedy proposed.

It was this difficulty of inducing Congress and the State Legislatures to make use of the ordinary method of amendment which led that very acute observer, Alexander H. Stephens, to speak as follows, so long ago as January, 1860: "I very much doubt if we have not passed the period in our Republic's life when any amendment of the Constitution is practicable; when any, however apparently proper, could be made: whether, in a word, for the balance of our existence, long or short, we must not make up our minds to get along as well as we can, and do the best we can with the Constitution as it is." He who will consider the insuperable difficulties which would beset the path of a Civil service reform Amendment, for example, will be inclined to agree with Mr. Stephens. The ordinary method of amendment was evidently not intended for any period of general, but undefined, dissatisfaction; and, if there were no other method, we could only regret that the Constitution was not altogether the Aladdin's lamp which we had supposed it to be, and subside into Mr. Stephens's conclusion.

The framers of the Constitution, however, were no such bungling workmen as to make this conclusion a correct one: they have provided another method of amendment, tho it is so carefully covered up and hidden in the ordinary process as to show that they intended it to be the exceptional method, while the other was to be the rule. They do not seem to have imagined that their work would always be executed with the same freedom from friction, after the freshness of its first existence should be past. The manner in which the politicians of the Confederation period had tied down the people in the forms of law was fresh in their memories, and they seem to have made careful and ample provision for a recurrence of such an emergency, by providing for a new Federal Convention, to consider reforms which should be persistently neglected by the public servants who control the ordinary method of amendment. The reader will find the provision in Article V. of the Constitution. Separated from the matter in which it is imbedded, it would read as follows: "The Congress, on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing Amendments, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths of them, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress."

Here, then, is common ground for reformers of every shade and variety of opinion and object. All the forms of individual or organized dissatisfaction may spend their strength for a century to come in beating at the doors of Congress and the State Legislatures, without ruffling the serenity of the powers that be, so long as these know that there is no union of popular desire for any particular reform. But a concentration of all these separate efforts, with the one purpose of forcing the State Legislatures to demand a Federal Convention from Congress, would wear a very different aspect, both to the powers that be and to the people behind them. If there really are, as we believe there are, evils that demand correction, the struggle would be a brief one. The first election after a refusal would bring the Legislatures to a surrender at discretion.

It is not difficult to see the advantages with which a Federal

Convention would approach our present difficulties. It would be a body entirely freed from the embarrassments or excuses of other work, and constituted for the special purpose of considering the imperfections of governmental machinery, eliminating small evils and unavailable remedies, and settling finally upon the serious evils and their appropriate modes of relief. It can, in this respect, do easily and well a work to which every other agent is incompetent.

Nor is it any more difficult to see with what weight the recommendations of such a body would come to the State Legislatures or conventions. They would have passed from the domain of "theory" to that of "practical politics," and it would be simply political suicide for a legislator to undertake to ignore them altogether. Whether ratified or rejected, they would at least compel that immediate attention which will never be given by Congress or by the State Legislatures to the most earnest efforts of scattered organizations or of individual citizens, without unity of purpose or concert of action. The Federal Convention is the nation's proper mouthpiece for its recommendations to the States.

It is in the highest degree improbable that the amendments proposed by such a Convention would be radical. Radical changes are not needed. The Constitution, in its true intent, suits and fits the people as well to-day as in 1787. The Convention's work would be mainly to clean the wheels, and its propositions would rather be declarative of the Constitution's true intent than remedial of its defects. Above all, the changes which the Convention might propose must be such as could successfully pass the ordeal of ratification by three fourths of the States; and this alone would be a sufficient guaranty of safety. There are, however, some changes which the material advancement of the country would bring prominently before a Federal Convention for consideration; and it seems advisable to suggest some of them here, as at least a *raison d'être* for the Convention itself.

(1) Congress has thrown the electoral system completely out of gear. It has asserted a *hiatus* of its own invention; it has claimed that, as no authority was given to any one to count the electoral votes, it had at least as good a right to do so as any

other agent; and then, by transforming "count" into "canvass," it has assumed to itself a control over the whole electoral system which was first suggested in 1817 only to be rejected, was established in 1821, and has grown more dangerous the more it has been exercised. The "electoral count" has been for sixty years an utterly lawless count, subject only to the partisan will of whatever party controls Congress, or to chance, if Congress be divided. Even the Hoar bill (or Edmunds bill) retains to Congress, in certain cases, this vicious power to "canvass," to which Congress has no more constitutional right than has the Chamber of Commerce of New York City. If the intent of the Constitution is to be followed, Congress should be compelled in plain terms to give up its asserted power to canvass the electoral votes, leave the choice of electors to the States, and pass only general, not special, laws to govern the final canvass of the votes by the President of the Senate. The Constitution meant to concentrate responsibility, not to divide it.

(2) Congress might be restricted to some extent in the matter of special legislation. No one can examine the Statutes at Large, from 1874 until 1881, as recently collected, without asking himself: "Is it for this that the country has paid nearly \$2,000,000 a year in Congressional salaries alone, in addition to mileage, 'stationery,' and the pay of a strong battalion of clerks, stenographers, and other employees?" In the whole mass of these eight years' legislation, there is but a corporal's guard of statutes of national importance, outside of the appropriations and the acts for the government of the Territories; and even these latter are packed with clauses interesting only to individual Congressmen and a very few of their constituents. There are experienced parliamentarians in each House, and in each party, who could undoubtedly suggest some remedy for this evil which would not take away the powers of special legislation which Congress must exercise in many cases. One remedy, an enlargement of the veto power, will be suggested next.

(3) The introduction of "riders," or foreign clauses unconnected with the general purpose of a bill, was never contemplated by the Convention of 1787, or by the Constitution, as necessary to be guarded against. The manœuvre, called in

Great Britain by the name of "tacking," had been altogether abandoned in that country since the Revolution of 1688. In 1702 the House of Lords formally condemned it as "unparliamentary and tending to the destruction of the constitution of this government." In 1704 the Tory majority in the House of Commons undertook to "tack" a bill against conformity to a money bill. The majority broke, and the attempt failed; and of the 134 members who voted for it, nearly half were thrown out at the next election. This lesson was sufficient to put an end even to attempts at "tacking" in Great Britain. When the United States entered upon existence, the practice was so unfamiliar that only one State (Maryland) thought it necessary to guard against it in the State constitutions. In course of time it was again introduced as a weapon of party warfare, both in Congress and in the Legislatures; but even in 1855, when an effort was made to decrease the tariff by a "rider" on the civil and diplomatic appropriation, it was denounced as an "unprecedented" attempt to coerce the Senate. It certainly was not unprecedented, even then; but it had never been an instrument of such common recourse as it was destined to become thereafter.

The conditions of the Civil War period—a homogeneous majority in both Houses of Congress, profoundly in earnest, and oppressed by a necessarily enormous mass of legislative work—almost destroyed the moral consciousness of the essential iniquity of these "riders." Time was even more than money; and economy of time often seemed to demand the union of several distinct measures into one bill. When a two-thirds majority in Congress was called upon to do battle with the President, during the Reconstruction period, the rider was a weapon too conveniently at hand to be neglected. The words "and for other purposes" in the titles of bills became a cover for the most extraordinary conjunctions, the climax being reached in 1867, when a rider to the army appropriation bill actually deprived the President of his constitutional functions as commander-in-chief. Twelve years afterward the opposite party attempted to use the same means to compel the President to refrain from executing an unrepealed law. These two cases may serve as shining examples of a practice which has been familiar not only to every party which has controlled Con-

gress since 1860, but to every clique of the party, and sometimes to energetic and influential individuals.

The practice of course falls most heavily on the appropriation bills, for the President must sign or veto a bill as a whole, and a veto of an appropriation bill, entailing the possible stoppage of part or all of the governmental machinery, is a most serious affair. It is impossible to say how many times in the last thirty years items of barefaced rascality, which have been smuggled into a bill in the hurry of the last hours of Congress, have received the unwilling signature of the President in order to save the appropriations and avoid a special session; but the number must have been very considerable. There is a further danger which was partially thrust upon public consideration in 1879. If a majority in one or both Houses is to refuse appropriations unless the President signs a rider, it must be remembered that the President has also the constitutional power to summon Congress together in special session again and again until one side or the other is wearied out, unless impeachment and conviction or open revolution intervene. A party weapon which makes such tactics even possible is hostile to constitutional government, and only fit to be abolished by organic law.

The remedy is simple. It is only necessary to so enlarge the veto power as to enable the President to veto single clauses of an appropriation bill, while approving the remainder. The following provision from the Confederate States' Constitution may serve as an example of the manner: "The President may approve any appropriation and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill. In such case he shall, in signing the bill, designate the appropriations disapproved, and shall return a copy of such appropriations, with his objections, to the House in which the bill shall have originated; and the same proceedings shall then be had as in case of other bills disapproved by the President." The principle of this remedy has since been introduced into the State constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. President Arthur took occasion to recommend it to the attention of Congress in his Message of last December; and Congress gave no more attention to it than if he had made no

such recommendation. It seems equally difficult to suggest any valid argument against it, or any hopeful means of obtaining it, except through a second Federal Convention.

(4) The principles of the Pendleton Act, in relation to the civil service, should be so placed in the Constitution as to secure all political parties from temptation, and all future Presidents from pressure.

(5) There is strong reason for giving to Congress the power to legislate, always by general laws, on the subjects of marriage and divorce. Exclusive jurisdiction over them is now reserved to the State Legislature; and our marriage and divorce laws have come to be, like other sin, a reproach to any people. The laxity of the bonds of marriage is working secretly, but surely, upon our family life; and sooner or later the effects must extend to our national life, if they have not already done so. Even from the standpoint of the individual, prompt and effective national interposition has come to be imperatively demanded. Every lawyer knows that there are thousands of ignorant women to whom the diversity of State marriage and divorce laws has done grievous wrong; that there are thousands of couples in the various States who believe themselves to be married, but are not married by human law; and that, as to thousands of others, it is difficult and practically impossible to tell whether they are married or not, and whether their issue is really legitimate. In many of the States it is positively unsafe for a new-comer, male or female, to be either married or unmarried; and the general results of this relegation of these subjects to the State Legislatures are such as no Christian man or woman can contemplate without shame.

In such a grant of power to Congress lies also the easy solution of the Mormon problem, for the difficulty in that case lies not so much in the present government of Utah as a Territory, but in the coming pressure for its admission as a State. Once admit it as a State (and the necessity for this step is yearly growing more pressing), and its State Legislature at once becomes omnipotent over the subject of marriage. The recently proposed Amendment simply prohibiting polygamy might prove a delusion, no matter what powers "to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation" were given to Congress;

so long as the State of Utah should pass no laws to formally permit or encourage polygamy, the Supreme Court might feel forced to emasculate the Amendment, as it has lately done with the XIVth and XVth Amendments. But if the proposed grant to Congress of power over marriage and divorce be made, if a record of conviction for bigamy in a Federal court becomes a bar to the holding of office as governor, legislator, or elector, it would be safer to govern Utah as a State than as a Territory, and political necessity would soon evolve a new monogamous revelation.

These five suggestions are only advanced as offering some justification for the proposal of a second Federal Convention. Of course they are not the only ones, and will seem to many by no means the most important ones that would be brought to the consideration of such a Convention. Indeed, that body would become a sort of funnel, into which would be poured the whole stream of the country's dissatisfaction; but, fortunately, the further necessity of ratification by three fourths of the States would also act as a filter, and would make it difficult for any alteration to pass the ordeal of the Convention unless greatly commended by its evident advisability. On the other hand, if any proposed alteration cannot pass the ordeal of the Convention, it must become evident to its most determined supporters either that it is defective in substance or that the country is not ready for it, and that in either case its present adoption would have had far less chance of success by the ordinary process of amendment. From any point of view it seems difficult to suggest a safer, surer, or easier method of dealing with our petty, irritating, and possibly dangerous national difficulties than this strictly constitutional method of a second Federal Convention.

No one can study the Constitution, its history and its workings, without being impressed by the keenness of judgment shown by its framers in their provision for the unknowable. It has risen superior to the disturbing influences of steam, electricity, and democracy, which have radically altered every other form of government; and it well deserves Gladstone's characterization of it as "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." But

perpetual motion is an impossibility; and it is certainly asking too much, even of a machine so nearly perfect, if we expect it to run for a century with undiminished smoothness. Some of its wheels are certainly clogged and crusted by the dust of so many years. To what agency can the work of cleaning and restoring them be more appropriately committed than to the same agency which formed them, the Federal Convention? And what year could be more appropriate for the meeting of a second Federal Convention than the rapidly approaching year 1887, the hundredth year from the meeting of the first Federal Convention? Fortunate will the country be if our descendants shall be able to live out another century of national life before feeling compelled to call upon the same agency for a similar service.

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